In  Memory  of 


**i3$  -i 


Raymond  Best 

THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


AWAKE!     U.S.A. 
WILLIAM   FREEMAN 


AWAKE!  U.S.A 

ARE  WE  IN  DANGER? 
ARE  WE  PREPARED? 

By 

WILLIAM  FREEMAN 

AUTHOR  OF 
"ARE  WE  PREPARED  ?  "  ETC.,  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


tt£U 

Fi  i     "■ 


COPYRIGHT,  IQl6, 
BY  GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


mmp  m  the  twited  statu  or  amzuca 


DEDICATION 

Dedicated  to  every  man  and  woman  who  is  up- 
lifted and  inspired — not  by  the  example  of  Peter 
who,  as  the  cock  crew,  bought  'peace  at  the  price  of 
denying  his  Master' — but  by  the  spirit  and  sacrifice 
of  Saint  Peter  suffering  martyrdom  under  Nero  at 
Rome. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/awakeusaareweindOOfreeiala 


CONTENTS 
Part  One:    Are  We  in  Danger? 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  Starving  Nations n 

II.  Why  Germany  May  Fight  Us  .         .         .40 

III.  Why  Japan  May  Fight  Us  .         .62 

IV.  Why  England  and  the  United  States  May  , 

Be  Led  into  War  .  .         .         >       77 

V.    The  Good  Faith  of  Nations    ...       91 

VI.    Their  Attitude  Toward  Us  .         -97 

VII.     Do  They  Intend  to  Attack  Us?  .     105 

VIII.     The  Nearness  of  the  Enemies  .         .         .     106 


Part  Two:    Are  We  Prepared? 

I.    The  Guards  Without       .         .         .         .127 

II.    The  Guards  at  the  Door  ....     152 

III.    The  Guards  Within  .....    165 


Part  Three:    What  Are  Our  Chances? 

I.     When  the  Spiked  Helmet  Comes      .         .  209 

II.    When  the  Brown  Man  Comes  .         .         .  218 

III.  If  the  Lion  Comes 238 

IV.  Military  Camps  or  Cemeteries  .         .        ..  246 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 


Part  Four:    Why  We  Are  Not  Prepared 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     Pacific  Militarism  for  Politics        .         .251 
II.    Inefficiency,  Negligence  and  Suppression 

of  Facts 260 

III.    Wasting  Billions     .         .         .  .     275 


Part  Five:    How  Political  Militarism  Fails 

I.    The  Minute  Men 291 

II.    The  Price  We  Have  Paid  .         .         .         .     316 
III.    Tragic  Comedy  ......     350 


Part  Six:    Will  the  Proposed  Plans  Protect? 

I.    Dealing  in  Futures — Daniels.        .         .  367 
II.    The    Wilson-Garrison    Bryanized    Army 

Plan 385 

III.    Belgium  and  Belgium       ....  400 


Part  Seven  :    What  Each  Citizen  Can  Do 


I.  As  to  Experts 

II.  As  to  Appropriations 

III.  As  to  Citizenship  Obligations 

IV.  As  to  National  Fitness    . 

V.  As  to  the  Ideal  of  the  Christ 


427 
434 
438 
443 
451 


PART   ONE:    ARE   WE    IN   DANGER? 


The  appreciation  and  thanks  of  the  author  are  due 
to  the  ranking  officers  in  the  United  States  Army  and 
the  ranking  officers  in  the  United  States  Navy  who 
have  kindly  and  carefully  verified  these  statements 
regarding  our  unprepaiedness. 


PART  ONE:    ARE   WE   IN  DANGER? 

CHAPTER   I 

STARVING   NATIONS 

DOES  not  the  home  and  family  exist  for  the 
purpose  of  protecting  and  providing  for  the 
children? 

And  does  not  the  nation  and  government  exist 
for  the  protection  and  welfare  of  its  citizens? 

Just  as  a  father  will  steal — even  kill— to  secure 
food  for  his  starving  children,  so  a  nation  will  levy 
indemnities — even  make  war — to  keep  its  people 
from  industrial  starvation. 

There  are  three  hungry  nations  in  the  world — 
and  only  three. 

The  three  hungry  nations  are :  Germany,  Japan 
and  Great  Britain.  They  are  significantly  and  re- 
markably alike  in  the  density  of  their  population, 
their  lack  of  areal  resources,  and  their  needs  of  in- 
ternational revenue.  Each  is,  from  a  commercial 
standpoint,  an  isolated  empire.  Great  Britain  and 
Japan  are  isolated  by  water,  while  Austria-Ger- 
many is  completely  surrounded  by  industrial  ene- 
mies. 

11 


12 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

The  people  of  Great  Britain  as  well  as  the  people 
of  Germany  and  Japan  are  industrially  hungry 
because  they  have  not  sufficient  materials  at  home. 
For  centuries  their  farmers  have  tilled  the  meagre 
soil  and  eaten  the  heart  out  of  their  lands;  their 
miners  have  drilled  into  the  earth  and  have  taken 
away  its  treasures,  the  axes  of  their  woodmen  have 
sounded  over  the  land  and  the  virgin  forests  have 
vanished. 

Their  people  are  hungry  for  food;  their  factories 
are  hungry  for  the  raw  products  of  the  soil  and  the 
minerals  of  the  earth;  their  ships  are  hungry  for 
the  trade  of  other  nations ;  their  banks  are  hungry 
for  over-sea  tolls.  They  must  have  nutriment  for 
their  people,  materials  for  their  factories,  products 
to  fill  the  holds  of  their  merchant  marines  and  inter- 
national tolls  to  fill  the  coffers  of  their  banks. 

Great  Britain  is  hungry,  but  Germany  and  Japan 
are  starving — it  is  necessary  to  arrest  this  process 
of  starvation  or  die. 

They  are  hungry  and  starving  not  only  for  new 
areal  resources,  but  they  are  hungry  even  for  lands 
upon  which  their  people  may  live.  In  Germany  and 
Japan  the  average  number  of  people  living  on  each 
square  mile  is  ten  times  the  number  in  the  United 
States  and  forty  times  the  average  in  South  Amer- 
ica. Of  the  world  powers,  Germany,  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  are  the  three  most  densely  populated 
countries. 


STARVING  NATIONS 18 

Density  of  Population 
Number  or  People  io  Eadi  SquareMile 

BoUvto  § 
Brazil  ■ 
Argentines 

Chile  ■ 

Russia       ■■ 

U.SA.  mm 

China 

Germany 

Japan 

QsBrftafiB 


When  we  think  of  a  densely  populated  country  bur  minds  turn 
to  China,  yet  the  average  number  of  people  to  each  square  mile  in 
Germany  is  250  per  cent,  more  than  the  average  number  of  people 
to  each  square  mile  in  China ;  in  Japan  230  per  cent,  more ;  in  Great 
Britain  370  per  cent,  more ;  and  in  England  alone  620  per  cent.  more. 
Area  data  are  taken  from  the  "Century  Atlas  "  1914  edition,  with 
exception  of  the  data  for  Bulgaria  and  Servia,  whose  areas  are 
given  as  they  existed  at  the  close  of  the  Second  Balkan  War.  Pop- 
ulation data  are  taken  from  the  "Century  Atlas"  (1914),  from  the 
"World  Almanac"  (1916),  from  "Statesman's  Year  Book"  (1915), 
from  "Government  Reports  of  U.  S.  A.,"  from  "Official  Reports  of 
European  Governments,"  and  from  "Revue  Statistique  de  l'Empire 
du  Japon"  (1915). 


(1)  Population  and  area  of  Continental  U.  S. 

(2)  Including  Manchuria,  Mongolia. 

(3)  Not  including  Korea,  Formosa, 


14 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

When  we  think  of  a  densely  populated  country, 
we  think  of  China !  Yet  the  number  of  people  per 
square  mile  in  Japan  is  230%  greater  than  in 
China;  the  number  of  people  per  square  mile  in 
Germany  is  250%  greater ;  in  Great  Britain,  370% 
greater,  and  in  England  alone,  620%  greater. 

Germany  and  Japan  are  the  only  densely  popu- 
lated countries  in  the  world  having  no  considerable 
colonial  territory  to  which  their  citizens  can  mi- 
grate.- Russia  has  immense  territories  to  the  East; 
she  is  not  even  as  densely  populated  as  the  United 
States.  All  northern  Africa — Tripoli,  Algiers, 
Morocco — are  open  to  the  people  of  Italy,  France 
and  Spain.  Norway  and  Sweden  are  not  densely 
populated. 

The  German  nationalities  have  lived  upon  their 
lands  for  more  than  ten  centuries;  the  English 
have  depleted  English  soil  for  a  thousand  years; 
the  Japanese  have  been  exhausting  their  lands  for 
six  thousand  years. 

In  one  respect  Great  Britain  is  essentially  differ- 
ent from  Germany  and  Japan.  Great  Britain  has 
millions  of  square  miles  of  colonial  territory  and 
for  that  reason  has  outside  resources  to  draw  from 
and  outlying  territories  to  which  her  people  may 
migrate.  Great  Britain  has  millions  of  square  miles 
of  colonial  territory  and  three  hundred  million  co- 
lonial population.  Great  Britain  has  abundant 
areal  resources  in  her  colonial  possessions.    Great 


STARVING  NATIONS 


15 


U,  SA    & 


HomeAreal 
Resources 


Brazil  (*> 


ik 


Argentine    Ch/A 
Boliv/o 


Germany 
Japan  I 
Gp Britain 

i_ 


1.  Areal  resources  of  Continental  United  States  only. 

2.  Reduced  27  per  cent,  to  make  allowance  for  lands  uninhabitable 
and  at  present  of  little  commercial  value. 


16 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Britain  has  abundant  trade  with  the  people  of  her 
own  colonies.  There  is  little  danger,  therefore, 
that  Great  Britain  would  ever  make  war  upon  us 
for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  our  territory  or  se- 
curing our  trade  unless  we  seriously  interfered 
with  her  trade  with  her  own  colonies. 

There  are  two  great  storehouses  of  wealth — 
North  and  South  America — eleven  million  square 
miles  of  land — grazing  meadows,  cereal  lands,  vir- 
gin forests,  mineral  riches — to  supply  the  needs  of 
this  century. 

These  storehouses  are  filled  with  everything  the 
starving  nations  need.  The  per  capita  areal  re- 
sources of  the  United  States  alone  are  eleven  times 
the  per  capita  areal  resources  of  Germany,  Japan 
or  Great  Britain.  Moreover,  the  areal  resources 
of  the  three  hungry  nations  have  been  worked  over, 
dug  out,  depleted  and  exhausted  for  a  thousand 
years. 

And  if  the  Americas  refuse  to  allow  themselves 
to  be  politely  robbed  by  commercial  dictation — 
then  the  starving  nations  will  fight.  They  will  at- 
tempt to  compel  the  Americas  by  force  of  arms,  if 
necessary,  to  give  up  the  wealth  of  their  storehouses 
— they  will  attempt  by  war  to  force  the  Americas 
to  pay  commercial  tribute  for  generations  to  come. 

They  will  do  so  because  areal  resources  are  es- 
sentially important  as  the  basis  of  wealth.  Bank- 
ing wealth  depends   upon  commerce;   commerce 


STARVING  NATIONS 17 

upon  manufacturing;  manufacturing  upon  the  ma- 
terials obtained  from  animals  living  upon  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  land,  from  vegetation  grown  upon  it, 
or  from  chemicals  and  minerals  taken  from  it. 

Individually  labour  is  an  equally  important  basis 
of  wealth,  but  differences  in  the  riches  of  differ- 
ent nations  depend  upon  differences  in  the  areal  re- 
sources. The  quality  of  labour  does  not  vary 
greatly  enough  to  vitally  change  national  values. 
The  German,  the  Englishman,  the  American,  the 
Japanese  labourer  are  each  efficient — each  has 
proved  it  by  centuries  of  existence. 

Are  there  storehouses  other  than  the  Americas? 

Other  lands  may  have  been  the  storehouses  of 
wealth  in  other  centuries  and  still  other  lands  may 
be  the  storehouses  of  wealth  in  centuries  to  come; 
but  for  the  twentieth  century,  North  and  South 
America  are  and  will  be  the  areal  resources  of 
wealth  of  the  world. 

The  comparison  of  the  great  areal  resources  of 
the  Americas  to  those  of  Great  Britain,  Germany 
and  Japan,  as  indicated  by  the  chart — "Areal  Re- 
sources at  Home" — tells  respectively  but  half  the 
story  of  the  differences  in  value. 

Considering  the  density  of  population,  the  real 
value  of  areal  resources  to  the  hungry  nations  can 
be  truly  judged  only  by  a  comparison  of  their  home 
areal  resources  per  person  with  the  "Home  Areal 
Resources  of  Bach  Inhabitant"  in  the  Americas. 


18  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


HOME  AREAL  RESOURCES  OF  EACH   INHABITANT 

The  true  value  of  the  areal  wealth  of  a  nation  depends  upon  two 
factors ;  first,  on  whether  or  not  it  is  largely  virgin  territory, 
unexhausted  by  having  supported  millions  of  people  for  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  years;  and,  second,  upon  the  number  of  people 
living  upon  the  lands.  The  home  areal  resource  of  each  inhabitant 
of  Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Britain  is  infinitely  small;  first,  be- 
cause there  are  many  millions  of  people  living  upon  tiny  bits  of 
land ;  and,  second,  because  the  land  in  each  case  has  been  exhausted 
— its  minerals  mined,  its  forests  cut,  its  soil  depleted  by  a  thousand 
years  of  occupancy. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  just  begun  to  open  up  the  vast  areal 
wealth  of  the  United  States ;  while  that  of  Chile,  Argentina,  Brazil 
and  Bolivia  is  much  of  it  as  yet  untouched. 


STARVING  NATIONS 


19 


Home  Areal  Resources 
to  Each  Inhabitant 


Bolivia 


mm. 


Brazil 


Argentine 

tyiile 


jj«-  Germany- Japan -GfBpltain 


UJA. 


20  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


THE  GIGANTIC  DEBT 

April  First,  1916 

These  figures  of  the  debts  of  the  nations  at  war  indicate  only  the 
loans,  war  credits  and  treasury  bills ;  they  do  not  indicate  the  enor- 
mous loss  of  property,  the  gigantic  financial  loss  due  to  interference 
with  industries. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  national  debts  of  the  American  nations  in- 
dicate a  proportionally  greater  burden  than  they  should.  They  do 
not  indicate  the  increasing  prosperity,  the  increase  in  gold,  the 
increasing  international  commerce,  the  increase  of  new  industries, 
and  the  increase  in  ability  to  meet  obligations. 
It  is  seen  that  the  combined  debt  of  the  nations  at  war  is  nearly 
927  per  cent,  greater  than  the  combined  debt  of  all  the  American 
nations  and  nearly  1661  per  cent,  greater  than  the  combined  debt  of 
all  the  neutral  European  nations. 


STARVING  NATIONS 


21 


Wh o  Will  Pay  llie 
GiganricDeW 


$  6Q335.00Q0OO-Debf  of  All  Nations 
a/War 
(without  Interest) 


1 

$2UJ5t,OOQ00O-Debt  of  Germany. 

Japan  and  Gr Britain 


$  SWOOQOOO-  Debt  of  All 
Neutral  Nations  of  Hie  Wo  rid 


zzi 


A.  $3,225,000,000  debts  of  U.  S. 

6.  $2,648,000,000,  debt  of  all  nations  of  Central  and  South  America. 


22 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

They  have  used  up  their  natural  wealth,  yet  they 
are  hungry — they  are  starving!  They  must  have 
food. 

They  must  induce  other  nations  to  pay  commer- 
cial tolls  or  failing  in  this,  they  must  take  com- 
merce and  resources  by  force  of  arms.  Germany, 
Japan  and  Great  Britain  cannot  pay  out  of  their 
own  wealth.  Not  only  have  they  small  natural 
resources  but  they  are  to-day  burdened  with  debts 
out  of  all  proportion  to  their  national  wealth. 

Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Italy,  Japan  and 
their  allies  were  on  April  1st,  191 6,  already  bur- 
dened with  war  loans,  war  credits,  etc.,  to  the 
amount  of  $21,435,470,(300.  The  war  loans  and 
war  debts  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and  Tur- 
key at  that  date  were  $13,992,556,000.  The  war 
debts  total  $35,428,026,000.  This  gigantic  sum  is 
the  amount  of  the  war  loans,  war  credits  and  im- 
perial treasury  bills  issued  to  carry  on  the  war. 

Moreover,  the  countries  at  war  were  heavily  bur- 
dened with  national  debts  before  the  war  began. 
The  combined  pre-war  debts  of  the  nations  en- 
gaged in  the  present  conflict  were,  in  19 13,  $24,- 
903,817,000. 

These  combined  with  the  present  war  debt 
make  a  grand  total — an  unimaginable  sum — of 
$60,335,843,000.  This  represents  the  debt  of  the 
nations  at  war  at  the  present  time;  and  the  war 
is  not  yet  finished. 


STARVING  NATIONS  23 

And  this  present  war  debt  of  the  nations  at  war 
is  not  only  equal  to  the  combined  national  debt  of 
the  United  States,  Mexico,  Brazil,  Argentina,  Bo- 
livia, Chile  and  all  the  other  independent  nations 
of  North,  Central  and  South  America,  but  it  is 
actually,  at  the  present  moment,  927%  greater. 

This  combined  debt  of  the  nations  at  war  is  not 
only  equal  to  all  the  debts  of  all  neutral  Euro- 
pean nations  but  1661%  greater  than  all  their  na- 
tional debts  put  together. 

This  gigantic  combined  debt,  however,  does  not 
represent  the  industrial  losses  of  the  war  nor  repre- 
sent the  decrease  in  revenue  that  will  be  felt  for 
many  years  after  the  war  is  closed. 

Besides  the  enormous  debt,  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria, if  defeated,  will  find  themselves  cut  off  from 
billions  of  dollars  of  foreign  trade;  and  England, 
if  defeated,  will  be  placed  in  a  like  position. 

This  war  debt  is  so  great  that  one  can  conceive 
of  it  only  in  comparison  with  other  great  sums. 

We  gasp  at  the  past  expenditures  of  our  govern- 
ment; yet  the  sum  total  of  every  dollar  spent  by 
our  government  during  the  last  127  years  for  all 
its  eleven  wars ;  of  all  the  moneys  spent  by  our  gov- 
ernment for  all  the  pensions  that  have  ever  been 
paid  for  all  the  wars  from  the  War  of  the  Revolu- 
tion to  the  Philippine  War;  of  all  the  money  paid 
as  interest  on  the  national  debt  from  the  founding 
of  the  government  to  the  present  moment;  of  the 


24  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


NATIONAL  BURDEN   OF  DEBT  TO  WEALTH 

A  comparison  of  amounts  of  the  debts  of  two  nations  is  mani- 
festly of  little  value. 

The  seriousness  of  the  burden  of  each  nation's  debt  depends,  first, 
upon  the  relation  of  its  debt  to  its  wealth ;  second,  upon  the  number 
of  people  laboring  to  pay  off  that  debt. 

This  chart  represents  the  national  burden  of  debt  to  wealth. 
Japan's  national  debt  is  $1,260,000,000.     The  national  debt  of  the 
United  States  is  $3,225,000,000.     Japan's  national  wealth,  however, 
is  less  than  ten  times  its  national  debt    The  wealth  of  the  United 
States  is  fifty-five  times  its  national  debt. 

The  national  debts  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  include  the  pre- 
war debts  and  war  debts  up  to  April  1st,  1916. 


PER  CAPITA  BURDEN  OF  NATIONAL  DEBT 
TO  NATIONAL  WEALTH 

The  seriousness  of  the  burden  of  each  nation's  debt  depends,  first, 
upon  the  relation  of  its  debt  to  its  wealth ;  second,  upon  the  num- 
ber of  people  laboring  to  pay  off  that  debt 

This  chart  represents  the  burden  of  national  debt  that  must  be 
borne  respectively  by  each  person  of  the  United  States,  Germany, 
Great  Britain  and  Japan. 

The  national  debts  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  include  the  pre- 
war debts  and  the  war  debts  up  to  April  1st,  1916. 


STARVING  NATIONS  25 

National  Burden 
of 
Debt  to  Wealth 


O.S.A. 

Germany 

GEBritafn 

Japan 


per  Capita  Burden 

of 

National  Debt  to  National  Wealth 

U.S.A.         ■ 

Germany 

Japan 

OEBnlain 


26  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

money  paid  for  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  for  the 
Gadsden  purchase,  for  Alaska,  for  Florida,  and  for 
Texas;  in  the  assumption  of  the  public  debt  of 
Hawaii;  for  the  purchase  of  perpetual  right 
to  the  Panama  Canal  and  even  the  building  of  the 
Panama  Canal — in  fact  every  dollar  ever  spent  by 
our  government  from  the  time  of  its  foundation  to 
the  present  day  for  extraordinary  purposes — has 
been  but  $14,999,490,000.  The  present  debt  of  the 
nations  at  war — and  more  than  half  of  it  has  been 
added  during  the  last  twenty-one  months — is  not 
only  equal  to  these  enormous  expenditures  of  ours, 
but  302%  greater. 

In  this  comparison  we  have  included  all  the  in- 
terest on  the  public  debt  of  the  United  States  for 
127  years,  while  the  figure  representing  the  debt  of 
the  nations  at  war  represents  only  the  principal  ex- 
isting at  the  present  time.  The  great  portion  of 
these  war  loans  have  been  made  at  4*/2%,  5%  and 
6%.  Only  one  of  them  was  at  less  than  4%.  If, 
then,  the  nations  at  war  should  pay  off  this  debt  in 
20  years — a  feat  absolutely  impossible — the  interest 
at  4%,  added  to  the  principal,  would  make  a  total 
of  $108,603,000,000. 

Inasmuch  as  the  pre-war  debts  of  the  nations  at 
war  were  increasing  even  in  prosperous  peace  times 
by  leaps  and  bounds — with  the  exception  of  Great 
Britain — it  is  recognised  that  after  this  war  it  will 
be  impossible  for  the  nations  to  pay  this  debt  even 


STARVING  NATIONS 27 

in  two  generations.  And  by  that  time,  even  though 
the  present  bonds  should  be  exchanged  for  others  at 
lower  rates  of  interest  and  all  the  other  expenses 
of  the  government  should  be  met  year  by  year,  the 
cost  of  the  debt  in  two  generations  would  rise  to  the 
enormous  sum  of  $i 56,87 1,000,000. 

This  is  an  overwhelming  burden  for  Europe — a 
debt  it  can  never  pay  out  of  its  own  wealth ! 

And  the  hungry  nations !  The  debt  of  the  three 
hungry  nations — Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Brit- 
ain— is  to-day  not  only  equal  to  the  debt  of  all 
the  American  nations,  but  311%  greater;  it  is 
607%  greater  than  all  the  debts  of  all  neutral 
Europe! 

Moreover,  the  wealth  areas  of  the  three  hungry 
nations  is  less  than  one-half  of  one  million  square 
miles,  while  the  wealth  areas  of  the  American  na- 
tions is  more  than  eleven  million  square  miles. 

The  combined  population  of  Germany,  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  is  almost  equal 
to  that  of  all  South  America,  of  Central  America 
and  of  the  United  States.  But  every  hundred  peo- 
ple of  the  three  hungry  nations  are  burdened  on  an 
average  with  a  national  debt  mortgage  of  $14,816, 
while  every  hundred  people  of  the  American  na- 
tions are  burdened  on  an  average  with  but  $3,300. 
Moreover,  the  national  debt  mortgage  of  the  three 
hungry  nations  on  each  square  mile  of  their  lands  is 
$50,314,  while  the  average  national  debt  mortgage 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


The  Overwhelming  Burden 

Interest  Must  Also  Be  Paid 


$60,335,000,000 
Debt j  of  | 
Nations  at  Ward* 
April  /,  1916 


$108,603,000,000 
Debts 
with  Interest 
U°/o-20year<s® 


i.  Pre-war  debts,  war  debts,  loans  and  treasury  bills  issued  to 
carry  on  the  war. 

2.  The  debt  of  the  nations  at  war,  with  interest  at  4  per  cent. 
Interest  at  4  per  cent,  is  a  low  estimate.  All  loans  have  been  made 
at  4,  5  and  6  per  cent.,  with  the  exception  of  one  loan— Great 
Britain's  first  one; 


STARVING  NATIONS 


29 


The  Overwhelming  Burden 

Interest  Must  Also  Be  Paid 


$>156,S7iOOO.OOO 
Debt 
witt)  Interest 
t/%-yOyrs 


I 

$  QS.265.00Q000  (n 
Interest  alone 
each  20  years 
att/% 


$  3t600t00Q000 
Great  Britain's  DeDf 
before  the  War-  w 


i.  The  interest  per  generation  is  835  per  cent,  greater  than  the 
entire  combined  debts  of  Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Britain  before 
the  war. 

2.  This  was  considered  so  large  before  the  war  that  statesmen 
never  expected  Great  Britain  to  pay  the  principal  in  full. 


30 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


National  Debt  Mortgage 

on  Each  100  People 


$iH8t6- Germany.  Japan  onctQrBr/fa/n 


$3.3/8'Amcrfcan  Nations 


The  governments  of  Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Britain  have  placed 
an  average  mortgage  of  $148  on  each  individual — every  man,  woman 
or  child;  while  each  man,  woman  or  child  of  the  American  nations 
is  burdened  with  an  average  governmental  debt  of  but  $33. 
The  average  national  debt  mortgage  of  Germany,  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  to  each  man,  woman  or  child  is  348  per  cent,  greater  than 
that  of  the  American  nations. 


STARVING  NATIONS 


Notional  Debt  Mortgage 
on  Each  Square  Mile 


$  50.3  m -Germany,  Japan 
and  Gr  BrJ/a/n 


$525 -American  Nations 


The  governments  of  Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Britain  have  bur- 
dened every  acre  of  their  home  lands  with  an  average  debt  mort- 
gage of  78  dollars. 

Each  acre  of  the  lands  of  the  American  nations  is  burdened  with 
a  national  debt  mortgage  of  but  82  cents. 

The  average  national  debt  mortgage  of  Germany,  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  on  every  square  mile  of  their  home  lands  is  9,485  per  cent. 
greater  than  that  of  the  American  nations. 


82 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

of  the  American  nations  on  each  square  mile  of 
their  lands  is  but  $525. 

Germany  may  have  some  portions  of  central  and 
southern  Africa  and  Japan  will  have  China  from 
which  to  draw  revenue  after  the  war.  These  coun- 
tries offer  wonderful  possibilities  for  the  century 
to  come.  They  would  offer  great  possibilities  for 
the  present,  if  Germany  and  Japan  should  have 
billions  of  dollars  of  cash  at  the  close  of  the  war 
to  develop  them,  build  railways,  colonise  and  wait 
two  or  three  generations  for  the  profits  from  such 
enterprises. 

But  burdened  by  a  debt  607%  greater  than  all  the 
combined  debts  of  all  neutral  Europe,  can  they  wait 
a  generation  for  the  results? 

Can  Germany  and  Japan,  especially,  turn  for 
ready  cash  at  the  close  of  the  present  struggle  to 
the  other  nations  at  war?  Austria  in  proportion 
to  her  wealth  will  be  more  heavily  burdened  than 
Germany.  France  even  before  the  war  had  the 
largest  national  debt  in  the  world.  It  will  take  a 
generation  for  Russia  to  readjust  her  finances.  In 
fact,  the  combined  debt  of  the  nations  at  war,  ex- 
cepting Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  is  al- 
ready 149%  of  the  combined  debt  of  Germany, 
Japan  and  Great  Britain.  The  three  hungry  na- 
tions cannot  turn  to  other  nations  now  at  war  for 
the  payment  of  immediate  indemnities. 

And  evidently  no  group  of  the  warring  European 


STARVING  NATIONS  83 

WHO  WILL  HAVE  THE  WEALTH  TO  PAY  THE  DEBT? 

We  gasp  at  the  burden  the  nations  at  war  have  piled  up  for  them- 
selves— billions  and  billions  of  dollars  of  debt.  We  know  they 
cannot  pay  it  out  of  their  own  areal  resources.  We  realize  that 
the  wealth  free  from  debt  of  all  neutral  European  nations  is  less 
per  million  people  than  that  of  the  nations  at  war,  burdened  as 
they  are  with  great  debts. 

Before  the  war  England,  Germany  and  Japan  might  have  turned 
to  Africa  and  China,  even  though  billions  of  free  wealth  are  re- 
quired to  develop  those  countries.  After  the  war,  however,  they 
will  not  have  the  billions  of  wealth  free  for  investment. 
The  American  nations  are  the  only  ones  that  have  developed  wealth 
immediately  available.  Their  per  capita  wealth  free  from  national 
debt  is  304  per  cent  of  the  free  per  capita  wealth  of  the  nations 
at  war,  323  per  cent,  of  the  free  per  capital  wealth  of  the  European 
nations,  2866  per  cent,  of  the  free  per  capita  wealth  of  China. 


81 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Who  Will  Have  The  Wealth 
Necessary  To  Pay 
IheDebt 


Naf/ona/  Wealth  free 
from 
National  Debt 
April  1 19 16 
per  1,000,000 people. 


All 
^Amertcan 
Nations 
t(6W,00Q0O0 


All 
Nations 
at  War 
$537,000,000 


All 
Neutral 
Eopopean 
Nal/onj 
Chtna  $505,000,000 

$57,000,000 1 
I  1 


STARVING  NATIONS 


35 


Who  Win  Have  Land 
To  Yield  The  Wealth 

Notional  Area!  Resources 
per  (000,000  people 


All 

American 
Nations 


All  All  Neutral 

Nations  European 

at  War    Germany  c/1/na  Nations 
Japan 
Gr.  Britain 

2,900 


64000 

Jg.mil. 


36  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

nations,  even  though  emerging  from  the  present 
war  successfully,  can  secure  indemnities  or  find 
sufficient  wealth  in  neutral  European  nations  to 
save  themselves. 

But  the  treasure  nations  of  the  world — having 
areal  riches  of  23  units  compared  to  the  1  unit  of 
the  hungry  nations — are  burdened  with  a  debt  only 
24%  of  that  of  the  three  hungry  nations. 

Our  North  and  South  American  home  areal  re- 
sources are  2,200%  greater  than  the  home  areal 
resources  of  the  three  hungry  nations  and  our 
North  and  South  American  debts  are  but  one- fourth 
t>f  their  debts.  And  North  and  South  America  are 
the  only  portions  of  all  the  lightly  burdened  treasure 
lands  that  are  sufficiently  developed  to  be  able  to 
furnish  international  revenue  to  the  hungry  nations 
without  the  expenditure  of  billions  of  dollars. 

Can  any  sane  man  doubt  that  the  hungry  na- 
tions— burdened  with  this  debt,  living  on  depleted 
lands  exhausted  of  their  natural  resources,  sup- 
porting the  densest  populations  in  the  world — will 
not  come  to  the  Americas,  the  unprotected  store- 
houses of  wealth  of  the  Twentieth  Century? 

Germany,  Japan  or  Great  Britain  will  not — either 
separate  or  combined — make  an  attack  upon  us  be- 
cause of  mere  desire  to  make  war.  Each  German, 
Japanese  or  English  family  is  just  as  adverse  to 
losing  its  sons  and  father  on  the  battlefield  as  is 
the  American  family.     The  governments  of  Ger- 


STARVING  NATIONS  37 

many  and  Japan  will  not  attack  us  because  of  hatred 
or  because  of  viciousness  but  because  of  absolute 
necessity.  If  they  come  they  will  come  because 
economic  conditions  force  them  to  take  our  treas- 
ures in  order  to  keep  their  people  from  industrial 
starvation. 

We  should  not  blame  them ! 

We,  under  similar  conditions,  would  probably  go 
to  other  nations  just  as  Germany  and  Japan  must 
come  to  us. 

Because  of  the  commerce  of  the  Americans  who 
had  settled  in  Texas  previous  to  1846,  we  sup- 
ported their  declaration  of  independence  and  took 
Texas  from  Mexico;  because  of  the  commercial 
interests  of  the  American  sugar  planters  who  had 
established  themselves  in  Hawaii  we  supported  their 
revolution,  dethroned  the  native  queen,  and  an-, 
nexed  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

It  is  useless  to  villify  the  intentions  of  Germany 
and  Japan;  it  will  be  useless  to  villify  Great  Brit- 
ain if  she  should  later  deem  it  necessary  to  take 
means  to  extend  her  commerce;  but  it  is  wise  to 
prepare  for  attack  if  we  desire  to  maintain  our 
commercial  independence,  especially  as  the  com- 
bined debt  of  these  three  hungry  nations  is  245% 
of  the  combined  debts  of  all  the  neutral  nations  of 
the  world. 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Who  Will  Be  Able  To  Pay 


Nations  at  WarzZz 
*6Q335.8tt3,000    |§ 


7SOQ000  jqm'iGJ 


^DebtsApi>iJ9IG  \ 
without  In  teres/ 

planet  Weattti- 
AreaJ  Resources 


w. 

Germany 
Japan 
GrBrJfain 
$Mt5(026,000 


y6Q00Osq.m/tej 


STARVING  NATIONS 


39 


TheAnswer 

Debts,  April  1,  1916 


□  Land  Wealth 
Area!  Resources 


Alt  Neutral  Nations  of  the  World 
Excepting  Liberia,  Persia  andJ/am 


All 

Neutral 
European 
Nations 


China 


*5tfQH6000 

$  3Q  15000  000~ 


650.000sq.mil 


All 
American 
Nations 


$5,875,800,000 


Q.  100.000  sq.mil 


CHAPTER  II 

WHY  GERMANY   MAY   FIGHT  US 

SUPERFICIAL  students  of  economics  talk  and 
write  of  the  great  prosperity  in  Germany.  It 
is  true  that  Germany  has  no  idle  class,  that  practi- 
cally every  man  is  busy,  that  every  factory  is  hum- 
ming, that  every  railway  is  burdened  with  prod- 
ucts being  shipped  from  the  factories  to  the  sea- 
ports, and  that  every  port  is  a  bee-hive  where  the 
loading  and  shipping  of  the  "made  in  Germany" 
products  go  on  night  and  day. 

"But  it  is  a  false  prosperity,  based  upon  a  forced 
system  of  taxation  and  an  increasing  national  debt, 
growing  by  gigantic  additions  year  by  year  even 
during  peace  times.  These  conditions  cannot  con- 
tinue many  months  longer.  No  other  nation  in  Eu- 
rope is  so  near  bankruptcy.  Every  known  method 
of  taxation  has  been  tried  by  Germany  with  the 
single  exception  of  the  capital  tax,  and  the  Im- 
perial Government  must  soon  impose  that  also ;  and 
after  that, — the  deluge  for  Europe! 

"I  warn  you,  to-night,  that  Germany  cannot  con- 
tinue two  years  longer  without  an  industrial  re- 
action.   To  save  herself  from  such  a  reaction  she 

40 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  41 

will  seek  war  with  some  neighbouring  power,  hoping 
thereby  to  gain  a  big  indemnity  sufficient  to  tide 
her  over  the  industrial  crisis  which  she  is  now  fac- 
ing." x 

Germany  was  on  the  point  of  bankruptcy  pre- 
vious to  the  war.  From  1880  to  19 10,  the  per  cent, 
of  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  and  in  expenditures 
for  the  army  and  for  the  navy  was  so  much  greater 
than  the  per  cent,  of  increase  in  wages  that  Ger- 
many could  not  have  continued  another  five  years 
without  an  industrial  revolution. 

During  the  thirty  years  indicated,  the  increase  in 
the  imperial  debt  was  1,223% ;  in  naval  expenditures 
was  1,054%,  the  increase  in  army  expenditures, 
127%;  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  109%, 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  European  nation, 
excepting  Austria-Hungary.  But  wages  in  Ger- 
many during  this  thirty  years  had  increased  only 

3i%. 

Germany,  then,  previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the 

European  war,  was  financially  in  a  worse  condition 
than  even  England.  The  average  increase  for  the 
four  great  expenditures  for  the  thirty  years  was 
628%.  The  increase  of  wages,  out  of  which  this 
was  ultimately  to  be  paid,  was  but  31%. 

Not  only  was  Germany  on  the  point  of  indus- 
trial bankruptcy  before  the  war ;  but,  even  with  all 
the  heavy  taxation  year  after  year,  Germany  was 
approaching  financial  ruin. 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


INCREASING  INDUSTRIAL  BANKRUPTCY  OF  GERMANY 

FOR  THIRTY  YEARS  BEFORE  THE  WAR, 

1880—1910 

The  industrial  prosperity  of  Germany  during  the  last  forty  years 
has  been  a  paper  prosperity. 

The  increase  from  1880  to  1910  of  the  imperial  debt  was  1223  per 
cent.,  the  increase  in  the  expense  of  the  navy  was  1054  per  cent.,  of 
the  army,  127  per  cent,  of  the  cost  of  living,  109  per  cent.;  while 
the  increase  in  wages  was  but  31  per  cent. 

Year  by  year  the  three  great  governmental  expenses  and  the  one 
great  individual  expense — cost  of  living — increased  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  the  increase  in  earning  income. 

Increases  in  public  expenditures  can  only  be  met  by  increased  loans 
which  must  some  day  be  paid,  increased  taxation,  or  by  indemnities 
levied  upon  foreign  nations  by  means  of  conquest 
The  prospect  was  industrial  bankruptcy. 

The  data  of  the  increases  in  the  expenses  of  the  navy  and  of 
the  army  are  taken  from  official  reports  of  the  German  Imperial 
Government  and  from  the  "Statesman's  Year  Books"  of  1880  and 
1910. 

The  data  on  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  and  the  increase 
of  wages  are  taken  from  various  German  writers  on  political  econ- 
omy and  sociology,  from  "Bliss'  Encylopxdia  of  Social  Reform" 
and  from  information  obtained  from  the  British  Museum,  the  Brit- 
ish Institute  of  Social  Science  and  the  Musee  Social  de  France. 
Increase  in  the  cost  of  living  is  not  based,  as  so  many  writers  on 
economics  wrongly  base  it,  upon  a  few  actual  necessities  of  life 
but  upon  the  average  amount  of  money  the  masses  spent  for  their 
living. 

The  increase  in  wages  is  based  neither  upon  the  increase  nor  de- 
crease of  the  wages  of  a  few  skilled  labourers  nor  upon  the  very 
small  increase  of  the  wages  of  unskilled  workers,  but  upon  the 
average  increase  of  all  types  of  labour. 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US 


43 


Increasing 

Industrial  Bankruptcy  or  Germany 

FoFltiirty  Years  Before  the  War 

1880-1910 


/223  %  Increase 
Imperial  Debt 


W5Q  %  Increase 
'Naval Expense 


~i — i 

127%  Increase 
Army£xpense 


/OP  %  Increase 
CosI  ofDWng 

V 

3/  Vo  Increase 
ofWages 

U 


44 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Germany  had  been  at  peace  for  forty  years.  In 
peace  times  nations  attempt  to  reduce  the  national 
debts  that  have  accumulated  in  times  of  stress  and 
war.  Not  so  with  Germany.  Her  seeming  indus- 
trial and  financial  progress  was  so  false  that,  not- 
withstanding the  colossal  taxes  she  imposed  upon 
her  people,  Germany's  national  debt  increased  year 
by  year  by  gigantic  sums.  The  average  increase  in 
national  debt  each  year  from  1875  to  1880  was 
$17,010,000;  the  increase  each  year  from  1880  to 
1890  was  $30,861,000;  each  year  from  1900  to 
1908  was  $69,741,000;  and  the  increase  including 
— as  stated  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Imperial  Treas- 
urer— the  deficits  to  be  covered  by  additional  loans 
was  $148,074,480  each  year  from  1908  to  1913. 

The  debt  of  the  German  Empire  previous  to  the 
beginning  of  the  war  was  given  as  a  little  more  than 
one  billion  dollars.  The  0W£-billion-dollar  debt, 
however,  was  the  indebtedness  of  the  Imperial 
Government  alone.  It  was  kept  separate  from  and 
did  not  include  the  debt  of  Bavaria.  The  Bavarian 
debt  was  listed  separately  because  of  her  separate 
army.  But  as  her  army  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
German  Imperial  armies,  a  portion  of  her  debt 
should  be  included  in  the  actual  debt  of  the  Empire. 
However,  in  all  statements  and  comparisons  given 
in  the  work,  only  the  amount  of  the  Imperial  debt 
is  employed,  unless  otherwise  stated. 

The  emptiness  of  Germany's  prosperity  during 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US 


45 


Yearly  increasing  Increases 
of 
Debt  of  Germany  l 


$W00Q00O 

Added 
Each  Year  2 


$69,000,000 

Added 
Each  Year 


*/7.ooo.ooo 

Acfdecf 
Rich  Year 


* 30,000.000 

Adcfea 
Each  Year 


1S80-/S90 


/S75-/SS0 


W00-/90S 


I904-/QJ3 


Not  only  has  the  debt  of  Germany  increased  every  year  of  each 
period  as  shown,  but  there  has  been  a  great  increase  of  the  increase, 
(i)  m  The  data  for  the  years  from  1875  to  1908  are  taken  from  the 
official  reports  of  the  German  Empire  and  from  the  Annual  Regis- 
ters for  the  years  from  1875  to  1908. 

(2)  Including  the  loans  necessary  to  cover  the  increasing  deficits, — 
as  reported  on  the  floor  of  the  Reichstag  by  the  Imperial  Treasurer. 


46 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

INCREASE  OF  NATIONAL  DEBT 
GERMANY   AND   U.    S.    1880 1914 

The  two  nations  of  the  world  that  were  renowned  for  remarkable 
commercial  and  industrial  prosperity  from  1880  to  iqio  are  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States. 

Germany  was  at  peace  during  all  those  thirty-four  years  and  a  real 
prosperity  should  have  shown  on  the  national  balance  sheets. 
The  United  States  during  that  period  was  engaged  in  two  wars — 
the  Spanish-American  War  and  the  Philippine  War,  costing  the 
United  States  more  than  538  millions  of  dollars.  Yet  the  increase 
in  our  national  debt  during  those  34  years  was  but  37  per  cent., 
while  that  of  Germany  was  1408  per  cent 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  ¥1 

Increase  of  National  Debt 

Germany  and  U.S.A. 

1880-  191H 


Germany  / 

mo8  % 


37% 


48  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

the  33  years  of  peace,  1880  to  1913,  is  best  indi- 
cated by  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  her  heavy 
taxation,  the  imperial  debt  alone  in  19 13  was 
1,408%  greater  than  it  was  in  1880.  The  signifi- 
cance of  this  is  overwhelming,  when  one  compares 
it  with  the  increase  of  the  national  debt  of  the 
United  States,  the  other  great  nation  of  the  world 
that  has  been  commercially  prosperous  during  this 
same  period  of  thirty-three  years — 1880  to  1913. 
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
carried  on  a  most  expensive  though  short  war  with 
Spain,  built  the  Panama  Canal  at  a  cost  of  hun- 
dreds of  millions,  and  pacified  and  redeemed  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines  at  a  great  addi- 
tional expense,  our  national  debt  increased  but  37% 
for  the  same  period  during  which  Germany's  in- 
creased 1,408%. 

But  even  this  comparison  does  not  tell  the  entire 
truth,  because  a  nation's  ability  to  pay  its  debts 
depends  upon  the  areal  resources,  its  wealth  and 
the  number  of  people  working  to  pay  off  that  debt. 
Germany's  areal  resources  were  but  one-fifteenth 
our  areal  resources,  Germany's  wealth  but  one-half 
our  wealth.  Consequently  Germany  had  during 
those  thirty  years  infinitely  smaller  resources  to 
pay  her  debt. 

The  more  just  comparison  is  obtained  by  com- 
paring the  increases  of  the  per  capita  national  debt 
of  Germany  with  the  changes  in  the  per  capita  na- 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  49 

tional  debt  of  the  United  States.  From  1880  to 
19 10  the  per  capita  national  debt  of  Germany  in- 
creased 4,400%,  our  per  capita  national  debt  de- 
creased 73%. 

And  now  there  is  the  addition  of  the  war  debt. 
Germany's  war  debt  for  the  first  twenty-one  months 
of  the  war  is  $9,817,560,000.  She  now  has  a  debt 
— pre-war  and  war — of  $11,011,560,000. 

Germany  has  lived  on  her  foreign  commerce  and 
must  have  immediate  money  at  the  close  of  the  war, 
whether  she  emerges  from  it  successful  or  unsuc- 
cessful. 

Even  if  successful,  Germany  cannot  immediately 
collect  billions  of  cash  indemnity  for  her  imme- 
diate needs,  either  from  England,  or  France,  or 
Russia,  because — they  will  not  have  it. 

Germany  has  lost  and  will  not  be  able  to  regain 
for  some  years  the  greater  portion  of  her  trade 
with  Russia,  with  England  and  with  the  British 
colonies  even  if  she  emerges  successful  from  the 
war.  She  has  also  lost  a  considerable  portion  of 
her  trade  with  the  United  States  and  will  not  be 
able  to  regain  all  of  it.  Factories  have  already  been 
established  here,  and  many  of  the  products  pre- 
viously imported  from  Germany  will  in  the  future 
be  made  within  our  own  country. 

Even  if  she  is  victorious  she  cannot  regain  all  of 
her  foreign  trade  within  three  years.  Her  own 
international  merchants  have  judged  that  it  will 


50 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Increase  of  Germany's  Debt 
per  capita 
I&77-19I5 


During  same period 
U.J.  per  capita  Debt 
Decreased.  73  % 


/S77 


m/ 


/886 


189/ 


JS96 


190/ 


1906 


I9IZ 


19/3 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  51 

National  Debts  Pep  Capita 
1880-1910 


Increase  per  capita 
Germany  ^00% 


Japan    ZZ7  % 


Decrease  per  cap/Id 
Gi? Britain- 40  % 


52  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

take  three  years  to  regain  even  seventy  per  cent,  of 
it. 

As  her  foreign  markets  will  not  be  immediately 
re-established  at  the  close  of  the  war,  Germany, 
even  if  successful,  will  have  six  million  men  out 
of  work,  with  nothing  to  do.  Before  the  war  these 
were  employed  in  factories  making  goods  for  for- 
eign trade. 

Four  million  men  are  now  in  the  army ;  two  mil- 
lion additional  men  are  in  training  camps  and  two 
million  more  are  employed  in  the  factories  manu- 
facturing war  material. 

Women,  as  before,  are  in  the  fields  and  have 
proved  themselves  capable  of  conducting  the  agri- 
cultural life  of  Germany  without  the  aid  of  the 
eight  million  men  now  in  the  army,  in  the  training 
camps  and  in  the  war  factories. 

With  war  over,  at  least  three  million  of  the  four 
million  under  arms  will  be  discharged. 

With  war  over,  there  will  be  no  further  need  of 
manufacturing  products  of  war  and  two  million 
men  in  war  factories  will  be  out  of  employment. 

With  her  foreign  trade  cut  off  and  at  least 
seventy  per  cent,  of  her  foreign  buyers,  not  only 
unwilling  but  unable  to  purchase  from  her,  the  fac- 
tories will  be  unable  to  reopen  for  months,  except 
under  governmental  management. 

This  governmental  supervision  of  factories  in 
Germany  would  require  enormous  capital.     They 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  53 

would  have  to  be  kept  running  at  least  one  or  two 
years  before  Germany's  foreign  trade,  according 
to  her  own  commercial  experts,  could  be  re-estab- 
lished on  the  old  basis.  Even  to  accomplish  this, 
Germany  would  have  to  flood  foreign  markets  with 
quantities  of  goods  at  cheap  prices. 

This  would  be  more  expensive  to  the  German 
Government  than  war.  At  present  Germany  is 
manufacturing  and  consuming  her  own  war  ma- 
terials; consequently  the  government  is  paying  the 
government  for  the  products  produced.  Moreover, 
the  men  now  employed  in  battle  line — over  four 
million  of  them — consuming  the  war  products  of 
the  factories — are  costing  Germany  not  more  than 
$.25  to  $.50  a  day,  but  in  peace  times  the  govern- 
ment would  have  to  pay  these  men  working  in  fac- 
tories from  $1.50  to  $2.00  a  day.  The  difference 
for  four  millions  of  men  is  enormous.  Such  indus- 
trial governmental  operation  after  the  war,  during 
the  first  year  at  least,  would  require  infinitely  more 
money  than  a  year  of  war  itself. 

This  governmental  nationalisation  of  factories 
might  be  attempted  if  Germany  should  have  at  the 
close  of  the  war  a  billion  or  more  in  clear  cash. 
But  impoverished  by  the  war — without  the  billion 
in  cash,  with  at  least  six  million  out  of  work — what 
would  happen  in  Germany? 

Nothing  could  prevent  an  industrial  revolution 
except  another  war  with  the  certainty  of  a  big  in- 


54  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

demnity;  and  the  Imperial  German  Government 
would  prefer  another  war  rather  than  run  the  risk 
of  revolution — no  matter  against  whom  it  might  be 
necessary  to  wage  war. 

It  is  well  known  among  diplomats  that  Germany 
has  in  her  secret  archives  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse 
exact  charts  showing  that  one-third  of  our  national 
wealth  is  located  within  one  hundred  miles  of  the 
Atlantic  seaboard;  and  Germany  has  long  been 
envious  of  American  wealth  and  American  com- 
merce. 

Prince  Radziwill,  a  former  German  Ambassador 
at  Paris,  said  on  February  26,  1899:  "There  is 
another  country  against  which  the  continental  pow- 
ers should  indeed  come  to  an  understanding  for 
the  organization  of  their  economic  defence.  There 
is  the  United  States,  whose  pretensions  and  riches 
are  becoming  a  danger  to  us  all." 

Germany  already  believes  that  if  we  had  not  sup- 
plied the  Allies,  and  England  in  particular,  with 
enormous  quantities  of  artillery  and  ammunition, 
the  war  would  now  be  over  and  she  would  now  be 
victorious. 

Germany  and  Austria  both  consider  that  the 
United  States  is  virtually  fighting  against  them  by 
furnishing  money  and  supplies  to  the  Allies.  High 
officials  in  Germany  have  publicly  stated  that  any 
neutral  country  which  turns  itself  into  an  arsenal 
to  supply  guns,  military  stores,  or  food  even,  to 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  55 

the  enemies  of  Germany  is  in  "active  participation" 
against  her. 

Germany  believes  that  such  successes  as  the  Al- 
lies have  had  is  due,  and  that  whatever  successes 
they  may  have  in  the  future  will  be  due,  to  the 
credit  and  the  ammunitions  we  have  supplied  them. 
The  Crown  Prince  has  publicly  stated  that  America 
is  "already  the  enemy  of  Germany"  for  having  al- 
lied herself  with  the  enemies  of  Germany  by  pro- 
viding them  with  the  necessities  of  war. 

But  still  more,  the  Imperial  Government  at  Berlin 
by  an  official  statement  of  its  General  Staff  notified 
the  world,  October  4,  191 5,  that  it  considered  the 
United  States  as  its  enemy — the  ally  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France.  The  statement  refers  to  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  Allies  on  the  western  front  "due"  to 
the  help  of  the  munition  factories  of  the  whole 
world,  "including  the  United  States."  This  notifi- 
cation to  the  world  by  a  statement  of  the  General 
Staff  that  the  successes  of  Germany's  enemies  are 
due  to  the  help  furnished  by  the  United  States  is 
especially  significant,  being  issued,  as  it  was,  only 
twenty-four  hours  before  Count  von  Bernsdorf 
made  his  personal  disavowal  of  the  Arabic  sinking. 

If  Germany  is  defeated,  it  will  be  most  easy  for 
the  German  mind  to  conceive  that  the  defeat  was 
due  to  the  ammunition  and  money  which  we  sup- 
plied to  Great  Britain  and  France.  And  what; 
would  be  more  natural  than  that  she  should  con- 


56  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

ceive  the  idea  that  we,  who  helped  to  defeat  her, 
should  be  also  compelled  to  help  put  her  on  her  feet 
again  ? 

But  Germany  has  another  excuse  for  seeking  a 
decisive  conflict  with  the  United  States.  That  is 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Germany  is  fighting  at  pres- 
ent to  establish  a  so-called  freedom  of  the  seas. 
And  for  what  purpose  ?  So  that  Germany  may  ex- 
tend her  colonisation  and  her  trade  wherever  she 
wishes  without  interference  from  the  navies  of 
other  powers.  No  other  nation  in  Europe  is  in 
such  need  of  expansion.  The  English  do  not  breed 
rapidly ;  neither  do  the  French.  The  Russians  have 
immense  areas  which  can  yet  be  utilized,  extending 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Pacific  and  from  the  Arctic 
to  the  Black  Sea.  But  Germany  has  no  room;  she 
has  but  two  hundred  thousand  square  miles  for 
nearly  seventy  millions  of  people.  While  South 
America  has  three  thousand  four  hundred  per  cent, 
more  land  and  not  half  as  many  people. 

"But  what  we  do  want  and  will  have  is  the  Ar- 
gentine. Had  you  (the  English)  not  given  your 
moral  support  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  stood 
between  us  and  our  goal  in  South  America,  we 
should  only  have  required  half  our  fleet  to  have 
laughed  at  the  American  nation  and  their  dog-in- 
the-manger  policy."  2 

Germany  has  determined  that  she  must  have 
South  America  for  her  rapidly  breeding  people. 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  57 

Her  population  has  increased  almost  beyond  belief. 
In  1870,  Germany  had  a  population  of  but  41,000,- 
000;  in  1910,  only  forty  years  later,  it  was  65,000,- 
000,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  hundreds  of  thousands 
had  gone  to  the  United  States,  to  Canada,  to  South 
America,  to  Africa,  to  Australia,  to  Russia  and  to 
France. 

But  the  English  navy  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
have  stood  in  Germany's  path  to  South  America. 

"England  once  out  of  the  way,  South  America 
will  be  ours,  to  be  colonised  by  our  flesh  and  blood, 
who  now  have  to  go  under  other  flags/'  3 

First  to  get  England  out  of  the  way,  then  to  over- 
throw the  Monroe  Doctrine!  Hence  the  present 
war  is  an  "advance  step"  just  as  Von  Bulow  de- 
clared it  would  be,  in  bringing  about  "new  political 
formations,"  especially  on  the  "American  side  of 
the  water." 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  stated  in  the  Reichstag, 
when  speaking  of  unrest  in  Germany  and  the  desire 
for  "oversea  activity,"  on  November  10,  191 2:  "At 
the  root  of  this  feeling  is  the  determination  of  Ger- 
many to  make  its  strength  and  capability  prevail  in 
the  world" 

Germany  has  never  admitted  the  right  of  the 
American  nation  to  promulgate  or  uphold  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  She  has  taken  every  occasion  to  vio- 
late it.  At  Manila  she  tried  to  force  her  battle- 
ships into  the  bay  in  order  that  she,  as  well  as  the 


68 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

WHAT  GERMANY  WOULD  GAIN  IN  ABKAL  RESOURCES 
FOR   COMMERCE 

This  depends  upon  the  condition  that  Germany  is  victorious  in  the 
present  war;  or  that  Germany  shall  make  terms  of  peace  with 
Great  Britain  such  that  Germany  shall  be  free  to  pursue  such  a 
policy  without  interference — a  not  improbable  result  in  case  of 
deadlock  in  the  great  European  struggle. 

If  Germany  should  for  commercial  and  naval  reasons  bring  about 
a  war  with  the  United  States  and  defeat  us  in  that  war,  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  have  to  be  abandoned 
by  us. 

In  consequence  Germany's  millions  of  people  would  be  free  to  col- 
onise and  cement  their  control  over  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil, 
Venezuela,  eastern  Colombia,  eastern  Mexico,  eastern  Central  Amer- 
ica and  to  obtain  restrictive  commercial  control  of  the  international 
commerce  of  the  United  States. 

Moreover,  Germany  would  gain  in  conjunction  with  Japan  actual 
control  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

This  would  give  Germany  not  only  the  coveted  naval  bases  in  the 
western  hemisphere,  but  the  commercial  control  of  the  untold 
wealth  of  9,975,000  square  miles  of  virgin  and  undepleted  territory. 
This  is  4480  per  cent,  greater  than  that  which  Germany  has  at 
present— a  prospective  gain  worth  fighting  for. 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  59 

What  Germany  Would  Gain 

in 
Areal  Besources  for  Commerce 


60 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

United  States,  might  have  a  claim  upon  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Philippines. 

Germany  hoisted  her  flag  over  the  custom  houses 
in  Venezuela  after  she  had  promised  not  to  do  so. 
President  Roosevelt  mobilized  our  fleet,  England 
and  Italy  acquiesced  in  our  demand  and  the  German 
flag  came  down. 

Even  as  late  as  19 12,  Germany  attempted  to  se- 
cure a  naval  station  on  the  coast  of  Colombia  at 
the  very  door  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

We  may  be  sure,  then,  that  if  Germany  comes  out 
of  this  war  victorious,  she  will  not  be  as  considerate 
of  our  Monroe  Doctrine  as  she  has  been  in  the 
past. 

Germany  will  be  burdened  by  an  enormous  debt. 
She  will  have  need  of  immediate  resources ;  she  will 
not  be  able  to  regain  her  foreign  trade  quickly  even 
if  successful  in  this  war;  her  factories  will  be  idle; 
she  will  face  an  industrial  revolution,  and  another 
foreign  war  against  the  nation  that  aided  her 
enemies  will  divert  the  populace  and  promise  a  great 
indemnity  of  twenty  billions  of  dollars,  opening  the 
pathway  at  the  same  time  to  Venezuela,  Brazil, 
Argentina,  and  Bolivia,  the  combined  areal  re- 
sources of  which  are  more  than  three  thousand  per 
cent,  greater  than  Germany  has  at  present. 

And  what  would  Germany  gain  by  a  successful 
attack  upon  us?  First:  areal  resources  in  Central 
America  and  Colombia,  fifty  per  cent,  greater  than 


WHY  GERMANY  MAY  FIGHT  US  61 

all  her  home  areal  resources;  areal  resources  in 
Mexico  two  hundred  per  cent,  greater ;  in  Venezu- 
ela, two  hundred  per  cent.;  in  Bolivia,  three  hun- 
dred per  cent. ;  in  Argentina,  six  hundred  per  cent. ; 
in  Brazil,  1,500  per  cent !  Second :  the  control  of  the 
Panama  Canal.    Third :  the  Mexican  oil  fields. 

Something  worth  fighting  for! 

"We  must  at  all  costs  hope  for  the  formation  in 
southern  Brazil,  of  a  state  with  twenty  or  thirty 
million  Germans."  4 

"How  unreasonable  it  is  to  expect  that  the  com- 
bined nations  of  Europe,  with  all  their  military 
strength,  shall  remain  restricted  to  one-twelfth  of 
this  world's  land,  burrowed  into  and  hewn  over  for 
the  last  thousand  years,  while  this  Republic,  with- 
out armies,  shall  maintain  dominion  over  one-half 
of  the  unexploited  lands  of  the  world ! 5 


QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  41.     From  address  of  M.  Brown-Landone,  given 
at  Sorbonne,  Paris,  December  18,  19 13. 

2  Page  56.    Hildegard  von  Hilton,  from  letter  to  the  Eng- 
lish from  the  Palais  Augustenberg,  June,  191 2. 

3  Page  57.    From  an  official  report  of  a  German  Consul 
in  Brazil. 

*  Page  61.    Schmoller,  prominent  German  political  writer. 
5  Page  61.    General  Homer  Lee,  in  "The  Valor  of  Igno- 
rance." 


CHAPTER  III 

WHY  JAPAN   MAY  FIGHT  US 

AND  Japan! 
Putting  aside  the  "agitation  of  jingoes,"  is 
there  any  real  cause  for  serious  concern  as  to  prob- 
able trouble  with  the  rising  power  in  the  Far  East  ? 

There  are  but  three  over-populated  isolated  na- 
tions in  the  world,  each  of  which  must  control  world 
commerce  on  its  portion  of  the  globe  or  go  down  in 
bankruptcy.    Japan  is  one  of  them. 

The  conditions  which  exist,  and  which  have  ex- 
isted in  Japan  during  the  last  thirty  years,  are  now 
culminating  financially  and  industrially. 

Japan  finds  herself  commercially  and  financially 
in  exactly  the  same  condition  as  Germany.  During 
the  thirty  years  from  1880  to  19 10,  Japan's  naval 
expenditure  in  1910  was  2,292  per  cent,  greater 
than  it  was  in  1880;  her  increase  in  army  expendi- 
tures, 933  per  cent.;  her  increase  in  the  Imperial 
debt,  519  per  cent. ;  and  the  increase  in  the  cost  of 
living,  87  per  cent. 

The  average  increase  of  the  four  great  expendi- 
tures during  the  thirty  years  was  957  per  cent.; 
while  the  increase  in  wages  was  but  28  per  cent. 

62 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US  68 

While  income  and  business  taxes  are  very  much 
higher  in  Japan  than  in  any  other  country,  the  en- 
tire revenue  yielded  from  both  income  and  busi- 
ness taxation  is  but  one-tenth  of  the  national  rev- 
enue of  Japan.  Therefore  the  people  out  of  their 
wages  have  paid,  or  ultimately  must  pay — either  by 
direct  taxation,  by  higher  cost  of  living,  or  by  less- 
ened wages  due  to  business  taxation — 90  per  cent, 
of  the  enormous  sums  that  have  been  spent  on  the 
army  and  the  navy  during  the  last  35  years. 

This  drain  upon  the  Japanese  people  cannot  go  on 
forever. 

Moreover,  Japan  was  burdened  before  the  war 
by  a  debt  which  in  proportion  to  her  national  wealth 
was  greater  than  that  of  any  other  world-power  in 
Europe,  Asia  or  America.  A  nation's  debt  can  be 
paid  by  the  combined  use  of  her  wealth  and  the 
labour  of  her  citizens,  by  the  opening  up  of  unde- 
veloped resources,  by  the  acquisition  of  interna- 
tional trade;  by  the  levying  of  indemnities  upon 
other  nations. 

In  proportion  to  her  area  and  her  wealth,  Japan 
has  an  enormous  population.  The  labour  wealth 
of  her  people  is  of  phenomenal  value;  but  labour 
must  have  capital  and  resources  to  produce  the  sur- 
plus wealth  with  which  to  pay  a  nation's  debt. 

Japan's  national  debt  in  proportion  to  her  popu- 
lation is  small.  From  the  labour  standpoint,  Ja- 
pan's burden  of  national  debt  is  much  less  than 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


INCEEASING  INDUSTRIAL  BANKRUPTCY  OF  JAPAN 

FOR  THIRTY  YEARS  BEFORE  THE  WAR 

1880—1910 

The  increase  in  the  expense  of  the  navy  was  2292  per  cent,  and 
of  the  army  993  per  cent;  the  increase  of  the  Imperial  debt  was 
519  per  cent,  and  of  the  cost  of  living,  87  per  cent.;  while  the 
increase  in  wages  was  but  28  per  cent. 

Year  by  year  the  three  great  governmental  expenses  and  the  one 
great  individual  expense,  the  cost  of  living,  had  increased  out  of 
all  proportion  to  the  increase  in  earned  income. 
Increases  in  public  expenditures  can  only  be  met  by  increased  loans 
which  must  some  day  be  paid,  increased  taxation,  or  by  indemnities 
levied  upon  foreign  nations  by  means  of  conquest. 
The  prospect  was  industrial  bankruptcy. 

The  data  of  the  increases  in  the  expenses  of  the  navy  and  of  the 
army  are  taken  from  the  "Revue  Statistique  de  l'Empire  du  Japon" 
and  from  the  "Statesman's  Year  Books"  of  1880  and  1910. 
The  data  of  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  and  the  increase 
of  wages  are  taken  from  "Bliss'  Encyclopaedia  of  Social  Reform" 
and  from  information  obtained  from  the  British  Museum,  the  Brit- 
ish Institute  of  Social  Science,  and  the  Musee  Social  de  France. 

Increase  in  the  cost  of  living  is  not  based,  as  so  many  writers  on 
economics  wrongly  base  it,  upon  a  few  actual  necessities  of  life, 
but  upon  the  average  amount  of  money  the  masses  spent  for  their 
living. 

The  increase  in  wages  is  based  neither  upon  the  increase  nor  de- 
crease of  the  wages  of  a  few  skilled  labourers  nor  upon  the  very 
small  increase  of  the  wages  of  unskilled  workers,  but  upon  the 
average  increase  of  all  types  of  labour. 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US 


65 


Increasing 
Industrial  Bankruptcy  of  Japan 
For  Thirty  Years~Bef ore  flieWar 

1880-1910 


2292  %  Increase 
Naval  Expense 


993  %  Increase 
Army  Expense 


5/9  %Increase 
Imperial  Defif 


W%Cbj/ofl/v/n^T 
H  %  Increase  ol  Wages 

u 


66 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

> 

ours.     Our  per  capita  national  debt  is  $32,  while 
that  of  Japan  is  $23. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  lately  and  much 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  solvency  of  Japan. 
But  in  all  the  newspaper  and  magazine  discussion 
there  has  been  no  comprehensive  summing  up  of 
all  the  factors  that  make  for  national  wealth,  that 
make  for  solvency.  Comparing  the  wealth  of  the 
two  countries  in  billions  of  dollars  leads  to  wrong 
conceptions.  A  comparison  of  the  per  capita  bur- 
den of  wealth  also  leads  to  wrong  conceptions. 
To  arrive  at  any  just  comparison  of  the  condition 
of  Japan  with  that  of  any  other  country,  all  the  ele- 
ments of  labour,  national  wealth,  national  debt, 
population  and  resources  from  which  to  draw 
wealth  must  be  considered.  Labour  is  useless  with- 
out capital,  capital  and  labour  are  useless  without 
materials  to  work  with ;  capital  and  labour  and  ma- 
terials are  of  little  commercial  value  with  no  mar- 
kets for  the  products. 

If  we  consider  both  our  population  and  our  wealth 
in  relation  to  our  national  debt  and  compare  the 
result  to  the  population  and  wealth  of  Japan  in  re- 
lation to  her  national  debt,  we  find  that  Japan  has 
a  burden  800  per  cent,  greater  than  the  one  we 
bear.\ 

The  labour  of  Japan's  fifty-five  million  people 
could  easily  solve  Japan's  financial  problem  if  they 
had  a  sufficient  surplus  of  natural  resources  and 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US 


67 


Japan  and  Four  Slates  of  U.S.A. 

Wealth  Population 


14 States  / 
$30-BflIfon<s 

7 a/i  an 
*/.o-B//i/on<s 

Japan 
55MI/f0fJ<f 

*/<S/ate<s  / 
Z3M/n/on<f 

The  four  states  chosen  are  New  York,  a  wealthy  and  populous 
state;    Pennsylvania,   a   manufacturing  and  mining  state  of   com- 
paratively   extensive   area;    Ohio,    a    manufacturing   and    farming 
state   not   densely   populated ;    and   West   Virginia,   a   state   noted 
neither  for  its  dense  population  nor  for  its  wealth. 
A  comparison  is  here  made  between  these  four  states  and  Japan. 
The  area  of  the  four  states  is  equal  to  that  of  Japan. 
These  four  states  have  thirty  billions  of  wealth  with  which  to  pay 
their  labourers  and  to  invest  in  their  industries;  Japan  has  but  ten. 
These  four  states  have  but  twenty-three  millions  of   people  that 
must  be  fed,  clothed  and  housed,  with  wealth  of  thirty  billions. 
Japan  has,  on  the  same  area,  fifty-five  million  people,  whose  food, 
clothing  and  shelter  must  come  out  of  the  profits  of  ten  billions  of 
wealth. 


68  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

sufficient  wealth.  While  Japan  lacks  these,  the 
United  States  as  well  as  other  countries  of  North 
and  South  America  have  limitless  undeveloped 
areal  wealth. 

The  mortgage  burden  of  the  national  debt  of 
Japan  averages  $8,780  for  every  square  mile  of  ter- 
ritory, while  our  national  debt  burdens  each  square 
mile  with  a  mortgage  averaging  but  $1,065. 

Not  only  is  Japan's  burden  of  national  debt  per 
square  mile  of  territory  very  much  greater  than 
ours,  but  her  national  debt  to  each  million  of  rev- 
enue is  greater.  Each  million  of  our  revenue  must 
pay  the  interest  and  a  portion  of  the  principal  of 
$3,086,000;  each  million  of  Japanese  revenue  must 
pay  the  interest  and  a  portion  of  the  principal  of 
$4,443,000. 

Every  billion  of  the  wealth  of  the  United  States 
is  mortgaged  by  but  #17,172,000;  every  billion  of 
Japan's  wealth  is  mortgaged  by  a  debt  of 
$126,700,000. 

Our  free  national  wealth  gives  us  $610,000,000 
for  the  development  and  cultivation  of  every  ten 
thousand  square  miles;  the  national  wealth  of  Ja- 
pan free  from  debt  gives  her  people  but  $541,000,- 
000  per  ten  thousand  square  miles. 

Each  million  Japanese  people  have  but  $158,000,- 
000  capital  freed  of  all  national  debt;  each  million 
Americans  have  $1,840,000,000  freed  of  all  na- 
tional debt. 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US  69 

Every  half  million  of  our  people  have  almost  a 
million  dollars'  worth  of  capital  with  which  they 
can  work  to  produce  other  wealth.  Every  half  mil- 
lion Japanese  have  but  one-twelfth  that  amount. 

Instead  of  527,000  people  to  every  billion  of 
wealth,  Japan  has  6,395,000  people. 

Moreover,  each  million  of  our  people  have  an 
average  of  320,000  square  miles  from  which  to 
draw  their  riches,  while  each  million  of  the  Jap- 
anese have  but  290  square  miles. 

From  all  this,  it  is  evident  Japan  lacks  every- 
thing except  labour.  And  her  labour  is  useless  un- 
less she  has  more  capital,  more  lands,  more  unde- 
veloped resources.  Not  only  is  labour  useless  with- 
out wealth  and  resources  but  millions  of  people 
without  sufficient  natural  resources,  without  suffi- 
cient capital,  with  increasing  debt,  increasing  taxes, 
increasing  cost  of  living  are  a  source  of  serious 
danger. 

Japan — with  her  fifty-five  millions  of  people, 
crowded  upon  islands  not  twice  the  size  of  Oregon, 
possessing  wealth  of  but  ten  billion  dollars,  with 
a  debt  of  $1,267,000,000 — must,  to  avoid  national 
bankruptcy,  draw  her  revenue  from  foreign  com- 
merce or  save  herself  by  levying  indemnities  on 
other  nations. 

Japan  must  have  new  lands,  undeveloped  re- 
sources and  international  commerce. 

But  new  lands  and  natural  resources  alone  are 


70  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

P— — — — — — — — —  —————— 

not  sufficient  for  Japan.  They  would  be  for  a  na- 
tion with  an  enormous  amount  of  capital  to  invest. 
Japan  has  only  surplus  labour.  Consequently 
China,  which  may  become  a  great  source  of  wealth 
to  Japan  in  another  hundred  years,  is  not  now  able 
to  furnish  Japan  the  revenue  she  needs  at  present. 
Japan  must  have  international  commerce.  But  even 
ships  are  not  enough  for  international  commerce. 
There  must  be  in  the  foreign  countries  well  organ- 
ised systems  of  transportation  to  handle  the  prod- 
ucts Japan  exports  to  them,  and  thousands  of  miles 
of  railroad  to  bring  the  products  of  the  foreign 
lands  to  the  ports  at  which  Japanese  ships  call. 

China  to  each  million  people  has  but  13  miles 
of  railway,  the  United  States  to  each  million  of  its 
population  has  2,460  miles. 

China  has  but  1,290  miles  of  railways  to  trans- 
port the  products  of  each  million  square  miles  of 
area.  The  United  States  has,  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  the  products  of  each  million  square  miles 
of  area,  80,400  miles  of  railways. 

The  Japanese  would  be  quite  satisfied  with  China, 
if  China  had  wealth,  developed  industry  and  trans- 
portation systems  comparable  with  the  wealth,  in- 
dustry and  railroad  systems  of  the  United  States. 
Japan  is  looking  to  China  for  the  future — but  for 
the  more  distant  future.  For  the  present  and  im- 
mediate future  she  must  look  to  the  United  States. 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US  71 

We  alone  can  meet  the  present  needs — wealth,  land 
and  commercial  revenue. 

To  acquire,  maintain  and  increase  a  nation's  com- 
merce, and  to  prevent  other  nations  from  destroy- 
ing that  commerce,  a  nation  must  have  control  of 
the  seas  its  merchantmen  traverse.  For  these  rea- 
sons Japan  has  definitely  planned  to  make  herself 
the  England  of  the  Pacific.  She  has  definitely 
planned  to  commercially  control,  and  if  need  be  po- 
litically control,  the  lands  capable  of  yielding  her 
the  greatest  income. 

Japan  has  already  established  herself  in  Korea 
and  has  assumed  control  of  eastern  Manchuria.  As 
she  extends  her  influence  over  China,  she  will,  lit- 
tle by  little,  close  the  ports  of  China  to  our  trade. 
This  will  not  be  done  by  open  declaration  but  by 
practical  direction  and  the  operation  of  her  navy 
until  the  trade  of  the  four  hundred  million  people 
passes  through  her  hands.  When  Manchuria 
passed  under  the  influence  of  Japan  the  "open  door" 
was  banged  shut  and  locked  and  our  twenty-mil- 
lion-dollar cotton  trade  with  that  province  was  at 
once  cut  off.  If  we  expect  to  maintain  an  open  door 
in  China  we  will  have  to  fight  for  it. 

To  protect  her  commercial  control  of  the  Pacific 
she  has  developed  in  twenty  years  a  navy  second 
only  to  the  navies  of  Great  Britain,  Germany  and 
France.  She  needs  coaling  stations  for  her  ships. 
She  has  already  secured  concessions  on  the  west 


72  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

— ^ — — 

coast  of  Mexico  within  easy  distance  of  the  Panama 
Canal;  she  is  now  rapidly  fortifying  the  Marshall 
Islands,  two  thousand  miles  nearer  our  shores  than 
the  Philippines. 

She  has  initiated  a  Monroe  Doctrine  for  Asia 
and  for  the  Pacific. 

An  important  Japanese  diplomat  said  a  few  years 
ago  to  one  of  our  patriotic  American  Lord  Roberts 
— Hudson  Maxim — "Mr.  Maxim,  you  have  a  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  America  for  the  Americans;  we  also 
have  a  similar  doctrine,  Asia  for  the  Asiatics,  but 
we  are  not  ready  to  enforce  ours  yet;  and  you  are 
not  ready  and  are  not  likely  to  be  ready  to  enforce 
yours.  A  little  later,  we  shall  inquire  by  what  logic 
you  can  proclaim  America  for  the  Americans,  and 
disclaim  our  right  equally  to  proclaim  Asia  for  the 
Asiatics." 

Prominent  Japanese,  men  in  power,  have  defi- 
nitely indicated  that  they  intend  to  seize  Alaska, 
as  well  as  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines,  for  Japan 
needs  lands  as  well  as  commerce  and  naval  bases. 
Japan  has  a  population  equal  to  one-half  of  our 
population.  They  are  crowded  on  islands  which, 
all  together,  are  not  twice  the  size  of  Oregon  alone. 
At  present  each  Japanese  citizen  has  an  areal  re- 
source but  one-third  of  one  per  cent,  of  a  square 
mile  and  this  land  has  been  depleted  and  exhausted 
by  eight  thousand  years  of  use.  Alaska  is  about 
three  times  as  large  as  Japan.    After  fifty  years  of 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US  73 

ownership,  we  have  a  population  there  of  but  65,- 
000;  yet  in  ten  years,  Japan  has  sent  100,000  Jap- 
anese to  our  coast  states,  a  quarter  million  to  Mex- 
ico and  thousands  to  the  Philippines  and  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands. 

"The  earth  of  California  is  so  rich  that  we,  in 
our  thrifty  way,  can  make  immense  money  there. 
The  air  is  salubrious,  and  the  cost  of  living  so  small 
that  we  can  in  twenty-five  years  defy  the  rest  of 
the  United  States."  * 

The  war  for  the  trade  of  Asia,  western  Mexico 
and  western  South  America  and  the  war  for  the 
control  of  the  Panama  and  the  Pacific  must  be 
fought;  China  in  1895,  Russia  in  1905,  America 
in  191 5  was  the  plan  outlined  by  the  late  emperor. 
The  war  must  be  fought !  The  financial  and  com- 
mercial need  is  too  great,  the  certainty  of  success 
too  sure  and  the  prize  to  be  obtained  too  rich  to 
waver  or  change. 

Japan  now  commercially  controls  less  than  one- 
third  of  a  million  square  miles  of  area  resources; 
if  successful  in  a  war  with  the  United  States,  she 
would  be  able  to  draw  commercial  revenue  from 
three  million  six  hundred  thousand  square  miles. 

If  Japan  wins,  she  will  in  conjunction  with  Eng- 
land or  Germany  not  only  control  the  Panama  Ca- 
nal, but  she  will  have  command  of  areal  resources 
of  Alaska,  of  all  the  Pacific  Coast,  of  western  Mex- 
ico, of  Peru,  of  Equador  and  of  Chile,  as  well  as 


74  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

possession  of  the  Philippines,  Guam  and  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands. 

If  Japan  succeeds  in  making  herself  master  of 
the  Pacific  as  England  has  made  herself  master  of 
the  Atlantic,  Japan  will  commercially  control  areal 
resources  1,800  per  cent,  larger  than  her  present 
home  resources. 

Japan  is  a  powerful  nation  with  a  navy  more 
modern  than  ours  and  an  army  fifty  times  as  great 
as  the  army  of  the  United  States  with  additional 
millions  of  other  trained  men  in  reserve. 

"No  prouder  nation  exists  on  the  face  of  the 
earth,  no  nation  which  has  more  venerable  tradi- 
tions of  which  it  justly  has  the  right  to  be  proud. 
Their  courtesy  and  tact  in  dealing  with  foreign 
nations  lose  nothing  by  comparison  with  France."  2 

We  have  signed  and  ratified  an  international 
treaty  with  Japan,  guaranteeing  her  citizens  certain 
rights  in  the  United  States.  In  accordance  with 
the  expressed  statement  of  our  United  States  Con- 
stitution, and  second  only  to  it,  our  ratified  treaties 
are  the  supreme  laws  of  the  nation  and  the  United 
States.  We  have  broken  our  treaties,  insulted  Ja- 
pan by  doing  so ;  and  we  offer  no  apology. 

Not  only  have  we  broken  faith  with  Japan  as  a 
nation,  but  we  insult  her  citizens  individually.  We 
have  treated  them  and  continue  to  treat  them  worse 
than  we  treat  Koreans,  Mexicans,  Chinamen  and 
negroes.    An  American  Y.  M.  C.  A.  (a  brother- 


WHY  JAPAN  MAY  FIGHT  US 


75 


What  Japan  Would  Gain 
in 
Areal  Resources  for  Commerce 


A 

3 


If  Japan  should  for  commercial  reasons  bring  about  a  war  with 
the  United  States  and  defeat  us  in  that  war,  the  maintenance  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  have  to  be  abandoned  by  us. 
In  consequence,  Japan's  millions  of  people  would  be  free  to  colonise 
and  cement  their  control  over  Alaska,  California,  Oregon,  Wash- 
ington, western  Colombia,  western  Central  America,  western  Mex- 
ico, Philippines,  Chile,  Ecuador  and  Peru,  and  to  retain  restrictive 
control  of  the  international  commerce  of  the  United  States. 
Moreover,  Japan  would  gain,  in  conjunction  with  England,  actual 
control  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

This  would  give  Japan  not  only  the  coveted  naval  bases  near  the 
Panama  Canal,  but  commercial  control  of  the  untold  wealth  of 
2,895,000  square  miles  of  virgin  and  undepleted  territory.  This 
territory  is  1700  per  cent,  greater  than  that  which  Japan  has  at 
present — a  prospective  gain  worth  fighting  for. 


76 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

hood  without  restriction  as  to  creed  or  race)  admits 
Koreans  and  Chinamen  but  refuses  membership  to 
Japanese.  When  their  navy  visited  our  shores,  they 
invited  our  naval  officers  to  a  ball  and  showed  them 
every  courtesy;  our  citizens  in  return  invited  their 
officers  to  a  function  in  their  honour  but  our  women 
refused  to  dance  with  the  admirals  and  aristocrats 
of  the  oldest  and  most  dignified  race  in  the  world. 

Japan  is  an  old  nation,  a  proud  nation,  with  an 
unbroken  imperial  family  six  thousand  years  old; 
it  is  an  oriental  nation  that  smiles  but  never  for- 
gets nor  forgives. 

How  foolish  to  imagine — 

"...  that  Japan,  possessed  of  two-thirds  the 
population  of  this  nation  and  a  military  organisa- 
tion fifty  fold  greater,  shall  continue  to  exist  on  her 
rocky  isles  that  are,  inclusive  of  Korea,  but  one- 
two-hundred-and-fiftieth  of  the  earth's  lands,  while 
an  undefended  one-half  lies  under  the  guns  of  her 
battleships?"3 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  73.  From  a  book  circulated  by  the  National  De- 
fense Association  of  Japan,  the  present  officers  of  which 
are  reported  to  be :  Count  Okuma,  premier  of  Japan,  presi- 
dent; Baron  Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan, 
Vice-President. 

2  Page  74.  General  Francis  V.  Greene,  U.  S.  V.,  in  the 
"Present  Military  Situation  in  the  United  States." 

8  Page  76.  General  Homer  Lee,  in  "The  Valor  of  Igno- 
rance." 


CHAPTER  IV 

WHY  ENGLAND  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES   MAY  BE 
LED  INTO  WAR 

ENGLAND  and  the  United  States  have  been  at 
peace  for  a  hundred  years.  The  peoples  of  the 
two  countries  speak  the  same  language  and  the 
blood  tie  between  the  two  countries  is  very  strong. 
But  neither  blood  ties  nor  similarity  of  language 
prevent  war  when  commercial  interests  are  at  stake. 

In  1763,  the  English  colonists  of  Massachusetts 
willingly  levied«a  tax  upon  themselves  of  two-thirds 
their  entire  yearly  income  to  fight  with  the  British 
against  the  French  forces  in  Canada.  They  thus 
contributed  to  the  English  war  chest  $70,000  in 
twenty  months — an  enormous  sum  for  those  days. 
They  also  raised  an  army  of  30,000  men,  to  fight 
with  their  English  brothers  against  the  French  in 
Canada. 

Yet  only  twelve  years  afterwards  these  same 
English  colonists  in  Massachusetts  turned  and 
fought  to  the  bitter  end  their  English  brothers  of 
the  same  blood  because  the  English  brothers  at- 
tempted to  restrict  the  commerce  of  the  English 
colonists  and  to  tax  them  without  their  consent. 

77 


78 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

If  the  United  States  and  England  ever  engage 
in  war  it  will  come  about  because  of  conflict  in  world 
trade.  England's  life  is  her  commerce.  When  the 
Englishman  fights  for  the  commerce  of  Britain,  he 
fights  for  the  nation's  life. 

Twice  in  140  years  England  and  the  United 
States  have  been  at  war  over  commercial  matters. 

The  War  of  the  Revolution  was  begun  because 
England  refused  to  allow  us  to  freely  trade  with 
other  nations  and  taxed  us  for  her  own  profit  even 
in  our  trade  with  her. 

We  call  our  War  of  the  Revolution  our  war  for 
political  independence  and  our  War  of  1812  our 
war  for  commercial  independence;  but  to  England 
both  wars  were  commercial  wars. 

A  little  over  a  hundred  years  ago  England  was 
engaged  in  a  life-and-death  struggle  with  France, 
whose  military  head,  Napoleon,  planned  to  invade 
England  and  destroy  forever  England's  control  of 
the  seas.  At  present  England  is  engaged  in  a  life- 
and-death  struggle  with  Germany,  whose  military 
head,  the  Kaiser,  has  planned  to  invade  England 
and  whose  avowed  purpose  is  to  destroy  for  all  time 
English  commercial  control  of  the  seas. 

After  this  war  England,  successful  or  unsuccess- 
ful, will  be  burdened  with  billions  of  debt.  We  are 
becoming  to  a  certain  extent  the  creditor  nation  of 
the  world  and  are  taking  over  at  a  considerable  rate 
a  larger  portion  of  the  world's  commerce  than  we 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  79 

have  ever  before  handled.  As  England  views  it, 
we  are  beginning  to  tap  her  veins;  and  we  are  be- 
ginning, in  a  small  way,  to  drain  the  life  blood  from 
her  body. 

England's  habitual  attitude  is  well  known.  For 
centuries  she  has  waged  wars  for  imperial  aggran- 
disement, for  world  trade,  for  British  supremacy; 
but  England  has  never  waged  wars  for  indemni- 
ties! Moreover,  the  results  of  her  imperial  con- 
quests have  been  so  beneficent  that  her  colonists, 
even  though  differing  in  blood  and  nature  from  her 
own  sons,  have  soon  become  as  loyal  to  the  Empire 
as  Englishmen  themselves.  Witness  the  large  per- 
centage of  German-Australians  who  volunteered 
and  fought  for  England  in  South  Africa;  witness 
the  South  Africans  of  to-day  loyal  and  faithful  to 
the  England  they  fought  but  a  generation  ago. 

Has  England  absolute  need  of  retaining  her  com- 
merce ? 

In  England  during  the  last  thirty  years,  1880- 
1910,  the  increase  in  naval  expenditures  was  245 
per  cent.;  the  increase  of  army  expenditures  was 
65  per  cent. ;  and  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living 
71  per  cent. 

The  citizens  of  a  nation  must  pay,  by  direct  or  in- 
direct taxes,  the  nation's  army  bill  and  the  navy 
expenditures;  and  they  must  pay  directly  for  the 
things — food,  clothing,  shelter — with  which  to  sup- 
port themselves.    Whatever  a  nation  pays  in  the  in- 


80 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

INCREASING     INDUSTRIAL     BANKRUPTCY     OF     GREAT 

BRITAIN  FOR  THIRTY  YEARS  BEFORE  THE  WAR 

1880—1910 

The  increase  in  the  expenses  of  the  navy  was  245  per  cent.,  of 

the  army  65  per  cent.,  of  the  cost  of  living  71  per  cent,  while  the 

increase  in  wages  was  but  27  per  cent. 

Year  by  year  the  two  great  governmental  expenses  and  the  one 

great  individual  expense — cost  of  living — had  increased  out  of  all 

proportion  to  the  increase  in  earning  income. 

Increase   in   public   expenditures   can   only  be   met   by   increased 

loans  which  must  some  day  be  paid,  by  increased  taxation  or  by 

indemnities  levied  upon  foreign  nations  by  means  of  conquest. 

The  prospect  was  industrial  bankruptcy. 

The  data  of  the  increases  of  the  navy  and  of  the  army  are  taken 

from  official   reports  of   the   British   Government  and   from   the 

"Statesman's  Year  Books"  of  1880  and  191a 

The  data  of  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  and  the  increase 
of  wages  are  taken  from  various  British  writers  on  political  econ- 
omy and  sociology,  from  "Bliss'  Encyclopaedia  of  Social  Reform," 
and  from  information  obtained  from  the  British  Museum,  the 
British  Institute  of  Social  Science  and  the  Musee  Social  de  France. 
Increase  in  the  cost  of  living  is  not  based,  as  so  many  writers  on 
economics  wrongly  base  it,  upon  a  few  actual  necessities  of  life, 
but  upon  the  average  amount  of  money  the  masses  spent  for  their 
living. 

The  increase  in  wages  is  based  neither  upon  the  increase  nor  de- 
crease of  the  wages  of  a  few  skilled  labourers  nor  upon  the  very 
small  increase  of  the  wages  of  unskilled  workers,  but  upon  the 
average  increase  of  all  types  of  labour. 

The  estimates  of  wage  increase  in  Great  Britain,  according  to 
the  work  of  the  Royal  Statistical  Society  and  the  report  of  the 
English^  Board  of  Trade  Blue  Books,  do  not  give  a  correct  estimate 
of  the  increase  of  income  of  the  masses,  because  of  the  fact  that 
wage  rates  are  made  per  day  and  per  week,  while  for  thirty  years 
before  the  war  through  middle  and  northern  England  men  and 
women  were  often  out  of  work  three  days  out  of  six.  Conse- 
quently the  actual  income  earned  was  but  one-half  of  the  wage 
scale  cited  upon  which  statistical  reports  are  made. 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  81 

Increasing 

Industrial  Bankruptcy  of  Great  Britain 

For  Thirty  Years  Before  the  Wop 

1880-1910 


2^5  %  Increase  Naval  Expense 


7f%Increase  Cos!  of  Living 

65  %  Increase  Apmy  Expense 

II1 
Z7  %  Increase  of  Wages 
□ 


National  Debt 
Decreased  $121000,000 
from  mo  to  1910 
although  Great  Britain   ■ 
carried  on  the  Boer  War 

during  this  Period 
at  a  CostoftUWOOQOOQ 


82  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

creased  cost  of  living,  army  expenditures,  and  naval 
expenditures,  must  come  out  of  what  they  earn, — 
unless  the  nation  levies  tribute  on  the  commerce  of 
other  nations  or  exacts  indemnities  f  romfthem.  The 
cost  of  living  must  be  paid  out  of  the  wages  earned. 
The  army  and  navy  expenditures  must  be  paid  by 
taxes,  and  95%  of  the  taxes  during  the  thirty  years 
previous  to  the  war  have  been  paid  out  of  the 
wages  earned. 

If  the  increase  in  wages  over  an  extended  period 
does  not  keep  pace  with  the  increase  in  army  and 
naval  expenditures  and  with  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living,  the  national  debt  grows  and  grows 
and  a  day  of  reckoning  comes  sooner  or  later.  The 
increase  in  wages,  in  England  during  the  thirty 
years  period,  from  1880  to  19 10  was  only  27%, 
while  the  average  per  cent,  of  increase  of  the  three 
great  expense  items  was  127%. 

Moreover,  the  people  of  Great  Britain  were 
burdened  before  the  war  by  a  debt  of  $3,600,000,- 
000.  The  present  war  debt  up  to  April  1,  19 16,  is 
$9,222,470,000,  making  a  total  debt  at  present  of 
$12,822,470,000.  The  per  capita  debt  of  Great 
Britain  is  $312,  while  our  per  capita  debt  is  $32. 
Great  Britain's  debt  is  at  the  present  time  15%  of 
her  entire  national  wealth. 

Without  natural  resources,  Great  Britain's  na- 
tional debt,  in  proportion  to  her  wealth  and  in  pro- 
portion to  her  population  is  greater  than  that  of 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  83 

any  other  country  in  the  world  today.  Bankruptcy 
can  be  avoided  only  by  tribute  on  international  com- 
merce or  by  indemnities  by  conquest. 

England  is  a  hungry  nation,  but  she  is  not  a  starv- 
ing nation.  Her  density  of  population  is  greater 
than  that  of  any  other  great  world  power.  The 
density  of  population  in  Great  Britain,  including 
Scotland  and  Wales,  is  370%  greater  than  that  of 
China ;  and  that  of  England  alone  is  620%  greater 
than  that  of  China.  England's  few  thousand  miles 
of  territory  have  been  dug  out,  depleted,  worked 
over  for  a  thousand  years.  The  food  which  she 
raises  on  her  lands  each  year  is  not  sufficient  to  feed 
her  population  for  six  weeks.  Therefore  for  the 
other  forty-six  weeks  of  the  year  she  must  obtain 
food  from  other  nations  for  forty-three  millions  of 
people.  England  does  not  produce  enough  material 
for  clothes  on  her  own  land  to  clothe  one  hundred 
out  of  every  hundred  thousand  of  her  people. 
Therefore  for  each  99,000  out  of  each  hundred 
thousand  she  must  secure  clothing  materials  from 
other  lands. 

England  each  year  must  in  some  way  get  hold 
of  enough  money  to  pay  other  nations  for  the  food 
of  forty-three  million  people  for  forty-six  weeks  a 
year  and  England  must  in  some  way  acquire  enough 
money  each  year  to  pay  for  the  cloth-material  for 
forty-two  million  people  a  year. 

But,  how  can  she  get  this  money?    She  cannot 


84  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

dig  it  out  of  her  soil;  she  cannot  secure  it  from 
crops  raised  on  her  lands.  There  are  but  two  ways 
— commercial  tribute  or  indemnities  by  conquest. 

By  possessing  a  gigantic  navy  and  thus  being 
able  to  control  the  seas  and  protect  her  merchant- 
men, she  can  monopolize  over  sea  commerce.  Be- 
cause of  this  monopoly,  England  makes  the  Aus- 
tralians pay  for  shipping  their  wool  to  England  in 
her  vessels,  makes  them  pay  for  its  manufacture 
into  cloth  in  England  and  makes  them  pay  a  third 
time  for  the  privilege  of  having  it  carried  back  to 
Australia  as  cloth.  In  the  same  way,  by  her  control 
of  the  seas,  she  has  for  more  than  seventy  years 
induced  us  to  pay  her  to  carry  our  cotton  to  Eng- 
land in  her  ships,  to  pay  her  for  manufacturing  it 
there,  and  to  pay  her  again  for  bringing  it  back 
to  us  as  cotton  cloth.  And  we  have  acquiesced  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  in  many  of  the  southern  states 
as  well  as  the  Middle  Atlantic  States,  there  is  coal 
and  iron  and  labour,  all  the  essentials  for  manu- 
facturing cotton  cloth. 

England's  very  existence — the  very  life  of  her 
people — depends  upon  the  triple  profit  which  she 
thus  compels  other  nations  to  pay  her  because  of 
her  control  of  the  sea.  It  is  not  only  the  profit  of 
the  manufacturing,  it  is  the  profit  of  transporting 
— the  revenue  of  international  commerce  that  is 
England's  life.  Every  great  English  manufacturer 
would  become  bankrupt  in  one  month  if  his  work 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  85 

were  limited  to  the  use  of  materials  produced  on 
the  soil  of  England. 

England,  burdened  by  her  great  war  debt,  can 
save  herself  from  financial  bankruptcy  only  by 
the  levying  of  great  indemnities  or  by  rapidly  and 
enormously  increasing  her  international  trade.  It 
is  not  England's  policy  to  wage  wars  for  indemni- 
ties. There  will  be  but  one  avenue  left  to  her — that 
of  increased  commerce  with  her  colonies  and  with 
North  and  South  America.  In  energetically  push- 
ing her  trade  with  the  United  States  and  with  the 
countries  of  South  and  Central  America  and  with 
Mexico,  England's  interests  may  come  in  conflict 
with  those  of  the  United  States. 

England  and  America  will  never  be  drawn  into 
war  because  of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  England  to 
obtain  territory. 

In  this  respect  England's  need  is  vastly  different 
from  that  of  either  Germany  or  Japan,  even  assum- 
ing that  all  the  colonial  territory  taken  from  Ger- 
many during  the  present  war  should  be  restored  to 
her.  In  fact,  Great  Britain  has  a  surplus  instead 
of  a  need.  Great  Britain,  with  but  88,000  square 
miles  of  territory,  has  colonies,  dependencies  and 
dominions  of  12,600,000  square  miles.  Germany 
with  200,000  square  miles  had  colonies  and  depend- 
encies before  the  war  of  but  1,000,000  square  miles. 
Japan  with  an  area  of  about  150,000  square  miles 


86  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

has  colonial  and  dependent  territory  of  but  1 10,000 
square  miles. 

At  the  present  time  each  million  of  Great  Brit- 
ain's population  have  an  average  colonial  territory 
from  which  resources  can  be  drawn  of  280,000 
square  miles.  If  all  German  territorial  possessions 
should  be  returned  at  the  close  of  the  war,  each  mil- 
lion German  population  would  have  but  18,000 
squares  miles  of  colonial  territory  from  which  to 
draw  trade  and  revenue;  while  each  million  of  Ja- 
pan's population  has  but  2,000  square  miles  of  co- 
lonial and  dependent  territory  from  which  to  draw 
trade. 

To  her  hundred  per  cent,  of  home  territory,  Ja- 
pan has  but  73  per  cent,  colonial  and  dependent  ter- 
ritory ;  to  her  hundred  per  cent,  of  home  territory, 
Germany  had  less  than  500  per  cent,  colonial  and 
dependent  territory;  to  her  hundred  per  cent,  of 
home  territory,  Great  Britain  has  more  than  14,000 
per  cent,  colonial  and  dependent  territory. 

It  is  possible  but  not  probable  that  England  and 
the  United  States  will  ever  again  be  drawn  into 
war  because  of  international  trade  conflicts. 

Japan  and  Germany  have  not  large  enough  colo- 
nial populations  from  which  to  draw  trade  and 
revenue  sufficient  in  amount  to  support  the  home 
governments  and  keep  the  home  empires  from 
industrial  starvation.  With  England  conditions 
are  entirely  different.     Japan's  colonial  and  de- 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  U.  S.  A.  87 

pendent  population  is  about  16,000,000 — about  35 
per  cent,  of  her  home  population.  Germany's  co- 
lonial and  dependent  population  is  about  14,000,000 
— less  than  20  per  cent,  of  her  home  population. 
Great  Britain's  colonial  and  dependent  population 
is  over  440,000,000 — over  1,100  per  cent,  of  her 
home  population. 

Every  million  of  Germany's  population  can  trade 
with  and  draw  revenue  from  but  200,000  colonial 
and  dependent  peoples.  Each  million  Japanese  can 
trade  with  and  draw  revenue  from  but  300,000 
colonial  and  dependent  peoples,  but  every  million  of 
Great  Britain's  population  can  trade  with  and  draw 
revenue  from  8,700,000  colonial  and  dependent  peo- 
ples. 

Great  Britain  has  the  opportunity  of  sufficient 
trade  with  her  own  people  to  save  her  from  bank- 
ruptcy and  to  feed  and  clothe  her  home  population. 

This  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  Great  Britain 
is  the  only  great  world  power  that  reduced  its  debt 
during  the  thirty-five  years  before  the  war. 

This  war  has  freed  us  of  one  great  illusion.  Un- 
til there  is  universal  disarmament,  no  nation  can 
continue  to  carry  on  an  increasing  commerce  with' 
the  colonies  of  another  nation  or  with  its  own  col- 
onies even  in  times  of  peace  without  armed  protec- 
tion for  that  commerce.  Germany  is  waging  war 
to-day  because  she  discovered  that  she  could  not 
gain  and  hold  international  trade  in  British  and 


88 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A 

French  colonies  without  political  control  of  those 
territories  and  naval  control  of  the  seas.  England 
is  fighting  because  she  realised  that  unless  she  con- 
tinued her  naval  control  of  the  seas  and  her  po- 
litical control  of  her  own  colonies,  she  could  not 
prevent  the  commercial  encroachments  of  Germany. 
The  nation  wishing  to  control  in  the  world  of  com- 
merce must  also  control  from  a  naval,  military  and 
political  standpoint. 

England,  successful  or  unsuccessful  in  this  war, 
knows  that  she  must  prepare  for  the  future.  Her 
navy  must  be  larger  than  ever  before.  Just  as  com- 
merce in  the  Nineteenth  Century  centred  in  the 
northern  hemisphere,  so  in  the  Twentieth  Century 
it  will  centre  in  the  southern  hemisphere  with  its 
millions  of  square  miles  of  undeveloped  resources. 

To  protect  her  trade  in  the  southern  hemisphere, 
England  must  have  ready  fuel  for  her  ships  and 
consequently  naval  stations  near  the  base  of  opera- 
tions. Oil  will  be  the  fuel  of  battleships  in  the  fu- 
ture. Mexico  will  be  the  source  of  oil  for  naval 
operations  near  North  and  South  America.  In 
Mexico  the  struggle  for  the  control  of  oil  lands  has 
been  going  on  for  a  generation  and  has  lately  re- 
sulted in  years  of  anarchy.  English,  German,  Jap- 
anese and  American  interests  are  fighting  for  su- 
premacy. 

It  is  most  improbable  that  England  would  ever 
wage  war  upon  the  United  States  for  the  purpose 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  U.  S.  A. 89 

of  levying  an  indemnity.  It  is  possible  but  not  prob- 
able that  England  and  the  United  States  would 
ever  be  again  led  into  war  because  of  conflicting 
interests  in  world  trade. 

But  it  is  very  probable  that  England  and  the 
United  States  may  be  led  into  war  if  we  continue 
to  assert  that  England  has  no  right  to  protect  her 
citizens  on  North  and  South  American  continents 
and  at  the  same  time  refuse  to  take  the  necessary 
means — means  which  we  now  claim  as  our  absolute 
rights — to  insure  the  safety  of  her  interests  and 
the  protection  of  her  citizens. 

England  is  justly  world-famed  for  the  protection 
she  gives  her  citizens,  no  matter  where  they  may 
be,  no  matter  how  small  the  injury,  no  matter  how 
slight  the  insult  offered.  Even  before  the  present 
war,  her  patience  was  sorely  tried  regarding  Mex- 
ico. If  the  American  oil  interests  place  a  man  of 
their  choice  at  the  head  of  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment, other  rebels  will  again  be  supplied  with  money 
and  arms,  just  as  English  and  German  interests 
have  done  in  the  past;  and  there  will  again  be 
trouble. 

If  England's  citizens  are  killed,  it  will  then  be 
necessary  for  us  to  back  down  regarding  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  or  fight. 

May  there  not  be  possibility  of  trouble  in  the  fu- 
ture if  we  do  not  recognise  our  duty  in  Mexico  and 


90  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

do  not  live  up  to  our  highest  conceptions  of  that 
duty? 

We  have  practically  guaranteed  all  the  Americas 
from  intervention,  but  if,  in  pushing  her  trade,  in 
Mexico  for  instance,  her  interests  and  her  citizens 
should  suffer  from  anarchy  and  if  we  should  con- 
tinue to  refuse  to  assume  the  responsibilities  of  our 
Monroe  Doctrine,  England  will  intervene,  protect- 
ing her  interests  and  her  citizens — Monroe  Doc- 
trine or  no  Monroe  Doctrine. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  GOOD   FAITH   OF  NATIONS 

THE  prophets  plead  with  us  to  trust  to  the 
"good  faith  of  nations"  and  to  "make  uni- 
versal arbitration  treaties." 

It  is  good  to  "have  faith,"  but  it  is  not  wise  to 
have  too  much  faith  in  "gold  bricks !" 

We  are  asked  to  trust  to  the  good  promises  of 
nations  that  have  not  kept  and  are  not  now  keeping 
their  agreements. 

France,  England,  Prussia,  Austria  and  Russia, 
have  each  at  many  times  both  ignored  the  treaties 
they  have  signed  and  violated  the  arbitration  agree- 
ments to  which  they  were  parties. 

And  what  of  ourselves?  Are  we  willing — have 
we  been  willing  in  the  past — to  abide  by  arbitra- 
tion? 

Would  we  have  agreed  to  the  decision  of  an  in- 
ternational tribunal  regarding  any  of  our  five  great 
crises:  the  Revolutionary  War,  the  War  of  1812, 
the  War  with  Mexico,  the  Civil  War,  the  War  with 
Spain  ?  ! 

In  1775  we  were  colonies  of  Great  Britain,  inter- 

91 


92  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

nationally  recognised  as  such,  under  the  govern- 
ment of  the  King  of  England,  who  decided  to  direct 
our  commerce  and  to  tax  us  as  British  subjects. 
If,  at  that  time,  there  had  been  an  international  tri- 
bunal and  if  we  had  carried  our  case  to  that  tri- 
bunal, would  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  Spain  and 
royal  France,  all  absolute  monarchies  and  leading 
nations  of  the  world,  have  decided  in  our  favour ;  or 
would  they  have  held  that  the  English  Government 
had  a  right  to  direct  the  commerce  of  one  of  its 
colonies  and  to  fix  import  duties? 

Certainly  in  1848,  if  we  had  submitted  to  an  in- 
ternational tribunal,  our  legally  unjustified  and  un- 
reasonable occupation  and  seizure  of  Texas,  a  por- 
tion of  another  nation — the  international  court 
could  have  arrived  at  but  one  decision :  "The  United 
States  has  no  international  right  to  steal  Texas." 
Yet  if  we  had  not  seized  it,  it  would  to-day  be  in 
the  same  condition  of  anarchy  as  that  in  which 
Mexico  finds  itself. 

In  1 86 1  we  went  to  war  to  compel  some  of  our 
federated  states  to  remain  in  the  Union.  If  we 
had  submitted  this  case  to  an  international  tribunal, 
South  Carolina  would  have  admitted  that  she  had 
agreed  to  federate;  but  she  would  have  asserted 
that  she  had  never  agreed  to  remain  in  the  Union 
forever,  unless  she  wished  to  do  so.  She  would 
have  pointed  out  that  both  Presidents  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  the  two  men  who  created  the  Constitu- 


THE  GOOD  FAITH  OF  NATIONS  93 

tion,  were  themselves  of  the  belief  that  the  Union 
could  not  force  any  state  to  remain  a  member  of  it ; 
she  would  have  pointed  out  that  the  supreme  law 
of  the  United  States  is  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  which  gives  the  Federal  Government 
power  to  regulate  affairs  not  allotted  to  the  sov- 
ereign states,  but  that  there  is  not  a  single  phrase 
in  the  Constitution  that  gives  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment any  right  to  force  a  state  to  remain  in  the 
Union  if  she  does  not  wish  to  do  so.  It  being  a 
point  of  law,  we  would  have  lost  our  case. 

Before  our  Spanish-American  trouble,  we  re- 
quested Spain,  by  a  concurrent  resolution  of  the 
House  and  the  Senate,  to  recognise  the  independ- 
ence of  Cuba  two  years  before  the  explosion  of  the 
Maine.  What  would  be  our  attitude  to-day  if  Ger- 
many should  send  us  a  "request"  to  recognise  Wis- 
consin's independence  as  a  separate  little  Germanic 
nation?  Before  our  declaration  of  war  the  united 
powers  of  Europe  urged  President  McKinley  to 
maintain  peace. 

Does  any  one  dream  that  a  concert  of  European 
nations  would  have  decided,  if  the  question  had  been 
submitted  to  a  Hague  Tribunal,  that  we  had  a  right 
to  demand  of  a  foreign  nation  that  she  withdraw 
all  her  naval  and  military  forces  from  a  portion  of 
her  own  territory  ? 

Will  we  be  more  likely  in  the  future  to  submit 
great  questions  to  the  decision  of  other  nations  than 


94 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

we  have  in  the  past?  Is  the  American  citizen,  if 
attacked  and  robbed,  willing  to  go  to  court  to  sub- 
mit to  arbitration  the  question  of  whether  a  robber 
has  a  right  to  rob  or  not? 

If  the  great  powers  of  the  world,  with  whom  we 
may  soon  have  trouble,  have  shown  for  centuries 
that  they  do  not  keep  agreements,  even  when  signed 
and  formally  honoured,  what  cause  have  we  to  be- 
lieve that  they  will  do  so  in  the  future,  especially 
when  high  officials, — men  in  power  in  the  nation, 
speaking  of  arbitration  and  the  inefficiency  of  di- 
plomacy publically  state  that : 

"No  true  statesman  will  ever  seriously  count  on 
such  a  possibility  (effectiveness  of  arbitration) ;  he 
will  only  make  the  outward  and  temporary  main- 
tenance of  existing  conditions  a  duty  when  he  wishes 
to  gain  time  and  deceive  an  opponent,  or  when  he 
cannot  see  what  is  the  trend  of  events."  * 

"No  nation  should  hold  to  a  paper  agreement 
when  it  is  to  its  interest  to  take  what  it  wants  and 
has  at  the  same  time  the  power  to  do  so."  2 

If  Great  Britain  should  buy  the  Galapagos  Islands 
of  Ecuador,  fortify  them  and  thus  create  a  naval 
colony  at  the  western  door  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
would  we  submit  to  arbitration? 

If  we  presented  our  case  to  the  International 
Hague  Tribunal,  the  first  question  asked  would  be : 
"Has  the  United  States  any  right  to  prevent  Great 


THE  GOOD  FAITH  OF  NATIONS  95 

Britain's  purchase  of  islands  that  do  not  belong  to 
the  United  States?" 

We  would  answer :  "Our  Monroe  Doctrine  pro-» 
hibits  the  purchase." 

Then  the  Hague  Tribunal  ( rendering  its  decision 
in  accordance  with  international  law)  would  ask 
us: 

"What  standing  has  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  in- 
ternational lawf" 

We  would  be  compelled  to  answer :  "No  nation 
has  ratified  it ;  and  all  nations,  except  ourselves,  re- 
fuse to  recognise  it." 

As  a  matter  of  courtesy,  the  Hague  Tribunal 
might  continue  the  inquiry;  and  the  next  question 
would  be  hypothetical : 

"Assuming  that  European  nations  may  be 
brought  to  recognise  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  is  it 
not  a  matter  of  fact  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
an  indirect  reply  to  the  proclamation  of  the  Holy 
Alliance;  that  it  definitely  states  that  it  applies  to 
governments  "distinctly  different"  from  that  of  the 
United  States — that  is,  to  those  nations  governed 
by  a  king  or  emperor  who  believes  in  his  divine 
right  to  rule?  That  being  the  case,  how  can  the 
United  States  hold  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ap- 
plies to  the  purchase  by  Great  Britain  of  the  Gala- 
pagos Islands ;  inasmuch  as  neither  the  English  peo- 
ple nor  even  the  King  of  England  himself  believes 


96 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

that  the  ruler  of  the  British  Empire  is  divinely  ap- 
pointed ? 

We  would  lose  our  case  before  any  international 
tribunal. 

If  Japan  should  occupy  the  Philippines,  Hawaii, 
Lower  California,  and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone, 
would  we  arbitrate  the  question  as  to  whether  she 
has  a  right  to  rob  us,  or  whether  she  has  a  right  to 
hold  us  up  for  blackmail  before  vacating  any  one  or 
all  of  the  territories  occupied? 

Would  we  arbitrate  or  would  we  fight  ? 

Why  pretend  that  we  want  universal  arbitration 
when  we  have  not  arbitrated  and  will  not  arbitrate 
vital  international  questions  ? 

Why  place  our  faith  in  unsupported  arbitration 
— a  form  of  settlement  often  broken  by  the  nations 
threatening  us  and  a  method  of  settlement  which 
we  would  refuse  to  accept  as  a  means  of  solving 
any  of  our  own  vital  problems  ? 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  94.     Prince  von  Bulow. 

2  Page  94.  Personal  statement  of  prominent  German 
official  to  the  author. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THEIR  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  US 

THE  diplomats  and  the  government  of  Great 
Britain  are  most  polite,  doing  everything  to 
appeal  to  us ;  yet  the  most  common  phrases  in  Eng- 
land to-day  are: 

"The  Americans  boast  of  their  love  of  liberty; 
Englishmen  fight  and  die  for  it." 

"They  (the  Americans)  wish  English  gold  too 
much  to  enter  the  European  conflict  for  liberty." 

"We  pity  you,  living  in  a  land  which  places  the 
dollar  before  all  else.  Here,  we  fight  for  honour 
and  the  sanctity  of  neutral  nations,  when  it  would 
have  paid  us  well  to  keep  out  of  it." 

"Belgium  has  been  violated  and  France  raped  of 
its  richest  provinces,  yet  you,  sister  republic  of 
France  at  whose  birth  Lafayette  presided,  send  no 
word  of  protest.  Has  the  Statue  of  Liberty  top- 
pled into  the  sea?  Has  the  land  of  the  free  no 
thought  for  the  brave?" 

They  think  of  us  principally  as : 

"Money-chasers,  dollar  hustlers,  intent  only  on 

97 


98 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

supplying  weapons  of  death  to  whosoever  will  buy, 
anxious  only  to  haggle  over  traffic  and  to  protest 
loudly  at  dislocation  of  trade." 

England  condemns  us. 

Because:  Our  government  did  not  protest 
against  the  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality; 

Because:  Our  government  did  not  protest 
against  the  laying  of  floating  mines  on  the  high 
seas; 

Because:  Our  government  did  not  speak  out 
against  the  devastation  of  Belgium; 

Because :  Our  government  did  not  raise  its  voice 
against  the  atrocities  of  Aerschot  and  Tongres; 

Because:  Our  government  made  no  objection 
to  the  bombardment  of  undefended  towns  and  the 
killing  of  peaceful  citizens ; 

Because:  Our  government  has  known  of  the 
massacres  of  five  hundred  thousand  Armenians  and 
has  made  no  official  protest ; 

Because:  Our  government  refused  to  sanction 
a  loan  to  France  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  on  the 
plea  that  our  gold  reserve  was  low;  yet  attempted 
at  the  same  time  to  pass  a  ship-purchase  bill  which 
would  have  placed  millions  of  credit  to  Germany's 
account ; 

Because :  Our  government  later,  when  it  meant 
increased  trade  for  us,  sanctioned  a  loan  to  the 
Allies ; 

Because:    We  made  our  first  protest  not  in  the 


THEIR  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  US  99 

interest  of  humanity,  but  for  the  benefit  of  our  own 
trade. 

General  Wolseley,  brother  of  the  late  Field  Mar- 
shal Sir  Garnet,  writes: 

"The  question  is  not  now  whether  America  should 
or  should  not  help  the  Allies;  it  is  now  that  the 
western  continent  of  the  world  should  prove  that 
she  is  a  truly  great  nation." 

Sir  E.  Ray  Lankaster,  a  noted  biologist  and 
world- famed  British  scientist,  says: 

"In  my  judgment,  the  American  abstention  from 
war  with  Germany  is  owing  to  a  mistaken  though 
patriotic  desire  on  the  part  of  many  leading  Ameri- 
cans to  safeguard  and  increase  the  material  pros- 
perity of  their  country.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  Material  interests  can  never  be  perma- 
nently and  greatly  advanced  by  shutting  our  eyes  to 
the  call  of  honour  and  humanity  and  allowing  our 
devotion  to  freedom  and  justice  dwindle." 

"...  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  America,  hav- 
ing tolerated,  submitted  to,  and  sought  profit 
through  triumph  of  German  iniquity,  would  lose 
her  self-respect  and  her  power  to  oppose  and  de- 
stroy what  is  vile  and  injurious." 

And  even  England's  greatest  socialist,  the  lover 
of  men  of  all  nations,  the  believer  in  universal  broth- 
erhood, H.  G.  Wells,  writes : 

"At  the  outset  we  believed  that  the  United  States 


100 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

would  stand  with  us  in  the  defence  of  civilisation 
and  if  need  be  act  with  us.  Nobody  now  expects 
the  United  States  to  act,  whatever  outrages  may 
occur.  Nobody  believes  now  that  President  Wil- 
son's last  message  was  a  Virtual  ultimatum/  The 
letters  and  messages  that  come  to  Europe  from 
America  attract  less  and  less  attention.  Britain 
had  expected  from  the  United  States  the  neutral- 
ity of  the  just  balance;  she  gets  the  neutrality  of 
deliberate  ineffectiveness. 

".  .  .  We  fight  not  merely  for  our  threatened 
selves;  we  fight  for  the  liberty  and  peace  of  the 
whole  world.  We  fight,  and  you  Americans  know 
we  fight,  for  you. 

"War  is  a  tragic  and  terrible  business,  and  those 
who  will  not  face  the  blood  and  dust  of  it  must  be 
content  to  play  only  the  most  secondary  of  parts  in 
the  day  of  reckoning. 

"That  is,  with  the  utmost  frankness,  what  I  am 
thinking,  and  what  a  very  large  number  of  other 
Englishmen  are  now  thinking,  about  the  United 
States." 

Germans  believe  that  we  are  wealthy  only;  that 
we  are  unpatriotic;  that  we  are  unwilling  to  pro- 
vide protection  or  to  fight  for  our  country — and  this 
to  them  means  cowardice! 

In  Munich,  July,  1913,  I  listened  to  the  address 
of  a  prominent  German  politician.    He  proclaimed 


THEIR  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  US  101 

that  there  were  only  Germans,  Austrians,  Russians, 
Jews,  Italians,  Scandinavians,  etc.,  living  in 
America,  but  no  Americans;  that  our  country  had 
been  developed  and  our  wealth  created  by  the  Ger- 
man people  in  America ;  that  our  enormous  wealth 
was  due  to  German  efficiency;  that  the  wealth  of 
America  was  in  reality  the  wealth  of  the  German 
people  here.  Munsterburg  in  a  late  article  has  also 
suggested  that  that  which  is  good  and  great  in  our 
development  is  the  result  of  the  industry  and  ideal- 
ism of  the  German-Americans. 

Von  Biilow  emphasised  this  also  in  1906  and 
hinted  that  he  could  control  our  politics  by  the  bal- 
ance of  power  then  wielded  by  the  voters  of  the 
seven  and  a  half  million  German  descendants  in 
the  United  States. 

Speaking  of  the  American  peace  movement  and 
our  efforts  to  establish  international  arbitration, 
Prince  von  Bulow  writes : 

"With  a  child-like  self-consciousness,  they  (the 
Americans)  appear  to  believe  that  public  opinion 
must  represent  the  view  which  American  pluto- 
crats think  most  profitable  to  themselves.  They 
have  no  notion  that  the  widening  development  of 
mankind  has  quite  other  concerns  than  material 
prosperity,  commerce  and  money-making."  x 

"They  (the  Americans)  have  a  dog-in-the-man- 
ger policy.    They  are  only  rich  but  on  the  whole 


102 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

not  patriotic  enough  to  be  able  to  defend  them- 
selves." 2 

The  German  military  caste,  which  is  the  German 
Government,  has  always  despised  us;  now  they 
hate  us, 

Because:  We  have  not  succeeded  in  inducing 
Great  Britain  to  abandon  her  blockade  of  German 
ports ; 

Because:  We  have  pushed  our  cases  (so  Ger- 
many believes)  against  her  with  much  more  vigour 
than  we  have  pressed  those  against  her  enemies ; 

Because :  We  have  defeated  her  efforts  to  pre- 
vent the  manufacture  of  ammunition  in  this  coun- 
try; 

Because:  We  have  refused  to  prevent  the  sale 
of  ammunitions  to  her  enemies; 

Because:  We  have  loaned  half  a  billion  dollars 
to  the  Allies; 

Because:  We  have  attempted  to  interfere  with 
her  submarine  warfare — her  only  efficient  weapon 
against  the  British  navy; 

Because:  We  have  (as  Germany  believes)  al- 
lied ourselves  with  her  enemies  by  allowing  our  mu- 
nition factories  to  be  placed  under  restrictive  con- 
tracts of  the  British  Government. 

Professor  Hans  Delbriick,  former  director  of 
Kaiser  Wilhelm's  education  and  training;  and  pres- 
ent Secretary  of  the  Home  Office  and  Representa- 
tive of  the  Chancellor  of  Germany,  writes : 


THEIR  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  US  103 

"Their  momentary  proud  position  need  deceive 
no  one.  The  Americans  have  not  yet  stood  any 
really  severe  test." 

And  across  the  Pacific  there  is  another  nation 
that  has  "ideas"  regarding  us ! 

The  following  quotations  are  from  a  booklet  of 
the  National  Defence  Association  of  Japan,  of 
which  the  present  officers  are  reported  to  be :  Count 
Okuma,  Premier  of  Japan,  president;  Baron  Kato, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  vice-president: 

"The  Americans  are  a  race  of  what-nots;  crimes 
among  them  run  rife  to  a  steadily  growing  greater 
degree  every  year;  and  we  Japanese  are  needed  to 
teach  them  honour,  morals  and  cleanliness." 

"It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Americans  are 
a  crude  race  that  consists  of  every  kind  of  riff- 
raff blood — including  the  negro- white  mixture — of 
foreign  nations.  We  in  Japan  have  a  glorious  his- 
tory that  antedates  by  thousands  of  years  even 
the  knowledge  that  the  wild  and  Indian-infested 
America  ever  existed." 

"The  United  States  seems  to  us  like  a  huge  soup 
pot,  into  which  every  kind  of  thing  has  been  put 
in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  savoury  mess.  The 
'mess'  is  there,  we  grant;  but  as  to  its  taste,  we 
know  that  it  is  bad,  and  that  its  smell  is  worse!" 

"And  still  the  Americans  say  that  their  'Eagle 
screams  with  pride.'    Rather,  we  should  say,  it  had 


104. AWAKE!  U.  S,  A. 

better  squawk  with  shame — or  that  the  United 
States  should  adopt  some  carrion  bird  of  filthy 
habits  that  fills  its  beak  with  the  flesh  of  human 
bodies  from  which  life  had — fortunately  for  them 
— departed.  This  sort  of  a  bird  would  be  a  better 
emblem  for  the  United  States."  3 

This  is  not  jingoism.  In  no  case  have  I  quoted 
the  extremists.  The  preceding  quotations  are  from 
men  and  works  of  prominence.  The  wise  men  in 
our  own  country  are  beginning  to  realise  the  dis- 
favour with  which  we  are  looked  upon  by  the  rest 
of  the  world. 

Even  so  conservative  a  man  as  Joseph  H.  Choate, 
former  Ambassador  of  the  United  States  to  Great 
Britain,  has  lately  stated  that  "the  United  States 
is  the  most  prosperous  and  hated  nation  of  the 
world;  that  two  of  the  warring  nations  of  Europe 
dislike  us  more  than  they  do  the  men  they  are  fight- 
ing in  the  trenches ;  that  even  in  British  dominions 
beyond  the  seas  the  Americans  are  the  most  hated 
people  on  earth." 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  101.    Prince  von  Bulow. 

2  Page  102.    Hildegard  von  Hilton. 

8  Page  104.  From  a  book  circulated  by  the  National 
Defense  Association  of  Japan,  the  present  officers  of  which 
are  reported  to  be :  Count  Okuma,  premier  of  Japan,  presi- 
dent; Baron  Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan, 
Vice-President.  . 


CHAPTER  VII 

DO  THEY   INTEND  TO  ATTACK  US? 

GERMANY  and  Japan  openly  state  their  in- 
tentions and  publicly  inform  their  people  of 
just  how  the  United  States  is  to  be  conquered. 

In  discussing  the  causes  for  attacking  the  United 
States  and  Germany's  intention  of  doing  so,  Frei- 
herr  von  Edelsheim,  in  an  official  work  widely  cir- 
culated in  Germany  with  the  approval  of  the  Em- 
peror and  the  General  Staff  at  Berlin,  writes  as 
follows : 

"With  that  country  (the  United  States)  political 
friction,  manifest  in  commercial  aims,  has  not  been 
lacking  in  recent  years  and  has,  until  now,  been 
removed  chiefly  through  acquiescence  on  our  part. 
However,  as  this  submission  has  its  limit,  the  ques- 
tion arises  as  to  what  means  we  can  develop  to 
carry  out  our  purpose  with  force,  in  order  to  com- 
bat the  encroachment  of  the  United  States  upon  our 
interests." 

It  is  feasible  for  us  to  build  strong  military  forces 
to  secure  by  fighting  a  feared  and  esteemed  position 
in  the  world  such  as  we  have  attained  in  Europe. 

105 


106  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

"This  shows  the  advisability  of  impressing  dis- 
tant countries  that  believe  themselves  inaccessible 
to  direct  attack,  with  the  size  and  strength  of  our 
army." 

"As  a  matter  of  fact,  Germany  is  the  only  great 
power  which  is  in  a  position  to  CONQUER  the 
United  States." 

"It  is  certain  that  after  the  defeat  of  the  United 
States  fleet,  the  great  extension  of  unprotected 
coast  line  and  resources  of  that  country  would  com- 
pel them  to  make  peace."  * 

(The  italics  and  capitals  are  the  author's.) 

It  would  be  wise  for  us  to  note  that  the  next  to 
the  last  paragraph  of  the  second  Ancona  note,  sent 
to  our  government  by  Austria,  contains  this  para- 
graph: 

"While  the  imperial  and  royal  government  may 
probably  consider  the  affair  of  the  Ancona  as  set- 
tled with  the  foregoing  statements,  it  reserves  to 
itself  at  this  time  the  right  to  bring  up  for  discus- 
sion at  a  later  period  the  difficult  questions  of  inter- 
national law  connected  with  submarine  warfare." 

Also  it  is  well  for  us  to  note  that  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung,  a  conservative,  semi-official,  German  paper 
in  the  Rhine  provinces,  stated  on  November  24th, 

1915: 

"Few  events  of  the  war  have  caused  such  wide- 
spread or  deep  bitterness  in  Germany  as  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  after  war  was  declared." 


DO  THEY  INTEND  TO  ATTACK  US?      107 

•".  .  .  When  Germany  has  recovered  from  the 
war,  she  will  undertake  a  widespread,  well-engi- 
neered work  of  education  in  America  as  to  the  rela- 
tive merits  of  Germans  and  Britons.  //  necessary 
the  mailed  fist  mill  also  be  applied  to  American 
aberrations. 

"Meanwhile  Germany  will  show  patience  and  con- 
sideration for  certain  weak  sides  of  the  American 
national  character." 

And  what  are  the  intentions  of  Japan? 

It  has  been  previously  shown  that  the  lands  and 
areal  resources  of  China  will  be  of  great  value  to 
Japan  in  another  seventy-five  or  a  hundred  years. 
It  has  also  been  shown  that  lack  of  capital  needed 
to  develop  industry  and  to  build  the  thousands  of 
miles  of  railway  necessary  in  China,  cannot  be  im- 
mediately supplied  by  Japan.  It  is  therefore  evi- 
dent that  Japan  cannot  at  present  reap  sufficient 
wealth  from  China  to  save  her  industrially. 

That  the  Japanese  statesmen  recognise  this  is  in- 
dicated by  the  expenditures  for  their  navy. 

During  the  year  1904-1905,  the  total  appropria- 
tions of  Japan,  both  for  the  ordinary  and  extra- 
ordinary expenses  of  the  Japanese  navy,  was  but 
20,614,000  yen.  This  was  the  year  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  Previous  to  this,  however,  when 
she  was  preparing  for  her  attack  upon  Russia — at 
the  very  time  European  and  American  statesmen 


108  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

asserted  Japan  had  no  intention  of  attacking  Rus- 
sia— Japan  was  spending  on  her  navy  sums  much 
greater  than  this.  For  eight  years  previous  to  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  the  expenditures  for  the  navy 
averaged  yearly  228  per  cent,  of  what  they  were  for 
the  fiscal  year  ending  1905.  But  immediately  after 
Japan  had  accomplished  the  defeat  of  the  Russian 
squadron  in  the  East,  the  average  yearly  expenses, 
ordinary  and  extraordinary  combined,  for  the  years 
ending  in  1905  and  1906,  were  only  48  per  cent,  of 
what  they  had  been  during  the  years  of  prepara- 
tion. 

Again,  in  1907,  the  Japanese  statesmen  began  to 
prepare  their  navy  for  another  conflict.  In  1908, 
in  a  time  of  peace  in  the  Pacific,  the  ordinary  and 
extraordinary  appropriations  for  the  navy  were  not 
only  equal  to  the  entire  appropriations  both  ordi- 
nary and  extraordinary  of  the  year  of  war  with 
Russia,  but  were  actually  293  per  cent,  greater. 
Why  should  the  expenses  of  the  Japanese  after 
three  years  be  393  per  cent,  of  what  they  were  dur- 
ing the  year  of  their  naval  war  with  Russia?  The 
only  explanation  possible  is  that  the  Japanese  states- 
men then  began  to  plan  to  prepare  their  navy  for 
some  extraordinary  conflict  in  the  future. 

And  these  expenses  have  continued.  In  1912,  for 
instance,  the  ordinary,  the  extraordinary  and  trans- 
ferred funds  for  the  upkeep  and  building  of  the 
Japanese  navy  were  545  per  cent,  of  what  they  were 


DO  THEY  INTEND  TO  ATTACK  US?      109 


Japanese  Naval  Preparation 
Expenditures 


tS9Jjg96 


For  War 


/S97-M9S  IS99  WOO  190/ 


I90S  1003  190  V 


I90fy90fy907 


D 


for  War 


tSVS  /909  /9/0  (9ti  /9IS  /9I3  19/1 


In  1895  and  1896  little  money  was  spent  by  Japan  on  her  navy  be- 
cause there  was  no  special  need  for  it.     The  Japanese  War  with 
China  proved  that  Japan  had  no  need  of  a  navy  so  far  as  China 
was  concerned. 
But  there  was  need  to  prepare  for  the  war  with  Russia. 

Consequently  during  the  eight  years  from  1897  to  1904  the  average 
expenditure  per  year  on  the  navy  was  425  per  cent,  of  the  average 
yearly  expenditure  during  the  Japanese  War  with  China.  That 
this  money  was  for  a  purpose  is  proven  by  Japan's  victory  over 
Russia. 

That  conquest  having  been  effected,  there  was  no  need  at  that  time 
for  great  constructive  work  on  the  navy.  Consequently  during 
1905  and  1906  the  average  expense  per  year  on  the  navy  was  but 
48  per  cent,  of  what  it  had  averaged  each  year  during  the  time 
Japan  was  preparing  for  the  conflict  with  Russia. 
In  1907  Japan  began  to  prepare  for  another  great  conflict. 
Since  that  time  Japan's  naval  expenditures  on  naval  preparation 
have  averaged  each  year,  from  1907  to  1914  inclusive,  392  per  cent. 
of  all  her  naval  expenses  during  the  year  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
Is  it  to  defeat  the  Chinese  Navy? 

The  Chinese  Navy  consists  of  four  tiny  ships,  all  more  than  nine- 
teen years  old.    The  largest  is  of  four  thousand  tons  displacement. 
What  navy  is  Japan  expecting  to  combat? 


110 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

during  the  year  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  This 
data  is  taken  from  the  Resume  Statistique  de  l' Em- 
pire du  Japon. 

In  studying  the  finance  report  of  the  Empire  of 
Japan,  one  needs  be  careful,  however,  to  search  out 
all  the  appropriations.  The  ordinary  appropriation 
is  in  one  place;  for  1912,  it  was  40,208,000  yen.  In 
another  place  one  finds  the  extraordinary  appro- 
priation, which  is  often  not  only  equal  to  the  ordi- 
nary, but  50  per  cent,  more;  in  1912,  it  was  60,225,- 
000  yen.  Then  also,  in  very  small  print  under  the 
heading  of  finance,  one  finds  a  transfer  of  funds 
for  submarines  and  warships  totalling,  in  191 1,  10,- 
689,586  yen,  and  estimated  at  12,000,000  yen  for 
1912. 

A  true  view  of  the  enormous  upbuilding  of  the 
Japanese  navy  can  best  be  understood  by  compar- 
ing this  tiny  "tucked-away"  expense  item — the 
amount  transferred — to  the  entire  appropriations 
of  the  Japanese  navy,  ordinary  and  extraordinary, 
during  the  year  of  war  with  Russia.  This  little 
"transferred"  item  for  submarines  and  special  craft 
was,  in  191 1,  51.8  per  cent,  of  the  entire  ordinary 
and  extraordinary  appropriations  of  the  navy  of 
Japan  for  the  year  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
Moreover,  a  late  official  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, in  speaking  to  the  Diet,  urging  larger  and 
larger  appropriations  for  navy,  said  in  substance: 


DO  THEY  INTEND  TO  ATTACK  US?      Ill 

"We  must  work  night  and  day  for  the  upbuilding 
of  our  navy.    Not  one  hour  must  be  lost." 

Are  Japanese  statesmen  mere  children  ?  Are  they 
expending  on  their  navy  these  enormous  sums  in 
proportion  to  their  wealth,  merely  for  the  folly  of 
spending?  If  not,  what  other  navy  do  they  expect 
to  combat  in  the  near  future?  Japan  has  an  of- 
fensive and  defensive  treaty  with  Great  Britain. 
Japan  has,  practically,  an  offensive  and  defensive 
treaty  with  Russia.  Japan's  offensive  and  defen- 
sive treaty  with  Great  Britain  makes  it  necessary 
for  Great  Britain  to  use  her  navy  against  Germany 
if  trouble  should  arise  between  Japan  and  Germany. 

But  there  is  China!  I  have  before  me  the  letter 
of  a  venerable  American  who  calmly  and  sincerely 
believes  that  Japan  holds  only  the  most  altruistic 
intentions  towards  America  and  who  also  believes 
that  Japan's  entire  preparation  is  for  the  conquest 
of  China.  But  China  has  no  navy.  The  Chinese 
navy  consists  of  four  tiny  ships.  The  largest — the 
Hai  Chi,  is  of  but  4,300  tons  displacement.  It  has 
a  battery  of  two  eight-inch  guns.  The  other  three 
ships  are  cruisers  25  per  cent,  smaller.  The  main 
armament  of  each  of  these  cruisers  consists  of  three 
six-inch  guns.  All  of  these  ships  are  more  than  19 
years  old. 

If  Japan's  military  and  naval  appropriations  were 
intended  for  the  conquest  of  China  there  would  be 
an  upbuilding  and  equipping  of  the  army.    Japan 


112  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

need  not  build  up  the  transport  system  of  her  navy 
if  her  intentions  are  directed  against  China,  for 
Japan  already  has  a  transport  system,  independent 
of  her  passenger  ships,  capable  of  carrying  199,000 
men.  In  a  few  weeks,  these,  plying  back  and  forth 
between  Japan  and  China,  could  carry  to  China  a 
million  men.  One  warship  would  protect  them  in 
their  trips  from  the  Japanese  coast  to  the  Chinese 
coast,  and  if  China  were  the  immediate  goal,  Japan 
would  need  greater  extraordinary  appropriations 
for  their  army — not  for  their  navy. 

If  Japan  by  these  most  extraordinary  measures 
is  not  preparing  her  navy  to  combat  the  navy  of 
the  United  States,  for  what  purpose  is  she  making 
such  gigantic  efforts?  Why  this  great  upbuilding 
of  the  navy  from  1908  to  the  present  time,  corre- 
sponding with  the  same  tremendous  upbuilding  of 
the  navy  during  the  years  before  the  Russo-Jap- 
anese war  ?  Can  any  one  doubt  that  this  money  is 
being  spent  for  a  definite  purpose?  And  since  Ja- 
pan needs  wealth  as  much  as  she  needs  land  and 
areal  resources  and  since  China  cannot  furnish  the 
wealth,  since  the  immediate  occupation  of  China 
would  demand  billions  of  Japanese  capital,  who  can 
doubt  that  Japan  is  preparing  her  navy  to  combat 
the  United  States  rather  than  China? 

Moreover,  we  have  her  own  testimony  in  regard 
to  this  matter. 

A  booklet  by  a  member  of  a  Japanese  National 


DO  THEY  INTEND  TO  ATTACK  US?      118 

Defence  Society,  circulated  with  its  approval,  de- 
scribes in  detail  how  our  Pacific  Islands  and  our 
Western  Coast  States  are  to  be  taken. 

"Our  war  with  the  United  States  will  be  one 
whose  intention  is  for  the  general  betterment  and 
benefit  of  the  world." 

"If  Washington  is  not  strong  enough  to  enforce 
its  orders  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  we  are!  In  short, 
the  United  States  Government  is  but  a  foolish  child- 
hood game,  such  as  checkers  or  jack  straws." 

"We  must  seize  our  standards,  unfurl  them  to  the 
winds  and  advance  without  the  least  fear,  as 
America  has  no  army,  and,  with  the  Panama  Canal 
destroyed,  its  few  battleships  will  be  of  no  use  until 
too  late." 

"The  Tokyo  arsenal  is  working  night  and  day  in 
making  ammunition  of  all  kinds.  The  Japanese 
Naval  Minister  is  now  occupied  in  the  great  work 
of  hastening  the  building  of  first-class  battleships, 
transports  and  submarines.  Our  army  and  navy 
commissariat  departments  at  Futagwa  are  now 
working  night  and  day  in  order  that  adequate  sup- 
plies of  our  own  compressed  foods  may  be  ready." 

"Sixty  million  Japanese  are  eager  to  begin  a  war 
against  the  United  States  that  shall  prove  to  the 
boasting  Americans  that  the  Japanese  people  do  not 
know  defeat  and  that  their  soldiers  are  invincible." 

"We  will  conquer  them!    How  can  we  fail?" 

"We  ask  no  clearer  vision  of  them — except  that 


114  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

which  we  will  have  over  the  sights  of  our  rifles  and 
the  guns  of  our  battleships." 

"We  will  of  course  have  only  trained  men  (sol- 
diers) go  out,  disguised  as  workmen  and  even  rich 
merchants.  These  will  slowly  be  reinforced,  with 
the  object  always  in  mind  of  capturing  the  Philip- 
pines and  Honolulu/' 

"Capture  these  islands  we  must,  in  order  to 
place  our  hands  firmly  and  once  for  all  on  the  Pa- 
cific Ocean." 

"Manila  being  ours,  we  will  divide  our  navy  and 
army  forces.  One  part  will  go  to  take  Honolulu 
and  all  the  Hawaiian  Islands;  the  other,  and  far 
greater  part,  will  proceed  to  the  Golden  Gate  of 
San  Francisco!" 

"Then  will  our  able  workmen,  agriculturists  and 
artisans  of  all  kinds  go  to  their  new  country!  And 
go  with  the  most  glad  hearts." 

"The  National  Manifestation  against  America 
that  took  place  last  year  in  Hibiya  Park,  in  our  im- 
perial capital,  attended  by  100,000  people  of  all 
ranks,  shows  how  glad  we  will  be  when  the  first 
shot  is  fired! 

"The  Text  of  the  resolution  that  was  then  passed 
is  as  follows : 

"We  herewith  formally  request  our  government 
to  declare  war  against  the  United  States  without 
an  instant's  delay ! 

"Let  America  beware!     For  our  cry   On   to 


DO  THEY  INTEND  TO  ATTACK  US?      115 

Hawaii!  On  to  California!  is  becoming  secondary 
in  our  country  to  our  imperial  anthem."  2 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  1 06.  From  a  book  outlining  Germany's  means 
and  method  of  attacking  England  and  the  United  States; 
prepared  by  Freiherr  von  Edelsheim,  when  member  of  the 
General  Staff  at  Berlin;  book  approved  by  the  Kaiser  and 
widely  circulated. 

2  Page  115.  From  a  book  circulated  by  the  National 
Defense  Association  of  Japan,  the  present  officers  of  which 
are  reported  to  be :  Count  Okuma,  Premier  of  Japan,  presi- 
dent; Baron  Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  vice-presi- 
dent. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  NEARNESS  OF  THE  ENEMIES 

AFTER  this  war  is  over  Japan  and  all  the 
nations  of  Europe  will  be  too  exhausted  to 
start  any  war  against  us;  and,  even  if  they  wished, 
we  are  so  isolated  on  the  east  and  on  the  west  by 
expanses  of  water  from  three  to  five  thousand  miles 
wide,  that  no  army  could  successfully  cross  to  our 
shores."  * 

Exactly  the  same  idea  was  expressed  by  Ran- 
dolph in  1810  referring  to  Great  Britain  and  war- 
ring Europe. 

A  citizen  who  goes  from  the  inactivity  of  his  of- 
fice into  the  wilderness  to  hunt  is  not  so  able  to  bear 
hardships  and  endure  fatigue  the  first  ten  days  as 
he  is  afterwards.  He  may  be  fagged  out  day  after 
day,  he  may  be  scratched  and  bruised,  he  may  lose 
thirty  or  more  pounds  of  fat,  but  after  a  few  weeks 
of  such  life  he  is  more  fit,  more  able  to  endure,  more 
skilled  in  using  his  gun  than  when  he  came  fresh 
from  the  office. 

"All  history  teaches  us  that  a  nation   never 

116 


THE  NEARNESS  OF  THE  ENEMIES       117 

fights  more  readily  and  more  valiantly  than  im- 
mediately after  the  close  of  a  war  in  which  it  was 
involved."  2 

We  ourselves  after  a  long  four-year  struggle 
were  well  equipped  and  ready  to  go  immediately 
into  Mexico — compelling  France  to  withdraw  the 
Emperor  she  had  installed  in  that  country.  Japan 
was  not  exhausted  by  the  war  with  China,  nor  by 
the  war  with  Russia. 

"Even  the  little  kingdom  of  Servia  fought  first 
Turkey,  then  Bulgaria  and  finally,  with  scarcely  a 
spell  of  rest,  she  waged  the  most  remarkable  cam- 
paign of  her  history  against  a  first-class  European 
power."  3 

Some  years  ago,  in  Paris,  a  French  diplomat  said 
to  me:  "We  in  Europe  have  learned  to  put  our 
treasures  in  bank  vaults  and  to  employ  guards  to 
watch  them.  But  you,  Americans,  are  a  strange 
people.  You  have  made  of  your  America  a  great 
glass  house  and  you  have  stored  within  it  the  great- 
est treasures  of  the  world.  I  should  think,  my  dear 
sir,  that  your  people  would  understand  that  there 
are  envious  nations  on  our  side  of  the  water,  who 
will  some  time  want  your  treasure." 

That  is  what  a  world  known  diplomat  thought; 
this  is  what  some  of  our  own  people  think: 

"Only  the  ridiculous  fear  of  a  crying  child  left 
alone  in  the  dark  can  account  for  the  wild  stories 
being  spread  about  of  how  a  foreign  nation  can  sue- 


118  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

cess  fully  send  an  invading  army  to  our  shores. 
Such  a  thing  is  impossible/'  4 

But  what  do  military  experts  think?  General 
Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the  United  States 
Army ;  Francis  V.  Greene,  Major-General  U.  S.  V. ; 
General  Leonard  Wood,  Commander  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  East;  Captain  Bristol,  Director  of 
Naval  Aeronautics ;  Captain  A.  W.  Grant,  Chief  of 
the  Submarine  Service! 

General  William  Crozier,  before  the  Congres- 
sional Committee  in  19 12,  stated: 

"So  far  as  transporting  troops  is  concerned,  the 
sea  as  a  highway  is  not  an  obstacle  but  a  facility." 

"It  is  very  much  easier  to  get  any  number  of 
troops  across  the  Atlantic  Ocean  than  it  would  be 
to  get  the  same  number  over  anything  like  the  same 
distance  on  land.  Marine  transportation  is  the  very 
best  kind  you  can  have;  the  easiest,  the  least  ex- 
pensive, and  the  most  expeditious,  if  you  are  con- 
sidering large  bodies  of  troops  and  large  amounts 
of  material." 

"In  smooth  water  and  fine  weather,  they  (the 
enemy)  could  land  almost  any  place." 8 

"The  guns  in  these  defences  (coast  forts)  would 
be  no  more  powerless  to  oppose  a  landing  beyond 
their  range  if  they  were  located  on  the  most  remote 
island  of  Alaska."  ° 

"Germany  by  using  only  50  per  cent,  of  her  mer- 
cantile marine,  only  including  vessels  of  more  than 


THE  NEARNESS  OF  THE  ENEMIES       119 


Transport  Facilities  for  Armies 
Qr.BFiiain 
Germany 
Japan 

U.S.A.      l 

Great  Britain's  ability  to  transport  large  armies  has  been  demon- 
strated for  two  hundred  years.  The  transportation  of  troops  in 
the  Boer  War  was  the  marvel  of  military  experts. 
In  the  transportation  of  troops  distance  is  not  the  important  factor. 
The  size  of  the  ships  and  the  number  of  ships  that  can  be  used  are 
essentially  important.  Great  Britain's  transportation  tonnage  is 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  country  in  the  world. 

Germany's  transportation  and  passenger  tonnage  is  next  to  that 
of  Great  Britain.  Even  in  iooi  Freiherr  von  Edelsheim,  then  a 
member  of  the  General  Staff  at  Berlin,  worked  out  a  definite  plan 
for  the  invasion  of  the  United  States  and  demonstrated  that  Ger- 
many could  embark  240,000  men  for  this  attack  upon  the  United 
States  in  two  and  a  half  days.  During  the  fifteen  years  that  have 
elapsed  since  1901  Germany's  transportation  facilities  have  greatly 
increased. 

Japan's  major  and  minor  transportation  fleets  can  now  accommo- 
date 109,000  men.  This  does  not  include  the  use  of  the  enormous 
passenger  ships  now  under  her  control. 

As  to  the  United  States :  We  have  now  the  problem  of  protecting 
lands,  interests  and  wealth  beyond  the  border  of  the  United  States. 
Porto  Rico,  Panama,  the  Philippines  and  the  marvellously  wealthy 
though   little  considered  Alaska. 

In  our  Spanish-American  War,  after  ninety  days'  preparation,  we 
could  not  obtain  transports  enough  to  move  more  than  17,000  troops 
from  Florida  to  Cuba,  and  it  took  our  transports  17  days  to  do 
this.  Men  were  left  behind  because  there  were  no  transportation 
facilities. 

In  April,  1014,  when,  after  more  than  two  years  of  trouble  with 
Mexico,  President  Wilson  ordered  General  Funston  to  sail  from 
Galveston  to  Vera  Cruz,  the  transport  fleet  was  able  to  take  less 
than  4,200  men.  A  large  portion  of  Guneral  Funston's  original 
command,  as  well  as  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  was  left  behind 
at  Galveston  because  there  were  not  sufficient  transports. 


120  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

2,000  tons'  registery,  could  land  450,000  men  in 
this  country  in  from  sixteen  to  seventeen  days  after 
domination  of  the  sea  had  been  obtained." 7 

"Since  steamers  have  supplanted  sailing  ships 
for  commercial  intercourse,  it  is  possible  to  trans- 
port our  large  troop  forces  in  them."  8 

What  are  the  experiences  of  history? 

"The  war  between  Japan  and  China,  between 
America  and  Spain,  between  England  and  the 
Transvaal,  and  finally  the  Chinese  Expeditions, 
have  largely  demonstrated  the  methods  of  trans- 
porting troops  over  the  sea."  9 

"Lord  Cochran  landed  18,000  men  on  the  open 
coast  of  America  in  five  hours ;  in  the  Crimean  War 
the  English  accomplished  the  disembarking  of  45,- 
000  men,  83  guns  and  about  100  horses  in  less  than 
eleven  hours."  10 

"In  an  operation  by  the  Russians,  8,000  men,  in- 
cluding infantry  and  cavalry,  were  embarked  in 
eight  hours."  " 

Our  own  experience  in  transporting  troops  to 
the  Philippines  is  sufficient. 

"We  had  four  transports — improvised  from 
mail  steamers,  plying  on  the  Pacific — the  largest 
of  which  had  a  gross  tonnage  of  5,000  and  the 
smallest  1,500.  The  total  tonnage  was  about 
12,500."  12 

Our  slowest  ship  had  a  speed  of  but  nine  knots 
and  of  course  the  transports  had  to  keep  together  so 


THE  NEARNESS  OF  THE  ENEMIES      121 

that  the  average  speed  was  not  greater  than  that 
of  the  slowest  ship.  Yet  in  thirty-two  days  we  cov- 
ered seven  thousand  miles  from  San  Francisco  to 
Manila  and  landed  our  forces ;  although,  when  war 
began,  we  were  unprepared  to  conduct  a  campaign 
across  the  Pacific. 

When  this  war  is  finished,  England,  whether  suc- 
cessful or  unsuccessful,  will  have  at  least  one  mil- 
lion men  in  training  camps  or  in  the  field  ready  for 
service.  The  carrying  capacity  of  her  railways  is 
such  that  these  cannot  be  dismissed  at  a  moment's 
notice.  For  months,  perhaps  for  a  year,  there  will 
be  a  standing  army  of  at  least  five  hundred  thou- 
sand men.  England  has  the  greatest  transport  sys- 
tem in  the  world  and  her  mariners  have  been 
trained  for  centuries  in  handling  traffic  and  troops. 

"In  England,  the  steamers  for  transporting 
troops  to  Cape  Town,  which  is  a  long  trip,  were 
prepared  in  four  days  for  the  infantry;  and  seven 
days  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery."  18 

The  combined  tonnage  of  the  British  India, 
White  Star,  Peninsular  and  Oriental  lines  is  nearly 
two  million  tons.  England  could  transport  to  the 
United  States,  without  even  interfering  with  her 
other  shipping  trade,  from  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  to  five  hundred  thousand  men,  in  two 
weeks'  time. 


122  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

And  Germany ! 

"When  the  war  is  over,  Germany  will  still  be  the 
second  naval  power  in  the  world,  stronger  than  our- 
selves in  battleships,  and  possessed  of  an  ocean-go- 
ing commerce  with  a  tonnage  nearly  five  times  as 
great  as  our  own."  14 

"There  would  be  no  lack  of  ships.  The  fleet  of 
the  Hamburg  line  alone  measures  1,168,000  tons, 
and  of  the  North  German  Lloyd,  795,000  tons."  15 

Even  all  the  details  have  been  worked  out  by  Ger- 
many— by  Freiherr  von  Edelsheim  when  a  member 
of  the  German  General  Staff. 

"The  expedition  corps  would  require  eighteen 
ships;  material  and  supplies  would  take  five.  The 
greater  part  of  this  number  would  be  amply  sup- 
plied by  our  two  large  steamship  companies,  the 
North  German  Lloyd  and  the  Hamburg-American 
Line.  The  charter  of  these  steamship  companies 
provides  for  their  use  as  transports  if  needed  for 
expeditions  of  this  sort." 

"The  greater  part  of  the  supplies  can  be  brought 
by  tugs  from  Bremen  to  Bremerhaven.  The  troops 
can  consequently  embark  at  Quai  in  about  four 
hours."  ie 

"Ninety-six  thousand  men  can  be  embarked  in 
one  day,  or  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men  in 
two  and  a  half  days."  17 

"If  we,  almost  ludicrously  unready  for  war  in 
1898,  could  do  this  (take  our  troops  to  the  Philip- 


THE  NEARNESS  OF  THE  ENEMIES       123 

pines)  is  it  to  be  supposed  that  Germany,  with  her 
plans  studied  out  long  in  advance,  with  her  enor- 
mous tonnage  of  fast  ships,  her  troops  in  instant 
readiness,  with  no  continent  to  cross  and  an  ocean 
of  barely  3,000  miles  instead  of  7,000  separating 
her  from  her  opponent — is  it  to  be  supposed,  I  say, 
that  Germany  could  not  bring  240,000  infantry 
with  the  corresponding  numbers  of  artillery  and 
cavalry  to  our  shores  in  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
days  ?  No  soldier  who  has  studied  the  question  will 
deny  that  Germany  can  do  this."  18 

Japan  has  a  merchant  marine  whose  tonnage 
almost  equals  that  of  the  White  Star,  Cunard, 
British  India,  and  Peninsular  and  Oriental  lines 
combined.  It  is  sufficient  to  handle  under  great 
emergency  one-half  million  men.  She  has  practi- 
cally absolute  control  of  trans-Pacific  trade,  except- 
ing for  the  few  English  ships.  England  is  pledged 
to  Japan  as  an  offensive  and  defensive  ally.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  Japan  could  land  within  four 
weeks  after  she  determines  to  do  so,  and  probably 
before  a  declaration  of  war,  from  two  hundred 
thousand  to  three  hundred  thousand  men  on  our 
western  coast. 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  116.    American  newspaper  editorial. 

2  Page  117.  General  Francis  V.  Greene,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
"The  Present  Military  Situation  in  the  United  States." 


124  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

8  Page  117.    (See  note  2.) 

*  Page  118.    American  newspaper  editorial. 

6  Page  118.    Rear- Admiral  Frank  F.  Fletcher. 

6  Page  118.  Report  of  the  Army  Committee  of  the 
National  Security  League,  including :  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stim- 
son,  ex-Secretary  of  War;  Colonel  William  C.  Church, 
editor  Army  and  Navy  Journal;  Captain  Matthew  Hannah ; 
General  Francis  V.  Greene;  Major  George  Haven  Put- 
nam; Colonel  S.  Creighton  Webb,  and  others. 

7  Page  120.  Press  report  of  interview  with  American 
Army  Officer. 

8  Page  120.  From  a  book  outlining  Germany's  means 
and  method  of  attacking  England  and  the  United  States; 
prepared  by  Freiherr  von  Edelsheim,  as  member  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  at  Berlin;  approved  by  Kaiser,  and  widely  circu- 
lated. 

9  10  11  Page  I2Q     (See  note  g) 

12  Page  120.  (See  note  2.) 
18  Page  I2i.  (See  note  8.) 
14  "  Page  122.    (See  note  2.) 

16  Page  122.    (See  note  8.) 

17  "  Pages  122-123.    (See  note  2.\ 


PART  TWO:    ARE  WE  PREPARED? 


PART  TWO:     ARE  WE  PREPARED? 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 

IN  case  of  war,  all  our  navy  need  do  is  to  find 
the  enemy's  fleet  and  sink  it." ' 

Easy  and  simple !  Just  about  as  simple  as  asking 
a  man  with  arms  cut  off  at  the  elbows  to  enter  the 
ring  to  thrash  Willard  or  Carpentier ! 

Admiral  Fiske  gave  official  testimony  that  it 
would  take  five  years  to  put  our  navy  in  shape  to 
meet  an  efficient  enemy.  Admiral*  Knight,  presi- 
dent of  the  naval  war  college,  when  urging  that  we 
make  our  navy  efficient,  stated  that  everybody  who 
knows  anything  about  the  navy  knows  that  it  is 
not  now  in  an  efficient  condition. 

Great  speed  and  guns  capable  of  high  elevation 
are  the  most  important  features  of  the  modern 
dreadnought.  Over-thick  armour  is  not  of  special 
value  to-day. 

The  most  powerful  battleships  possess  very  large 
guns  capable  of  being  elevated  thirty  degrees,  have 
armour  plate  of  but  medium  thickness,  and  are  able 
to  make  from  twenty-five  to  twenty-eight  knots  per 

127 


128  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

hour.  We  have  not  one  battleship  combining  these 
qualities. 

The  battle  in  the  North  Sea  demonstrated  how 
important  speed  is  to  a  big  battleship.  A  fast  ship 
can  move  in  and  out  and  around  its  enemy,  keeping 
out  of  range  when  it  desires  to  do  so,  and  coming  in 
again  unexpectedly.  A  dreadnought  with  an  ad- 
vantage of  even  one  knot  in  speed  is  fifty  per  cent, 
more  efficient  than  a  ship  of  equal  size  and  with  like 
guns,  one  knot  slower.  The  powerful  Bluecher  was 
destroyed  not  because  of  lack  of  armour,  or  lack  of 
big  guns,  but  because  she  was  too  slow  to  get  away. 
Yet  the  Bluecher  was  able  to  make  three  knots  more 
per  hour  than  the  fastest,  most  powerful,  best- 
equipped  armoured  ship  we  have  in  our  navy. 

"They  have  no  conception  of  the  fact  that  a  ship 
one-half  knot  faster,  with  guns  of  one-half  mile 
greater  range,  with  practically  all  other  conditions 
equal,  would  have  at  its  mercy  any  ship  having 
lesser  speed  and  guns  with  the  shorter  range."  2 

England  has  twenty  battleships  capable  of  main- 
taining from  23  to  29  miles  an  hour,  Germany  has 
fourteen,  Japan  has  four.      We  have  none! 

Although  guns  on  ships  of  foreign  navies  can  be 
elevated  twenty,  twenty-eight  and  thirty  degrees, 
we  have  had  none  that  can  be  elevated  more  than 
fifteen  degrees  and  most  of  them  can  be  elevated 
only  ten  degrees. 

Even  the  two  ships  just  about  to  go  in  service — 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT  129 

Modern  Dreadnoughts  1 

US-    o 
Jap. 
Gemu 
tefirft 


Japan  has  finished  four  modern  dreadnoughts  in  the  last  two 
years,  three  of  which  have  a  displacement  of  27,500  tons  and  the 
other  a  displacement  of  30,600  tons. 

The  first  three  have  a  speed  of  27  knots  and  the  fourth  a  speed 
of  23  knots. 

Two  more  ships  of  this  last  type  are  practically  ready  for  service 
and  will  probably  be  in  service  by  the  time  this  paragraph  is  read. 
We  have  no  ships  of  this  type  whatever. 

Our  two  best  ships — the  Nevada  and  the  Oklahoma — have  a  maxi- 
mum speed  of  22  knots. 

The  engine  efficiency  of  our  best  dreadnoughts  is  26,000  and  25,000 
horsepower  respectively.  Japan's  dreadnoughts  have  an  engine  effi- 
ciency of  60,000  horsepower. 

During  the  past  eighteen  months  German  naval  construction  has 
been  pushed  at  an  enormous  rate. 

Our  own  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  just  admitted  that  Great 
Britain  has  probably  added  to  her  navy  sixteen  great  fighting  ships 
since  the  present  war  began. 


130 AWAKE!  XL  S.  A. 

the  Oklahoma  and  the  Nevada — are,  in  comparison 
with  foreign  ships,  plodders.  The  Oklahoma  and 
the  Nevada  in  their  speed  tests  some  months  ago 
were  able  to  make  an  extreme  record  of  about  21 
knots  per  hour.  These  are  our  best  ships,  but  they 
are  not  yet  in  service. 

Japan  has  three  new  ships  of  68,000  horse-power 
that  have  a  speed  of  27  knots,  one  great  super- 
dreadnought  of  40,000  horse-power  that  has  a 
speed  of  23  knots.  These  ships  are  already  finished 
and  in  service.  Two  more  ships  of  the  super- 
dreadnought  type  of  the  same  speed  are  to  be  fin- 
ished this  year. 

Ships  like  the  Minnesota,  Connecticut,  Vermont 
and  New  Hampshire  cannot  maintain  a  speed  of 
even  12  or  15  knots. 

Moreover,  the  guns  on  many  of  our  ships  have 
shorter  range  than  the  guns  of  the  ships  of  foreign 
navies.  All  the  ships  of  the  Alabama  class  have 
an  extreme  range  of  only  J%  miles.  The  two 
great  battles  of  the  present  war  have  been  fought  at 
a  distance  greater  than  10  miles. 

After  witnessing  a  review  of  ten  of  our  best  bat- 
tleships a  short  time  ago,  John  Hays  Hammond, 
Jr.,  remarked,  "As  we  watched  these  massive  struc- 
tures pass,  some  of  us  wondered  how  long  they 
could  contest  with  the  superior  range  gun-power 
and  speed  of  the  modern  battle  cruisers  of  other 
nations.    To  those  interested  in  naval  development, 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 13f 

it  was  obvious  that  only  four  out  of  the  ten  would 
make  a  real  showing  under  modern  battle  condi- 
tions." 3 

All  of  our  battleships  are  supposed  to  be  equipped 
with  useable  torpedo  tubes,  yet  Rear-Admiral 
Strauss,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  United 
States  Navy,  admitted  in  testifying  that  all  ships  of 
our  navy,  previous  to  the  Nevada  and  the  Okla- 
homa, have  torpedo  tubes,  which  are  useless  for 
modern  torpedoes.  As  the  Nevada  and  Oklahoma 
are  not  yet  in  commission,  his  admission  means  that 
we  have  now  not  one  single  torpedo  tube  in  any  bat- 
tleship afloat  that  is  of  any  value.  Even  when  the 
Nevada  and  Oklahoma  are  commissioned,  there  will 
be  but  eight  torpedo  tubes  adapted  to  the  use  of 
modern  torpedoes  in  our  entire  navy,  while  every 
single  modern  German  battleship  has  six  tubes  each. 

Our  torpedo  boats  are  out  of  date  and  are  ineffi- 
cient. All  of  them  are  more  than  fifteen  years  old 
and  about  as  useful  as  an  automobile  of  an  1899 
model. 

Fast  light  cruisers  are  most  important,  not  only 
in  protecting  other  ships  of  the  fleet,  but  above  all, 
in  protecting  coast  lines.  Yet  we  have  but  three 
up-to-date  ones  to  aid  us  in  protecting  thousands  of 
miles  of  the  Atlantic  Coast,  thousands  of  miles  of 
the  Pacific  Coast  and  both  entrances  of  the  Panama 
Canal. 

"This  leaves  our  fleet  peculiarly  lacking  in  this 


132  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Big  Guns  on  Ships1 


US. 

Japan 
Germa 
GrBrifaii 


(i)  Keels  laid  since  1905. 

The  guns,  larger  than  10-inch,  on  ships  the  keels  of  which  have  been 
laid  since  1905  are  as  follows: 

United  States   172 

Japan 186 

Germany  232 

Great  Britain   330 

United  States  ships  of  this  class  have  no  13-inch  gun  and  almost 
one-half  of  all  the  guns  are  12-inch. 

Germany  has  twenty-four  15-inch  guns,  and  Great  Britain  eighty 
15-5  guns  on  ships  of  this  class, 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT  133 


Average  House  Power  per  Ship f 


U.S. 
Qermanyi 
Japan  i 
OF.BFttaini 


(i)  Keels  laid  since  1905. 

This  represents  the  average  horsepower  of  each  ship  of  the  first 
line  ships. 

Japan  has  three  ships  finished  of  68,000  horsepower  each,  one  fin- 
ished of  40,000  horsepower,  two  more  almost  ready  for  service  of 
40,000  horsepower. 

In  our  entire  navy  we  have  but  four  ships  the  engines  of  which 
have  more  than  30,000  horsepower  each,  and  the  engines  of  three 
of  these  are  just  over  the  30,000  horsepower  mark. 


134 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

element  so  necessary  for  information  in  a  naval 
campaign,  and  of  such  great  value  in  opening  and 
protecting  routes  of  trade  for  our  own  commerce, 
and  prohibiting  such  routes  to  the  commerce  of  the 
enemy."  4 

"Leading  the  torpedo  flotilla  came  the  Birming- 
ham, a  sad  reminder  that  we  have  only  three  light 
cruisers  of  considerable  speed,  and  these  vessels, 
compared  to  the  numerous  craft  of  this  type  in  the 
British  and  German  navies,  would  present  a  sorry 
contrast  in  their  relatively  low  speed  and  weak 
armament."  B 

We  have  not  a  single  fast  scout  boat  built  or  even 
authorised  since  1904.  The  three  we  have  are  not 
armed  adequately  and  are  too  slow  for  use.  None 
of  them  has  ever  made  more  than  twenty-six 
knots.  Up  to  the  present  time,  we  have  not  been 
able  to  secure  firemen  able  to  live  before  their  fur- 
naces, for  whenever  there  is  a  little  wind  they  draw 
into  the  faces  of  the  firemen,  instead  of  upward 
into  the  stacks. 

England  and  Germany  have  been  adding  scout 
cruisers  at  the  rate  of  from  three  to  eight  each 
year.  Each  is  able  to  make  thirty  knots  or  more  an 
hour.  Before  the  war  Germany  had  fourteen  and 
Great  Britain  thirty-one. 

We  have  less  than  seventy  destroyers.  We 
should  have  at  least  three  hundred. 

The  less  said  about  our  submarines,  the  better. 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT  135 

Nearly  a  year  ago  Commander  Sterling  testified 
that  one  out  of  the  twelve  on  the  Atlantic  Coast 
could  efficiently  take  part  in  the  manoeuvres  at  sea. 

In  the  spring  manoeuvres  this  year,  all  of  our 
good  submarines,  excepting  one,  were  again  unable 
to  continue  their  operation  because  of  some  acci- 
dent or  other.  In  the  October  manoeuvres,  all,  ex- 
cept one,  were  again  conveyed  to  the  navy  yards, 
because  "something"  happened  to  their  engines  or 
other  machinery. 

But  a  new  submarine  has  just  been  launched! 
Assuming  that  this  one  will  work,  we  have  evi- 
dently but  two  submarines,  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
north  of  Panama,  able  to  manoeuvre  for  a  few  days 
at  least — without  having  to  be  convoyed  to  port. 

Even  those  of  the  L,  type,  which  in  the  past  we 
have  considered  about  as  perfect  as  any  of  our 
submarines,  are  now  found  to  be  defective. 

We  have  two  mine  layers,  one  to  cover  the  thou- 
sands of  miles  of  the  Atlantic  Coast-line  and  one 
for  the  thousands  of  miles  of  the  Pacific.  Each 
mine-layer  has  but  a  few  hundred  mines.  Germany 
had  about  19,500  mines  when  the  war  began,  and 
evidently  laid  about  14,000  or  more  in  the  North 
Sea  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  British  commerce. 

The  American  nation  wishes  no  navy  for  the 
purpose  of  waging  a  war  of  aggression  against  any 
nation.  We  wish  a  navy  for  the  purpose  of  sup- 
porting our  policy  and  defending  ourselves.     Such 


136 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Average  Speed  of  Ships  ' 


US. 

German 
GEBrffain 
Japan 


i.  Speed  of  ships  whose  keels  have  been  laid  in  the  last  six  years, 
showing  the  increasing  tendency  for  great  speed  in  the  construc- 
tion of  battleships  of  Germany,  Great  Britain  and  Japan. 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 


137 


AverageTonnage  Displacement  per  Gun 


Japan 

Germany 

QFJBrftain 

US. 


Not  only  are  our  ships  slower  than  the  ships  of  Japan,  Germany 
and  Great  Britain,  not  only  is  the  average  horsepower  of  each  of 
our  first  line  ships  less — in  most  cases  less  than  half  that  of  the 
ships  of  Japan — but  the  average  tonnage  displacement  per  gun  of 
our  ships  is  greater. 

Our  weaker  engines  propelling  ships  at  less  speed  must  carry 
around  greater  weight  per  gun  than  the  stronger  engines  of  the 
ships  of  Japan,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain.  To  carry  each  gun 
on  the  first  line  ships,  our  engines  must  pull  a  bulk  16  per  cent, 
heavier  than  that  which  the  higher-powered  engines  of  Japan's  first 
line  ships  have  to  propel. 


138 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

defence  must  prevent  other  nations  from  bombard- 
ing our  cities  or  landing  troops  on  our  coasts.  As 
the  nature  of  our  shores  permits  landing  of  troops 
practically  anywhere  along  our  coast-line,  the 
primal  purpose  of  our  navy  is  to  defend  our  coast. 
"We  have  21,000  miles  of  coast-line  and  a  rapidly 
increasing  commerce  to  defend."  8 

Our  coast-line  now  includes  that  of  Alaska, 
Hawaii,  the  Philippines  and  Porto  Rico,  as  well  as 
that  of  the  continental  United  States. 

German  submarines  are  certainly  as  efficient  as 
ours.  With  one-half  of  their  submarine  fleet  and 
fourteen  thousand  mines,  they  attempted  to  block- 
ade 2,600  miles  of  the  coast-line  of  Great  Britain. 
Yet  with  all  these  means,  they  were  able  to  stop  or 
destroy  only  two  per  cent,  of  the  ships  entering 
British  ports. 

We  have  an  idea  that  our  present  fleet  of  sub- 
marines and  our  present  supply  of  mines  will  be  of 
great  value  in  defending  our  coasts  against  an  in- 
vading fleet.  At  least,  we  have  hoped  that  the 
number  of  mines  we  have,  strewn  along  our  coast, 
and  the  activity  of  our  submarines  might  be  able  to 
prevent  a  considerable  portion  of  an  attacking  fleet 
from  landing  men  on  our  shore. 

We  will  assume  that  our  submarines  are  just  as 
powerful,  just  as  fleet,  just  as  perfect  in  construc- 
tion, just  as  well  manned  as  the  German  submarines 
which  operated  against  the  English  coast  for  eight- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT  139 

een  months — and  the  German  submarines  are  the 
marvels  of  the  world. 

We  will  assume  that  the  mines  we  have  can  be 
laid  just  as  efficiently  and  that  they  are  just  as  pow- 
erful as  the  mines  Germany  planted  on  the  seas  in 
her  attempt  to  prevent  ships  entering  British  ports. 

Germany's  effort  in  preventing  ships  entering 
English  ports  was  confined  to  a  coast-line  one-tenth 
as  extensive  as  the  coast-line  we  would  have  to 
guard.  Her  chances,  compared  to  what  ours  would 
be,  were  consequently  ten  to  one.  The  number  of 
German  submarines,  compared  to  those  we  have, 
indicates  that  Germany's  chances,  compared  to  what 
ours  would  be,  were  five  to  one.  The  number  of 
mines  the  Germans  used  compares  to  all  the  mines 
we  have  as  twenty-five  to  one.  Taking  all  these 
factors  into  consideration,  the  chances  Germany 
had  of  preventing  ships  entering  British  harbours 
compares  to  the  chance  we  would  have  of  prevent- 
ing foreign  vessels  entering  our  harbours  as  1250 
to  1. 

Our  present  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Daniels, 
takes  great  pride  in  comparing  our  navy  to  other 
navies  of  the  world  by  showing  its  relative  tonnage. 
In  tonnage  the  navy  of  Great  Britain  is  183  per  cent, 
greater  than  ours,  while  Germany's,  according  to 
the  Navy  Year  Book  of  19 14,  was  24  per  cent, 
greater  than  ours.    By  this  same  method  our  navy 


140  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

is  ranked  greater  than  the  navy  of  France  and 
greater  than  that  of  Japan. 

No  method  of  judging  the  fighting  qualities  of  a 
navy  can  be  more  misleading  and  ridiculous  than  to 
determine  those  qualities  by  the  tonnage  of  the 
navy.  One  might  as  well  judge  the  fighting  quali- 
ties of  a  man  by  his  bulk.  On  the  tonnage  basis 
the  greatest  pugilist  in  the  world  would  be  the  fat- 
test man.  If  a  man  has  a  gouty  foot  and  a  wrenched 
back,  if  his  wrists  are  swollen  with  rheumatism; 
and  his  shoulders  suffering  from  neuritis,  he  isn't 
of  much  value  in  the  fighting  ring,  even  though  he 
may  weigh  470  pounds. 

All  naval  authorities  of  Europe  consider  a  battle- 
ship as  a  fighting  instrument,  not  a  boat.  As  a 
fighting  instrument,  either  for  offensive  or  defen- 
sive purposes,  a  battleship  loses  much  of  its  value 
in  twelve  years,  and  is  completely  superannuated  in 
twenty  years.  For  this  reason,  a  navy  rapidly  de- 
teriorates in  value  if  new  ships  are  not  constantly 
added.  Consequently  the  plans  of  construction  for 
the  European  navies  are  based  upon  retiring  ships 
as  soon  as  they  reach  a  certain  age,  replacing  them' 
with  modern  up-to-date  ships.  A  merchant  vessel 
is  an  efficient  carrier  of  commerce  when  it  is  twenty 
or  even  thirty  years  old,  but  a  carrier  of  commerce 
is  not  a  fighting  instrument. 

Our  navy  department,  however,  counts  as  fight- 
ing instruments  anything  and  everything  that  floats 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 


141 


Battleships  and  Bottle  Cruisers  • 


GrJBrtt 

German 

Japan 

U«S.A. 


I.  This  represents  the  number  of  battleships  and  battle  cruisers 
authorized  and  laid  down  from  December  31st,  1904,  to  January  1st, 
1914. 

And  since  January  1st,  1914,  Germany,  Japan  and  Great  Britain 
have  been  rushing  construction  of  ships  of  this  type  at  a  tremen- 
dous rate. 

It  is  admitted  even  by  Secretary  Daniels  that  Great  Britain  has 
probably  completed  sixteen  large  ships  since  this  date.  It  is  known 
that  Germany  and  Japan  have  been  rushing  construction  of  new 
ships  night  and  day. 

A  member  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet,  in  presenting  the  new  budget, 
urged  that  "not  a  single  hour  should  be  lost  in  Japanese  Naval 
construction." 

The  United  States  has  lagged  woefully  behind;  at  this  writing, 
April  1st,  1916,  the  Oklahoma  and  Nevada  are  not  yet  in  service, 
although  they  were  authorized  more  than  five  years  ago, 


142  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

in  a  seaworthy  condition.  No  other  method  of 
making  the  apparent  strength  of  our  navy  more 
misleading  could  possibly  be  evolved. 

Our  navy  has  greatly  decreased  in  value  rela- 
tively to  other  great  navies  during  the  last  six  years 
because  new  fighting  instruments  have  not  been 
built  to  take  the  place  of  those  that  have  lost  the 
value  they  once  had.  Because  the  American  people 
fail  to  recognise  the  difference  between  the  fighting 
value  of  a  ship  and  its  seaworthiness,  they  are  still 
under  the  impression  that  they  now  have  as  strong 
a  navy  compared  to  the  navies  of  other  nations  as 
they  had  under  President  Roosevelt.  A  battleship 
fifteen  years  old  may  be  a  very  efficient  and  sea- 
worthy craft,  but  almost  useless  as  a  fighting  fac- 
tor. Our  Navy  Department  not  only  lists  ships 
fifteen  years  old,  but  those  twenty  years  old,  thirty 
years  old,  and  even  forty  years  old. 

Only  four  months  ago  the  government  at  last  as- 
signed to  the  junk-man  a  warship  built  just  seventy- 
three  years  ago.  This  ship  was  used  in  the  war 
with  Mexico  in  1846  and  went  to  Japan  with  Perry 
in  1853.  ^ 

By  listing  anything  and  everything  and  ignoring 
our  shortage  in  enlisted  men  and  reserves,  we  have 
greatly  over-rated  our  naval  efficiency.  If  we  in- 
clude personnel  and  count  only  ships  less  than 
twenty  years  old,  we  fall  to  fourth  place,  finding 
France's  navy  better  than  ours. 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 143 

Other  nations  of  the  world  do  not  list  their  ships 
in  this  way.  Japan,  for  instance,  discarded  most  of 
her  torpedo  boats  more  than  seven  or  eight  years 
old.  In  1904  the  navy  list  of  the  official  report  of 
the  Empire  of  Japan  showed  85  torpedo  boats;  in 
19 1 3  she  lists  but  33.  Her  old  torpedo  boats  have 
become  useless  as  fighting  factors  and  Japan  does 
not  try  to  deceive  herself  by  counting  her  useless 
units.  Also  note  that  the  official  report  of  the  Em- 
pire of  Japan  shows  that  she  has  added  47  new  war 
vessels  to  her  navy,  exclusive  of  her  torpedo  boats 
and  submarines  in  the  last  twelve  years. 

According  to  our  naval  lists,  we  have,  of  all  types 
of  fighting  ships — battleships,  armoured  cruisers, 
first,  second  and  third  class  cruisers — only  27  ships 
whose  keels  have  been  laid  in  the  last  twelve  years, 
even  counting  ships  almost  completed,  but  not  yet 
in  commission. 

Other  navies  of  the  world  do  not  count  their  ships 
until  they  are  finished.  We  count  them  as  units 
of  our  navy  as  soon  as  they  are  voted  and  the  Navy 
Department  counts  them  the  moment  the  keels  are 
laid.  But  oftentimes  two  years  elapse  between  the 
voting  and  the  laying  of  the  keel.  And  three  years 
more  elapse  between  the  laying  of  the  keel  and  the 
commissioning  of  the  ship.  The  Nevada  and  the 
Oklahoma  at  the  present  moment,  April  1,  19 16, 
are  not  yet  in  service,  although  they  were  voted 
early  in  ipn,  five  years  ago. 


144 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Battle  CrutseFs  > 


Qr.Britai 
German 
Japan 

U.5.A.     o 


I.  This  represents  the  number  of  battleships  and  battle  cruisers 
authorised  and  laid  down  from  December  31,  1904,  to  January  1, 
1914. 

During  this  period  Great  Britain  authorized  and  laid  down  10,  Ger- 
many 7,  Japan  6,  U.  S.  A.  none. 

And  since  January  1,  1914,  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  Japan 
have  rushed  construction  of  battle  cruisers  at  an  enormous  rate. 
We  have  no  battle  cruisers  in  our  navy,  and  none  is  authorised. 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 


145 


Seoul  Cruisers  * 


ur.Brilain 
Germany 
Japan     ■ 

U.S.A.     o 


i.  This  represents  the  number  of  battleships  and  scout  cruisers 
authorised  and  laid  down  from  December  31,  1904,  to  January  1, 
1914. 

And  since  January  1,  1914,  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  Japan 
have  rushed  construction  of  scout  cruisers  at  an  enormous  rate. 
We  have  neither  authorised  nor  laid  down  a  single  scout  cruiser 
since  December  31,  1904,  and  we  have  only  three  defective  ones 
in  our  entire  navy. 


146 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

If  you  glance  over  the  reports  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  you  will  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  we 
have  thirty-three  first-class  battleships  capable  of 
defending  our  shores.  But  the  ordinary  reader 
does  not  understand  that  when  a  ship  is  "out  of 
commission"  or  "in  ordinary"  or  "in  reserve,"  it  is 
temporarily  or  permanently  useless. 

"A  battleship  'in  ordinary/  as  it  is  called,  with 
less  than  a  hundred  men  on  board  might  as  well  be 
eliminated  from  the  lists  of  ships  available  for  any 
service  within  reasonable  length  of  time." 7 

And  when  a  ship  is  "out  of  commission"  it  takes 
months  to  repair  it.  The  overhauling  and  repair- 
ing of  the  engines  and  machinery  of  a  fifteen  to 
eighteen  million  dollar  fighting  machine  cannot  be 
done  in  a  few  short  weeks. 

At  the  present  day  a  navy  is  of  value  for  defen- 
sive purposes  only  if  it  is  ready  in  both  material 
and  personnel  for  immediate  action.  If  Winston 
Churchill  had  not  kept  the  British  Navy  in  such  a 
state  of  preparation  that  it  could  sail  to  sea  on 
twelve  hours'  notice,  England  would  now  be  a  con- 
quered province  of  the  German  Empire.  If  Eng- 
land had  found  it  necessary  to  take  even  sixty  days 
to  put  her  fleet  in  order,  the  German  fleet  could 
have  bombarded  the  towns  of  northern  France,  the 
Germans  would  have  reached  Paris  and,  the  German 
fleet  controlling  the  channel,  the  Germans  could 
have  landed  an  army  of  five  hundred  thousand  men 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT 147 

in  England  before  England  could  have  mobilised 
more  than  200,000  soldiers.  England's  existence 
to-day  is  due  not  only  to  the  fact  that  she  had  a 
great  navy,  but  that  she  had  it  ready  to  move  at 
once. 

As  Rear  Admiral  Knight  has  stated,  "A  ship 
which  is  laid  up  for  repairs  is,  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses of  defence,  practically  non-existent."  The 
rest  of  a  fleet  will  be  defeated  before  the  ships  "in 
ordinary"  or  "in  reserve"  can  be  made  ready  to  be 
of  any  value  to  the  fleet. 

Of  our  33  battleships,  12  are  already  in  one  or 
another  of  the  three  useless  classes;  and  all  of  the 
21  remaining  are  not  by  any  means  in  first-class 
condition.  Many  of  them  are  continuously  in  na- 
val hospitals.  Of  those  in  actual  commission,  ten 
only  are  ships  of  the  first  line  and  eleven  of  the  sec- 
ond line.  Of  the  ten  of  the  first  line,  two  are  so 
out  of  date  that  they  are  to  be  relegated  to  the  sec- 
ond line  within  three  months.  So  by  June  1916 
we  shall  have  only  eight  first-class  battleships  in 
the  entire  American  navy;  and  not  one  of  these  bat- 
tleships can  maintain  a  speed  of  more  than  22V2. 
knots,  not  one  has  a  gun  that  can  be  elevated  more 
than  fifteen  degrees  and  every  one  is  weighted  down 
with  over-heavy  armour. 

To  man  our  ships  in  time  of  war  with  the  small- 
est possible  crews  would  require  72,500  men.     We 


148 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

have  53, coo.  Our  torpedo  boats  have  but  two  offi- 
cers each.     They  should  have  six. 

As  previously  stated,  our  only  purpose  in  desiring 
an  efficient  navy  is  to  protect  ourselves  from  battle 
fleets  coming  to  our  shores  with  the  intention  of  in- 
flicting damage  upon  us  or  of  demanding  conces- 
sions and  indemnities  from  us.  We  want  a  fleet 
that  can  prevent  the  landing  of  foreign  troops  on 
our  coast. 

The  great  navy  of  England  has  been  developed 
for  defensive  purposes;  first  to  reach  out  and  de- 
fend its  colonies  and  its  commerce  with  them  and 
other  countries ;  and  second,  to  defend  Great  Britain 
itself  from  invasion.  The  German  Navy  has  been 
built  up  to  defend  German  commerce  and  to  defend 
Germany's  commercial  ports,  in  case  Great  Britain 
should  ever  attempt  to  bombard  Hamburg  and  Bre- 
men, as  she  bombarded  Copenhagen  and  Amster- 
dam to  destroy  their  commerce  when  they  were 
ports  of  world  importance. 

From  the  defensive  standpoint,  therefore,  a  navy 
is  of  value  proportionately  to  the  length  of  its  coast- 
line; a  navy  is  of  value  in  proportion  to  the  popula- 
tion of  the  country  it  has  to  defend — if  the  com- 
merce of  that  country  is  destroyed  all  of  the  people 
will  suffer ;  and  a  navy  is  of  value  in  proportion  to 
the  area  of  the  country  it  has  to  defend,  inasmuch 
as  the  value  of  areal  products  will  decrease  in  pro- 
portion to  interference  with  the  country's  interna- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT  149 

Comparaffve 
Naval  Projection  Given  Each  Citizen 

B.S-A.     m 

sot 

Japan    ■■ 

GF.Brifai!mHBMBHHi 

Naval  Protection  perMile  of  Coast  Line 

U.SA.       ■  i 

Japan     n 

Or.Brflain 
OeFinany 

Naval-Protection  Often  Home  Lands 
By 

U.S.A.       I 

it 

Japan 

Germany 
Or.Brfiaini 


150 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

tional  trade.  This  is  the  only  true  way  of  valuing 
a  navy. 

Germany  has  a  coast-line  of  1,000  miles;  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  have  a  coast-line  of  3,700  miles, 
Japan  has  a  coast-line  of  6,600  miles.  From  the 
defensive  standpoint  (as  we  have  an  enemy  in  the 
Orient)  our  coast-line  stretches  from  Maine  to 
Florida,  from  Florida  to  Mexico,  from  Mexico  to 
Porto  Rico,  and  from  Porto  Rico  to  Panama;  on 
the  west  it  stretches  from  Panama  to  Lower  Cali- 
fornia, from  Lower  California  to  British  Colum- 
bia, along  the  shores  of  Alaska;  and  then  there  are 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  Guam  and  the  Philippine  Is- 
lands. The  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson,  ex-Secretary 
of  War,  states  that  the  coast-line  we  must  defend 
equals  21,000  miles.  Comparing  the  greater  popu- 
lation of  the  United  States  with  that  of  other  coun- 
tries, its  greater  territory  with  theirs,  its  greater 
coast-line  with  theirs,  our  navy  is  pitiably  small  and 
inefficient. 

Even  though  our  battleships  outnumbered  and 
outclassed  those  of  the  enemy;  even  though  we  had 
a  sufficient  number  of  high-speed  cruisers;  even 
though  our  coast  forts  had  guns  of  fifteen-mile 
range,  instead  of  seven  and  a  half — of  what  value 
will  our  guards  be  to  us  if  we  leave  them  as  now 
with  ammunition  enough  for  only  thirty  minutes' 
fighting? 

"The  amount  actually  available   for   the  guns 


THE  GUARDS  WITHOUT  151 

in  some  of  our  most  important  batteries  is 
sufficient  for  only  thirty  or  forty  minutes'  fir- 
ing." 8 

But  lack  of  sufficient  trained  personnel  is  even 
more  serious  than  lack  of  ammunition — because 
ammunition  can  be  more  easily  obtained. 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  127.    Editorial,  Indiana  newspaper. 

2  Page  128.    National  Defense,  Vol  I,  No.  2. 
8  Page  131.    Associated  Press  report. 

4  Page  134.  Press  report  of  an  interview  with  an  Ameri- 
can naval  officer. 

5  Page  134.  Associated  Press  report  of  interview  with 
John  Hays  Hammond,  Jr. 

6  Page  138.  The  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson,  ex-Secretary 
of  War. 

7  Page  146.    Rear-Admiral  Austin  Knight. 

8  Page  151.  Report  of  the  Army  Committee  of  the 
National  Security  League,  including :  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stim- 
son, ex-Secretary  of  War ;  Colonel  William  C.  Church,  edi- 
tor Army  and  Navy  Journal;  Captain  Matthew  Hannah; 
General  Francis  V.  Greene;  Major  George  Haven  Putnam; 
Colonel  S.  Creighton  Webb,  and  others. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   GUARDS  AT   THE  DOOR 

THE  ordinary  American  citizen  believes  that  the 
guns  of  our  harbour  defence  would  be  able  to 
prevent  a  landing  of  troops  on  our  shores ;  but  the 
layman  does  not  make  a  distinction  between  harbour 
defences  and  land  coast  defences.  The  guns  of  our 
harbour  forts  may  be  of  value  in  opposing  an  attack 
upon  our  cities  and  may  be  of  value  in  preventing 
ships  entering  the  harbour,  but  of  land  coast  de- 
fences, we  have  none!  There  are  1,000  miles  of 
good  beach  on  our  Atlantic  coast  on  which  an  ene- 
my's fleet  could  land  without  the  least  opposition 
any  number  of  troops  they  might  transport  to  our 
shores. 

We  have  no  guns  there;  we  have  no  railroad 
tracks  capable  of  carrying  guns  to  those  points ;  we 
have  not  a  single  armoured  train  in  this  country 
for  the  transportation  of  troops,  guns  and  ammu- 
nition— the  ordinary  freight  car  under  fire  of  an 
enemy  would  be  almost  useless.  So  far  as  prevent- 
ing armed  invasion  of  our  country,  the  guns  at  our 
harbour  defences  are  absolutely  useless. 

152 


THE  GUARDS  AT  THE  DOOR  153 

>—— i^— — — i         — — —  —— — ^ 

We  have  forts  at  Boston,  New  York,  at  the  mouth* 
of  the  Chesapeake  and  on  the  Pacific  coast.  The 
gun  range  of  these  forts  is  less  than  seven  and  a 
half  miles — four  and  a  half  miles  short  of  the 
range  of  the  guns  of  the  battleships  which  would  be 
sent  to  attack  us.  The  main  entrance  of  the  Chesa- 
peake, leading  to  Washington,  is  one  and  a  half 
miles  beyond  the  extreme  range  of  the  guns  at  Fort 
Monroe.  So  that  an  entire  fleet  of  the  enemy  could 
steam  through,  more  than  a  mile  beyond  the  reach 
of  Fort  Henry's  guns. 

The  largest  guns  we  have  mounted  on  our  Atlan- 
tic coast  defences  are  twelve-inch.  They  carry  7^2 
miles.  General  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  who 
has  been  in  the  army  twenty  years,  states  that  if  we 
remount  these  guns  so  as  to  make  greater  elevation 
and  consequently  longer  range  possible,  we  must  re- 
duce the  bursting  charge  or  weaken  the  penetrating 
power  of  the  shell. 

These  guns  might  be  so  mounted  as  to  have  a 
range  of  fifteen  miles.  At  such  a  distance  the 
"angle  of  fall"  is  so  great  that  the  principal  effect 
is  obtained  by  the  shell  falling  on  the  deck.  If 
these  guns  were  remounted  so  as  to  have  a  range  of 
even  fifteen  miles,  the  penetrating  power  of  their 
shells  would  become  practically  nil.  The  penetrat- 
ing power  of  the  shell,  reduced  in  size  from  1,000 
pounds  to  700  pounds,  would  be  but  six  inches.  Six- 
inch  penetration  power  against  modern  battleships 


154 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

renders  a  shell  practically  useless  so  far  as  penetra- 
tion is  concerned.  The  explosion  of  a  shell  which 
penetrates  battleship  armour  but  six  inches  takes 
place  in  the  air  outside  the  ship.  The  real  value 
of  an  explosive  shell  is  in  exploding  within  the  ship, 
either  after  penetrating  the  armour  or  falling  on 
the  deck.  In  other  words,  for  adequate  long-dis- 
tance defence  our  harbour  guns  are  useless  because 
of  their  short  length.  They  would  be  relatively 
weak  if  remounted,  for  either  armour  or  deck 
attack. 

We  are,  however,  soon  to  mount  two  new  gigan- 
tic guns  of  long  range  at  Sandy  Hook.  These  two 
guns  are  to  operate  in  a  single  turret,  hence  it  will 
be  possible  to  aim  them  at  but  one  point  at  a  time. 
If  a  fleet  of  thirty  dreadnoughts  and  battle  cruisers 
attacked  New  York,  each  of  the  thirty  ships  could 
move  about  at  will,  changing  its  location  as  often  as 
desired,  so  that  the  turret  to  be  placed  at  Sandy 
Hook,  to  be  effective  against  such  a  fleet,  would  be 
compelled  to  get  thirty  different  aim  ranges  at  the 
same  time  for  thirty  different  battleships.  But  the 
ships,  moving  themselves  about  as  much  as  they 
pleased,  could  centre  their  one  hundred  and  fifty 
guns  at  the  same  moment  on  the  one  fixed  turret  at 
Sandy  Hook.  Thirty  different  battleships  from 
thirty  different  locations  could  concentrate  the  shot 
of  one  hundred  fifty  guns  on  the  single  turret  at 


THE  GUARDS  AT  THE  DOOR  155 

Sandy  Hook ;  yet  it  could  fire  at  but  one  single  bat- 
tleship at  a  time. 

While  these  two  long-range  guns  could  fire  twenty 
shots  at  thirty  different  moving  ships,  the  battle- 
ships could  hurl  2,000  huge  explosive  shells  upon 
that  fixed  turret.  And  all  other  coast  defence  guns 
would  be  useless  in  such  a  conflict  because  of  their 
short  range. 

"Most  of  the  guns  that  are  mounted  on  our  coast 
fortifications,  that  is — all  those  of  the  8-inch,  10- 
inch,  and  12-inch  calibre — date  back  to  a  design  that 
was  made  in  the  early  nineties  and  late  eighties."  * 

The  good  12-inch  guns  made  for  the  defences  of 
Panama,  after  having  rested  for  months  and  even 
years  on  the  Cristobel  Docks,  are  at  last  mounted; 
but  our  one  big  gun  there,  the  16-inch  gun,  which 
we  have  been  told  was  so  powerful  a  defence  for 
the  canal,  was  still  unmounted  last  January.  It  was 
tested  in  1903  and  then  it  rested  ten  years  on  the 
beach.  When  General  Wood  took  charge  he  imme- 
diately called  for  blue  prints  of  the  carriage  of  this 
gun,  but  was  astonished  to  find  that  the  War  De- 
partment had  never  even  made  a  design  for  the 
carriage.  In  spite  of  his  urging,  it  took  the  depart- 
ment just  two  years  to  get  the  designs  ready,  and 
the  carriage  was  not  finished  in  January  1916, 
though  the  gun  was  finished  and  tested  thirteen 
years  ago.  This,  in  itself,  is  an  adequate  answer 
to  Secretary  Daniels'  proposal  to  have  the  United 


156  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

States  Government  make  its  own  armour,  manu- 
facture its  large  guns,  shells  and  ammunitions. 

Panama  is  better  fortified  than  any  other  portion 
of  our  coast  or  any  other  harbour,  yet  we  have  on 
hand  such  an  insufficient  amount  of  ammunition 
that  after  two  hours'  fire  there  would  not  be  one 
single  shell  for  the  Panama  guns  within  a  thousand 
miles  of  the  Canal.  In  fact,  for  the  sixteen-inch 
gun,  no  shells  are  yet  made.  Congress  has  ex- 
travagantly ordered  55  rounds  for  this  gun,  and  this 
is  under  manufacture  but  not  yet  ready  to  ship. 
For  the  twelve-inch  guns  at  Panama,  only  2,500 
rounds  have  been  shipped. 

"It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  an  hour  and  forty- 
six  minutes  would  suffice  to  exhaust  the  last  round 
of  ammunition  if  the  guns  were  fired  at  their  max- 
imum rate."  2 

It  is  assumed  by  the  American  people  that  if  war 
broke  out,  we  could  manufacture  ammunition 
quickly.  We  are  misled  as  to  our  ability  to  quickly 
produce  sufficient  ammunition  by  what  seems  to  us 
the  enormous  war  orders  which  we  are  filling  for 
Europe.  That  war  has  been  going  on  for  sixteen 
months.  Every  manufacturer  in  the  United  States 
can  sell  two  and  three  and  four  hundred  per  cent, 
more  shells  a  day  than  it  is  possible  for  us  to  manu- 
facture. The  big  industrial  arms  and  steel  fac- 
tories of  the  United  States  have  turned  their  forces 
to  filling  these  orders  because  they  can  obtain  almost 


THE  GUARDS  AT  THE  DOOR  157 

Production  o/AFliliepy  Ammunition 

MILS. 


a 

125.000 

'" 6Q000 

C 

/gooo 

A.  Rounds  of  artillery  ammunition  now  used  every  day  by  France. 
The  figures  are  given  on  the  authority  of  a  Major-General  of  the 
United  States  Army. 

B.  The  number  of  rounds  of  artillery  ammunition  used  every  day 
by  the  British  forces  in  France.  The  figures  are  given  by  the 
same  authority  as  the  above. 

C.  The  number  of  rounds  of  artillery  ammunition  which  all  the 
United  States  Government  factories  and  all  the  private  ammuni- 
tion plants  are  able  to  produce  daily,  after  twenty  months  of  in- 
tense effort  on  the  part  of  our  greatest  industrial  corporations, 
backed  by  our  greatest  financiers,  both  endeavouring  to  turn  out 
the  largest  possible  number  of  shells. 

England  and  France  alone  are  now  using  every  twenty-four  hours 
not  only  as  many  shells  as  all  the  U.  S.  Government  and  private 
manufacturers  in  the  United  States  can  turn  out,  but  87s  per  cent. 


158 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

any  price  asked,  yet  with  all  the  push  of  big  busi- 
ness, knowing  that  enormous  profits  await  them, 
after  sixteen  months'  effort,  all  the  industrial  re- 
sources, governmental  and  private,  are  turning  out 
only  19,000  a  day.  One  of  the  highest  officials  of 
the  United  States  Army  states  that  France  alone 
is  using  125,000  shells  a  day  and  England  60,000. 

But  let  no  layman  think  that  the  factories  of  the 
United  States  can  turn  out  nineteen  thousand  shells 
a  day  for  American  guns! 

Some  of  our  factories  are  turning  out  guns  for 
European  nations ;  other  factories  are  making  shells 
for  Russia.  These  guns  are  made  to  inch  measure. 
The  shells  are  made  to  the  millimetre  measure. 
Even  though  the  shells  and  the  bore  of  the  guns  are 
almost  the  same  size,  the  shell  made  to  the  milli- 
metre measure  cannot  be  used  in  the  gun  made  to 
the  inch  measure.  The  shell  must  exactly  fit  the 
gun — not  "almost"  fit  it. 

A  change  of  machinery  would  be  necessary  to 
make  shells  to  fit  American  guns  and  it  takes 
months  to  make  the  machines  that  make  the  shells. 
It  takes  months  to  make  the  machines  that  in  turn 
make  the  ammunition-making  machines. 

It  is  also  urged  that  we  could,  if  war  were  de- 
clared, run  our  factories  night  and  day,  and  turn 
out  enormous  amounts  of  ammunition,  thus 
equipping  ourselves  in  a  short  time.  Such  an  as- 
sumption or  such  an  argument  is  due  to  ignorance. 


THE  GUARDS  AT  THE  DOOR  159 

At  present  almost  all  of  the  ferro-manganese  which 
our  steel  factories  depend  upon  as  the  alloy,  comes 
from  India  and  Brazil.  We  can  make  ferro-man- 
ganese in  the  United  States;  but  if  our  munition 
manufacturers  should  be  forced  to  make  it  out  of; 
our  ore,  the  manganese  content  would  be  much 
lower.  The  product  would  also  cost  more;  and 
there  would  be  trouble  in  the  factories  before  our 
chemists  became  adjusted  to  the  use  of  the  American 
product. 

If  we  were  at  war,  any  foreign  navy  could  easily 
cut  off  our  supply.  Two  or  three  Bmdens  near  the 
coast  of  Brazil,  or  near  the  ports  of  India,  could 
completely  bar  this  material  from  importation  into 
the  United  States. 

Gun  cotton  is  one  of  the  principal  ingredients  of 
smokeless  powder.  But  to  make  gun  cotton,  it  is 
necessary  to  have  nitric  acid.  Nitric  acid  is  made 
from  nitrates.  By  far  the  largest  source  of  our 
supply  comes  from  Chile.  This  supply  could  also 
be  cut  off.  Our  principal  sulphur  mines  are  along 
the  coast  and  a  foreign  navy  could  easily  take  pos- 
session of  them. 

The  time  to  prepare  for  war  is  before  the  war  be- 
gins. The  great  English  drive,  which  Kitchener 
prophesied  would  take  place  last  May,  failed  to  ma- 
terialise because  General  French  had  shells  only  for 
one  day's  fighting  out  of  seven. 

All  our  forts  are  but  half  manned.     Those  about 


160  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Boston  have  an  average  of  less  than  240  men  each. 
Fort  Wadsworth,  protecting  New  York,  has  a  gar- 
rison of  about  four  hundred  men,  and  Fort  Hamil- 
ton about  one-third  more. 

"Unless  provision  is  made  in  the  near  future  for 
additional  Coast  Artillery  personnel,  it  will  be  nec- 
essary to  reduce  the  garrisons  to  mere  caretaker 
detachments  at  some  of  the  defences  of  lesser  im- 
portance, including  Portsmouth,  Delaware,  Charles- 
ton, Savannah,  Key  West,  New  Bedford,  Potomac, 
Tampa,  Columbia,  Baltimore,  Cape  Fear  and  Mo- 
bile." 3 

A  short  time  ago  one  of  the  two  forts  at  Key 
West,  the  true  key  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  was 
manned  by  a  sergeant  and  his  family.  After  the 
death  of  the  Sergeant,  the  widow  and  her  daughter 
for  months  formed  the  garrison  of  defence. 

General  Weaver,  Chief  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
Division,  stated  in  the  Senate  that  we  have  252 
twelve-inch  guns  already  mounted  without  a  single 
person  to  man  them,  two  f ourteen-inch  guns  mount- 
ed without  a  single  man  to  operate  them  and  37 
eight-inch  guns  mounted  and  useless  with  no  crew, 
71  ten-inch  guns  mounted  without  a  single  man  to 
operate  them.  Modern  guns  are  not  simple  cata- 
pults but  complicated  machineries.  One  has  to  be 
trained  and  skilled  to  handle  them.  No  matter  how 
intelligent  the  American  citizen,  he  cannot  step  in 
and  at  once  operate  one  of  these  guns  off-hand,  as 


THE  GUARDS  AT  THE  DOOR  161 

men  could  jump  in  and  operate  the  guns  of  a  hun- 
dred years  ago. 

A  century  ago  the  guns  used  were  short-range 
guns.  One  could  look  at  the  object  he  aimed  at 
and  by  sighting  over  the  gun  with  his  eye,  bring 
the  gun  into  line. 

But  at  the  present  time  gunners  manipulating 
even  the  seven-mile  range  guns  of  our  harbour  de- 
fences are  unable  to  aim  by  eye.  As  the  gunner 
looks  seven  miles  out  at  sea,  he  sees  only  the  mast 
of  the  ship,  very  little  of  the  hull.  If  the  ship  is 
ten  miles  away  he  sees  no  hull  at  all.  But  even  if 
he  sees  the  entire  deck  of  a  great  dreadnought — 
one,  six  hundred  feet  long — by  holding  a  cigarette 
in  front  of  his  eye  at  arm's  length,  the  entire  ship 
is  completely  shut  off  from  his  vision.  The  mark 
to  be  aimed  at,  so  far  as  the  eye  is  concerned,  is  less 
than  the  size  of  a  cigarette. 

For  instance,  a  few  years  ago  large  mortars  were 
considered  practically  useless — the  aim  was  so  bad. 
However,  since  the  installation  of  base  stations, 
range  finding  and  direction  finding  instruments, 
these  guns  are  valuable  again.  The  use  of  these  in- 
struments for  determining  lateral  deviation,  eleva- 
tion, and  the  handling  of  complicated  machinery  of 
the  guns  is  work  for  skillfully  trained  men. 

Aiming  to-day  is  the  result  of  the  co-operation  of 
three  corps  of  men  at  three  different  places.  The 
man  down  in  the  pit  firing  the  gun  is  unable  to  see 


162 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

anything,  except  the  sky  above  him.  To  argue  that 
an  untrained  man,  even  though  skilled  in  other  lines 
of  mechanics,  could  step  in  and  efficiently  handle 
these  guns  is  as  ridiculous  as  to  argue  that  a  man 
who  has  never  touched  an  automobile  could  enter 
as  a  race-driver  merely  because  he  knew  how  to  run 
a  typewriter. 

But  even  if  more  men  could  be  quickly  trained, 
large  numbers  of  the  guns,  in  fact,  a  very  large 
number,  could  not  be  used  because  we  have  not  suf- 
ficient range-finders.  Direction  and  fire  control 
have  been  installed  only  at  the  most  important  har- 
bour forts  along  our  coasts.  They  have  not  been 
installed  in  other  places,  not  only  because  Congress 
has  not  provided  for  them,  but  because  we  cannot 
import  the  necessary  lenses  at  the  present  time. 
Not  only  are  many  of  the  guns  of  our  coast  de- 
fence absolutely  blind,  but  many  of  the  guns  of 
our  army  and  of  our  navy  could  not  be  used, 
because  we  neither  have  glasses,  nor  can  we 
buy  them.  And,  moreover,  we  cannot  manufacture 
them.  Our  manufacturers  are  dependent  upon  Ger- 
many for  the  glass  for  the  lenses.  At  present  we 
cannot  get  that  glass.  If  Germany  were  to  attack 
us,  she  would  not  kindly  send  us  50,000  or  100,000 
lenses  in  advance.  If  we  were  at  peace  with  Ger- 
many, and  Japan  or  Great  Britain  should  attack  us, 
the  navy  of  Japan  or  the  navy  of  Great  Britain  is 
efficient  enough  to  interfere  with  our  imports. 


THE  GUARDS  AT  THE  DOOR  163 

In  this  case,  as  in  the  case  of  munitions,  the  ques- 
tion is  asked :  Why  can't  we  get  to  work  and  manu- 
facture them?  Chemists  and  workmen  who  are 
specialists  in  this  line  are  rare.  We  have  very  few 
in  this  country.  We  have  not  a  sufficient  number 
of  chemists  and  workmen  specialised  in  these  lines 
to  meet  the  present  demand.  It  takes  time  for  the 
ordinary  chemists  to  become  specialists,  just  as  it 
takes  time  for  the  ordinary  physician  to  acquire  the 
knowledge  and  technique  necessary  to  make  him  a 
specialist. 

Our  coast  fortifications  manned  with  from  160 
to  600  men  can  easily  be  taken  from  the  rear  by 
five  thousand  men,  landed  eight  miles  away,  beyond 
the  range  of  the  guns  of  the  fort.  None  of  the  guns 
protecting  Boston,  New  York  and  the  entrance  to 
Washington  could  be  used  to  repel  a  land  attack. 

"Fortified  harbours  from  the  days  of  the  Romans, 
to  our  own  have  usually  fallen  to  a  land  attack  ren- 
dered possible  by  naval  superiority."  4 

All  along  the  Atlantic  coast  there  are  excellent 
strips  of  beach  from  fifty  to  two  hundred  miles  in 
length.  Speaking  of  the  possibility  of  landing  an 
army  on  these,  General  Francis  Greene  says: 

"From  Portland  to  Portsmouth  there  is  a  stretch 
of  about  fifty  miles  in  which  there  are  no  fortifica- 
tions, from  Portsmouth  to  Boston  a  similar  stretch, 
from  Boston  around  to  Newport  a  still  longer  piece 
of  unfortified  coast;  from  Montauk  Point  to  Coney 


164  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Island  and  from  Sandy  Hook  to  Cape  May,  similar 
stretches  of  sandy  beach,  each  more  than  a  hundred 
miles  in  length." B 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page   155.     General  Weaver,  testifying  before  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs,  House  of  Representatives. 

2  Page  156.    Huidekoper,  in  "The  Military  Unprepared- 
ness  of  the  United  States." 

3  Page  160.    Brigadier-General  E.  M.  Weaver. 

4  Page  163.    National  Defense,  Vol.  I,  No.  2. 

'Page  164.     General  Francis  V.  Greene,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
"The  Present  Military  Situation  in  the  United  States." 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 

AFTER  the  mud  dikes  have  been  washed  away, 
what  will  there  be  to  stop  the  flood? 

When  the  enemy  attacks  our  eastern  or  our  west- 
ern coast,  it  will  be  done  without  warning.  It  will 
be  executed  just  as  Great  Britain  bombarded  Copen- 
hagen in  1807,  just  as  Japan  attacked  China  in  1894, 
just  as  she  unexpectedly  attacked  the  Russian  navy 
two  days  before  declaring  war  against  Russia,  just 
as  Austria  sent  her  soldiers  to  France  in  1914 
three  days  before  she  withdrew  her  ambassador 
from  Paris,  just  as  Germany  marched  into  Belgium 
but  four  hours  after  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Brussels  indignantly  intimated  to  the  Belgian  for- 
eign office  that  the  latter  should  not  even  question 
Germany's  honourable  intentions  respecting  Bel- 
gium's neutrality. 

High  officials  of  both  Germany  and  Japan  have 
informed  their  people  even  in  print  that  when  they 
attack  the  United  States  it  will  be  done  quickly  and 
without  warning.  No  time  to  prepare  will  be 
given  us. 

165 


166 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


OurTreasuFeLandsWbldiWeMustPro/ed 

and  Hiose  of  ftfULRale  Powers 


"Holland       i  «.^» 
Switzerland  t  m  . 

Serbia 
Portugal 

LfbGFftl 

Bulgaria 
Rumanfa 
Uruguay 
Sweden 
Persia 
•Peru 
U.S. 


I    urn 


V*m*m+ 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 167 

OurMeonso/ Protecting  ourTrea sure  Lands 
Compared  with  those  0/  Fifth  Rate  Powers 

Sweden  ^ggmmmmmmmmmmmma^mmmmmmmmm 

Rumania  ■■— m^— iibiiwiii hi  milium ■■ 

Serbia  im— — iiniiiiii  ■nm 

Bulgaria  ■■■■^■■■■ni 

*  Hi 

Switzerland  RBmHrannaH 

Portugal      ■■■B^mHB 

Holland       mmmm 

Liberia 

Persia 

Peru 

Uruguay 

U.S.1 


Although  the  treasure  lands  which  we  have  to  protect  are  from 
420  per  cent,  to  308,330  per  cent,  greater  than  the  lands  of  any  one 
of  the  fifth-rate  powers,  yet  the  mobile  army  which  we  have  in 
the  United  States  to  protect  our  lands  is  but  5.6  per  cent,  of  the 
army  of  Sweden,  and  but  30  per  cent,  of  that  of  Uruguay. 

1.  Entire  United  States  Army  scattered  throughout  United  States, 
in   Porto  Rico,  in  the  Philippines,  in  Hawaii,  in   Alaska. 

2.  The  mobile  army  in  continental  United  States. 


168  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

To  defend  our  eastern  coast  against  a  quick  at- 
tack we  have  an  army  of  6,600  men,  stretched 
from  Maine  to  Florida.  This  army,  in  number, 
equals  one-fifteenth  of  the  army  of  Paraguay,  one- 
sixteenth  of  the  army  of  Siam,  one-seventeenth 
that  of  Guatemala,  one- thirtieth  that  of  Liberia. 

The  soldiers  of  one  thousand  one  hundred  and 
nine  armies,  each  equal  in  size  to  our  entire  army 
of  the  East,  have  been  killed,  wounded  or  taken  pris- 
oners during  the  last  twenty-one  months  in  Europe. 

Even  the  mobile  entire  army  in  the  United  States, 
which  General  Wood  says  might  possibly  be  mobil- 
ised in  thirty  days  by  taking  all  of  our  troops  from 
the  Mexican  border  and  the  Pacific  coast,  numbers 
only  34,000  men  and  they  are  scattered  about  in 
forty-nine  different  ports. 

Of  course,  in  extreme  necessity,  this  regular  army 
could  be  reinforced  by  our  reserve  army  of  sixteen 
men! 

The  English  and  French  have  lost  in  killed  and 
wounded  five  times  as  many  men  as  our  entire  mo- 
bile army  in  the  United  States  on  a  battle  front  not 
twenty  miles  long  in  Gallipoli  alone ! 

And  the  militia !  It  also  is  scattered  from  Boston 
to  Charleston,  from  Seattle  to  Los  Angeles.  On 
paper,  our  militia  numbers  119,000  men.  More 
than  60,000  of  these  men  have  had  no  rifle  practice 
and  only  one-third  of  them  have  been  able  to  pass 
the   test  of   second-class   marksmanship.     Thirty 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  169 


Comparative 


Army  Equipment  Protection  Given  Eatii  Citizen 
By 

USA.      ■ 


Japan 

GEBritam 
Germany 


Army- Police  Protection  Given  Eadi  Often 
U.S.A.  ■ 

Australia 

Old  system 
New  System 


Switzerland 


170 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

thousand  have  never  tried  to  qualify  as  third-class 
marksmen.  Forty- four  thousand  seldom  appear  on 
the  rifle  ranges  from  year  to  year. 

"In  no  state  is  the  prescribed  minimum  peace 
strength  of  all  organisations  of  the  organised  mili- 
tia maintained,  and  in  many  instances  the  deficiency 
has  reached  such  a  figure  as  to  leave  the  correspond- 
ing organisations  such  in  name  only,  organisations 
of  no  value  as  military  assets  to  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment." ' 

"It  is  believed  to  be  a  safe  conclusion  that  not  a 
single  unit  at  its  maximum  strength  marched  a  dis- 
tance of  io  miles  fully  equipped."  2 

In  times  of  war  large  cities  have  to  be  garri- 
soned. If  we  were  to  bunch  together  all  of  our 
mobile  army  and  all  of  our  trained  militia,  we  would 
not  have  a  garrison  equal  to  that  which  Paris  re- 
quires at  the  present  time,  and  Paris  is  only  about 
one-half  the  size  of  New  York,  and  about  a  third 
larger  than  Chicago. 

If  our  entire  army  and  every  man  of  our  militia 
were  to  be  thinly  stretched  out  in  trenches,  they 
would  cover  but  two-thirds  of  the  circumference  of 
Greater  New  York  alone.  If  then  the  entire  mobile 
army  of  the  United  States  and  every  man  of  the 
militia  of  our  forty-eight  states  could  be  made,  as 
by  magic,  to  instantly  appear  in  New  York  City, 
they  could  establish  one  single  trench  but  two-thirds 
the  way  around  Greater  New  York,  leaving  for  the 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 


171 


U.S.Apmy  Protection 
per  1.000,000  Cfifeens 


tnmo 

infMO 

in  kQQ 

tn  tan 

In  1810,  1840  and  1890  we  found  ourselves  well  along  in  great 

peace  periods. 

The  year  1810  was  twenty-eight  years  after  the  close  of  the  War 

of  the  Revolution;  the  year  1840  was  twenty-five  years  after  the 

close  of  the  War  of  1812;  and  the  year  1890  was  twenty-five  years 

after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War. 

During  such  long  peace  periods  without  any  danger  looming  up 

before  a  nation,  the  people  become  indifferent  to  the  army  and 

the  protection  it  may  be  called  upon  to  give  them. 

Yet  to-day,  after  five  years  of  anarchy  to  the  south  of  us,  with  half 

of  the  entire  world  at  war,  with  ourselves  in  greater  danger  than 

at  any  time  since  the  Civil  War,  we  find  that  in  proportion  to  each 

million  of  population,  the  number  of  soldiers  we  have  in  the  United 

States  to  protect  us  is  only  about  25  per  cent  of  what  it  was  in 

1810. 


172  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

enemy  a  free  open  pathway  into  our  interior  thirty 
miles  wide. 

In  proportion  to  our  citizens,  in  proportion  to  our 
area,  and  in  proportion  to  our  wealth,  we  have  a 
smaller  army  than  we  have  had  even  during  the 
great  peace  periods  of  the  United  States. 

In  1810,  twenty-eight  years  after  the  close  of  the 
War  of  the  Revolution,  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives in  Washington  held  that  the  United  States 
would  never  again  be  involved  in  war.  It  was 
during  this  time  that  many  public  men  even  advo- 
cated the  abolition  of  the  army,  believing  that  it 
would  never  be  employed  again. 

By  1840,  twenty-six  years  after  the  War  of  1812- 
14,  we  had  been  at  peace  with  all  Europe  for  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century.  Europe  seemed  disposed  to  let 
us  alone.  There  seemed  to  be  no  reason  why  we 
should  ever  go  to  war  again.  And  once  more  prom- 
inent public  men  at  our  capital  suggested  not  only 
the  abolition  of  our  army,  but  even  the  abolition 
of  our  navy,  hinting  that  the  world  was  so  civilised 
that  no  great  war  would  ever  again  occur. 

By  1890,  twenty-five  years  after  the  close  of  our 
Civil  War,  we  had  again  had  a  generation  of  peace 
and  the  men  in  power  were  of  a  different  age  than 
those  who  had  been  leaders  during  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion.  These  are  three  great  peace  periods  of 
our  national  history — periods  during  which  there 
was  the  least  thought  of  war. 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 


173 


U.S.  Army  Protection 
per  100,000  SquareMfles 


fn  two 

inlA^O 

in  mo 

fn/m 

In  1810,  1840  and  1890  we  found  ourselves  well  along  in  great  peace 
periods. 

The  year  1810  was  twenty-eight  years  after  the  close  of  the  War 
of  the  Revolution,  the  year  1840  was  twenty-five  years  after  the 
close  of  the  War  of  1812 ;  the  year  1890  was  twenty-five  years  after 
the  close  of  the  Civil  War. 

During  such  long  peace  periods  without  any  danger  looming  before 
a  nation,  the  people  become  indifferent  to  the  army  and  the  pro- 
tection it  may  be  called  upon  to  give  them. 

Because  of  the  great  increase  of  our  territory  out  of  all  propor- 
tion to  the  increase  of  our  army,  the  number  of  soldiers  we  have 
to  protect  every  thousand  square  miles  from  invasion  is,  to-day,  but 
one-half  of  what  it  was  in  1810. 


174 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

In  a  democracy  like  that  of  the  United  States,  the 
one  purpose  of  the  army  is  to  protect  the  nation 
from  rebellion,  to  protect  the  nation  from  outside 
attack.  It  is  the  idea  and  duty  of  the  army  to  pro- 
tect its  citizens,  to  protect  its  land,  to  protect  its 
wealth.  But  in  times  of  peace,  especially  after  a 
Whole  generation  of  peace,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
forget  the  value  of  any  army — to  forget  that  a  na- 
tion's citizens,  that  a  nation's  wealth  needs  a  stand- 
ing army  for  its  protection.  Hence  we  might  ex- 
pect that  in  1810,  1840,  1890  the  army  of  the 
United  States  would  have  been  smaller  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  of  its  citizens,  in  proportion  to 
its  area  and  in  proportion  to  its  wealth  than  to-day 
when  nations  and  colonies  of  four  of  the  five  con- 
tinents are  at  war. 

But  in  proportion  to  our  population  our  mobile 
army  in  the  United  States  furnishes  us  to-day  but 
397  soldiers  per  million  population  against  436  in 
1890,  621  in  1840  and  1417  in  1810. 

In  proportion  to  each  hundred  thousand  square 
miles  of  our  territory,  the  mobile  army  in  the  Unit- 
ed States  to-day  furnishes,  for  the  protection  of  that 
unit  of  area,  but  1034  soldiers,  as  against  1041  in 
1890,  1/74  in  1840,  1984  in  18 10. 

That  which  will  most  tempt  foreign  nations,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  number  of  our  people  nor  the 
amount  of  land  we  have — each  of  the  hungry  na- 
tions can  secure  undeveloped  lands  in  South  Amer- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 


175 


U.S.  Army  Proiecff on 
per  Billion  of  U£.Wealth 


Our  wealth  tempts  foreign  nations  more  than  our  population,  more 
even  than  our  land. 

One  week's  bombardment  of  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Washington, 
Boston,  San  Francisco  and  Seattle  might  win  for  a  foreign  power 
indemnities  of  fifteen  billions  of  dollars. 

To-day  more  than  any  other  time  in  our  national  history  we  need 
an  army  to  protect  our  wealth. 

The  army  we  now  have  to  protect  each  billion  of  wealth  is  ridicu- 
lously small  compared  with  that  which  we  had  in  1810,  1840,  and 
1890,  when  we  appeared  to  be  in  no  danger. 

Per  billion  of  wealth,  our  army  in  1890  was  nearly  100  per  cent, 
greater  than  it  is  to-day;  in  1840  it  was  nearly  550  per  cent,  greater; 
and  in  1810  it  was  2,100  per  cent,  greater. 


176  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

ica — but  our  wealth  tempts  them !  In  proportion  to 
each  billion  of  wealth  our  mobile  army  in  the  United 
States  at  the  present  time  furnishes  us  but  245  sol- 
diers against  451  in  1890,  1761  in  1840,  4960  in 
1810.  Yet  there  are  those  who  fear  that  we  are 
becoming  militaristic ! 

We  have  grown  so  rapidly  in  population,  we  have 
added  to  our  territory  so  greatly  and  we  have  grown 
in  wealth  so  enormously  that  our  army  to-day  is  but 
a  handful,  so  far  as  its  ability  to  protect,  compared 
to  the  army  we  supported  in  the  peaceful  days  of 
1 8 10.  And  in  18 10  there  had  not  been,  during  the 
years  previous  to  that  time,  any  great  change  in  the 
matter  of  guns  and  equipment;  but  to-day  things 
have  changed. 

If  we  to-day  had  an  army  proportionate  in  num- 
bers to  our  present  wealth,  as  the  army  of  1810  was 
to  the  wealth  of  the  nation  at  that  time,  it  would 
give  us  to-day  a  mobile  force  in  the  United  States  of 
702,697  fighting  men. 

Neither  Thomas  Jefferson  nor  President  Madi- 
son thought  the  army  in  their  day  too  large, 
although  both  were  opponents  of  a  big  standing 
army.  But  if  our  wealth  in  1810  had  been  as  great 
as  it  is  to-day  the  peace-loving  Jefferson  and  the  pa- 
cifically-inclined Madison  would  probably  have  had 
an  army  of  at  least  700,000  men,  especially  if  the 
population  of  the  United  States  had  then  been 
ninety-seven  millions.     If  the  army  of  18 10  had 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 177 

been  reduced  so  that  the  number  of  men  stood  to 
their  wealth  as  the  number  of  men  in  our  army  to- 
day stands  to  our  present  wealth,  the  United  States 
would  have  had  an  army  in  1810  of  just  491  men. 

Our  little  army  has  practically  no  field  guns. 

"We  now  have  less  than  800  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion to  serve  them  less  than  one  and  one-half  days !" 

"To  send  our  modern  infantry  without  the  pro- 
tection of  field  guns  against  an  enemy  armed  with 
them  is  simply  murder." 

"After  war  breaks  out,  field  guns  cannot  be  pur- 
chased abroad,  nor  can  they  be  extemporised  at 
home.  From  the  date  of  giving  the  order  for  the 
manufacture  of  such  guns  to  the  date  of  delivery  of 
the  first  gun,  an  interval  of  at  least  five  months 
must  necessarily  elapse."  3 

In  Europe  they  are  using  12J/2  and  16^2  inch 
howitzers.  Although  by  June  1,  1915,  the  war  in 
Europe  had  been  in  progress  five  months,  the  Unit- 
ed States  did  not  then  have  a  single  field  howitzer 
greater  than  the  six-inch ;  and  the  United  States  had 
only  thirty-two  of  these  in  all  the  United  States, 
Philippines  and  Hawaii  combined.  Of  the  remain- 
ing, 85  per  cent,  are  less  than  4  inch  and,  moreover, 
80  of  these  are  old  mountain  guns  absolutely  ob- 
solete. 

"We  own  little  over  half  the  guns  which  Russia 
had  at  the  battle  of  Mukden.     Yet  any  ordinary 


178  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

engagement  of  the  European  war  makes  the  battle 
of  Mukden  look  like  a  peace  conference."  4 

The  equipment  of  the  militia  is  worse  than  that 
of  the  regular  army.  It  has  no  siege  artillery  at 
all,  no  large  field  mortars  nor  howitzers ;  and  both 
the  batteries  of  the  regular  army  and  the  militia  are 
without  sufficient  horses  to  draw  them. 

"The  militia  needs  316  of  these  guns  to  complete 
its  equipment."8 

For  the  guns  which  the  army  has  and  for  the 
guns  which  the  militia  have  there  is  not  half  enough 
ammunition. 

For  years  Congress  has  been  urged  to  appropriate 
enough  money  to  provide  our  field  guns  with  an  am- 
munition reserve  of  1856  rounds  per  gun.  This  to 
Congress  seemed  enormous,  although  it  is  66  per 
cent,  of  the  minimum  number  of  rounds  that  Ger- 
many kept  on  hand  in  peace  times.  Year  after 
year  Congress  has  failed  to  provide  for  this  ammu- 
nition reserve.  And  at  the  rate  of  its  past  appro- 
priations, it  will  take  five  years  to  bring  it  up  to  this 
34  to  40  per  cent,  deficiency,  compared  with  the 
number  of  rounds  other  nations  kept  on  hand  when 
at  peace.  At  present,  for  the  guns  actually  made, 
we  have  only  27  per  cent,  of  the  ammunition  asked 
for — 27  per  cent,  of  the  estimate  which  is  infinitely 
lower  than  the  minimum  supply  kept  on  hand  by 
other  nations  during  peace  times.    At  present  Ger- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  179 


Artillery  Equipment 

Germany  mmmmmmmmmmmm 
England 
Japan 
U.S. 


This  chart  represents  only  the  number  of  guns. 
It  is  almost  needless  to  reiterate  that  the  guns  of  our  army  are 
toy  pistols  compared  to  the  great  guns  of  other  powers. 
Germany  has  gigantic  fourteen-,  fifteen-  and  sixteen-inch  guns. 
England  has  hundreds  of  nine-  and  twelve-inch  guns. 
The  United  States,  on  the  ist  of  January,  1915,  as  admitted  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  had  but  634  guns  completed. 
It  is  now  rumoured  that  we  have  850,  and  this  chart  takes  advantage 
of  the  rumour. 

Of  the  actual  number  of  guns  on  hand  January  1,  1915,  85  per  cent, 
were  less  than  4-inch  and  eighty  of  these  were  old  3-inch  mountain 
guns,  absolutely  obsolete. 

1.  This  estimate  of  the  number  of  German  guns  is  very  conserva- 
tive, as  is  also  the  estimate  as  to  the  English  guns.  A  former 
officer  of  staff  of  the  United  States  Army  personally  informed 
the  author  in  January,  1916,  that  Germany  had  at  least  21,000  guns. 


/ 


180  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

many  and  France  are  using  three  hundred  per  cent, 
more  than  their  pre-war  maximum  estimate.  The 
number  of  rounds  now  allotted  to  each  gun  in  the 
German  army  is  more  than  3,000  per  cent,  greater 
than  the  number  of  rounds  we  have  on  hand  per  gun 
in  the  United  States. 

For  the  guns  which  the  army  has  and  for  the 
guns  which  the  militia  have,  there  is  not  half 
enough  ammunition. 

"And  we  have  ammunition  to  serve  those  guns, 
at  the  rate  ammunition  is  now  used,  rather  less  than 
one  day  and  a  half  of  fighting."  6 

Sixty  years  ago  cavalry  scouts  acted  as  eyes  for 
the  army,  reconnoitring  and  reporting  the  location 
of  the  enemy.  To-day  they  are  about  as  efficient  as 
blind  men.  Reconnoitring  is  now  done  by  aero- 
plane. 

"An  army  without  aerial  scouts  and  aerial  aux- 
iliary can  be  coralled  and  slaughtered  like  a  herd  of 
sheep;  a  harbour  or  naval  station  without  aerial 
defence  is  at  the  mercy  of  every  puny  submarine 
and  cruiser." 7 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  England  had  four 
hundred  aeroplanes  and  she  now  finds  it  necessary 
to  manufacture  about  five  hundred  a  week  to  meet 
her  needs  and  those  of  her  allies.  Germany  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  had  about  one  thousand  aero- 
planes and  is  now  manufacturing  at  least   four 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 


181 


Rounds  of  Artillery  Annnunitfon 


a 

1356 

B 
50U 

m 

A.  Daily  rate  at  which  ammunition  has  been  used  on  present  Euro- 
pean battlefields  as  actually  observed  by  an  American  military  au- 
thority, from  the  fire  of  two  German  guns. 

B.  Actual  daily  rate  of  fire  per  gun  of  the  First  Battery  of  the 
Ninth  Artillery  Brigade  at  the  Battle  of  Mudken,  March  3,  1905. 

C.  Actual  daily  amount  of  ammunition  per  gun,  including  all  the 
reserve  ammunition  in  the  United  States,  if  pieced  out  to  last  forty- 
eight  hours.  This  amount  was  actually  used  in  two  and  a  half 
hours  by  a  German  gun,  as  witnessed  by  an  American  military 
observer. 

We  have  on  hand  in  the  army  and  in  reserve  but  27  per  cent,  of 

the  minimum  peace   estimate  of  the  War  Department.     But  our 

minimum  estimate  for  times  of  peace  is  34  per  cent,  less  than  the 

minimum  estimate  made  by  Germany  for  each  gun  in  times  of 

peace. 

This  means  that — in  all  our  reserves — we  have  on  hand  for  each 

gun  but  10  per  cent  of  the  minimum  per  gun  peace  estimate  of 

Germany. 

Germany  is  now  using  three  times  her  maximum  estimate.    Hence 

we  have  on  hand  for  each  gun  but  2.5  per  cent,  of  the  ammunition 

Germany  can  use  per  gun  each  twenty-four  hours. 


182 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

hundred  weekly.  The  United  States  Government 
has  about  thirty  useless  ones.  We  have  fewer  aero- 
planes than  has  Chile,  Greece,  Spain  or  Brazil. 
The  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  testifying, 
stated  that  the  aeroplanes  of  the  navy  were  of  the 
oldest  makes  and  that  none  of  them  were  armoured. 

"On  the  day  President  Wilson's  note  was  trans- 
mitted to  Germany,  the  United  States  Navy  had 
only  three  aeroplanes  in  commission  and  the  Army 
barely  twice  as  many.  Of  the  150  licensed  civil 
aviators  in  the  United  States,  only  half  have  made 
flights  of  more  than  fifty  miles,  and  none  have  ex- 
perience in  cross-country  flying  or  know  even  the 
rudiments  of  military  aeronautical  requirements. 
Our  Army,  Navy,  National  Guard  and  Naval  Mili- 
tia have  had  practically  no  experience  in  handling 
air  craft."  8 

The  Chief  of  the  Department  of  Aerial  Defence 
estimates  that  if  every  aeroplane  factory  in  the  en- 
tire United  States  were  run  to  its  full  capacity, 
night  and  day,  we  could  turn  out  only  three  hun- 
dred weekly. 

One  of  our  greatest  military  authorities,  how- 
ever— Mr.  Carnegie — believes  that  we  do  not  need 
guns,  ammunition,  aeroplanes  or  other  equipment, 
not  even  rifles,  so  long  as  we  have  in  the  United 
States  sixteen  million  men  willing  to  die  for  their 
native  land: 

"I  have  always  said  that  if  at  any  time  any 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  183 


Third  Fourth  and  Fifth  Rare  Powers 
Surpassing  as  in  Aeronautic  Equipment 


Bulgaria 
Rumania 
Serbia 
Spain 
Switzerland! 

U.S.i    - 

US.  2     ■ 
ILS.  5     • 


The  number  of  aeroplanes  respectively  possessed  by  Bulgaria, 
Rumania,  Serbia,  Spain  and  Switzerland  is  greater  than  repre- 
sented here  because  of  the  fact  that  these  nations  have  been  adding 
aeroplanes  to  their  service  since  the  beginning  of  the  war — and  full 
details  of  these  additions  have  not  been  given  out. 
i.  Of  the  aeroplanes  of  the  United  States,  no  two  are  like  any 
other  two;  twenty-three  are  absolutely  obsolete  and  useless;  and 
none  are  armoured. 

2.  Number  of  aeroplanes  supposedly  capable  of  service  which  the 
United  States  was  able  to  get  together  to  aid  in  the  punitive  ex- 
pedition into  Mexico. 

3.  The  number  of  aeroplanes  that  could  actually  aid  in  this  puni- 
tive expedition,  all  others  being  unfit  for  service  or  breaking  down 
on  first  trial. 

On  the  day  President  Wilson's  first  note  was  sent  to  Germany 
the  United  States  had  eight  unarmoured  aeroplanes  in  commission; 
three  in  the  navy  and  five  in  the  army. 


184.  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

country  was  foolish  enough  to  attempt  invasion, 
the  best  possible  plan  would  be  to  make  their  land- 
ing as  easy  as  possible,  point  out  to  them  the  best 
possible  roads,  and  allow  them  to  go  as  far  as  they 
desired  to  go,  inland.  Then  warn  them  to  look 
out,  and  turn  a  million  of  our  16,000,000  militia 
upon  them."  9 

But  what  would  the  invading  enemy  be  doing 
while  we  were  arming  a  million  men?  Arming 
them  with  rifles  alone  would  be  useless  against  the 
shrapnel-throwers  and  rapid-fire  machine  guns  of 
an  invading  army.  But  how  are  we  going  to  in- 
stantly get  a  million  rifles  even,  not  to  say  any- 
thing of  the  larger  guns ! 

Even  if  we  could  raise  a  million  men  in  a  day, 
even  if  we  could  arm  every  man  with  the  best  rifle 
in  the  world  and  supply  them  with  an  abundance 
of  ammunition  for  that  rifle;  what  would  happen 
if  we  tried  to  oppose  the  advance  of  250,000  sol- 
diers, or  100,000  or  even  10,000  men  well  equipped 
with  fan-sweeping  mitrailleuses  and  shrapnel 
guns?  Our  men  would  be  compelled  to  advance 
over  a  strip  of  land  four  miles  wide  before  they 
could  get  within  rifle  range  of  the  foe.  During 
every  step  of  that  four-mile  march,  our  men  would 
be  swept  by  shrapnel ! 

If  a  million  men  in  any  army  of  Europe  should 
be  so  foolhardy  as  to  attempt,  without  the  aid  of 
successive  trenches  and  the  protection  of  heavy 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  185 

artillery,  to  advance  against  250,000  men  equipped 
with  mitrailleuses  the  entire  million  men  could  be 
wiped  out  in  an  hour. 

Armies  of  Europe  are  provided  with  one  or  more 
mitrailleuses  for  every  hundred  men.  The  mitrail- 
leuse is  a  fan-sweeping  rapid-fire  rifle.  It  swings 
in  a  fan  movement  from  left  to  right  and  from 
right  to  left,  firing  from  three  to  seven  hundred 
bullets  at  terrific  speed  every  minute. 

The  only  protection  against  them  is  digging  into 
trenches;  the  only  machines  to  combat  them  are 
heavy  artillery  and  shrapnel-throwers.  To  send 
a  million  rifle-armed  citizen  soldiery  against  such 
guns  would  result,  just  as  General  Wood  and 
Henry  L.  Stimson  have  said  it  would  result,  in 
nothing  less  than  murder. 

A  land  force  of  two  hundred  thousand  invading 
men  would  bring  with  them  at  least  two  thousand 
five  hundred  mitrailleuses,  for  immediate  use,  be- 
sides those  which  they  would  keep  in  reserve. 
These  guns  can  be  carried  on  a  soldier's  back, 
pulled  by  trained  dogs,  attached  to  motorcycles,  or 
even  bicycles.  Such  an  invading  army  could  easily 
bring  75,000  such  guns  if  it  should  be  deemed  nec- 
essary. 

But  even  two  thousand  five  hundred  of  these 
guns  could  fire  in  three  hours,  allowing  for  changes 
of  belts,  cooling  time  and  so  forth,  900,000,000 
shots. 


tl86  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Modern  warfare  is  a  contest  of  trained  brains 
directing  delicate,  complicated,  high-speed,  death- 
dealing  machines !  No  matter  how  strong  the  men, 
how  brave  the  heart,  how  noble  the  soul,  citizen 
soldiery  unequipped  with  like  instruments  and  un- 
directed by  like  brains  are  but  food  for  Moloch! 

But  we  would  not  even  be  allowed  to  arm.  Two 
hundred  thousand  equipped  troops  landed  at  Bos- 
ton, New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Washington 
could  almost  immediately  seize  all  our  eastern  ar- 
senals, our  gun  factories,  our  ammunition,  explo- 
sive and  powder  works;  so  that  we  could  arm  our 
million  men  only  with  golf  clubs,  walking  sticks, 
and  pocket  knives. 

Many  of  the  large  government  ammunition 
works,  gun  factories,  naval  stations,  arsenals  and 
submarine  bases  are  on  the  coast  and  could  be 
easily  destroyed  by  bombardment  from  enemy's 
ships  standing  off  ten  miles  completely  out  of 
range  of  our  coast  guns.  The  enemy,  if  they  so 
wished,  could  destroy  the  five  big  gun  and  am- 
munition works  at  Bridgeport;  the  Winchester 
Arms  Company  and  the  Modern  Firearms  Company 
at  New  Haven,  the  U.  S.  Naval  Magazine  at  Hing- 
ham,  Mass.,  the  United  States  Submarine  Station 
at  Newport,  the  Bliss  Torpedo  Works  at  Brooklyn, 
the  United  States  Navy  Yards  at  Portsmouth,  Bos- 
ton, Brooklyn,  Philadelphia,  Norfolk,  Washington 
and  Charleston,  the  United  States  Arsenal  at  Gov- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  187 

ernor's  Island,  the  Proving  Grounds  at  Indian 
Head,  the  Marine  Barracks  at  Washington  and 
Port  Royal,  the  Naval  Stations  at  Key  West  and 
Guantanamo,  the  new  Du  Pont  factories  at  City 
Point,  Virginia. 

The  location  of  these  works  is  exactly  known  to 
the  navies  of  all  foreign  nations.  Unlike  the  guns 
of  our  harbour  defences,  they  are  not  hidden  in  pits 
from  the  sight  of  the  enemy.  While  there  is  a 
dumb  hope  among  us  that  by  some  miraculous 
means  we  may  be  able  to  prevent  the  guns  of  for- 
eign fleets  destroying  these  factories,  that  hope  is 
indeed  vain. 

Every  man  knows  that  a  difference  of  even  an 
inch  in  the  reach  of  a  prize  fighter  gives  him  a 
great  advantage  over  an  opponent  whose  reach  is 
one  inch  less.  But  what  chance  would  a  prize 
fighter  have  with  arms  32  inches  long  if  he  were 
to  attempt  to  combat  with  a  man  with  arms  64 
inches  long?  Even  if  it  were  possible  to  install 
guns  to  protect  these  works  their  effective  range 
compared  with  the  range  of  the  guns  of  foreign 
battleships  would  be  as  32  to  64. 

The  largest  United  States  arsenal  for  the  manu- 
facture and  storage  of  rifles  is  at  Springfield, 
Massachusetts,  three  hours  by  train  from  Boston 
and  three  and  a  half  hours  from  New  York.  At 
Dover,  New  Jersey — less  than  two  hours  from  New 


188  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

York — are  located  the  big  naval  depots  for  explo- 
sives and  ammunition  for  the  Atlantic  fleet  and 
the  United  States  Army  arsenal,  at  which  prac- 
tically all  the  high  explosives  and  smokeless  pow- 
der of  the  United  States  Government  are  kept. 

Nine-tenths  of  all  the  large  private  manufac- 
tories of  rifles,  rapid-fire  guns,  heavy  artillery, 
shrapnel,  smokeless  gunpowder,  torpedoes  and 
high  explosives  are  within  three  and  a  half  hours 
by  train  from  Boston,  New  York  or  Philadelphia. 

The  principal  private  gun,  ammunition,  powder, 
shrapnel  and  explosive  factories  are  located  as 
follows : 

At  Hartford,  Connecticut,  which  is  but  three 
hours  by  train  from  New  York  and  three  hours 
from  Boston,  are  the  Colt  Patent  Fire  Arms  Com- 
pany and  Pratt  and  Whitney  Works; 

At  New  Haven,  three  hours  from  Boston  and 
three  and  a  half  hours  from  New  York,  is  the 
Smith  &  Wesson  Revolver  Co. ; 

At  Bridgeport,  one  hour  and  a  half  from  New 
York,  are  the  Bridgeport  Arms  Company  (which  is 
of  such  magnitude  that  it  has  been  able  to  take  many 
enormous  European  war  order  contracts — one  or- 
der alone  amounting  to  168  millions  of  dollars), 
the  Union  Metallic  Cartridge  Company,  the  Ameri- 
can-British Manufacturing  Company,  which  makes 
rapid-fire  guns,  and  the  Locomobile  Company; 

At  Troy,  New   York,   four  hours   from   New 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 189 

York,  are  big  gun  factories  and  one  of  the  most 
important  high  explosive  works  in  the  United 
States ; 

At  Schenectady,  four  hours  from  New  York,  is 
the  General  Electric  Co.,  which  has  already  con- 
tracted for  $100,000,000  European  war  orders; 

At  Utica,  which  is  distant  from  New  York  but 
nine  and  ten  hours  by  two  different  routes,  is  the 
Savage  Arms  Company; 

At  I  lion,  nine  hours  from  New  York,  is  the  Rem- 
ington Small  Arms  Company; 

At  Carney's  Point,  Parlin  Lakes  and  Pompton 
Lakes,  each  not  more  than  two  hours  from  New 
York,  are  the  Du  Pont  Smokeless  Powder  Works ; 

At  Dover,  New  Jersey,  but  one  hour  and  a  half 
from  New  York,  is  the  Picantinny  Arsenal ; 

At  Bethlehem,  Pennsylvania,  only  three  hours 
from  New  York,  is  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Works, 
with  its  big  gun  factories,  shrapnel  and  torpedo 
works ; 

At  Philadelphia,  two  hours  from  New  York  and 
on  the  Atlantic  Coast,  is  the  Baldwin  Locomotive 
Company ; 

At  City  Point,  Virginia,  is  the  new  mammoth  Du 
Pont  Powder  Works. 

And  there  are  also  the  Westinghouse  Company, 
the  American  Car  &  Foundry  Company,  the  Ameri- 
can Locomotive  Company,  the  JEtm.  Explosive 
Company,  the  Pressed  Steel  Car  Company,  the  New 


190  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

York  Air  Brake  Company,  the  Crucible  Steel  Com- 
pany, the  Hercules  Powder  Company,  and  the 
Studebaker  Corporation — all  fitted  to  make  supplies 
of  war. 

But  with  the  exception  of  a  very  few  establish- 
ments, all  of  the  foregoing  are  within  ten  hours  by 
rail  of  New  York.  Even  Pittsburg,  the  centre  of 
the  steel  industry  of  the  United  States,  is,  for  a 
military  train  making  no  stops  except  for  change 
of  engines,  but  ten  hours  either  from  New  York 
or  Washington. 

Before  a  foreign  army  landed,  patriotic  citizens 
of  foreign  governments  naturally  loyal  to  their  fa- 
therlands, yet  living  in  the  United  States,  could  cut 
all  telegraphic  and  telephonic  cables  between  New 
York  and  the  West,  and  five  hundred  of  these 
men  by  quick  and  unexpected  attacks  could  seize 
and  control  the  wireless  stations. 

They  could  establish  themselves  in  accordance  to 
previous  instructions  along  the  principal  railways 
leading  out  of  New  York  City,  protecting  the  rail- 
ways from  damage,  and  easily  keeping  them  clear 
for  the  movement  of  foreign  troops. 

I  am  well  aware  that  not  one  out  of  ten  thou- 
sand Americans  will  believe  that  there  is,  within 
the  United  States,  any  military  supervision  of  the 
citizens  of  foreign  governments.  The  sun  shines, 
however,  even  though  blind  men  fail  to  see  it. 
And  if  we  do  not  wake  up  to  the  fact  that  there 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  191 

are  in  the  United  States  at  present  semi-organised 
military  units  of  at  least  four  different  foreign  gov- 
ernments, and  if  we  do  not  immediately  prepare 
to  interfere  with  the  plans  of  those  foreign  gov- 
ernments, we  shall  see  enacted  here  in  our  own 
land  exactly  what  happened  less  than  twenty-two 
months  ago  in  France,  in  Austria  and  in  eastern 
Prussia. 

When  in  19 12  and  19 13  I  made  statements  to 
Germans  of  Russia's  activity  in  East  Prussia,  when 
I  informed  French  friends  in  the  Ministere  de  la 
Marine  as  to  German  war  preparation  in  northern 
and  eastern  France,  each  and  all  shrugged  their 
shoulders,  smiled  patiently  and  indulgently,  think- 
ing me  obsessed. 

The  Russians  had  prepared  the  way  into  Eastern 
Prussia  and  into  Austria.  The  movement  into 
Austria  failed  because  of  the  activities  of  the  secret 
agents  of  the  Austrian  government;  but  even  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  was  not  awake  to  what  the  Rus- 
sians had  been  doing  in  Eastern  Prussia.  General 
von  Hindenburg  for  more  than  half  a  generation 
had  been  fortifying  East  Prussia  until  its  defences 
against  Russian  invasion  were,  according  to  all  Eu- 
ropean military  critics,  the  strongest  in  the  world. 
Yet  Cossacks,  unequipped  with  heavy  artillery,  made 
an  advance  of  scores  of  miles  past  these  "strongest 
and  heaviest  fortifications."  They  were  able  to 
do  so  only  because  the  gates  were  opened  to  them 


192  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


by  Teutonic-Russians  living  in  Eastern  Prussia  and 
because  mines  were  sprung,  opening  up  passage- 
ways. 

And  the  Germans'  advance  to  the  very  gates  of 
Paris  was  due,  partially  at  least,  to  two  gates 
opened  to  them,  one  on  either  side  of  Lille.  Six 
months  after  the  war  began  it  was  found  that  a 
private  assistant  of  one  of  the  most  important  mili- 
tary men  in  France  was  of  foreign  parentage,  al- 
though he  possessed  the  birth  certificate  and  mili- 
tary training  papers  of  a  young  French  lad  who 
had  died  in  a  foreign  country  and  whose  death  had 
not  been  reported  at  home.  Even  nine  months 
after  the  beginning  of  the  war  a  way  was  again 
opened — the  entire  aerial  defences  of  Paris  were 
misdirected — permitting  a  Zeppelin  raid  on  that 
city  in  March,  191 5. 

In  New  York  City,  during  the  last  few  months, 
I  have  heard  discussed  by  citizens  of  three  differ- 
ent foreign  countries  the  methods  by  which  a  ma- 
jority of  the  taxies  and  private  automobiles  of  the 
city  of  New  York  could  be  mobilised  within  five 
hours  after  the  general  order  was  given  to  chauf- 
feurs of  foreign  citizenship;  I  have  heard  explana- 
tions of  the  intelligence  system  by  which  foreigners 
employed  as  drivers  of  large  trucks  can  be  given 
their  instructions  as  to  what  they  are  to  do  and 
how  they  are  to  do  it;  I  have  heard  described  the 
method  of  withholding  food  supplies  from  the  pop- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 193 

ulation  of  New  York  and  the  subsequent  delivery  of 
these  supplies  to  the  invading  army;  I  have  heard 
explanations  of  the  system  by  which  patrols  can  be 
established  on  an  hoar's  notice  on  all  roads  leading 
out  of  New  York,  Jersey  City  and  Hoboken,  pre- 
venting the  passage  of  any  automobile  that  has  not  a 
permit;  the  arrangement  for  cutting  off  the  light 
and  the  power,  if  that  should  be  deemed  necessary ; 
the  organisation  of  foreign  engineers,  repairmen, 
and  railroad  workmen  for  the  repairing  of  any 
damage  to  railroads  occasioned  by  American  citi- 
zens wishing  to  stop  the  advance  of  a  foreign  foe. 

I  am  not  writing  of  the  agents  and  officers  of 
any  one  country;  these  things  have  been  planned 
by  citizens  of  at  least  four  different  foreign  nations. 

And  why  should  they  not  do  so  ?  If  foreign  gov- 
ernments are  planning  to  seize  our  cities  and  hold 
them  for  ransom,  it  would  be  foolish  not  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  advance  of  their  invading  forces 
to  our  ammunition  works,  gun  factories  and 
arsenals? 

There  are  living  in  the  United  States  one  mil- 
lion British  subjects;  at  least  seventy  thousand 
trained  Japanese  soldiers;  and  two  hundred  thou- 
sand loyal  German  and  Austrian  men,  not  German- 
Americans,  but  Germans  and  Austrians  who  have 
no  desire  to  become  citizens,  who  have  never  de- 
clared their  intentions  of  doing  so  and  who  are 
now  reservists  of  the  German  and  Austrian  arm- 


194 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

ies,  under  the  command  of  their  respective  Em- 
perors. 

Within  an  hour  after  the  landing  of  a  hostile 
army  in  New  York  every  railroad  station  could  be 
seized. 

Dover,  where  practically  all  the  high  explosives 
of  the  United  States  are  stored  and  where  the  great 
naval  depot  is  located,  is  but  one  hour  and  a  half 
from  New  York,  even  by  slow  train.  Three  trains 
of  ten  cars  each  running  fifteen  minutes  apart  could 
easily  convey  to  Dover  one  thousand  trained  sol- 
diers with  all  their  light  equipment,  including  one 
hundred  motorcycles,  with  rapid-fire  fan-sweeping 
mitrailleuses.  If  they  could  not  at  once  take  pos- 
session of  the  factories  and  arsenals  they  could 
absolutely  control  the  situation  until  reinforcements 
and  heavy  guns  arrived. 

I  saw  a  French  lad  of  twenty- three,  wounded  in 
the  arm  and  in  the  head,  brought  into  one  of  the 
hospitals  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne.  He  and 
his  companion  had  operated  one  mitrailleuse. 
This  they  had  placed  in  a  small  opening  between 
two  rocks,  so  that  they  were  fairly  well  sheltered. 
These  two  boys  effectively  worked  their  one  ma- 
chine-gun for  three  hours.  When  the  enemy  was 
finally  driven  back  it  was  found  that  1963  dead 
bodies  had  been  left  in  the  fan-sweep  of  this  one 
gun. 

Bridgeport  at  the  east — the  Essen  of  the  United 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 195 

States — is  but  one  and  one-half  hours  from  New 
York.  This  could  be  taken  and  held,  with  the  aid 
of  bombardment  from  the  sea,  more  easily  even 
than  Dover.  With  gatling  guns  once  established, 
the  factories  could  be  held  by  five  hundred  men. 
Other  divisions  could  then  move  on  to  New  Haven 
and  later  to  Hartford.  Another  division  could 
move  to  Springfield  from  Boston,  only  three  hours 
by  rail.  From  the  Pennsylvania  Station  alone, 
trains  of  ten  cars  could  be  run  to  the  west  every 
fifteen  minutes,  if  necessary.  A  hundred  thousand 
troops  could  be  moved  in  seventy-two  hours  to  cap- 
ture all  the  plants  in  New  Jersey  and  Eastern  Penn- 
sylvania. 

Pompton  Lake,  Carney's  Point,  Parlin  Lake  and 
all  the  important  ammunition,  powder  and  explosive 
factories  in  New  Jersey  could  be  reached  from 
New  York  in  less  than  four  hours.  Bethlehem  it* 
self  and  the  eastern  coal  fields  are  but  three  hours 
away. 

From  the  New  York  Central  an  equal  number 
of  trains  could  carry  an  equal  number  of  troops 
to  capture  the  arms  and  ammunition  factories  in 
Eastern  New  York,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut 
and  Rhode  Island. 

But  could  a  foreign  army  accomplish  all  this  in 
the  face  of  the  opposition  of  individual  American 
citizens  ? 


196  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  European  war  France 
mobilised  one  million  men  in  the  first  six  days; 
Belgium  had  two  hundred  thousand  regulars,  re- 
serves and  garde  civique,  and  England  within  fif- 
teen days  had  at  least  forty-five  thousand  men  on 
the  continent.  Yet  three  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand Germans  (an  army  no  larger  than  that  which 
could  be  easily  landed  at  New  York  either  by  Great 
Britain  or  Germany)  although  opposed  by  a  stub- 
born resistance  of  the  Belgians,  forty-five  thousand 
British  and  at  least  one-third  of  the  million  the 
French  had  mobilised,  ploughed  their  way  through 
Belgium,  passed  through  the  open  gates  at  either 
side  of  Lille  and  advanced  200  miles  in  the  face  of 
that  opposition,  to  the  very  suburbs  of  Paris. 

Every  official  of  importance  in  the  United  States 
army  and  every  military  authority  of  the  United 
States  who  has  expressed  his  opinion  regarding 
this  matter  has  asserted  that  a  small  foreign  army 
equipped,  as  European  armies  are  equipped  to-day, 
could  easily  land  on  our  coast,  take  our  port  forti- 
fications by  rear  action  and  advance  into  the  coun- 
try, taking  possession  of  practically  all  our  am- 
munition supplies,  our  gun  factories,  our  explo- 
sive and  torpedo  works,  our  arsenals  and  our  de- 
pots of  military  and  naval  supplies. 

Of  course,  if  we  should  kindly  be  given  six  days' 
notice,  we  could  mobilise  our  twelve  little  field  guns 
east  of  the  Mississippi.    We  could  send  one  toward 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  197 

Boston  to  stop  the  movement  of  foreign  troops  ad- 
vancing upon  the  United  States  Arsenal  at  Spring- 
field. Two  more  guns  could  be  sent  up  the  Hudson 
to  prevent  the  advancing  hosts  moving  on  toward 
Troy,  where  most  important  high  explosive  works 
are  located.  Three  might  be  sent  to  stop  the  ad- 
vance through  New  Jersey  and  eastern  Pennsyl- 
vania ;  two  to  Philadelphia  and  two  to  Washington. 
The  other  two  would  probably  be  kept  to  equip  our 
Army  of  the  East  in  line  of  defence.  Thus  we 
might  arrest  the  invading  armies. 

But  if  these  guns  should  not  stop  or  annihilate 
the  enemy,  the  only  opposition  possible  (if  we  do 
not  at  once  prepare)  would  be  an  avalanche  of  men 
and  our  only  victory — "a  flood  of  blood." 

"The  president  knows  that  if  this  country  needed 
a  million  men,  and  needed  them  in  a  day,  the  call 
could  go  out  at  sunrise  and  the  sun  would  go  down 
on  a  million  men  in  arms."  10 

"American  daring  and  patriotism  will  drive  back 
with  terrible  blows  any  foe  that  dares  put  his  foot 
upon  the  land  of  the  free."  " 

Before  the  present  European  war,  the  forts  of 
Liege,  Namur  and  Antwerp  were  considered  the 
strongest  in  the  world.  Military  experts  agreed 
that  they  could  never  be  taken  nor  destroyed.  Yet 
the  great  German  howitzers  (which  the  French- 
English-American  experts  asserted  existed  "only 


198 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

in  imagination")  cracked  open  the  Belgian  forts 
as  though  they  were  tgg  shells. 

War  to-day  is  a  matter  of  machinery — howitzers, 
shrapnel-throwers  and  rapid-fire  machine  guns. 
Any  army,  not  fully  equipped  with  all  of  these, 
must  bow  to  defeat,  no  matter  how  courageous  and 
stubborn  the  individual  fighting  of  its  soldiers.  If 
any  army  lacks  but  one  element  of  such  equipment, 
that  lack  will  in  all  probability  lead  to  at  least  tem- 
porary defeat. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  French  were 
not  as  well  armed  with  rifles  as  were  the  Germans ; 
they  were  not  as  well  supplied  with  rapid-fire  guns ; 
they  were  not  as  well  equipped  with  shrapnel- 
throwing  guns,  nor  with  heavy  artillery.  Conse- 
quently the  Germans  forced  their  way  from  the 
western  boundary  of  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  to 
the  suburbs  of  Paris  in  four  weeks. 

The  English  in  retreat  were  mown  down  and 
slaughtered,  not  by  individuals,  but  by  German  war- 
machines.  In  one  little  spot  in  southwestern  Bel- 
gium two  thousand  three  hundred  nine  British  sol- 
diers lay  in  one  place  as  a  result  of  two  hours' 
work  of  German  shrapnel  and  rapid-fire  guns.  It 
was  the  price  paid  for  non-equipment! 

Irl  November,  a  year  ago,  General  von  Hinden- 
bur  \  made  a  statement  that  his  field  and  machine 
gur/s  had  filled  in  the  swamps  of  eastern  Prussia 
wi  h  the  dead  bodies  of  the  Russian  Cossacks,  who 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN 199 

had  been  armed  only  with  rifles  and  lances.  The 
Germans  themselves  have  never  spoken  disparag- 
ingly of  the  courage,  bravery  and  stubborn  resist- 
ance of  the  Russian  soldiers;  time  and  again  they 
have  justly  praised  their  fighting  qualities.  Yet 
Russia,  with  a  reserve  of  13,000,000  men  of  mili- 
tary age,  has  been  driven  back  two  hundred  thirty 
miles  because  her  armies  were  not  efficiently 
equipped  with  guns  and  ammunition. 

Since  France  has  acquired  a  supply  of  75's  and 
I55's  and  a  plentitude  of  rapid-fire  machine  guns 
she  has  been  able  to  hold  in  check  and  to  drive  back 
little  by  little  the  well-equipped  Germans. 

A  small  army,  not  numbering  more  than  fifty 
thousand,  if  well  equipped  with  field  artillery, 
shrapnel-throwers,  and  rapid-fire  machine  guns 
drawn  by  dogs  or  carried  on  bicycles,  can  wipe  an 
army  of  half  a  million  men  equipped  as  we  are 
equipped  to-day. 

Remember,  two  French  boys,  with  one  machine 
gun  held  thousands  of  equipped  Germans  at  bay; 
and  as  a  result  of  only  three  hours'  fighting  the 
one  gun  garnered  a  toll  of  1963  dead  bodies. 
There  would  be  no  possible  means  of  preventing 
the  investment  and  capture  of  all  the  arms  and 
ammunition  works,  arsenals  and  naval  depots  of 
Dover. 

No  more  striking  remark  was  made  at  Platts- 


200 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

burg  than  that  of  the  instructor  in  artillery  prac- 
tice, who  said  in  substance: 

"General  Longstreet  and  General  Hill  in  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg  had  in  their  corps,  in  service, 
only  nine  fewer  field  guns  than  there  are  in  the 
regular  army  in  the  United  States  to-day.  We 
have  nine  less  guns  than  were  used  by  two  corps 
at  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg — a  sad  reminder  of  the 
fact  that  the  regular  army  has  to-day,  east  of  the 
Mississippi,  only  three  batteries  (12  guns)  of  field 
artillery." 

Twelve  guns  to  hold  back  an  army  advancing 
from  Portland,  or  Boston,  or  New  York,  or  Phil- 
adelphia, or  Washington,  or  Charleston  or  Savan- 
nah. 

"The  fire  of  modern  field-artillery  is  so  deadly 
that  troops  cannot  advance  over  terrain  swept  by 
these  guns  without  prohibitive  losses.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  to  neutralise  the  fire  of  hostile  guns 
before  our  troops  can  advance,  and  the  only  way  to 
neutralise  the  fire  of  this  hostile  field-artillery  is 
by  field-artillery  guns,  for  troops  armed  with  the 
small  arms  are  about  as  effectual  against  this  fire, 
until  they  arrive  at  2000  yards,  as  though  they 
were  armed  with  knives. 12 

No  enemy  would  attempt  to  land  on  our  shores 
with  less  than  two  hundred  thousand  men,  com- 
pletely armed  and  perfectly  equipped.  Our  entire 
army  of  the  East  is  but  6,600  men  and  they  are 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  201 

scattered  over  a  strip  three  thousand  miles  long. 
They  have  but  twelve  pieces  and  but  44%  of  the 
ammunition  necessary  for  immediate  use. 

"The  Secretary  of  War  (Mr.  Garrison)  has 
stated  on  several  occasions,  although  not  in  public 
utterance,  that  we  have  on  hand  but  one  round  of 
ammunition  for  our  field  artillery/' 13 

I  have  before  me  a  personal  letter  from  one  of 
the  aides  attached  to  the  staff  of  General  Joffre,  in 
which  he  writes  me  of  the  value  of  the  motorcycle 
mitrailleuse  and  its  destructiveness  as  demon- 
strated in  the  present  war.  I  quote  a  portion  of 
that  letter. 

"The  motorcyclette  armed  with  a  small  mitrail- 
leuse such  as  we  now  employ  is  much  more  useful 
than  the  armoured  motor-car.  It  is  very  small; 
one  can  come  very  near  to  the  enemy  without  being 
seen ;  one  can  hide  behind  trees,  bordering  the  road, 
make  an  attack  upon  an  advance  guard  and  get 
away  quickly  and  safely.  If  the  road  is  bad,  one 
can  take  the  muddy  sides  and  avoid  the  big  holes 
which  are  disastrous  for  heavy  carriage ;  one  clever 
rider  and  skillful  operator  can  do  great  harm  in  a 
few  minutes.  As  soon  as  he  arrives  at  the  place  from 
which  he  wishes  to  attack,  he  can  put  his  mitrail- 
leuse in  position  and  destroy  a  patrol,  or  a  convoyA 
or  even  an  advance  guard  and  speed  back  to  his 
own  lines  at  eighty  kilometres  an  hour.  He  can 
change  his  position  so  often  and  so  quickly  that 


202  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

the  enemy's  detachment  cannot  find  his  firing  posi- 
tion. In  the  country  he  offers  only  a  very  small 
target  compared  with  the  big  side  of  a  steel-covered 
motor-car. 

"Three  of  our  cycle-mitrailleuse  accomplished 
here  yesterday  a  wonderful  raid.  They  heard  that  a 
German  regiment  was  going  to  enter,  music  ahead, 
a  village.  They  arrived  in  front  of  the  column 
and  hid  behind  bushes.  As  the  first  ranks  of  the 
Germans  entered,  our  three  men  fanned  them  with 
the  three  motor-cycle  guns.  Every  man  in  the 
German  regiment  was  not  only  wounded,  but 
killed/' 14 

If  a  million  of  our  noblest  men  'sprang  to  arms' 
providing  themselves  with  clubs,  knives,  crowbars, 
revolvers,  shot  guns  and  rifles,  they  would  be  mur- 
dered as  they  advanced  under  the  range  of  the 
enemy's  shrapnel-shell  throwers  and  rapid-fire  fan- 
sweeping  guns.  If  we  remain  unprepared,  a  half 
of  our  "million  men"  will  be  slaughtered  in  this 
way:  and  then  those  who  now  advocate  such  a 
system  of  defence  should  be  held  as  "guilty  of 
murder  in  the  second  degree." 

We  can  raise  a  million  in  a  day ! 

And  we  can  send  forward  a  million  men,  un- 
drilled,  untrained  and  only  partially  armed  to  meet 
the  field  artillery,  the  shrapnel  and  the  rapid-fire 
machine  guns  of  the  present-day  warfare!    But  if 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  203 

we  do  so,  we  shall  form  lakes  in  our  fields,  our  low- 
lands and  our  meadows — out  of  their  blood ! 

Let  us  not  go  into  the  darkness  again  with  un- 
filled lamps! 

We  have  listened  before  to  the  Randolphs  and 
the  Buchanans!  We  have  listened  to  those  who 
preferred  peace-at-any-price ;  we  have  in  the  past 
heeded  those  who  wished  us  to  prepare  only  after 
the  calamity  was  upon  us;  we  have  followed  those 
who  feared  that  sane  preparation  would  turn  us 
into  a  military  camp!  And  each  time,  because  of 
our  stupidity,  we  paid  a  tragic  price  ten-fold  too 
great ! 

It  is  sad  for  a  nation  to  lose  its  men  on  the  bat- 
tlefield, even  when  fighting  for  that  which  is  right- 
eous; but  it  is  vicious  to  live  cowardly  in  the  face 
of  the  evils  which  threaten  us.  Let  us  be  as  will- 
ing to  pay  the  just  price  as  were  the  Christian 
martyrs  at  Rome;  but  let  us  not,  by  listening  to 
false  prophets,  permit  ourselves  to  be  once  more 
forced  to  pay  a  tragically  vain,  needlessly  wasteful, 
wanton  toll  of  blood  again ! 

Yet  even  this  would  not  be  the  full  price,  how- 
ever. Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Wash- 
ington would  be  bombarded  if  we  refused  to  guar- 
antee gigantic  indemnities,  refused  to  abandon  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  refused  to  turn  over  the  trade 
of  South  America  and  the  control  of  the  Panama 
Canal  to  our  foreign  foe. 


204 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Then  we  would  be  compelled  to  take  a  new  posi- 
tion in  the  world  of  affairs!  It  might  correspond 
to  our  present  position  as  Persia's  status  to-day- 
corresponds  to  the  station  she  occupied  before  she 
was  conquered  by  Alexander;  it  might  correspond 
to  our  present  position  as  Spain's  present  interna- 
tional status  compares  with  her  seventeenth  century 
prosperity  and  world  power ;  it  might  correspond  to 
our  present  world  status  as  little  Holland  of  to-day 
compares  with  the  mighty  Netherlands  of  less  than 
three  centuries  ago;  and  it  might  correspond  to 
our  present  supremacy  as  the  condition  of  Poland 
divided  into  Austrian,  German  and  Russian  pro- 
vinces corresponds  to  the  position  occupied  by  that 
renowned  kingdom  before  she  was  apportioned 
among  the  three  hungry  nations  of  her  day. 


QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  170.  Brigadier-General  Miles,  Chief  of  the 
Militia  Division  of  the  War  Department,  United  States 
Government. 

2  Page  170.  Report  of  General  Wotherspoon,  Chief  of 
Staff,  United  States  Army. 

3  Page  177.  From  address  to  Merchants'  Association 
by  the  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson,  ex-Secretary  of  War. 

4  Page  178.  The  Hon.  Augustus  P.  Gardner,  Congress- 
man from  Massachusetts. 

5  Page  178.  Report  of  the  Army  Committee  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  League,  including:  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stim- 


THE  GUARDS  WITHIN  205 

son,  ex-Secretary  of  War;  Colonel  William  C.  Church,  edi- 
tor Army  and  Navy  Journal;  Captain  Matthew  Hannah; 
General  Francis  V.  Greene;  Major  George  Haven  Put- 
nam; Colonel  S.  Creighton  Webb,  and  others. 

6  Page  1 80.    (See  note  4.) 

'Page  180.  Alan  R.  Hawley,  President  Aero  Club  of 
America. 

8  Page  182.    (See  note  7.) 

9  Page  184.  Interview  of  Andrew  Carnegie,  as  reported 
by  the  Associated  Press. 

10  Page  197.  Hon.  William  Jennings  Bryan,  in  address 
to  the  Baltimore  Bar  Association. 

11  Page  197.    American  newspaper  editorial. 

12  Page  200.  General  Leonard  Wood,  Commander  of 
the  Army  of  the  East. 

13  Page  201.  George  Lauferti,  in  "United  States  and  the 
Next  War." 

14  Page  202.  From  personal  letter  from  a  member  of  the 
staff  of  General  Joffre. 


PART    THREE:       WHAT   ARE    OUR 
CHANCES? 


PART  THREE:    WHAT  ARE  OUR 
CHANCES? 

CHAPTER  I 

WHEN  THE  SPIKED  HELMET  COMES 

THE  German  Navy  is  practically  twice  as 
strong  as  ours,  even  if  we  accept  the  official 
figures  of  Berlin  and  Washington  as  the  standards 
of  comparison.  But  most  of  the  German  ships 
have  been  built  during  the  last  twenty  years.  Ger- 
man ships  are  of  the  most  modern  construction, 
while  many  of  our  listed  ships  are  out  of  commis- 
sion, "grey-bearded"  or  in  their  "second  childhood" 
— one  J2  years  old  has  just  this  year  been  disposed 
of  by  the  Navy  Department. 

How  misleading  comparisons,  made  by  listing 
anything  and  everything,  really  are,  can  be  judged 
from  the  official  statement  of  Naval  Intelligence, 
United  States  Navy  Department,  issued  only  thirty 
days  previous  to  the  beginning  of  the  present  Eu- 
ropean War.  It  assured  us  in  figures  that  we  had 
three  more  submarines  than  Germany  had  and  that 
we  were  building  more  than  Germany. 

Very  few  of  our  ships  have  guns  that  can  be  ele- 

209 


210 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

vated  more  than  10  degrees ;  a  few  can  be  elevated 
15  degrees.  Most  of  the  German  ships  have  guns 
that  can  be  elevated  from  20  to  28  degrees.  This 
is  of  supreme  importance!  Even  the  eleven-inch 
guns  of  the  Germans  because  of  this  advantage  can 
throw  explosives  fourteen  miles. 

"Germany  can  oppose  twenty  dreadnoughts  to 
our  ten,  and,  judging  from  such  naval  actions  as 
were  fought  in  the  late  war,  in  which  both  the  gun- 
nery and  the  seamanship  of  the  Germans  was  ex- 
cellent, there  can  be  little  doubt  that  with  such 
great  odds  against  us  we  should  be  defeated."  * 

Germany  could  send  against  us  nearly  twice  as 
many  dreadnoughts  and  battleships  as  we  could  to 
oppose  their  attack.  And  the  German  dreadnoughts 
have  greater  speed;  their  guns  have  longer  range 
and  can  be  elevated  twice  as  high  as  the  guns  on 
our  ships.  Germany  can  send  against  us  six  times 
as  many  swift  cruisers  as  we  have.  Germany  could 
send  against  us  more  than  twice  as  many  destroyers 
as  we  could  employ  in  opposition;  Germany  could 
easily  send  fifty  of  the  most  modern  submarines. 
On  the  Atlantic  coast  we  have  eighteen.  Five  of 
these  are  located  at  Panama.  Two,  north  of  Pan- 
ama, are  capable  of  operation  under  water. 

If  they  wished  they  could  easily  transport  to  our 
shores  five  hundred  thousand  men,  but  the  General 
Staff  at  Berlin  knows  that  250,000  veterans  are 
sufficient.     Consequently  their  definite  plans  are 


WHEN  THE  SPIKED  HELMET  COMES     211 


Our  Chances  at  Sea  against  a  German  AliacK  * 
Germany  U.S.A. 

Batfleshfps.„ 

Average  Speed. 
Oun  Range 
GunElevatfoi 
TorpedoT 

Baffle  cruisers 
scout  cruisers 

Destroyers. 

Submarines 


N.  B.  Lines  representing  the  same  United  States  factors  of  defence 
may  vary  on  different  charts  because  they  represent  proportional 
values. 

1.  This  chart  represents  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  scout  cruisers 
and  destroyers  authorised  and  laid  down  by  Germany  and  the 
United  States  from  December  31,  1904,  to  January,  1914.  These 
modern  boats  are  the  ones  that  determine  sea  battles.  Grey  beards, 
ships  in  reserve  and  ships  in  ordinary  are  not  an  aid.  They  hinder 
the  speed  of  the  fleet,  they  have  to  be  taken  care  of  by  the  modern 
ships;  hence,  their  detrimental  value  in  modern  battle. 

Since  January  1,  1914,  Germany  has  been  building  modern  battle- 
ships, battle  cruisers,  scout  cruisers,  destroyers  and  submarines  at 
a  tremendous  rate.    We  have  been  lagging  woefully  behind. 

2.  Torpedo  tubes  for  modern  torpedoes  which  we  will  have  after 
the  Oklahoma  and  Nevada  are  in  service. 

3.  The  three  scout  cruisers  we  have  are  of  doubtful  value,  because 
of  their  defective  furnaces. 

4.  Representing  the  proportion  of  all  our  useless  submarines  to 
the  submarines  Germany  could  spare  from  European  waters. 

5.  Representing  the  proportion  of  submarines  able  to  submerge,  to 
those  Germany  could  send  to  attack  us. 


212  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

made  for  the  transportation  of  but  a  quarter  mil- 
lion well-equipped  perfectly  armed  men. 

"Germany  has  the  second  largest  merchant  ma- 
rine in  the  world,  which  affords  a  first-class  trans- 
port fleet,  not  surpassed  even  by  England's." 

"Germany  has  greater  resources  for  enterprises 
of  this  kind,  and  is  more  efficient  than  any  other 
country." 

"In  our  loading  of  East  Asia  transports,  it  re- 
quired one  to  one  and  one-half  hours  to  load  one 
battalion.  The  speed  of  our  loading  has  amazed 
departmental  circles  in  general." 

"For  long-distance  transportation  our  large  har- 
bours on  the  North  and  East  Seas  can  be  utilised 
equally  well  for  embarkation.  Speed  is  the  chief 
requisite" 

"Especially  suitable  harbours  on  the  North  Sea 
are  Emden,  Wilhelmshaven  and  Bremerhaven  in 
connection  with  Bremen,  and  Cuxhaven  with  Ham- 
burg and  Gluckstadt." 

"Bremerhaven  is  by  far  the  best.  From  this 
point  two  or  more  divisions  could  be  shipped  daily 
without  difficulty.  Cuxhaven  is  not  so  well  situated, 
but  its  connection  with  Hamburg  is  important.  If 
it  were  brought  up  to  full  development  it  could 
take  care  of  two  divisions  a  day,  which  Hamburg 
could  well  supply." 

"The  United  States  at  this  time  is  not  in  a  posi- 


WHEN  THE  SPIKED  HELMET  COMES     213 

tion  to  oppose  our  troops  with  an  army  of  equal 
rank.  Its  regular  army  actually  totals  65,000  men, 
of  whom  not  more  than  30,000  are  ready  to  defend 
the  home  country."  2 

Certainly  the  Germans  would  not  land  an  invad- 
ing army  without  thoroughly  equipping  them. 
Their  250,000  men  would  bring  with  them  148  bat- 
teries of  six  guns  each — 888  guns.  It  is  reported  by 
several  different  military  authorities  that  we  have 
twelve  field  guns  east  of  the  Mississippi ;  even  should 
this  number  be  tripled,  we  would  have  but  one  field 
gun  to  every  24  of  the  Germans.  Germany,  accord- 
ing to  the  present  minimum  armament  of  the  men 
she  has  in  the  field  (and  her  men  must  be  well 
equipped  or  they  could  not  hold  their  trenches)  has 
now  a  reserve  of  19,400  field  guns,  while  we  have 
but  850.  The  average  size  of  the  German  guns  is 
twice  the  size  of  ours. 

The  German  army  would  be  amply  supplied  with 
ammunition.  Germany  has  shown  for  twenty-two 
months  that  she  does  not  start  a  campaign  until  she 
is  able  to  furnish  sufficient  supplies. 

"It  is  almost  a  certainty  that  a  victorious  assault 
on  the  Atlantic  coast,  tying  up  the  importing  and 
exporting  business  of  the  whole  country,  would 
bring  about  such  an  annoying  situation  that  the 
government  (U.  S.  A.)  would  be  willing  to  treat  for 
peace." 

"To  accomplish  this  end,  the  invaders  would  have 


214 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

to  INFLICT  REAL  MATERIAL  DAMAGE  by 
injuring  the  whole  country  through  the  successful 
seizure  of  many  of  the  Atlantic  seaports  in  which 
the  threads  of  the  entire  wealth  of  the  nation 
meet."  3 

(The  italics  and  capitals  are  the  author's.) 
Only  peace-at-any-price  insanity  can  prevent  us 
from  realising  that  once  the  Germans  have  crossed 
the  Atlantic,  they  will,  unless  we  agree  to  their 
demands,  carry  on  a  campaign  of  destructiveness 
{real  material  damage). 

On  the  chart  "Our  Chances  on  Land  Against 
German  Invasion,"  as  well  as  on  the  chart,  "Our 
Chances  on  Land  Against  British  Invasion,"  every 
fighting  factor  of  the  United  States  is  not  only 
given  at  its  full  value,  but  oftentimes  greatly  exag- 
gerated. This  is  done  not  to  mislead,  but  because 
of  my  desire  not  to  underestimate  any  factor  of  our 
resources.  For  instance,  the  line  representing  the 
guns  with  our  Army  of  the  East  (the  only  army 
together  with  the  Eastern  Militia  that  could  be 
gathered  quickly  enough  to  meet  a  rapid  invasion) 
is  900%  longer  than  it  ought  really  to  be!  It  is 
made  thus  because  it  is  hoped  that,  by  some  mi- 
raculous means,  a  few  of  the  guns  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi might  be  rushed  to  the  Eastern  coast  in 
time  to  be  of  some  value.  The  most  sanguine  opti- 
mist, however,  can  hardly  expect  me  to  give  greater 
leeway  than  an  exaggerated  estimate  of  900%. 


WHEN  THE  SPIKED  HELMET  COMES     215 

OurChaiues  on  land  against  German  Invasion 
fompapatfve  Values 


Dew 


Invading  Army    Oerj 
Opposing  Arniy    IL 


uunswirtiArmy 
Guns  in  Reserve 
Sixeofuuns 


U.S.H2 


uer.i 
U.8J 

Oerj 

ILSj 


Ammunftton  Supply: 
lsllShours^ 


Merwurds0 


US. 


N.  B.  Lines  representing  the  same  U.  S.  factors  of  defence  may 
vary  on  different  charts  because  they  represent  proportional  values, 
(i)  Representing  the  entire  army  which  can  be  mobilised  in  thirty 
days,  men  in  our  Atlantic  Coast  defences,  and  the  militia  of  the 
Eastern  States. 

(2)  Representing  900  per  cent,  more  field  guns  than  we  now  have 
with  our  entire  army  east  of  the  Mississippi  River. 

(3)  And  in  addition,  a  line  500  per  cent,  longer. 

(4)  Representing  all  of  the  field  guns  in  the  United  States. 


216 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

All  lines  representing  supplies  are  of  course  greater 
than  the  actual  amount  on  hand. 

At  the  same  time  the  invader  could  without  doubt 
have  the  aid  of  warring  factions  in  Mexico  whose 
attempted  invasion  of  the  United  States  from  the 
south  would  compel  us  to  keep  on  the  Texan  border 
the  eighteen  thousand  troops  we  already  have  sta- 
tioned there. 

To  meet  the  Atlantic  invasion  we  would  then 
have  an  army  of  6,600  men,  supplied  with  enough 
ammunition,  stored  in  many  different  arsenals  in 
various  parts  of  the  United  States,  to  fight  for 
thirty-six  hours.  Besides  these  regular  troops, 
we  might  oppose  them  with  unarmed  volunteers. 

"Two  real  defenders  of  the  country  that  must 
not  be  forgotten  are  Major-General  Frederick 
Funston,  and  Major-General  Leonard  Wood. 
General  Funston  has  11,000  men  under  his  com- 
mand in  the  Department  of  the  South,  including 
Texas,  through  which  hostile  forces  might  seek  to 
come  from  Mexico.  He  is  a  veteran  and  knows 
how  to  handle  troops.  General  Wood  commands 
the  Eastern  Division  and  has  6,600  men  under  his 
command. 4 

No  one  doubts  for  a  moment  the  ability,  the 
saneness  and  the  justly  honoured  efficiency  of  Gen- 
eral Wood;  and  for  that  very  reason  we  ought  to 
accept  his  opinion  as  to  what  he  could  do  with  the 
army  in  its  present  condition.     He  has  definitely 


WHEN  THE  SPIKED  HELMET  COMES    217 

stated  that  it  would  take  at  least  thirty  days  to 
mobilise  our  present  army  of  34,000  men,  to  say 
nothing  of  enlisting,  organising  and  equipping  a 
citizen  soldiery. 

Does  the  newspaper  editor  above  quoted  expect 
that  a  quarter-million  German  veterans,  who  have 
performed  deeds  of  valour  in  Belgium,  would,  if 
General  Wood  should  mount  the  base  of  the  Statue 
of  Liberty  and  wave  his  arms  in  the  air,  take  fright 
and  drown  themselves  by  plunging  in  terror  into 
the  sea? 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  210.  J.  Bernard  Walker,  Chairman  of  the  Navy 
Committee,  National  Security  League,  and  editor  Scientific 
American. 

2  Page  213.  From  book  outlining  Germany's  means  and 
method  of  attacking  England  and  the  United  States;  pre- 
pared by  Freiherr  von  Edelsheim,  when  member  of  the 
General  Staff  at  Berlin;  book  approved  by  the  Kaiser  and 
widely  circulated. 

3  Page  214.    (See  note  2.) 

4  Page  216.    Indiana  newspaper  editorial. 


CHAPTER  II 

WHEN  THE  BROWN   MAN   COMES 

THE  Japanese  cannot  afford  another  war ;  their 
national  debt  is  now  one-eighth  their  national 
wealth." 

"The  Japanese  might  attack  the  Philippines,  but 
they  would  not  attempt  to  bring  an  army  across 
the  Pacific;  they  could  not  do  so  if  they  wished — 
such  a  feat  is  impossible !" 

"Besides  the  fleet  on  the  Pacific,  the  United) 
States  has  eight  submarines  here  and  coast  forts 
that  are  declared  impregnable.  Certainly  an  enemy 
would  find  itself  as  hard  put  in  attempting  to  in- 
vade our  west  coast  as  the  Allies  are  in  attempting 
to  storm  the  Dardanelles." 

"If  the  Japanese  ever  come  to  attack  us,  we'll 
drown  them  like  rats  in  the  Pacific."  * 

Our  greatest  danger  in  connection  with  the  Japa- 
nese is  that  we  stupidly  laugh  at  the  idea  that  they 
may  attack  us  and  refuse  to  see  things  as  they 
are. 

It  is  possible  for  Japan,  if  she  wishes,  to  send 
three  hundred  thousand  or  half  a  million  troops  to 

218 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        219 

our  shores.  With  the  exception  of  one  British 
steamship  line,  all  the  traffic  between  America  and 
Japan  is  now  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese.  The 
Nippon  Yusen  line  alone  has  a  tonnage  of  three 
hundred  thousand  tons.  The  Toyo  Kisen  Kaisha 
has  an  enormous  tonnage.  To-day  Japan  controls 
all  but  about  70,000  tonnage  of  the  Pacific  trade. 
But  Japan  would  not  even  need  these. 

"Japan  has  a  major  transport  fleet,  as  shown  by 
the  figures  in  1909,  of  forty  steamers,  with  a  troop 
capacity  of  1 14,235,  and  a  minor  transport  fleet  of 
fifty-five  steamers,  with  a  troop  capacity  of  85,292; 
or  199,526  in  all.  These  are  army  transports 
alone,  and  do  not  include  passenger  ships  which 
could  be  utilised.  Compared  with  this  the  United 
States  has  a  transport  fleet  of  ten  ships,  with  a 
troop  capacity  of  15,758.  There  are  only  four 
transport  ships  on  the  Pacific  coast."  2 

The  marvellous  transportation  system  of  the 
Japanese  makes  us  understand  why  they  laugh  at 
ours.  When  General  Funston  was  ordered  in  April, 
1 9 14,  to  take  his  command  from  Galveston  to  Vera 
Cruz  a  major  portion  of  the  troops  had  to  be  left 
behind  because  there  were  not  sufficient  transports 
to  carry  them.  Consequently  he  could  take  to  Vera 
Cruz  less  than  4,200  men.  Moreover,  much  of  the 
field  artillery  and  cavalry  had  to  be  left  behind. 

Compare  the  inefficiency  of  our  transportation 
system,  which,  after  months  of  strain  with  Mexico, 


220 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

was  unable  to  handle  four  thousand  men  with  the 
efficient  Japanese  transportation  system,  which  has 
a  troop  capacity  of  199,000  independent  of  her 
passenger  ships. 

But  to  land  Japanese  troops  and  to  furnish  sup- 
plies for  those  already  in  the  United  States,  their 
navy  must  meet  our  navy  in  the  Pacific. 

Our  navy  has  more  ships  than  the  Japanese.  But 
we  could  not  run  the  risk  of  sending  our  complete 
navy  to  the  Pacific  in  time  to  decide  a  naval  battle 
even  were  it  possible  to  do  so. 

The  Japanese  have  four  super-dreadnoughts  of 
high  speed  with  guns  capable  of  higher  elevation 
than  ours.  We  have  not  a  single  dreadnought  of 
this  class.  Japan  will  have  two  more  finished  this 
year.  If  Congress  orders  one  or  one-and-a-half  or 
two,  they  cannot  be  finished  within  three  or  four 
years. 

As  fighting  ships  we  include  everything,  no  mat- 
ter what  the  size,  the  age,  or  the  uselessness  of  the 
craft.  A  very  few  of  our  ships  of  our  Pacific  fleet 
have  four  eight-inch  guns  each.  Most  of  them  are 
equipped  with  only  six-,  five-  and  three-inch  guns. 
These  compare  to  the  mammoth  guns  on  the  Japa- 
nese ships  about  as  a  boy's  Fourth  of  July  toy 
pistol  compares  to  a  .38  Smith  and  Wesson.  Our 
largest  ship  in  the  Pacific  has  a  displacement  of  a 
little  over  13,000  tons,  while  the  Japanese  have  bat- 
tleships with  displacements  of  from  25,000  to  31,- 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        221 

ooo  tons.  One  can  judge  best  of  their  real  value 
by  their  cost.  A  good  battleship  to-day  costs  from 
$15,000,000  to  $18,000,000.  We  have  three  in  the 
Pacific  which  cost  a  little  over  five  million;  a  few 
others  are  one-and-a-half-  and  two-million-dollar 
ships;  some  cost  less  than  one-quarter  of  one  mil- 
lion dollars.  Japan  has  twenty-five  fighting  ships 
each  of  which  cost  from  five  to  fifteen  million 
dollars. 

More  striking  still  than  the  difference  in  number 
and  differences  of  grade,  stated  separately,  is  a 
comparison  of  the  number  of  Japanese  battleships 
that  surpasses  the  best  we  have  in  the  Pacific. 
Japan  has  twenty  ships,  every  one  of  which  is  su- 
perior to  the  very  best  we  have  in  the  Pacific. 
What  chance,  then,  would  our  tug  boats  and  our 
gun  boats  and  our  old  light-armoured  cruisers  have 
against  the  Japanese  navy? 

We  have  in  the  Pacific  less  than  twenty  ships. 
Japan  has  a  navy   of  modern  battleships. 

The  Fuso  has  twelve  14-inch  guns,  as  well  as 
more  smaller  ones  than  we  have  on  any  one  ship  in 
the  Pacific.  The  Haruna,  Hiyei,  Kirishima,  and 
Kongo  each  have  eight  14-inch  guns.  The  Ka- 
waychi  has  twelve  12-inch  guns.  There  are  three 
more  battleships  of  the  Fuso  class  which  are  al- 
most finished.  These  ships  alone  have  64  torpedo 
tubes.    Our  ships  on  the  Pacific  have  a  total  of 


ggj AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

eighteen  torpedo  tubes  and  all  of  them  are  admitted 
to  be  useless. 

Some  of  Japan's  ships  have  a  speed  of  27  knots. 
We  have  not  a  single  battleship  in  our  navy  that 
can  maintain  a  speed  of  more  than  22  knots. 

All  of  our  F  type  submarines  which  were  lately 
accepted  and  stationed  at  Honolulu  are  now  admit- 
ted to  be  useless  because  of  faulty  construction. 
They  are  reported  out  of  commission. 

Our  Pacific  fleet,  besides  being  inefficient,  is 
without  sufficient  ammunition  and  often  has  not  had 
coal  enough  to  steam  from  our  Pacific  ports  to 
Honolulu  and  back  again!  Even  though  govern- 
ments at  Washington  have  known — twice  in  the 
last  five  years — that  a  Japanese  attack  might  be 
made  at  any  hour. 

We  have  naval  stations  in  the  Pacific  and  on  our 
Pacific  Coast ;  but  the  nearest  naval  magazine  from 
which  our  tiny  supplies  might  be  drawn  is  Mifflin, 
Pennsylvania.  This,  however,  is  not  a  very  im- 
portant magazine  and,  next  to  it,  the  nearest  one  to 
the  Pacific  coast  is  Dover,  New  Jersey, — some  three 
thousand  miles  overland  from  the  Pacific  coast  and 
some  ten  thousand  miles  overland  from  the  Philip- 
pines. 

When  Japan  moves  she  will  do  so  suddenly  and 
without  warning.  It  will  be  an  attack  in  the  night 
and  we  will  not  be  allowed  one  moment's  prepara- 
tion. 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        223 


Our  Chances  at  Sea  against  a  Japanese  Attack  * 

Japan  U.S.A. 

SuperDreudnau 

Battleships  and... 

Baffle  Cruisers  — 

Average  Speed 

aim  Range 

Qun  Elevation 

Totpedolubes 

Scout  Cruisers 

Destajyias.--. 
Submarines 


N.  B.  Lines  representing  the  same  United  States  factors  of  defence 
may  vary  on  different  charts,  because  they  represent  proportional 
values. 

i.  This  chart  represents  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  scout  cruisers 
and  destroyers  authorised  and  laid  down  by  Japan  and  the  United 
States  from  December  31,  1904,  to  January,  1914.  These  modern 
boats  are  the  ones  that  determine  sea  battles.  Grey  beards,  ships 
in  reserve  and  ships  in  ordinary  are  not  an  aid.  They  hinder  the 
speed  of  the  fleet,  they  have  to  be  taken  care  of  by  the  modern 
ships;  hence  their  detrimental  value  in  modern  battle. 
Since  January  1,  1914,  Japan  has  been  building  modern  battleships, 
battle  cruisers,  scout  cruisers,  destroyers  and  submarines  at  a  tre- 
mendous rate.    We  have  been  lagging  woefully  behind. 

2.  Torpedo  tubes  for  modern  torpedoes  which  we  will  have  after 
the  Oklahoma  and  Nevada  are  in  service. 

3.  Representing  the  proportion  of  all  our  useless  submarines  to 
the  submarines  Japan  has. 

4.  Representing  the  proportion  of  our  submarines  able  to  submerge, 
to  those  Japan  could  send  to  attack  us. 


g£4 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Manila  is  well  fortified  but  each  fort  can  be  eas- 
ily taken  from  the  rear.  All  the  military  authori- 
ties agree  that  landing  would  be  comparatively 
easy. 

"There  are  no  fortifications  on  Lingayen  Bay  on 
the  North,  Balayan  Bay  on  the  South,  or  Lamon 
Bay  on  the  east.  A  landing  at  either  of  these  points 
presents  no  difficulties,  and  once  landed  it  is  but  a 
few  days'  march  to  the  rear  of  Manila."  8 

"Little  does  the  United  States  know  that  we 
(the  Japanese)  have  many  plans  arranged  for  the 
destruction  of  the  Manila  forts  and  guns." 4 

"There  will  leave  our  great  naval  base  at  Yok- 
suka  50,000  of  our  men  in  a  suitable  number  of 
transports,  that  will  be  amply  protected  by  fast 
cruisers.  This  flotilla  will  land  part  of  the  troops 
at  Lingayan  and  part  near  Polillo,  at  the  rear  of 
Manila.  They  will  take  but  a  short  time  to  disem- 
bark and  will  advance,  converging  toward  one  an- 
other, having  all  plans  laid  to  attack  the  port  of 
Manila  from  the  rear — which  is  its  weakest  part."  5 

At  Honolulu  we  have  spent  millions  fortifying 
Pearl  Harbour,  but  there  is  not  enough  ammunition 
to  fight  twenty- four  hours. 

"Our  first  move  will  be  to  seize  Honolulu !  This 
can  very  simply  be  done  by  a  fleet  of  transports  car- 
rying 30,000  men  and  protected  by  our  fast  cruis- 
er-class ships.  .  .  . 

"The  Hawaiian  Islands  are  only  distant  from 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        225 

San  Francisco  a  few  hours  by  our  fast  warships 
and  cruisers,  and  in  the  islands  are  at  present  80,- 
000  Japanese — all  of  them  have  received  army  in- 
struction and  they  know  their  duty !"  6 

Experience  at  the  Panama  Canal  has  amply  con- 
vinced us  that  slides  are  at  least  possible. 

"The  Americans  boast  of  their  Panama  Canal, 
but  it  is  only  too  ridiculously  simple  for  us  to  dyna- 
mite it  effectually — at  the  cost  of  an  old  steamship 
loaded  with  explosives. 

"Or  the  canal  can  be  instantly  dynamited  by  our 
people,  who  are  living  quite  near  it,  and  before 
anything  can  be  done  by  the  United  States  Navy 
our  ships  will  be  in  full  possession  of  the  impor- 
tant points.  .  .  . 

"And  before  the  United  States  warships  can 
come  all  the  way  around  South  America  we  will 
have  seized  the  islands !  These  lie  much  nearer  to 
our  shores  than  they  do  to  the  United  States  coast, 
and  it  will  be  a  very  difficult  matter  to  oust  us, — 
our  navy  is  much  stronger  than  the  American,  bet- 
ter equipped  and  better  officered.  .  .  . 

"The  Honolulu  group  of  islands,  however,  is 
not  large  enough  to  adequately  support  our  coun- 
trymen. We  can  seize  the  port  and  fortifications 
(such  as  they  are)  with  the  greatest  of  ease,  thus 
permitting  about  60  per  cent,  of  our  people  already 
there  to  help  in  breaking  California's  shut  door."  T 

The  only  thing  the  United  States  could  do  to 


226  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

^— — — — ^— — ^ BBBi — — ^— -^— ^— — — — —— — — «"^— • — — — ^— ^— — — 

prevent  a  landing  on  the  Pacific  would  be  to  send 
our  fleet  around  South  America  or  our  soldiers 
over  the  mountains. 

Seven-tenths  or  more  of  our  soldiers  are  east  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains;  while  the  Japanese  have  al- 
ready on  our  soil,  or  in  Mexico  and  British  Colum- 
bia, adjoining  our  territory,  trained  troops  which 
number  251,000  men — seven  times  as  many  as  our 
entire  mobile  army  in  the  United  States. 

There  are  already  35,000  trained  Japanese  troops 
in  Hawaii,  55,000  in  the  Philippines,  100,000  in 
Mexico,  61,000  in  California,  Oregon  and  Washing- 
ton. And  these  troops  are  where  they  can  be  in- 
stantly used  the  moment  the  transports  land  ma- 
chine guns  on  our  coast.  Every  Japanese  in  Cali- 
fornia reports  to  his  consul  once  every  week  to  re- 
ceive instructions. 

"We  have  tricked  California,  however,  by  sending 
our  men  as  residents  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 
There  they  become  'citizens'  and  from  there,  after 
a  certain  time,  proceed  to  California.  .  .  . 

"We  have  sent  both  army  and  navy  officers  in 
the  clever  disguise  of  workmen;  and  they,  having 
been  thoroughly  taught  in  Japan  how  to  swim,  have 
quietly  slipped  overboard  and  gained  a  landing  in 
California  and  Oregon  ports,  under  the  very  eyes 
of  the  asinine  United  States  customs  and  immigra- 
tion officials."  8 

The  Japanese  now  have  a  new  base  from  which 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        227 

they  can  direct  their  operations.  The  Marshall 
Islands  form  an  important  naval  station  2600  miles 
nearer  our  Pacific  coast  than  Tokyo!  Her  engi- 
neers and  army  officials  are  working  night  and  day 
constructing  new  concrete  fortifications.  Our  Pa- 
cific forts  are  of  little  value  in  protecting  our  ports. 
They  are  old.  For  years  the  War  Department  has 
not  sent  sufficient  ammunition  to  the  Pacific  coast 
to  give  the  garrison  two  hours'  practice  per  month. 

The  Japanese,  when  they  sent  their  fleet  on  its 
tour  of  the  Pacific,  demonstrated  that  they  could 
enter  our  ports,  with  lights  out,  without  local 
pilots.  From  the  Japanese  who  already  live  in  the 
western  states  they  would  have  ample  aid  in  land- 
ing anywhere  along  the  Pacific  coast. 

"There  are  officers  of  ours  scattered  everywhere 
on  the  Pacific  coast  to-day.  We  do  not  need  to  ex- 
plain why  they  are  there !"  9 

And  what  could  not  happen  in  twenty-four 
hours?  Most  of  our  army  and  practically  all  of 
our  ammunition  is  east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 
These  mountains  form  the  greatest  natural  barrier 
in  the  world. 

We  have  six  railway  lines  crossing  them — the 
Santa  Fe,  Southern  Pacific,  Western  Pacific,  Union 
Pacific,  Northern  Pacific,  Great  Northern,  and 
Milwaukee,  Chicago  and  St.  Paul.  These  rail- 
roads climb,  in  traversing  the  mountains,  to  great 
heights,  pass  through  many  tunnels  and  creep  over 


228  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

long  dizzy  trestles.  It  took  years  to  construct 
these  bridges  and  tunnels.  At  every  strategic  point 
along  these  railroads  there  are  colonies  of  Japanese 
labourers,  who  are  in  reality  Japanese  soldiers  and 
engineers. 

In  every  group  there  are  several  who  are  in 
the  secret  service  of  Japan.  They  would  be  in- 
formed of  any  premeditated  attack,  even  of  the 
exact  hour,  long  before  any  American  had  knowl- 
edge of  it. 

All  our  transcontinental  telephone  and  telegraph 
wires  follow  the  lines  of  the  railroads.  Upon  re- 
ceiving code  instructions  by  telegraph  or  wire- 
less they  could,  in  one  hour,  cut  every  telephonic 
and  telegraphic  wire  connecting  the  east  with  the 
west.  In  one  night  the  railway  guards  could  be 
overpowered  and  every  tunnel  blown  up  and  every 
trestle  ruined. 

The  coast  states  would  be  cut  off  from  their  meat 
supply  and  California  from  her  grain  and  wheat 
supply;  the  vegetable  farms  and  markets  are  al- 
ready in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese. 

Within  twenty-four  hours  after  landing,  trains 
could  be  seized  by  trained  Japanese  now  working 
as  common  labourers  along  the  railroads,  and 
twenty  thousand  trained  Japanese  already  living  in 
California  could  be  hurried  to  the  mountain  fast- 
nesses where  the  railroads  cross  the  summits.  In 
each  of  these  places  a  thousand  men  with  the  ma- 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES         229 

chine  guns  brought  by  their  transports  could  hold 
at  bay  our  entire  mobile  army  in  the  United  States. 

But  they  need  not  wait  for  mitrailleuses  from 
their  transport  ships.  There  are  scores  of  secret 
Japanese  stores  of  arms  on  the  Pacific ;  and  no  one 
can  compute  the  ammunition  and  equipment 
stored  in  Southern  California.  Only  lately  four 
warships  were  there  two  weeks  (to  fish)  before 
our  Navy  Department  investigated.  In  that  dry 
land,  guns  and  ammunition  can  be  stored  without 
elaborate  preparation.  The  twenty  thousand  Japa- 
nese soldiers  in  British  Columbia,  ready  to  invade 
from  the  north,  are  well  equipped. 

Recently  in  a  police  raid  of  a  Japanese  boarding 
house,  it  was  found  that  the  basement,  the  attic, 
every  cupboard,  every  cubic  foot  of  space  in  the 
house  was  filled  with  mitrailleuses,  other  guns 
and  ammunition.  These  guns  were  of  the  type 
that  could  be  mounted  on  bicycles  or  carried  on  the 
back.  Even  the  space  under  the  beds  was  occupied 
by  boxes  containing  ammunition. 

Hence  without  any  supplies  or  men  even  from 
Japan,  all  of  the  railroads  reaching  the  Pacific  in 
the  north  and  all  those  reaching  it  in  the  south, 
could  be  seized  and  mountain  passes  held. 

We  could  not  march  an  army  over  the  Rocky 
Mountains  in  ten  years  with  the  Japanese  control- 
ling the  passes  with  rapid-fire  machine  guns.  We 
could  march  army  after  army  to  the  mountains, 


230  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

but  they  would  never  get  over  and  they  would  never 
come  back. 

Even  if  we  gained  the  summits  we  could  not 
reconstruct  the  tunnels  within  twelve  months. 

Meanwhile  100,000  of  the  200,000  Japanese  in 
Mexico  could  move  on  Texas  and  engage  most  of 
our  mobile  army.  They  could  be  supplied  not  only 
by  arms  already  stored  in  Mexico,  but  by  transports 
sent  to  the  Magdalena  and  to  the  Turtle  Bays. 
Mexico  has  had  an  understanding  with  Japan  for 
years.  Six  years  ago  Mexican  silver  was  passing 
current  in  the  streets  and  bazaars  of  Tokyo. 

If  the  Japanese,  in  accordance  with  their  inten- 
tions, were  to  send  an  army  of  two  hundred  thou- 
sand to  our  shores,  together  with  the  three  hun- 
dred fifty  thousand  already  on  our  territory  and 
in  Mexico  and  British  Columbia,  they  would  have 
then  an  attacking  force  of  over  half  a  million 
men. 

West  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  at  our  Pacific 
coast  forts  and  in  Alaska,  we  have  about  3,538 
army  men  and  6,751  paper  militia  in  the  coast 
states.  But  the  armies  are  in  five  different  places 
and  the  largest  group  in  any  one  place  consists  of 
but  1,260  men.  The  different  groups  are  separated 
by  distances  of  from  two  hundred  to  two  thousand 
miles.  The  Japanese,  then,  would  have  to  combat 
less  than  two  thousand  troops  at  any  one  place. 

The  Japanese  army  would  be  equipped  with  at 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        231 

Trained  Japanese  Men 
Now  on  U.S.  Soil, In  Mexfccand  British  Columbia 


s 


I 


^ 


1 


! 

f 

I 


I 

l 

I 


T 


5 


1 


USArmya> 


| 


i.  This  number  is  considered  very  conservative.  An  officer  of  the 
United  States  Army  who  made  an  investigation  of  this  matter  in 
western  Mexico,  five  years  ago,  estimates  that  the  number  of 
trained  Japanese  men  in  western  Mexico  is  ioo  per  cent,  greater 
than  the  number  here  stated. 

2.  The  entire  mobile  army  of  the  United  States  is  scattered 
throughout  the  forty-eight  States  of  the  Union.and  over  Alaska, 
Porto  Rico,  Panama  Canal  Zone,  Hawaii,  Philippines,  and  some 
are  stationed  in  China. 

The  largest  number  of  United  States  trained  troops  that  the  Jap- 
anese would  have  to  meet  at  any  one  place  at  the  present  time  is 
but  8,ooo. 


232  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

least  eight  hundred  field  guns,  their  minimum  reg- 
ular equipment,  and  in  addition  at  least  two  thou- 
sand mitrailleuses.  We  have  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Rocky  Mountains  such  a  small  number  of 
guns  that  one  hesitates  to  mention  them. 

As  a  reserve,  Japan  has  two  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred field  guns  to  draw  from,  while  we  have  but 
eight  hundred  fifty  for  our  entire  army.  The 
average  size  of  the  Japanese  field  guns  is  greater 
than  ours.  Japan's  army  would  certainly  be 
equipped  with  sufficient  ammunition ;  for  ten  years 
we  have  not  had  enough  on  the  Pacific  coast  to 
fight  thirty  minutes. 

There  is  little  chance  that  our  Pacific  and  Asiatic 
fleets  could  render  effective  resistance  to  the  Japa- 
nese fleet,  which  contains  twenty  battleships  and 
cruisers,  every  one  of  which  is  better  than  the 
best  ship  we  have  on  the  Pacific. 

The  two  flagships  in  our  Asiatic  and  Pacific 
fleet  have  a  displacement  of  only  13,000  and  8,000* 
tons,  respectively ;  cost  but  five  and  four  million  dol- 
lars, respectively,  and  have  main  armament  which 
consists  of  but  four  eight-inch  guns  each.  What 
chance  would  these  have  against  the  great  ships 
of  the  Japanese  Navy,  having  from  27,000  to  30,- 
000  tons  displacement,  having  engines  of  40,000 
and  68,000  horse-power,  having  batteries  of  enor- 
mous fourteen-inch  guns? 

It  is  common  knowledge  to  the  world  that  the 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        233 

Our  Chances  on  Land  against  Japanese  I  nvasf  on 
Comparative  Values 


Invading  Army  Japmm 
OpposingArmy  U.S.b  2 
US.I1 


famyirtfliAnny:^1 


OunsfnReserve 
Sfeeofuuns 


Japj 
U.S.I 

Japj 
CJ.S.I 


Ammunition  Supply 

Paci  tf c  Isl  a  nd  s  Janj 
1st  two  days  U.S.I 


PadflcCoasi  «?ap.l 
IsMwo hours  U.S.I 

AfteF^haups?0^ 


US.  t 

i.  The  largest  group  of  United  States  troops  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains  that  the  Japanese  would  be  compelled  to  meet  at  any 
one  place. 

2.  Representing  all  of  the  regular  army  in  the  Philippines,  in 
Hawaii,  in  Alaska,  at  Panama,  in  Washington,  Oregon  and  Cali- 
fornia ;  men  in  the  Pacific  Coast  forts ;  and  the  militia  of  the 
Pacific  Coast  States. 

3.  Representing  the  guns  on  the  Pacific  Coast  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains. 


234  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

policy  of  Japan  is  always  to  strike  quickly  and 
without  warning.  Without  doubt  her  warships  will 
be  brought  together  in  such  a  way  as  to  allay  sus- 
picion, ostensibly  for  a  manoeuvre;  and  that  they 
will  be  half  way  across  the  Pacific  before  we  shall 
have  the  slightest  inkling  of  the  fact  that  Japan 
is  planning  an  immediate  attack. 

It  is  assumed  that  we  could  send  our  Atlantic 
fleet  or  a  portion  of  it  through  the  Panama  Canal 
or  around  South  America  in  time  to  decide  a  naval 
war  with  Japan.  It  is  very  questionable  if  the 
patriotic  Japanese  living  in  the  Panama  Canal 
Zone  would  allow  our  ships  to  pass  through  the 
canal  when  it  is  possible  to  prevent  them  doing  so. 
A  small  amount  of  dynamite  could  create  such  a 
slide — even  before  we  would  have  knowledge  of 
the  contemplated  innocent  Japanese  naval  manoeu- 
vre— that  the  canal  would  be  blocked  for  months. 

If  we  attempt  to  send  our  Atlantic  fleet  around 
Cape  Horn,  those  battleships  must  be  accompanied 
by  supply  ships.  Even  though  we  have  fighting 
vessels  that  can  make  21  knots  an  hour,  the  fleet 
would  have  to  be  held  together.  It  could  travel 
no  faster  than  the  slowest  ship.  To  separate  it, 
that  is,  to  allow  a  few  ships  to  enter  the  Pacific  at 
a  time,  would  be  the  height  of  folly.  Even  if  all 
were  kept  together,  the  fleeter  ships  of  the  Japa- 
nese Navy  could  speed  in  to  the  advance  column, 
destroy  the  vanguard  and  retreat  again;  and  our 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        235 

ships  would  be  unable  to  follow,  because  of  their 
slower  speed.  This  could  be  done  over  and  over 
again — the  fleeter  Japanese  ships  each  time  cen- 
tring their  fire  on  one  or  two  of  our  slower  ships 
and  getting  away  again  with  little  risk  of  damage 
to  themselves. 

What  chances  have  we,  in  our  present  state  of 
preparation  ? 

With  wonderful  business  sagacity  we  assert  that 
they  cannot  afford  another  war.  This  is  the  great- 
est of  all  fallacies.  The  Balkan  States  are  prob- 
ably the  poorest  states  in  the  world.  Only  a  few 
years  ago,  when  a  rich  merchant  of  Montenegro 
purchased  an  automobile — the  first  owned  by  a  na- 
tive Montenegrin — the  King  sent  the  merchant  a 
polite  note  calling  attention  to  the  man's  extrava- 
gance and  hinting  that  he,  the  King  of  Montene- 
gro, could  not  afford  one.  Yet  Montenegro  and 
Serbia,  though  two  of  the  poorest  little  nations  in 
the  world,  have  been  able  to  play  a  remarkable  part 
in  three  wars  within  five  years. 

It  is  true  that  the  Japanese  national  debt  is  one- 
eighth  their  entire  wealth,  but  their  national  debt 
per  capita  is  less  than  the  per  capita  debt  of  the 
United  States.  The  national  debt  per  capita  of 
Japan  is  twenty-three  dollars;  and  that  of  the 
United  States,  thirty-two  dollars.  Per  person, 
we  have  a  greater  burden  to  bear  in  the  payment 


236 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

of  our  national  debt  than  have  the  Japanese  in  the 
payment  of  their  debt. 

The  cost  of  feeding  a  Japanese  soldier  is  one- 
twelfth  the  cost  of  feeding  an  American.  The  feed- 
ing cost  of  an  American  soldier  is  $.24  per  day,  that 
of  a  Japanese  $.02.  Moreover,  the  Japanese  sacri- 
fice everything  for  their  country.  Japanese  mer- 
chants and  men  of  wealth  willingly  and  gladly  pay 
large  income  taxes  for  the  support  of  the  army  and 
navy  of  Japan. 

The  Japanese  are  a  marvellous,  courageous,  am- 
bitious, proud  people.  They  may  be  slightly  smaller 
in  body  than  we  are ;  but  equipment,  ability  and  en- 
durance count  to-day  in  war,  not  stature. 

We  laugh  at  these  little  Japanese  and  talk  about 
"drowning  them  in  the  Pacific  like  rats!" 

In  Hong  Kong,  many  years  ago,  it  was  my  hor- 
rible misfortune  to  be  forced  to  witness  a  life-and- 
death  struggle  between  a  six- foot- four  Chinaman 
and  an  infuriated  rat  which  the  Chinaman  had  been 
torturing  to  amuse  himself.  The  rat  was  so  small 
and  so  quick  in  its  assaults  that  it  easily  avoided 
the  hands  that  sought  to  grip  it.  It  was  so  agile,  so 
slippery,  so  terrific  in  biting  and  ripping  the  throat 
of  the  Chinaman — running  up  and  down  the  man's 
back,  over  his  shoulders,  under  his  arms,  over  and 
over  again  to  the  Chinaman's  throat,  without  be- 
ing caught — that  the  powerful  six-foot  Chinaman, 
blood  spurting  from  the  ripped-open  veins,  soon  fell 


WHEN  THE  BROWN  MAN  COMES        237 

to  the  floor  and  died  before  aid  could  reach  him. 
The  rat  scampered  away  unhurt. 


QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  218.    Extracts  from  American  newspapers. 

2  Page  219.  Henry  Litchfield  West,  Executive  Secre- 
tary National  Security  League. 

3  Page  224.  General  Francis  V.  Greene,  U.  S.  V.,  from 
"The  Present  Military  Situation  in  the  United  States." 

4  6  Page  224 ;  6  7  page  225 ;  8  page  226 ;  9  page  227.  From 
a  book  circulated  by  the  National  Defence  Association  of 
Japan,  the  present  officers  of  which  are  reported  to  be  Count 
Okuma,  Premier  of  Japan,  president;  Baron  Kato,  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan,  vice-president. 


CHAPTER   III 

IE  THE  UON   COMES 

IF  the  Allies  are  successful  in  Europe,  Great  Brit- 
ain could  send  twenty-eight  dreadnoughts  and 
battleships  to  make  an  attack  on  our  Atlantic  coast 
and  still  keep  a  sufficient  number  at  home  to  guard 
her  interests  there.  In  case  of  an  attack  by  Great 
Britain  or  any  one  else  on  our  Atlantic  coast,  we 
would  not  dare  to  take  all  the  ships  of  our  Pacific 
fleet  from  the  Pacific ;  but  were  we  to  do  so,  Great 
Britain's  attacking  fleet  would  outnumber  our  en- 
tire defensive  fleet,  three  to  one. 

Great  Britain  could  send  against  us  nine  battle 
cruisers,  we  have  none;  thirty  swift  cruisers,  we 
have  three,  and  it  is  even  questionable  if  our  three 
could  operate  for  any  length  of  time,  because  of 
their  furnaces.  She  could  send  one  hundred  de- 
stroyers to  combat  our  sixty-two,  even  if  we  were 
to  bring  all  of  ours  from  the  Pacific. 

Her  ships  have  an  average  speed  of  from  two 
and  a  half  to  three  knots  an  hour  greater  than  ours 
and  the  average  range  of  her  battleship  guns  is 
greater. 

238 


IF  THE  LION  COMES 


239 


Our  Chances  at  Sea  against  a  British  Attack  1 
Oieal  Britain      U.&A. 


Battleships 

AveratjeSpeed 
Oun  Range 
GunElevatioi 
Torpedo 


Battle  Cruisers 
Scout  Cruisers. 
Destroyers 
Submarines 


N.  B.  Lines  representing  the  same  United  States  factors  of  defence 
may  vary  on  different  charts,  because  they  represent  proportional 
values. 

i.  This  chart  represents  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  scout  cruisers 
and  destroyers  authorised  and  laid  down  by  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  from  December  31,  1004,  to  January,  1914.  These 
modern  boats  are  the  ones  that  determine  sea  battles.  Grey  beards, 
ships  in  reserve  and  ships  in  ordinary  are  not  an  aid.  They  hinder 
the  speed  of  the  fleet,  they  have  to  be  taken  care  of  by  the  modern 
ships;  hence,  their  detrimental  value  in  modern  battle. 
Since  January  1,  1914,  Great  Britain  has  been  building  modern  bat- 
tleships, battle  cruisers,  scout  cruisers,  destroyers  and  submarines 
at  a  tremendous  rate.  We  have  been  lagging  woefully  behind. 
Secretary  Daniels  admits  that  Great  Britain  has  probably  added  to 
her  navy  sixteen  new  modern  fighting  ships  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war. 

2.  Comparative  number  of  torpedo  tubes  we  will  have  when  the 
Oklahoma  and  the  Nevada  are  in  service.  All  other  torpedo  tubes 
are  useless  for  modern  torpedoes. 

3.  The  three  scout  cruisers  we  have  would  be  doubtful  factors,  be- 
cause of  their  defective  furnaces. 

4.  Representing  the  actual  number  of  all  our  useless  submarines. 

5.  Representing  the  submarines  at  Panama  and  on  the  Atlantic 
Coast,  that  have  been  able  to  submerge  during  the  last  three 
manoeuvres  without  being  convoyed  to  port. 


240  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Great  Britain's  battleships  would  be  equipped 
with  112  modern  torpedo  tubes.  We  will  soon  have 
two  ships  with  four  torpedo  tubes  each  that  are  of 
use  for  modern  torpedoes — no  more. 

Great  Britain  has  eighty  submarines;  she  could 
spare  forty  to  send  here;  we  have  two  on  the  At- 
lantic coast,  north  of  Panama,  that  have  been  able 
to  navigate  under  water  without  being  conveyed 
to  port  immediately  afterwards ;  we  have  five  more 
at  the  canal. 

On  the  chart,  "Our  Chance  at  Sea  against  British 
Attack,"  every  questionable  estimate  as  to  the  num- 
bers and  efficiency  of  naval  factors  is  charted  in 
favour  of  the  United  States.  All  the  three  swift 
cruisers  are  represented  at  full  value  although  they 
are  old,  slow  and  their  furnaces  are  inefficient  in  the 
least  wind.  If  a  true  comparison  of  the  differ- 
ences were  given,  the  line  representing  Great  Brit- 
ain's equipment  in  swift  cruisers  would  be  forty 
times  as  long  as  the  line  representing  ours.  She 
has  built  two,  four,  six  or  even  eight  cruisers  of 
the  finest  speediest  type  every  year  during  the  last 
ten  years. 

This  chart  estimates  only  the  ships  that  Great 
Britain  could  spare  to  send  against  us  during  times 
of  peace  in  Europe ;  while  everything  we  have  in  the 
Atlantic,  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  in  our  navy  yards, 
in  our  dry  docks,  even  everything  laid  up  for  re- 
pairs, is  counted  in  our  favour. 


IF  THE  LION  COMES  241 

And  yet  what  chance  would  we  have? 

Japan  is  bound  to  England  by  an  offensive  and 
defensive  treaty,  and  in  case  of  war  with  England 
it  might  be  necessary  to  divide  our  fleets  and  fight 
the  navies  of  the  two  countries. 

Great  Britain  would  not  attempt  an  invasion  with 
less  than  250,000  trained  men.  Our  entire  opposi- 
tion to  resist  an  attack  would  consist  of  46,000  men, 
including  the  Army  of  the  East,  ten  thousand  men 
now  manning  our  coast  forts,  and  all  the  available 
eastern  militia — thirty  thousand!  These  could  not 
be  mobilised  even  in  thirty  days. 

Prepared  for  a  quick  attack,  the  English  army  of 
invasion  of  250,000  men  would  be  equipped  with 
900  field  guns,  not  counting  two  or  three  thousand 
mitrailleuses.  Her  field  guns  in  size  are  nearly 
twice  as  large  as  ours.  More  than  this,  supply- 
ships,  arriving  later,  could  bring  from  her  reserve 
of  5,500  guns  any  number  of  guns  she  might  de- 
sire. 

Heavy  guns  can  be  moved  across  the  water  more 
easily  than  they  can  be  moved  on  land.  England 
has  found  it  possible  to  transport  9^ -inch  howit- 
zers across  the  English  Channel.  It  is  infinitely 
more  difficult  to  do  this  than  to  send  them  across  the 
Atlantic  Ocean.  The  difficulty  in  transporting 
large  guns  is  in  loading  and  landing,  and  the  har- 
bours of  the  Channel  are  so  shallow  that  large  ships 
cannot  enter  them. 


242  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

As  a  reserve,  Great  Britain  has  now  5,500  guns 
— we  have  850  guns,  counting  every  field  gun  in  the 
United  States,  even  those  just  now  completed  and 
soon  to  be  completed. 

Great  Britain's  ammunition  supply  can  be  esti- 
mated at  one  hundred  per  cent,  sufficient.  Ours, 
counting  all  the  ammunition  stored  in  the  United 
States,  is  44  per  cent.  The  amount  would  feed  our 
guns  for  about  a  day  and  a  half.  Supply-ships 
continuously  arriving  from  Great  Britain  and  sup- 
plies arriving  from  Canada  would  maintain  her  100 
per  cent,  sufficiency  even  after  our  supply  was  com- 
pletely exhausted. 

The  coast  forts  near  New  York  City  could  be 
easily  destroyed  by  explosive  shells  from  British 
battleships,  firing  from  a  distance  of  twelve  miles 
and  upward,  while  our  antedated  guns,  even  the 
new  modern  ones  just  installed  at  Fort  Totten,  could 
playfully  drop  their  shells  in  the  water  four  and  a 
half  miles  short  of  the  ships  of  the  British  fleet. 
We  have  but  two  coast  guns  from  Panama  to  Maine 
with  a  range  equal  to  those  of  foreign  battleships — 
but  these  are  not  yet  mounted. 

The  British  navy  could  also  destroy  the  forts  at 
Boston  and  Philadelphia,  without  even  coming  in 
range  of  the  guns  there. 

Another  division  of  British  dreadnoughts  could 
steam  past  Fort  Monroe  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chesa- 
peake, without  coming  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of 


IF  THE  LION  COMES 243 

Ouf  (bonces  on  Land  against  British  Invasion. 
CbmparativeValues 

InvadingArmy  ^B.mtammmaamammmmm 
Opposing  Army  ILS.mbbi 

Guns  with  AnnymT  -^^^^^^^^^^ 

U.S.BB2 


OunsinRcseFve 


Size  or  Guns 


O.B.l 
U.S.I 

O.B.l 

118.1 


Ammunition  Supply 
IsllShouFS^'1 

Afterwards ( 


US.  ? 


N.  B.  Lines  representing  the  same  United  States  factors  of  de- 
fence may  vary  on  different  charts,  because  they  represent  pro- 
portional values. 

1.  Representing  the  entire  army  which  can  be  mobilised  in  thirty 
days,  men  in  our  Atlantic  Coast  defences,  and  the  militia  of  all  the 
Eastern  States. 

2.  Representing  900  per  cent,  more  field  guns  than  we  now  have 
with  our  entire  army  east  of  the  Mississippi  River. 

3.  Representing  the  entire  equipment  of  field  guns  in  the  United 
States. 

4.  And  a  line  26e  pe r  sent  longer. 


244  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

the  extreme  limit  of  the  guns  of  Fort  Monroe,  and 
destroy  Washington  or  hold  it  up  for  ransom  or 
treaty  concessions.  Without  even  landing  a  single 
man  in  New  York,  the  British  fleet  could  with  a  few 
explosive  shells  blow  up  the  power  stations  of  our 
subways  at  Fifty-ninth  Street,  of  our  elevated  lines 
at  Seventy-sixth  Street,  and  of  our  New  York 
Street  Railways  system  at  Ninety-first  Street. 

The  British  ability  to  transport  an  army  to  our 
shores  is  unquestioned.  The  merchant  marine  of 
Great  Britain  has  a  tonnage  of  19,000,000  tons. 

If  after  the  invasion  we  tried  to  oppose  the  ad- 
vance of  their  army,  we  would  necessarily  be  forced 
into  battle  line. 

"An  army  of  a  million  men,  consisting  of  infan- 
try, armed  with  modern  shoulder-arms,  would  be 
completely  overmatched  and  easily  defeated  by  an 
army  of  25,000  men  amply  equipped  with  modern 
field  artillery.  The  infantry  would  be  wholly  un- 
able to  get  within  musket  range,  because  they  would 
all  be  destroyed  by  the  shrapnel  of  the  enemy  before 
they  could  get  near  enough  to  fire  a  single  effective 
shot."  * 

Great  Britain  in  an  attack  upon  us  would  not  only 
have  the  aid  of  Japan's  navy  on  our  Pacific  coast, 
but  might  also  be  supported  by  a  Mexican  invasion, 
as  well  as  a  Japanese  advance  from  Mexico.  If 
Great  Britain  and  Japan  should  furnish  Mexico 
with  money,  ammunition  and  supplies  to  fight  the 


IF  THE  LION  COMES  245 

Gringoes  whom  the  Mexicans  so  much  hate,  the 
Mexicans  would  do  so. 

Japan  has  now  at  least  100,000  Japanese  in  Mex- 
ico, and  about  20,000  in  British  Columbia,  all  of 
whom  have  had  military  training. 

On  the  north  we  would  have  to  prepare  against 
invasion  from  Canada.  Canadians  themselves 
might  not  fight  us,  but  English  troops  could  make 
an  invasion  through  Canada.  And  if  it  ever  came 
to  a  draw  between  the  United  States  and  England, 
even  the  Canadians  would  certainly  join  with  Eng- 
land. No  matter  what  the  blood  tie  between  the 
Canadians  and  the  people  of  the  United  States,  the 
blood  tie  between  Canada  and  England  is  stronger. 
But  blood  ties  do  not  prevent  war  when  commercial 
interests  are  at  stake. 

"No  nation  can  be  trusted  farther  than  it  is 
bound  by  its  interests."  2 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  244.    Hiram  Maxim,  in  "Defenceless  America." 

2  Page  245.    George  Washington. 


CHAPTER  IV 

MILITARY  CAMPS  OR  CEMETERIES 

THERE  is  a  story  of  foolish  virgins  and  of  wise 
ones.  The  wise  ones  prepared;  the  foolish 
ones  went  out  into  the  darkness  with  their  lamps 
empty. 

Preparation  may  not  always  prevent  war,  but  it 
gives  a  nation  a  fighting  chance  to  prevent  defeat, 
vassalage  and  annihilation. 

Judea  did  not  harken  to  the  prophet  Isaiah  who 
called  upon  her  to  prepare  herself  for  defence;  and 
was  overthrown  by  the  hosts  of  Mesapotamia. 

Greece,  unprepared,  was  made  a  vassal  of  Rome; 
and  only  fragments  of  her  law,  her  literature,  her 
art,  her  philosophy  have  come  down  to  us. 

The  peace  campaign  of  Hanno  prevented  men  and 
supplies  being  sent  to  Hannibal ;  and  Carthage  fell ! 

One  hundred  years  ago  Europe  was  not  pre- 
pared ;  Napoleon  conquered  Italy,  Egypt,  Flanders, 
Holland,  Saxony,  Bavaria,  Austria  and  Prussia. 
One  lesson,  however,  was  enough  for  the  Prussian 
king.  When  the  treaty  was  signed  Napoleon  per- 
mitted him  a  small  army  of  but  a  few  thousand  men 

246 


MILITARY  CAMPS  OR  CEMETERIES     247 

— only  to  preserve  order  at  home!  The  King  of 
Prussia  immediately  enrolled  the  allowed  number. 
These  men  were  trained,  prepared  and  dismissed; 
another^group  was  enrolled,  trained,  prepared  and 
dismissedKand  then  another,  and  another  and  an- 
other,  until  every  man  was  trained  and  fit.  Then 
Prussia  added  the  balance  to  the  measure  that  finally 
overthrew  the  great  Corsican. 

France  lost  Alsace  and  Lorraine  in  1871  because 
the  Republicans,  for  political  reasons,  obstructed 
the  efforts  of  the  government  to  prepare  for  the 
coming  conflct. 

In  August,  1914,  three  weeks  after  mobilisation, 
600,000  French  soldiers  were  without  rifles.  Many 
others  had  old  rifles  unfit  for  service;  they  could 
not  then  combat  the  well-equipped  Germans  who  ad- 
vanced to  the  very  gates  of  Paris. 

England  was  warned  by  Lord  Roberts,  the  mili- 
tary genius;  by  Winston  Churchill,  the  prophet  of 
naval  preparedness ;  and  by  Robert  Blatchford,  the 
peace-loving  socialist:  Blatchford  was  not  stupid 
merely  because  he  believed  in  the  ultimate  realisa- 
tion of  the  brotherhood  of  man. 

Lord  Haldane  sent  England's  army  out  into  the 
night  with  no  oil  in  its  lamps.  When  England 
should  have  been  enlisting  and  training  a  million 
men,  Lord  Haldane  dismissed  80,000  and  publically 
threatened  to  abolish  Lord  Roberts's  pension  if  the 


248  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

grand  old  man  continued  his  agitation  for  prepara- 
tion. 

England  lost  one  man  out  of  four,  from  Mons  to 
Marne,  because  she  did  not  have  sufficient  up- 
to-date  artillery  to  protect  her  soldiers. 

When  a  nation  does  not  fill  its  lamps  with  oil  it 
fills  them  with  the  blood  of  its  heroes. 

When  Marshal  Niel  was  pleading  in  the  French 
Chamber  in  1868  in  favour  of  a  bill  of  defence, 
Jules  Favre  replied:  "You,  militarists,  wish  to 
turn  France  into  an  armed  camp." 

"And  you,  pacificists,"  replied  Marshal  Neil,  "are 
taking  care  to  make  of  it  a  cemetery." 


PART  FOUR:  WHY  WE  ARE  NOT 
PREPARED 


PART  FOUR:    WHY  WE  ARE  NOT 
PREPARED 

CHAPTER  I 

PACIFIC  MILITARISM  FOR  POUTICS 

WE  are  unprepared  because  we  have  been  bur- 
dened by  a  particular  form  of  militarism — 
pacific  militarism  for  politics. 

There  is  militarism  and  militarism.  There  is 
militarism  for  conquest,  militarism  for  protection, 
and  militarism  for  politics  of  pacifism  and  pork. 

The  last  is  by  far  the  worst  type  of  militarism. 
It  is  the  type  Congress  and  the  people  have  made 
existent  in  the  United  States  of  America.  It  has 
come  about  as  a  reaction  against  militarism  for 
conquest.  It  places  incompetent  men — incompe- 
tent because  they  have  had  no  experience  in  the 
work  for  which  they  are  appointed — at  the  head 
of  the  army  and  navy  departments. 

It  results  to-day — and  the  history  of  the  United 
States  proves  that  it  has  always  resulted — in  blun- 
ders, in  negligence,  in  suppression  of  the  truth,  in 
deception  of  the  public,  in  creation  of  false  ideals 
as  to  the  safety  of  the  nation,  and  in  enormous 

251 


252 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

waste  of  moneys — a  gigantic  system  of  graft,  the 
most  gigantic  and  wasteful  in  the  world. 

But  these  results  have  not  been  and  are  not  due 
to  the  military  or  the  navy.  They  have  grown  out 
of  the  political  system  which  is  dominated  by  the 
ideas  of  the  pacifists — a  system  which  has  controlled 
and  controls  the  military  and  naval  organisations — 
thanks  to  the  indifference  of  the  public. 

With  very  few  exceptions,  the  pacifists  do  not  be- 
lieve in  peace  at  any  price ;  they  do  not  believe  that 
we  should  give  up  our  sovereignty — tamely  submit- 
ting to  conquest  rather  than  fighting  for  independ- 
ence. But  they  do  believe  that  an  adequate  trained 
army  in  times  of  peace  is  a  danger ;  they  do  believe 
that  one  should  never  prepare  for  war  until  war  is 
upon  us — that  when  the  danger  arises  the  mass  of 
people,  because  of  their  patriotism  and  loyalty,  will 
spring  to  arms  and  adequately  defend  the  country. 

The  principle  and  theory  of  the  pacifists  is  ideal ; 
the  practice  abominable  and  criminal. 

The  waste  of  billions  of  dollars,  the  prolongation 
of  months  of  struggle  into  years  of  suffering  and 
anguish,  the  loss  of  tens  of  thousands  of  men  by 
sickness  and  the  loss  of  scores  of  thousands  by 
death  have  been  due  above  all  else  to  the  pacific 
ideas  of  President  Jefferson,  President  Polk  and 
President  Buchanan. 

If  it  had  not  been  for  the  ultra-pacific  ideas  of 
Thomas  Jefferson  and  his  coterie  of  followers,  we 


PACIFIC  MILITARISM  FOR  POLITICS        253 

would  have  had  in  1812  a  trained  army  of  20,000 
men  and  the  war  with  England  would  have  been 
ended  in  one  campaign.  If  it  had  not  been  for  the 
pacific  ideas  of  Polk  and  his  followers  in  Congress, 
the  Mexican  War  would  not  have  lasted  six  months, 
and  fifteen  thousand  instead  of  a  hundred  four 
thousand  men  would  have  been  necessary.  If  it  had 
not  been  for  the  pacific  ideas  of  Buchanan  and  his 
followers,  the  Civil  War  would  certainly  have  been 
ended  in  two  years  at  most  and  we  would  have  re- 
quired but  300,000  men  instead  of  nearly  3,000,000. 

The  military  has  always  opposed  the  pacifists' 
idea  of  a  voluntary  army  springing  to  arms  after 
war  has  been  declared.  The  military  consequently 
has  always  opposed  and  the  leaders  of  the  army  and 
navy,  have  always  lamented  the  enormous  political 
waste  in  men  and  money  due  to  the  political  sys- 
tem which  grows  out  of  the  pacifists'  idea  of  mili- 
tarism. 

We  were  prepared  but  once  in  our  history  and 
that  preparation  saved  us  from  what  might  have 
been  the  greatest  war  in  which  we  would  have  been 
engaged — a  war  with  France,  England,  Austria 
and  Mexico  combined.  At  the  close  of  our  Civil 
War  we  had  more  than  a  million  trained  men.  Aus- 
tria had  violated  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  placing 
Maximilian  on  the  throne  of  Mexico.  England 
was  our  bitter  enemy  all  through  the  Civil  War  and 
would  readily  have  joined  the  forces  of  Austria  and 


254 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

France ;  but,  being  prepared  at  the  moment,  we  had 
but  to  request  the  withdrawal  of  the  Emperor  of 
Mexico.  Then  France  and  Austria  backed  down.  If 
we  had  been  unprepared  would  they  have  done  so  so 
readily  ?  And  what  would  have  been  the  result  of 
a  war  between  an  unprepared  nation  on  this  side  of 
the  water  and  England,  Austria,  France  and  Mex- 
ico combined  against  us  ? 

Because  of  the  fact  that  we  have  never  met  a 
single  first-class  power  using  its  full  forces  in  any 
war  in  which  we  have  been  engaged,  we  have  con- 
tinued to  shut  our  eyes  to  all  the  waste  of  the  past 
and  have  continued  to  allow  the  system  to  persist 
up  to  the  present  time. 

Primarily,  the  people  have  been  and  are  at  fault 
for  permitting  such  a  system  to  exist;  secondly, 
Congress  has  been  and  is  to  blame  for  pandering  to 
this  pacific  political  militarism,  thus  wasting  bil- 
lions of  dollars;  thirdly,  the  political  administra- 
tions have  been  and  are  to  blame  for  conferring  the 
offices  of  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  as  "plum  puddings"  to  good  friends  and 
former  political  helpers.  This  policy  results  from 
the  pacifists'  fear  that  efficient  military  and  naval 
heads  of  the  departments  would  put  our  people  in 
danger  of  military  oppression. 

The  preparation  for  protecting  against  all  for- 
eign aggression — the  safety  of  our  nation — rests, 
by  the  appointment  of  the  President,  in  the  hands 


PACIFIC  MILITARISM  FOR  POLITICS       255 

of  two  men — the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy. 

No  man  should  be  appointed  to  either  of  these 
positions  merely  because  he  is  a  "friend"  or  a  "suc- 
cessful business  man"  or  a  "social  reformer."  A 
man  should  be  picked  for  his  fitness  for  the  work 
to  be  done. 

This  is  not  a  criticism  of  the  present  administra- 
tion alone ;  it  is  a  criticism  of  the  general  policy  of 
our  government.  No  business  corporation  would 
tolerate  such  a  policy.  The  Directors  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  or  any  other  large  busi- 
ness organisation  would  never  choose  a  man  as  man- 
ager merely  because  he  came  from  Georgia  instead 
of  Michigan  or  because  he  had  been  a  successful 
attorney  or  a  successful  manufacturer  of  silk  skirts; 
neither  would  a  banking  institution  choose  a  man 
as  bank  president  merely  because  of  his  taste  for 
bon-bons  or  diluted  raspberry  juice. 

A  political  Secretary  of  War  or  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  spends  his  first  year  in  attempting  to  find  out 
what  the  reports  of  his  subordinates  mean;  his  sec- 
ond year  in  ascertaining  what  he  is  expected  to  do ; 
his  third  in  getting  a  glimpse  of  the  needs  of  the 
department ;  his  fourth  in  discussion  and  investiga- 
tion. Then  he  goes  out  of  office,  and  another  begins 
the  circle! 

The  first  step  in  our  campaign  for  adequate  prep- 
aration must  be  insistence  upon  a  change  of  policy 


256 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

at  Washington.  The  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  should  be  chosen  from  the 
ranks  of  men  who  have  worked  in  the  army  and 
navy  for  years;  from  the  group  of  men  who  have 
proved  their  knowledge  of  the  subject,  who  have 
demonstrated  their  efficiency ;  and  who  have  shown 
that  they  know  how  to  handle  men. 

Moreover,  each  should  have  a  seat  in  the  House 
and  in  the  Senate  so  that  each  can  come  in  contact 
with  Congressmen  and  Senators  and  inform  these 
men  as  to  the  real  needs  of  the  Army  and  the  Nayy. 
Our  world  to-day  is  a  very  busy  one ;  Americans  are 
especially  busy.  It  does  not  reflect  upon  the  intelli- 
gence of  Congressmen  from  the  Kansas  cornfields, 
from  the  Nevada  mining  towns,  from  the  bluegrass 
meadows  of  Kentucky,  the  brewery  districts  of  Mil- 
waukee, the  oil-fields  of  Oklahoma,  or  the  logging 
districts  of  northern  Michigan  to  state  that  they  do 
not  know  the  real  needs  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Each  is  intelligent,  but  each  has  had  little  time  to 
specialize  in  army  and  navy  matters  previous  to  his 
election.  Each,  without  doubt,  has  been  previously 
occupied  by  personal  business  and  by  the  affairs  of 
his  district.  Hence  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  should  have  seats  in  the  Con- 
gress and  in  the  Senate,  so  that  they  may  enter  into 
discussion,  elaborating  in  detail,  when  advisable, 
the  reasons  for  their  recommendations  to  Congress. 
This  would  make  it  possible  for  Representatives  and 


PACIFIC  MILITARISM  FOR  POLITICS       257 

Senators  to  find  out  exactly  what  the  needs  of  the 
army  and  navy  are ;  and  in  this  way  Congressmen 
and  Senators  may  become  convinced  of  the  neces- 
sity of  appropriating  the  moneys  asked. 

A  political  secretary  of  the  Navy  or  a  political 
Secretary  of  War,  previously  uninformed  of  the 
actual  needs,  is  never  qualified  to  speak  to  Congress 
with  authority. 

And  another  change  is  vitally  needed. 

Congressmen  now  have  the  power  of  determining 
how  army  and  navy  appropriations  should  be  spent ; 
their  knowledge  of  the  real  needs  of  the  army  and 
navy  depends  upon  the  reports  of  the  Secretaries  of 
War  and  the  Navy.  As  these  officials  seldom  are 
sure  enough  of  themselves  to  convince  Congress 
that  they  know  what  they  are  asking  money  for, 
Congress  naturally  concludes  that  the  matter  cannot 
be  of  great  consequence.  As  a  result  certain  Con- 
gressional leaders  follow  their  own  inclinations  and 
interests  and  "sluice  to  the  barrels." 

We  should  do  away  with  the  present  system  of 
appropriation  and  adopt  the  budget  system.  All 
other  nations  in  the  world  have  adopted  this  policy. 
Even  the  South  American  republics  are  far  in  ad- 
vance of  us  in  this  matter. 

Our  present  system  is  a  violation  of  the  very  prin- 
ciples of  our  government.  According  to  those  prin- 
ciples Congress  is  the  law-making  body,  the  Pres- 
ident and  the  cabinet  are  the  executives  of  the 


258  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

nation,  and  the  Supreme  Court  exercises  the  judi- 
cial function. 

Congress  as  the  law-making  body  has  the  su- 
preme right  in  determining  the  appropriations  but 
it  has  assumed  the  executive  function  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  determining  in  detail  how  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  members  of 
the  executive  department  of  the  government,  shall 
spend  the  money,  even  to  the  number  of  dollars  to 
be  paid  a  scrub  woman. 

It  seems  reasonable  that  among  our  one  hundred 
million  people  an  efficient  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
might  hire  a  departmental  assistant  at  $200  or  less 
per  month  who  would  be  able  to  hire  and  discharge 
at  reasonable  prices,  scrub  women,  ice  men  and 
laundresses.  How  ridiculous  and  wasteful  to  en- 
gage 536  Senators  and  Representatives,  each  at  a 
yearly  salary  of  $7,500 — a  total  of  four  million 
dollars — not  including  railway  expenses  and  all  the 
expenses  of  upkeep  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  the  Senate,  to  discuss  in  detail  an  act  to  appro- 
priate $360  a  year  for  a  common  labourer,  to  em- 
ploy four  scrub  women  at  $192,  or  to  engage  a  chief 
laundress  at  $240.  Would  any  business  corpora- 
tion engage  a  Board  of  Directors  at  a  salary  of 
$4,220,000  a  year — almost  $3,000  per  working  hour, 
to  discuss  whether  they  should  pay  a  scrub  woman 
$184  a  year  or  $192  a  year,  and,  moreover,  not  only 
hours,  but  days  and  even  weeks  in  such  discussions  ? 


PACIFIC  MILITARISM  FOR  POLITICS        259 

Think  of  a  Congressional  act  that  requires  but  270 
words  to  appropriate  $33,000,000  for  ships  of  the 
navy,  and  400  words  to  determine  how  ice,  religious 
books  and  stationery  shall  be  purchased,  and  100 
words  to  determine  the  manner  in  which  an  enlisted 
man  shall  be  given  his  shoes,  hat,  coat,  belts  and  so 
forth.  Monumental  work  for  men  commanding  a 
salary  of  $4,220,000  a  year ! 

We  are  the  only  nation  in  the  world,  even  among 
the  third-rate  powers,  that  has  not  adopted  the 
budget  system. 

First,  then,  let  us  urge  and  insist  upon  a  change 
in  our  government's  policy  so  that  trained  and  in- 
formed men  shall  be  appointed  to  direct  our  depart- 
ments of  the  army  and  the  navy. 

Second,  let  us  urge  and  insist  that  these  men  be 
given  seats  in  the  House  of  Representatives  and  in 
the  Senate. 

Third,  let  us  urge  and  insist  upon  the  adoption  of 
the  budget  system  of  appropriating  money  for  the 
army  and  navy. 

Let  us  do  away  with  militarism  for  pork ! 

The  only  righteous  military  system  is  that  which 
is  based  upon  the  ideal  that  all  citizens  owe  a  duty 
to  their  government  in  return  for  the  protection 
which  the  government  gives  to  all.  This  is  mili- 
tarism for  protection — the  service  of  all  for  the 
good  of  all.  It  is  the  system  of  Switzerland  and 
Australia.    Let  us  adopt  it. 


CHAPTER  II 

INEFFICIENCY,    NEGLIGENCE   AND    SUPPRESSION    OF 

FACTS 

WE  are  unprepared  because  of  past  inefficiency 
— due  to  political  mismanagement. 

The  political  head  of  a  military  or  naval  system 
must  necessarily  be  more  influenced  by  the  political 
factors  than  would  a  permanent  naval  or  military 
board  having  full  executive  power  and  being  quite 
independent  of  politics. 

When  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what 
the  military  experts  believe  is  needed  and  that  which 
supporters  of  the  administration  believe  is  neces- 
sary, the  political  secretary,  having  been  trained  in 
the  art  of  listening  to  the  voice  of  political  support- 
ers, is  at  least  more  inclined  to  listen  to  their  plea 
than  to  that  of  the  military  experts.  The  heroic 
music  of  the  military  is  strange  to  him  and  he  does 
not  understand  it;  but  the  rag-time  approval  of  his 
political  constituents — supporters  of  the  adminis- 
tration— is  not  only  familiar  to  his  ear,  but  pleasing 
to  his  temperament. 

Moreover,  a  temporary  political  head  is  not  well 
enough  informed  regarding  naval  and  military  or- 

260 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION         261 

ganisation  nor  well  enough  trained  in  the  handling 
of  naval  or  military  units  to  reorganise  or  build 
up  a  better  organisation  when  one  is  needed. 

Our  naval  promotion  system  is  a  burlesque  of 
those  of  Europe ;  it  seems  that  everything  has  been 
done  that  could  have  been  done  to  keep  able  am- 
bitious young  men  out  of  the  navy. 

No  young  man,  desiring  a  future,  wishes  to  grow 
gray-haired  under  a  system  which  holds  him  in  the 
two  lowest  ranks  of  the  navy  until  he  is  two-score 
and  ten.  There  is  no  efficient  arrangement  for  pro- 
motion even  of  trained  college  men. 

"...  the  promotion  of  officers  is  so  completely 
blocked  that  a  young  man  graduating  from  the 
Naval  Academy  must  look  forward  to  spending  all 
the  best  years  of  his  life  in  the  two  lowest  grades 
of  the  service;  to  performing,  as  a  gray-headed 
man,  the  same  duties  he  has  performed  as  a  boy; 
and  to  receiving  but  a  very  small  increase  in  salary/' 

"I  ask  you  to  picture  the  effect  of  a  condition 
where  a  young  officer,  graduating  from  the  Naval 
Academy,  full  of  spirit  and  enthusiasm,  finds  him- 
self confronted  with  a  prospect  of  promotion  to  the 
grade  of  Lieutenant  at  the  age  of  52  years." * 

Also  in  the  organisation  of  our  army  efficiency 
seems  to  be  the  last  thing  thought  about. 

Our  army  is  a  badly  balanced  organisation,  and 
for  this  Congress  is  to  blame. 


262 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Were  it  not  necessary  to  increase  our  army  in 
time  of  war,  the  number  of  officers  we  have  in  the 
United  States  Army  would  be  a  fair  proportion  to 
the  number  of  enlisted  men.  Our  standing  army, 
however,  will  be  but  the  nucleus  for  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  volunteers.  Certainly  we  cannot  ex- 
pect to  effectively  oppose  an  invading  army  of 
250,000  trained  men  with  less  than  one  million  vol- 
unteers in  addition  to  our  present  army,  inasmuch 
as  it  took  nearly  three  million  Union  volunteers  to 
defeat  the  volunteer  armies  of  the  South  in  the  Civil 
War. 

Every  company  of  a  hundred  men  needs  at  least 
four  officers.  It  is  better  to  have  six — at  least  two 
in  reserve  for  each  company  in  time  of  war.  The 
officers  in  our  army  are  but  a  little  more  than  5.3 
per  cent,  of  the  enlisted  men.  Assuming  that  the 
officers  of  our  militia,  each  and  every  one  of  them, 
should  turn  out  to  be  efficient  officers,  which  is  very 
doubtful,  then  we  should  have  just  5,015  officers  of 
the  United  States  Army  to  captain  our  army  of 
93,610  men  and  to  train  the  1,000,000  volunteers; 
that  is,  one  officer  to  every  2,012  men.  This  would 
mean  just  one-eightieth  of  the  minimum  number  of 
officers  absolutely  necessary ;  and  not  a  single  officer 
in  reserve.  If  our  entire  mobile  army  in  all  the 
United  States  to-day  were  officered  at  this  rate,  we 
would  now  have  but  17  officers  of  all  ranks. 

Officers  promoted  from  the  ranks  without  pre- 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION         263 

vious  training,  are  seldom  of  value ;  there  are  excep- 
tions, of  course,  which  stand  out  in  history,  but  they 
are  few.  In  our  Civil  War  more  than  25,000  men 
made  officers  by  promotion  had  to  be  returned  to  the 
ranks  because  of  their  inefficiency. 

Our  campaign  against  Mexico  was  probably  the 
most  creditable  campaign  the  United  States  Army 
ever  conducted.  General  Scott  has  asserted  that  its 
success  would  have  been  doubtful  except  for  the 
percentage  of  trained  men  and  especially  the  large 
percentage  of  trained  officers. 

"The  magnitude  of  the  task  in  training  volunteer 
officers  is  apparent  when  it  is  realized  that  it  will  be 
necessary  to  develop  not  less  than  25,000  in  case  we 
should  have  to  mobilise  enough  additional  volun- 
teers to  bring  our  total  force  up  to  1,000,000 
men."  2 

The  more  trained  officers  we  can  have  on  hand, 
in  case  it  becomes  necessary  to  quickly  enroll  and 
train  volunteers,  the  better  our  chance  of  success 
will  be. 

Not  only  is  there  lack  of  proper  organisation,  but 
there  is  actual  blundering! 

Mere  lack  of  knowledge  on  the  part  of  a  political 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  or  an  untrained  Secretary  of 
War  has  led  to  serious  mistakes. 

Our  F  submarines  were  authorized  in  1908. 
They  were  accepted  as  satisfactory  in  May,  19 13, 


264  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

by  Secretary  Daniels.  They  are  now  out  of  com- 
mission because  of  faulty  construction.  Five  years 
to  build  four  defective  submarines ;  and  22  men  sent 
to  their  death ! 

The  G-2  was  authorized  in  May,  1908,  and  is  yet 
but  nine-tenths  complete — a  seven-year  profitable 
job. 

For  the  same  reason  we  are  still  building  great 
battleships,  costing  from  fifteen  to  seventeen  million 
dollars,  vitally  deficient  in  one  great  essential — 
speed. 

The  keel  of  the  California  has  just  been  laid.  We 
are  told  of  the  wonderful  armor  it  will  have,  of  the 
twelve  mighty  guns  it  will  carry,  of  the  engines  we 
are  going  to  experiment  with;  yet  we  are  not  so 
vividly  informed  that  its  speed  is  to  be  but  twenty- 
one  knots  an  hour — a  deficiency  which  would  have 
outclassed  it  even  three  years  ago. 

Of  course,  no  intelligent  man  holding  so  responsi- 
ble a  position  as  that  of  Secretary  of  War  or  that 
of  Secretary  of  the  Navy  wishes  to  make  an  impor- 
tant decision  upon  any  vital,  gigantic  question  until 
he  has  informed  himself  regarding  it.  This  is  to 
his  credit,  but  the  result  of  the  system  is  no  less 
detrimental  to  the  army  or  the  navy.  While  he 
seeks  information,  talks,  discusses  and  investigates, 
opportunities  pass.  He  is  unable  to  judge  of  the 
true  value  of  new  devices.  Hence,  because  of  ig- 
norance on  the  part  of  secretaries  of  the  Navy  and 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION         265 

of  War,  because  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  Con- 
gress, we  have  lost  opportunities  of  first  equipping 
our  army  and  navy  with  the  most  modern  means  of 
defence. 

Our  people  have  invented  the  greatest  instru- 
ments in  modern  warfare;  yet  we  have  practically 
none  of  them.  While  our  political  secretaries  have 
been  investigating  other  nations  have  taken  them 
up  and  developed  them. 

A  citizen  of  the  United  States  made  the  first  aero- 
plane that  would  fly.  Our  Army  and  Navy  depart- 
ments have  been  testing,  experimenting,  investi- 
gating and  talking  ever  since — but  not  building. 
When  the  war  opened  we  had  twenty-three  obsolete 
aeroplanes,  although  Germany  had  a  thousand  one 
hundred  perfected  modern  aeroplanes  and  France 
one  thousand  five  hundred. 

An  American  invented  the  Audion  Amplifier, 
which  is  used  by  the  French  and  English  armies  to 
detect  the  far  approaching  aeroplanes  and  Zeppe- 
lins.   We  have  none  for  this  purpose. 

It  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  per- 
fected the  submarine ;  and  we  have  only  a  few  that 
can  safely  operate  under  water,  although  foreign 
nations  have  scores  of  submarines  capable  of  mak- 
ing three  and  four  days'  trips,  even  two  weeks'  voy- 
ages away  from  the  bases  of  supply. 

An  American  invented  the  microphone,  which  is 
now  used  by  the  British  Navy  to  detect  approaching 


2W  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

submarines  under  water.  We  have  none  for  this 
purpose. 

A  citizen  of  the  United  States  invented  the  great- 
est explosive  known  yet,  when  it  was  first  adopted 
we  were  so  doubtful  of  its  value  that  instead  of 
ordering  thirty  million  dollars'  worth  Congress  ap- 
propriated thirty  thousand  dollars  to  be  divided 
among  seven  different  factories. 

When  the  government  concentrated  its  forces  at 
Manila  and  a  portion  of  our  army  at  San  Diego,  the 
Pacific  fleet  did  not  have  enough  coal  to  steam  to 
Honolulu  and  back.  Lack  of  fuel  for  the  Pacific 
fleet  at  this  time  was  wholly  due  to  neglect! 

In  August,  191 5,  when  the  government  felt  it 
might  be  compelled  to  again  order  ships  to  Mexico, 
the  Tennessee  which  was  close  to  New  York  Har- 
bor could  not  leave  for  the  south  because  she  could 
not  get  enough  coal  to  steam  even  as  far  as  Newport 
News. 

The  Tennessee  asked  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard 
for  coal  and  begged  for  fifty  tons  only  if  the  Yard 
could  not  spare  more.  But  the  Brooklyn  Navy 
Yard  did  not  have  fifty  tons  on  hand  and  did  not 
have  that  amount  twenty-four  hours  later.  And 
this  shamefully  neglectful  condition  existed  after 
four  years'  tension  with  Mexico,  after  an  entire 
year  of  war  in  Europe,  and  after  four  months' 
diplomatic  strain  with  Germany. 

The  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard  is  one  of  the  great  sup- 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION        267 

ply  stations  for  the  Atlantic  fleets,  with  Boston  hun- 
dreds of  miles  to  the  north  and  Philadelphia  far  to 
the  south.  And  this  great  naval  station  could  not 
supply  FIFTY  TONS  OF  COAL  when  needed, 
even  though  the  department  at  Washington  had 
known  for  weeks  that  it  might  be  called  upon  at  any 
time  to  send  ships  to  the  south! 

There  are  1 52  twelve-inch  guns  mounted  without 
a  single  person  to  man  them;  there  are  two  four- 
teen-inch  guns  mounted  to  protect  our  coasts  with- 
out a  single  man  trained  to  operate  them ;  there  are 
71  ten-inch  guns  and  37  seven-inch,  and  no  one 
trained  to  handle  them  in  case  of  need. 

The  great  16-inch  gun  for  the  defence  of  the 
Panama  Canal  was  finished  and  fire-tested  in  1903. 
Through  neglect  it  lay  on  the  beach  for  ten  years. 
At  the  end  of  that  time  it  was  found  that  not  even 
a  design  had  been  made  for  a  carriage!  And  in 
January,  19 16,  thirteen  years  after  the  gun  was  fin- 
ished and  tested,  the  carriage  was  not  even  ready 
to  be  sent  to  Panama.  Similar  facts  as  to  neglect 
in  supplying  ammunition  and  supplying  men  for  our 
harbor  defences,  brought  out  at  the  Senate  investi- 
gation a  year  ago,  caused  one  Senator  to  exclaim : 

"This  is  nothing  less  than  criminal  negligence." 

Perhaps  one  of  the  most  serious  results  of  our 
policy  of  placing  politicians  at  the  head  of  the  army 


268  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

and  navy  is  the  friction  that  develops  between  the 
generals  of  the  army  and  the  admirals  of  the  navy 
who  have  had  from  35  to  40  years'  practical  experi- 
ence on  the  one  hand  and  the  political  head  with  no 
naval  or  military  experience  on  the  other. 

At  present  we  have  such  a  flagrant  example  of  a 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  unwilling  and  refusing  to 
take  advice  of  experienced  admirals  or  the  General 
Board,  that  the  weakness,  danger  and  viciousness 
of  the  political  system  of  appointment  is  most  strik- 
ingly brought  home  to  us.  This  is  not  a  criticism 
of  Secretary  Daniels  personally,  it  is  a  criticism  of 
the  system  that  makes  such  an  appointment  possible. 

At  best  it  is  most  embarrassing  for  a  man  with 
only  a  country  newspaper  experience  to  step  into  a 
department  of  which  he  knows  nothing  and  at  once 
become  the  superior  of  hundreds  of  men  who  have 
had  years  of  practical  and  scientific  training  in  the 
navy  and  in  the  department. 

Any  man  placed  in  such  a  position  feels  that  ( for 
the  good  of  the  service — a  service  whose  efficiency 
depends. upon  obedience)  he  must  make  it  known 
that  he  is  the  "head."  Consequently,  if  mistakes  are 
made  or  if  defects — not  due  to  him  at  all — are  ex- 
posed, he  is  tempted  to  justify  his  political  appoint- 
ment and  to  justify  his  chief  at  the  head  of  the  Ad- 
ministration, by  covering  up  those  mistakes,  by  shift- 
ing the  blame  upon  a  previous  administration  or  by 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION        269 

suppressing  the  truth  about  the  defects  which  exist. 

Perhaps  never  in  the  history  of  the  United  States 
has  there  been  a  time,  excepting  during  the  times 
when  we  were  at  war,  when  publicity  as  to  our  un- 
preparedness  is  so  much  needed  as  at  present,  and 
there  probably  has  never  been  a  time  in  all  our  his- 
tory, excepting  times  when  we  were  at  war,  during 
which  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  attempted  to 
suppress  the  truth  as  to  our  real  condition  so  auto- 
cratically as  at  present. 

In  the  United  States  knowledge  of  facts  regard- 
ing our  unpreparedness  need  not  be  withheld  be- 
cause of  the  fear  that  foreign  governments  may 
learn  of  them.  Every  man  of  sense  knows  that  the 
secret  agents  of  Germany,  Russia,  England  and 
Japan  know  about  our  unpreparedness.  Their 
agents  have  been  at  the  business  of  finding  out  a 
long  time  and  they  were  well  qualified  for  their  task 
in  the  beginning.  Every  fact  that  has  been  given 
us  during  that  last  two  years,  every  astonishing 
revelation  made  as  to  our  unpreparedness,  every- 
thing that  has  helped  to  open  our  eyes,  has  been  and 
is  well  known  to  every  foreign  government. 

Any  man  in  the  service  who  attempts  to  give  the 
public  information  as  to  the  actual  conditions  of  the 
army  or  of  the  navy,  for  the  support  of  which  the 
people  are  contributing  two  hundred  million  dollars 
a  year,  is  promptly  reprimanded  or  transferred. 


270 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Anyone  outside  of  the  service  who  attempts  to 
tell  the  people  the  truth  is  subjected  to  the  displeas- 
ure and  ridicule  of  the  heads  of  the  departments. 

No  loyal  American  citizen  desires  the  Secretary 
of  War  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  make  public 
one  single  fact,  the  suppression  of  which  might  be 
for  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

During  the  present  administration,  however,  offi- 
cers both  in  the  army  and  navy  have  been  repri- 
manded, even  major-generals  and  admirals  not  ex- 
cepted, because  they  have  stated  the  most  general 
truths  of  our  unpreparedness — truths  already  well 
known  to  every  layman  who  has  made  a  study  of 
the  subject. 

The  Secretary  of  War  reprimanded  a  Captain 
for  stating: 

■  "It  will  take  the  United  States  about  three  years 
to  put  an  army  of  one  million  trained  men  in  the 
field,  and  in  that  time  an  enemy  could  take  and  hold 
our  American  seaboards." 

If  a  similar  statement  had  been  made  in  peace 
times  in  militaristic  Germany  or  Russia,  members 
of  the  staff  would  have  engaged  in  open  debate  on 
the  subject. 

Admiral  Fiske  stated  that  it  would  take  five  years 
to  put  our  navy  in  condition  to  fight  a  first-class 
power.  This  is  truth  which  any  one  who  knows 
anything  about  the  navy  already  knows.  But  it 
convinced  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Daniels,  who  had 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION        271 

i  — — — — ^—  — — ^— 

been  in  the  navy  twenty-four  months,  that  Admiral 
Fiske,  who  had  been  in  the  navy  forty-four  years, 
was  either  ignorant  or  careless  in  his  statements; 
hence  Admiral  Fiske  was  "transferred." 

This  same  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Daniels, 
furnishes  us  an  amusing  and  at  the  same  time  tragic 
illustration  of  the  inability  of  a  man  who  has  had 
no  previous  knowledge  of  naval  affairs  to  know  of 
what  he  has  approved  and  of  what  he  has  disap- 
proved. Less  than  four  months  ago  Admiral  Fiske 
was  again  called  to  the  office  of  Secretary  Daniels. 
Admiral  Fiske  was  told  that,  had  he  been  a  younger 
officer,  Secretary  Daniels  would  have  court-mar- 
tialled  him  for  publishing  an  article  without  first 
referring  it  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  amusing  side  of  this  incident  is  that  the  ar- 
ticle of  which  Secretary  Daniels  disapproved  was 
an  article  which  Admiral  Fiske  had  previously  sub- 
mitted to  Secretary  Daniels  and  which  Mr.  Daniels 
had  himself  previously  approved.  Secretary  Dan- 
iels is  not  to  be  blamed ;  with  his  previous  experience 
only  as  a  small  town  newspaper  editor  and  state 
printer,  how  could  he  be  expected  to  have  suffi- 
cient knowledge  of  naval  affairs  to  determine 
whether  an  article  should  be  approved  or  disap- 
proved until  it  had  been  made  public  and  he  had 
found  out  from  the  politicians  that  its  publication 
was  unwise  politically  ? 

Who  is  Admiral  Fiske?     He  is  one  of  the  great- 


272  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

est  naval  experts — he  has  been  in  the  navy  forty 
years,  he  has  won  two  gold  medals  for  navy  insti- 
tute work,  he  has  had  command  of  three  different 
divisions  of  the  Atlantic  fleet,  he  has  invented  a 
naval  telephone  sight  which  is  now  adopted  by  all 
the  navies  of  the  world,  he  has  been  president  of 
the  Naval  Institute. 

The  serious  and  tragic  side  of  the  incident  is  that 
Admiral  Fiske — a  man  with  such  a  record — should 
be  absolutely  forbidden  by  Secretary  Daniels  to 
write  for  any  publication  or  to  speak  anywhere  on 
national  defence.  Secretary  Daniels'  words,  as 
creditably  reported  by  Admiral  Fiske  himself,  were 
in  substance  these:  "You  cannot  write  or  speak 
on  any  subject  connected  with  national  defence.  If 
the  people  really  want  to  know  anything  about  the 
navy  they  can  come  to  its  Head.  You  cannot  even 
say  two  and  two  make  four." 

This  is  one  of  the  results  of  our  political  military 
system.  It  makes  it  possible  for  any  president,  no 
matter  of  what  party,  to  appoint  a  politician  who  is 
so  ignorant — no  matter  what  his  native  capacity  in 
his  own  line  may  be — of  naval  affairs  and  naval 
science  that  he  cannot  tell  whether  he  has  approved 
or  disapproved  of  an  article  of  military  affairs.  It 
is  regrettable  that  such  a  secretary  can  maintain 
his  assumption  of  superiority  only  by  depriving  the 
most  noted  expert  in  the  navy  department  of  his 
freedom  of  speech  even  in  private  life. 


BLUNDERING  AND  SUPPRESSION        273 

^ *^— ~— — ■— "~*-^— ~— ■— — |~"~— ^^ 

Moreover,  the  public  is  misled  by  the  statements 
officially  given  out  as  to  the  real  condition  of  the 
navy. 

In  May,  19 15,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  pub- 
lically  proclaimed  that  nine  of  our  submarines  had 
made  an  extraordinary  trip  from  Key  West  to  New 
York;  but  he  did  not  inform  us  that  three  out  of  the 
nine  submarines  never  joined  the  fleet  until  they 
reached  a  position  off  Delaware;  nor  were  we  told 
that  one  of  the  K  boats  and  the  E-2  had  to  be  towed ; 
nor  were  we  told  that  the  fleet  was  accompanied  by 
a  tender  all  the  way. 

Moreover,  in  comparing  the  broadside-fire  of  our 
best  ships  with  those  of  the  British  Navy,  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy  compared  the  broadside  fire 
of  British  ships  which  have  been  finished  with  ships 
which  we  are  going  to  have  some  day. 

And  again,  Secretary  Daniels  in  his  late  an- 
nouncement has  classified  the  Michigan  and  the 
South  Carolina  as  dreadnoughts — although  all  na- 
val experts,  our  navy  department,  and  even  Secre- 
tary Daniels  himself,  have  not  previously  so  classi- 
fied them.  These  ships  have  a  speed  of  but  18^4 
knots  and  a  propelling  power  of  but  16,000  and 
18,000  horsepower  respectively. 

His  announcement  that  the  United  States  navy 
keeps  a  larger  percentage  of  men  on  its  ships  in  time 
of  peace  than  any  other  navy  in  the  world,  is  but  a 
portion  of  the  truth.    We  keep  practically  all  the 


274  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

trained  men  we  have  on  our  ships,  because  we 
haven't  enough.  Other  navies  have  thousands  of 
trained  men  in  reserve.  They  are  not  on  the  ships 
in  peace  time,  but  they  are  ready  to  go  on  at  a  mo- 
ment's notice. 

What  the  American  citizen  wishes  is  frankness 
and  freedom!  He  is  not  afraid  of  the  truth;  if 
there  are  dangers,  he  wants  to  know  of  them;  if 
there  are  defects  in  his  tools  of  defence,  he  wants 
to  remedy  those  defects! 

But  how  could  the  American  public  ever  have  be- 
come informed  of  our  present  condition  if  laymen 
and  students  and  former  government  officials  and 
statesmen  had  not,  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of 
this  administration,  revealed  to  us  the  present  de- 
fects of  our  army  and  navy?  All  thanks  are  due 
them.  The  important  point,  however,  is  that  these 
same  conditions  may  arise  again  and  again — no 
matter  what  party  is  in  power,  no  matter  what  man 
is  in  the  White  House — so  long  as  we  tolerate  the 
"political-plum"  method  of  placing  the  safety  of 
pur  nation  in  the  hands  of  untrained  men. 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  261.    Rear- Admiral  Austin  M.  Knight,  U.  S.  Navy. 

2  Page  263.    Major-General  Leonard  Wood. 


CHAPTEP  III 

WASTING  BILLIONS 

WE  are  unprepared  because  we  have  wasted 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  through 
political  mismanagement.  We  have  been  paying, 
on  an  average,  for  the  last  ten  years  at  the  rate 
of  one  hundred  million  dollars  a  year  to  maintain  an 
army  of  less  than  100,000  men.  This  little  army, 
because  of  the  waste  and  extravagance  due  to  the 
"pork-barrelling-method"  of  appropriating  moneys, 
and  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  political  Secretaries  of 
War,  has  cost  us  in  ten  years  one  billion  dollars. 

Yet  after  all  this  expenditure  we  have  but  thirty- 
four  thousand  men  in  the  United  States  that  can  be 
mobilised,  and  those  are  so  scattered  that  they  can- 
not be  mobilised  inside  of  thirty  days. 

Switzerland  has  an  army  much  more  efficient  and 
better  equipped.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war 
Switzerland  mobilised  an  army  equal  in  number  to 
seven  armies  of  the  size  of  the  entire  mobile  army 
in  the  United  States.  This  was  done  in  forty-eight 
hours.  And  these  men  were  fully  equipped.  If  it 
had  been  necessary  she  could  have  mobilised  in  ten 

275 


276 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Our  Mf  If  total  for  Pork 


o 

1 

B 

G-  Our  O/myondA/ovy 
Expend/fares  from 

J7SO-/9IO 

416,500.000.000 

B-  atl  Other  Government 
Expenditures  from 

1790-1910 

iuj900.000.000 


A.  $16,500,000,000 — Our  Army  and  Navy  Expenditures — including 

pensions  and  interest  on  public  debts  caused  by 
war — from  1790  to  1910. 

B.  4,000,000,000 — All  other  Government  Expenditures  from  1790 

to  1910. 


WASTING  BILLIONS 


277 


Our  Milfiarfcm  for  Pork 


Q -a// Expenditures  of 
US/rom  foundation 
of  Government  tow/o 

S2//500.00QOOO 

B= Portion  of  Qbove 
Expended  forQrmy 
and  Nervy  durfng 
sameperiod 

*  16.500,000/000 


A.  $21,500,000,000 — All    expenditures   of   U.    S.    from   foundation 

of  Government  to  1910. 

B.  16,500,000,000 — Portion  of  above — including  pensions  and  inter- 

est on  public  debts  caused  by  wars — expended 
for  Army  and  Navy  during  same  period. 


278  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

days  eight  more  additional  armies,  each  equalling 
in  number  and  surpassing  in  equipment  the  entire 
mobile  army  in  the  United  States. 

Switzerland  has  maintained  her  army,  and  one  of 
the  very  best  small  armies  in  the  world,  out  of  a 
population  about  equal  to  that  of  Massachusetts. 
Switzerland  has  done  this  without  interrupting  the 
industry  of  the  country  and  without  altering  the 
peace-loving  nature  of  the  people  nor  the  peace- 
policy  of  the  Swiss  Government.  No  nation  in  Eu- 
rope has  for  its  size  a  more  efficient  army  and  no 
nation  is  more  awft'-militaristic. 

For  every  $i  Switzerland  spends  to  train,  equip 
and  keep  a  soldier  in  training,  we  spend  $80.69.  If 
we  had  been  during  the  last  ten  years  as  econom- 
ically efficient  as  Switzerland,  our  army  would 
have  cost  us  less  than  twelve  million  dollars  instead 
of  one  thousand  million  dollars. 

But  this  is  a  comparison  with  Switzerland  only. 

Mr.  Bryan,  Mr.  Ford,  Mr.  Kitchin  and  others 
wail  that  we  do  not  wish  to  burden  our  people  with 
the  excessive  cost  of  a  militaristic  system  similar 
to  that  of  Russia,  Germany  or  France. 

The  truth  is  this:  we  could  have  maintained  an 
adequately  trained  army  of  half  a  million  men  each 
year  since  the  Civil  War  and  have  saved  the  United 
States  several  hundred  millions  of  dollars  each 
generation,  had  we  adopted  the  system  of  Russia, 
Germany  and  France. 


WASTING  BILLIONS  279 

What  is  the  annual  soldier  cost  of  each  man  of 
the  United  States  Army  compared  with  the  annual 
soldier  cost  of  each  man  in  the  armies  of  the  most 
militaristic  countries  in  the  world? 

We  pay  from  400  to  600  per  cent,  more  for  the 
training  and  equipment  of  each  soldier  than  other 
nations  pay  and  get  almost  nothing  in  return.  The 
per  soldier  cost  in  times  of  peace  in  Switzerland 
is  $13,  in  Germany,  $209,  in  France,  $249,  in  Aus- 
tria, $256,  in  Russia,  $293,  and  in  the  United 
States,  $1,049. 

Again  objection  is  made  that  there  is  a  vast  dif- 
ference between  sustaining  an  army  as  it  is  sus- 
tained in  the  United  States,  with  men  at  a  salary 
of  $16  per  month  each,  and  sustaining  peace  armies 
in  Europe  where  the  allowance  as  salary  is  but  a 
few  pennies  a  day  per  soldier.  The  objection  is 
also  made  that  there  is  a  vast  difference  between 
the  cost  of  food  furnished  to  our  soldiers  and  that 
furnished  to  the  soldier  of  Russia,  Germany  and 
France  respectively. 

Both  objections  are  granted.  It  is  true  that  the 
food  furnished  each  man  of  the  United  States  Army 
costs  more  than  the  food  furnished  each  man  of  the 
Russian,  German  or  French  armies;  but  the  ex- 
cessive cost  is  due  more  to  waste  and  inefficiency  in 
management  than  to  a  difference  in  the  quality  or 
amount  of  food. 

But  this  waste  and  this  inefficiency  in  manage- 


280 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Mflffarfsm  forProfecffon  to  Militarism  forPorK 
Annual  Peace  Soldiery  per $  5.000.000 


Q  -  Swllzctlancj    ss^m 
B-US.CL  goo 


Militarism  for  Pork  rs  Mflffarfsm  forProfecffon 
Cosf  per  Soldier  per  year 


0 

B 
c 

a- us  a  *l0oo 
B- trance  *m 
C-  Switzerland '*» 


WASTING  BILLIONS  281 

ment  have  not  been  due  to  inefficient  men  in  the 
Subsistence  Department  but  to  the  small  number  of 
men  allowed  by  Congress  for  that  work.  At  the 
beginning  of  our  war  with  Spain  there  were  but 
twenty-two  trained  heads  in  our  Subsistence  De- 
partment and  these  men  were  compelled  to  direct, 
even  after  partially  trained  men  were  given  as  aides, 
the  buying  of  materials  and  the  supplying  of  these 
foods  to  nearly  300,000  men  in  different  camps  in 
the  United  States,  and  to  the  armies  in  Cuba,  Porto 
Rico,  the  Philippines  and  in  China.  Is  there  any 
wonder  that  there  was  waste? 

But  to  go  back  to  the  comparative  cost  of  the 
soldier  of  different  nations  in  peace  times. 

After  we  have  deducted  respective  amounts 
paid  for  salaries  and  food  from  the  respective  total 
cost  of  each  soldier  of  the  armies  of  Germany  and 
the  United  States,  we  find  that  the  annual  cost  for 
equipment  and  training  of  a  soldier  in  the  United 
States  is  631  per  cent,  greater  than  it  is  in  militar- 
istic-burdened Germany.  And  in  Germany  the  sol- 
dier is  equipped  and  he  is  trained.  Not  only  is  he 
taken  care  of  in  the  most  perfect  manner,  from  his 
toe-nails  to  his  scalp,  but  he  is  provided  with  the 
most  modern  and  costly  equipment  and  is  furnished 
with  sufficient  ammunition  for  practice.  Although 
we  pay  63 1  per  cent,  more  per  soldier  per  year  than 
Germany  pays,  the  United  States  Army  has  prac- 
tically no  equipment  at  all.     In  other  words,  elimi- 


282 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


Our  Army-  Wli a  f  Might  Ha  ve  Been 


M. 


O^OrmyWeNowfiove        gspoo 

B-amyvtMQhtHaveHoa 

Every  Year  from  /s7$-to  - 
im  forourMoney,Hoo!/t 
Been  S/ien fas  w/sefy  as 
/niSWflzer/and. 

65W0G0 


Our  Mflflurfem  for  Port 


Ct-CbstofOurOrmy 
for  last  35  years 

*t06S.0OQPOO 

B-  mat  ftshoucf nave 
cost  us,  ff  money  fiad 
been  spent  as  eccno- 
mtcoffyQsfnJlvltzerJand 


WASTING  BILLIONS 283 

nating  the  differences  in  the  costs  in  food  and  sal- 
aries, the  United  States  spends  631  per  cent,  more 
per  year  for  the  equipment  and  management  of 
each  soldier  than  Germany  does.  Germany  spends 
100  per  cent,  for  equipment  and  gets  the  best  in  the 
world.  We  waste  631  per  cent,  and  get  little  or 
nothing.     Which  is  the  burdened  country  ? 

We  scoff  at  the  bureaucratic-grafting  govern- 
ment of  Russia  and  we  pity  the  poor  Russians  bur- 
dened by  militarism;  but  even  eliminating  the  dif- 
ferences in  the  costs  of  food  and  salaries,  we  an- 
nually spend  for  equipment  374  per  cent,  more  per 
soldier  than  Russia  does.  Russia,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  present  war,  equipped  and  mobilised  2,000,- 
000  men  in  30  days;  we  cannot  mobilise  34,000 
even  partially  equipped  men  in  30  days ! 

Why  is  America  so  inefficient?  Because  there 
has  been  flagrant  administrative  inefficiency  and  ig- 
norance and  because  there  has  been  congressional 
waste  and  lack  of  co-operation. 

One  of  the  great  causes  of  waste  is  the  continu- 
ance of  49  different  army  posts  for  34,000  men. 
Most  of  these  were  established  a  hundred  years 
ago.  They  were  then  necessary  to  protect  the 
pioneers  from  the  Indians.  Five  hundred  men  are 
still  kept  at  Oswego,  New  York — evidently  to  pro- 
tect the  people  from  the  Red  Skins  that  overrun  the 
surrounding  country.  Congress  has  not  yet  recog- 
nised that  we  are  living  in  1916  instead  of  1814. 


284 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

President  Roosevelt's  Secretaries  of  War  over 
and  over  again  urged  Congress  to  abolish  most  of 
these  army  posts,  insisting  that  they  were  useless 
and  the  cause  of  great  waste.  But  Congressmen 
were  appealed  to  by  their  constituents,  who  begged 
that  their  sources  of  revenue  be  not  cut  off.  Hence 
Congress  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  repeated  demands 
of  the  Secretaries  of  War. 

Corresponding  to  the  useless  army  posts,  there 
are  useless  navy  yards. 

Great  Britain  in  first-class  fighting  ships  has  a 
navy  almost  four  times  as  large  as  our  own,  yet  we 
have  twice  as  many  first-class  navy  yards.  In 
other  words  we  have  spent  enough  money  to  ade- 
quately accommodate  a  navy  800  per  cent,  greater 
than  that  we  now  have.  Yet  many  of  our  yards 
are  useless.  Germany  has  a  much  more  powerful 
and  efficient  navy  than  we  have  and  Germany  has 
adequate  navy  yards  to  accommodate  her  entire 
fleet,  yet  all  her  yards  combined  do  not  equal  one- 
third  of  the  accommodations  we  have  provided 
for  ships  we  have  not.  Navy  yards  have  been 
established  hit-and-miss  along  the  coast.  When- 
ever a  Senator  or  a  Congressman  could  bring 
enough  pressure  to  bear  to  secure  an  appropriation 
for  his  state  or  district  a  navy  yard  was  established. 

As  an  instance  of  this,  some  years  ago  a  south- 
ern Senator  insisted  that  a  navy  yard  be  established 
at  Port  Royal,  South  Carolina.     There  was  a  site 


WASTING  BILLIONS  285 

for  sale  for  five  thousand  dollars.  This  was  pur- 
chased and  nearly  half  a  million  appropriated  to  be 
distributed  among  the  bankers,  constructors,  news- 
papers and  politicians  in  the  Senator's  district.  Of 
course,  subsequent  appropriations  were  necessary 
and  the  station  was  not  abandoned  until  nearly 
three  million  dollars  had  been  wasted  there.  Later 
this  same  Senator  insisted  on  another  navy  yard 
at  Charleston  and  five  million  dollars  was  squan- 
dered. This  Charleston  yard  was  built  especially 
for  big  battleships,  but  is  so  badly  constructed  that 
it  can  be  used  only  for  destroyers  and  gun  boats. 

Nine  million  dollars  have  been  spent  at  Mare  Is- 
land, California.  Yet  the  water  is  so  shallow  that 
it  has  not  an  adequate  dock  and  none  of  the  larger 
battleships  built  in  the  last  thirteen  years  can  berth 
there. 

If  up  to  1910  we  had  spent  our  appropriations 
for  navy  yards  as  efficiently  as  Great  Britain  or 
Germany  have  spent  their  appropriations,  we  should 
have  saved  enough  money  to  build  two  hundred  sub- 
marines at  one  million  dollars  each,  or  four  hun- 
dred submarines  at  half  a  million  dollars  each,  or 
fourteen  of  the  finest  dreadnoughts  afloat. 

And  now,  although  former  secretaries  of  the 
navy  have  insisted  on  the  abandonment  of  half  a 
score  or  more  of  these  wasteful  enterprises,  the 
present  Secretary  of  the  Navy  announces  that  he 
will  not  abandon  a  single  one  of  them. 


286 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


War  Expenses  and  Peace  Waste 


A-&1Q90Q000.OOO 

B-     q/2/,000000 

A.  The  sum — including  pensions  and  interest  on  public  debts  caused 
by  war — we  have  spent  on  our  army  and  navy  from  1790  to  1015. 

B.  The  total  actual  cost  of  all  our  wars  from  1700  to  1914,  showing 
that  we  have  spent  in  peace  times  10,779  millions  of  dollars,  while 
the  cost  of  the  wars  of  the  United  States  has  been  but  $6,121,000,000. 


WASTING  BILLIONS  287 

Since  1900  we  have  spent  in  round  numbers  a 
billion  and  a  half  dollars  on  our  navy.  Germany 
has  a  navy  almost  twice  as  powerful  as  that  of  the 
United  States,  yet  she  has  spent  $500,000,000  less 
than  we  have.  We  have  wasted  and  allowed  our- 
selves to  be  pork-barrelled  out  of  five  hundred  mil- 
lion dollars  in  fifteen  years.  This  would  have  built 
five  hundred  of  the  best,  most  up-to-date  coast  sub- 
marines, and  in  addition  to  that  we  could  have  added 
sixteen  first-class  modern  dreadnoughts  of  great 
speed,  mediumly  light  armour  and  high-elevation 
guns.  Sixteen  dreadnoughts  of  this  type  and  five 
hundred  coast  submarines  would  have  given  us  one 
of  the  greatest  navies  in  the  world.  This  amount 
our  Congresses  have  wasted  in  a  little  over  fifteen 
years. 

This  is  the  result  of  political  militarism — of  un- 
trained Secretaries  of  War,  of  pork-barrelling  Con- 
gresses and  of  ninety  million  American  citizens 
"criminally  indifferent"  to  the  welfare  of  their 
country ! 


PART  FIVE:     HOW  POLITICAL 
MILITARISM  FAILS 


PART  FIVE:     HOW  POLITICAL 
MILITARISM  FAILS 

CHAPTER   I 

THE  MINUTE   MEN 

THE  minute  men  have  won!" 
This  was  the  cry  heard  in  every  American 
colony  after  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 

The  minute  men — our  noble  Revolutionary  an- 
cestors— were  each  day  struggling  with  nature  for 
a  living  and  holding  the  Indians  at  bay.  They  were 
courageous  and  physically  fit.  Moreover,  every  one 
of  them  knew  from  boyhood  how  to  use  firearms 
and  how  to  hit  the  mark. 

Not  only  they,  but  their  fathers  and  their  grand- 
fathers had  been  so  trained.  A  gun  was  taken  with 
them  when  they  went  to  work  in  the  fields;  a  gun 
was  ever  ready  for  the  use  of  the  wife  and  the 
mother  at  the  house;  a  gun  was  taken  to  the  town 
meeting;  even  to  church. 

And  that  gun,  in  relation  to  the  armament  of 
those  days,  stood  as  the  rapid-fire  machine  gun  does 
in  relation  to  the  armament  of  to-day.  "The  min- 
ute men"  in  those  days  designated  men  physically 

291 


292  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

fit;  men  trained  from  boyhood  up  in  the  expert 
use  of  the  efficient  fire-arm  of  that  time ;  men  armed 
with  and  owning  the  firearm;  men  ready  at  a  mo- 
ment's notice. 

To-day  the  citizen  soldiery  means :  men  physically 
unfit,  coming  from  behind  the  counter,  from  the 
office  desk,  or  from  the  club;  men  untrained  in  the 
use  of  the  rapid-fire  machine  gun,  the  efficient  in- 
fantry weapon  of  to-day;  men — not  one  in  a  thou- 
sand— having  expert  knowledge  of  the  machine 
gun;  men — not  one  in  a  million — being  the  owner 
of  such  a  gun;  men  absolutely  unready  to  fight  on 
a  month's  notice. 

To  believe  that  citizen  soldiery  to-day  can  spring 
to  arms  and  accomplish  even  what  was  accom- 
plished at  Bunker  Hill  is  a  vain  hope.  We  might  ac- 
complish a  similar  feat  if  every  male  citizen  were 
physically  fit,  if  every  male  citizen  from  childhood 
up  had  possessed  a  rapid-fire  machine  gun  and  had 
had  years  of  practice  in  using  it.  But  in  our  coun- 
try to-day  there  is  not  one  man  in  each  half  million 
of  our  unorganised  militia  that  knows  anything 
about  the  expert  use  of  a  rapid-fire  machine  gun. 

But  did  the  minute  men  alone  win  the  Battle  of 
Bunker  Hill?  They  were  entrenched  on  a  hill — a 
natural  fort — behind  breastworks,  thrown  up  under 
the  direction  of  trained  generals.  The  British  were 
compelled  to  march  up  the  hill  unprotected,  to  face 
men  behind  intrenchments !     The  selection  of  the 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  293 

hill  and  the  breastworks  were  due  to  the  wisdom  of 
the  expert  officers  who  had  been  trained  in  the  ear- 
lier colonial  wars.  The  minute  men  inflicted  a 
heavy  loss  upon  the  enemy,  yet  their  loss  was  42 
per  cent,  of  the  British  loss.  Students  of  military 
matters  are  all  unified  in  believing  that  the  victory 
of  Bunker  Hill  was  due  not  only  to  the  minute  men, 
but  to  the  trained  officers  who  chose  the  position, 
planned  the  breast  works,  and  restrained  the  impul- 
sive men,  so  that  they  did  not  zvaste  their  small  sup- 
ply of  ammunition. 

They  won  at  Bunker  Hill,  but  what  is  the  true 
story  of  the  minute  men,  the  militia  men,  the  citizen 
soldiery,  during  the  remainder  of  the  War  of  the 
Revolution,  during  the  War  of  1812,  during  the 
Civil  War? 

The  minute  men  won  at  Bunker  Hill!  But  the 
minute  men,  or  militia,  or  citizen  soldiery,  no  matter 
by  what  name  they  are  designated,  have  won  but 
two  battles  in  all  the  history  of  the  United  States — 
that  of  Bunker  Hill  and  that  of  New  Orleans,  and 
even  at  the  Battle  of  New  Orleans  the  division  un- 
der General  Morgan  deserted  and  fled  battle  when 
attacked. 

Yet  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  during  the  seven  long 
years  of  the  Revolutionary  War  the  minute  men 
suffered  defeat  after  defeat,  never  again  winning 
a  single  battle  in  that  war,  the  reputation  of  that 
one  victory  has  been  allowed  to  modify  all  our  mili- 


294  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

tary  history — has  resulted  in  years  of  unnecessary 
struggle,  suffering  and  devastation,  needless  waste 
of  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars,  and  wanton 
waste  not  only  of  thousands,  but  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  men. 

Citizen  soldiery — half -trained  volunteers  have 
failed.  They  have  failed  at  the  most  vital  crises  to 
enlist  in  sufficient  numbers ;  they  have  failed  during 
their  training — refusing  to  obey  orders,  mutinying 
and  deserting;  they  have  failed,  surprising  as  it 
may  seem,  in  the  ideal  of  volunteer  service;  they 
have  always  failed  in  battle. 

First:  they  have  failed  to  enlist  at  vital  crises. 
Within  thirty-five  days  after  the  Battle  of  Bunker 
Hill  Congress  issued  commissions  and  provided  for 
a  continental  army  (July  21,  1775)  not  to  exceed 
22,000  men.  During  the  four  months  from  July 
21  to  November  19,  1775,  only  966  enlisted.  So 
slow  was  the  recruiting  that  Washington  had  to 
issue  a  special  call  for  five  thousand  men  to  replace 
the  minute  men  who  were  then  insisting  upon  going 
back  to  their  homes. 

And  this  was  at  a  time  when  the  colonies  were 
preparing  to  fight  for  their  very  existence. 

Later,  out  of  the  20,000  troops  called  for  by  Con- 
gress during  the  last  three  months  of  1775,  less  than 
10,000  enlisted;  and  even  after  enlisting  many  of 
them  refused  to  join  the  army. 

During  the  year  1776  Congress  and  the  colonies 


THE  MINUTE  MEN 


295 


ttttzen  Soldiery  against  Trained  Troops 


Revolutionary 
War 


Warofisjs 


Mexican  War 


a 

B 

a-Cb/onfa/  Forces 

395.000 

B-Brfttsh  Clrmfes 

150.000 


c 
1 


t 
f       I 


C-L/S.ro/ves  E-US.forces 

527000  mooo 

DrOctuai British  Qrmy  /r-Mex/'canQrmy 

16.000  U6J000 


Revolutionary  War 

A.  So  inefficient  was  the  volunteer  system,  that  Washington  was 
never  able  to  bring  into  battle  line  a  force  larger  than  one-seventieth 
part  of  the  forces  enlisted. 

B.  Largest  actual  British  force  which  our  army  had  to  meet  at 
any  time,  was  about  36,000  men,  even  including  all  the  British 
ineffectives. 

War  of  181 2 

C.  So  inefficient  were  the  volunteer  forces  that  the  largest  number 
that  could  ever  be  assembled  for  battle  was  only  one-hundred- 
thirty-second  part  of  the  forces  enlisted. 

D.  The  aggregate  force  we  had  to  meet  in  any  one  place  at  any 
one  time  was  not  more  than  one-half  of  this  number. 


Mexican  War 

E.  The  volunteer  forces  were  so  inefficient  that  the  Generals,  after 
working  for  eighteen  months  to  get  them  in  shape,  finally  invaded 
Mexico  with  but  little  more  than  ten  thousand  men. 

F.  The  Mexican  Army  was  not  composed  of  well-trained  troops. 


296  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

authorised  more  than  90,000  troops.  Yet  the  year 
1777  opened  with  Washington  going  into  winter 
quarters  at  Morristown  with  an  army  which  was 
reduced  during  his  stay  to  less  than  3,000  men, 
although  there  were  more  than  20,000  trained  Brit- 
ish veterans  less  than  thirty-five  miles  away. 

Even  during  the  last  year  of  the  war,  when  the 
fate  of  the  colonies  hung  in  the  balance,  the  colonies 
called  for  more  than  50,000  men,  yet  Washington 
was  unable  to  get  more  than  5,000  effective  troops. 

And  this  failure  of  the  nation's  citizens  to  vol- 
unteer during  times  of  great  stress  has  not  been 
confined  to  the  Revolutionary  War. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  Civil  War  volunteers 
exceeded  the  call,  but  as  soon  as  they  saw  that  there 
was  real  fighting  to  be  done  many  seized  the  first 
opportunity  and  went  home  at  the  expiration  of 
their  short  enlistments,  or  deserted.  In  the  Civil 
War,  as  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  when  the  real 
crisis  came,  the  citizens  did  not  volunteer  in  suffi- 
cient number  to  meet  the  needs.  The  draft  had  to 
be  enforced. 

During  the  Spanish-American  War  the  nation 
passed  through  no  crisis.  The  war  was  over  in  109 
days.  We  do  not  know  what  the  results  of  volun- 
teer system  would  have  been  had  the  men  enlisting 
deemed  the  campaign  more  than  a  great  lark. 

Not  only  have  the  militia  failed  to  enlist  in  suf- 


THE  MINUTE  MEN 


297 


arizen  Soldiery Atiafnsl  Indians 


Cteek  Indian 
Warl812-181d 


Florida  War 
1333-1892 


Seminole  war  BfacHHau/K 
f  8/7 -1818        War  1832 


c 


ArUSM521    C.-US-QQJJ  E-U.S.-5989    G- U.S.- 60,691 
BrJnd-1950  D.-Ind-lOOO  F-IndJoOO     Hind-   /800 


A.  The  number  of  men  called  out  for  the  purpose. 

B.  Many  authorities  estimate  the  Indian  forces  as  low  as  1,100. 

D.  Estimated  by  some  authorities  as  low  as  seven  or  eight  hundred 
instead  of  one  thousand. 

F.  Indian  forces  probably  not  more  than  eight  hundred,  according 
to  conservative  estimate. 

G.  The  60,000  militia  and  volunteers  were  so  inefficient  that  General 
Scott  begged  Congress  to  disband  them  and  give  him  3,000  regulars 
instead. 

H.  Indian  forces  are  estimated  by  various  authorities  at  from  1,100 
to  1,000. 


298  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

ficient  numbers  whenever  there  was  a  real  crisis  to 
be  met  and  real  fighting  to  be  done,  but  they  have 
failed  during  training. 

They  have  mutinied  and  deserted  in  unbelievable 
numbers.  Innumerable  instances  of  mutinying  and 
desertion — so  many  they  cannot  here  be  mentioned 
— occurred  among  the  militia  of  the  various  colon- 
ies before  they  were  incorporated  into  the  army  of 
Congress.  And  even  in  the  army  under  Washing- 
ton within  five  months  after  its  organisation,  deser- 
tion of  troops  became  a  serious  matter.  In  writing 
of  his  failure  to  hold  them,  Washington  stated: 

"Notwithstanding  this  (my  explanation  and 
plea)  yesterday  morning  most  of  them  resolved  to 
leave  the  camp.  Many  went  off  and  the  utmost  vig- 
ilance was  used  to  apprehend  them." 

In  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  1812  General 
Hopkins,  commanding  4,000  Kentucky  mountain 
militia,  started  to  invade  Canada.  But  in  five  days 
all  the  troops  mutinied,  deserted  and  went  home. 
Another  large  force  under  William  Henry  Harri- 
son, organised  for  the  same  purpose,  also  decided  to 
return  to  their  homes.  One  month  later  practically 
all  of  the  troops  under  General  Dearborn,  organised 
to  invade  Canada  by  the  Lake  Champlain  route, 
marched  up  to  the  very  border  and  then  decided 
they  did  not  wish  to  go  to  Canada.  As  a  result 
they  mutinied,  absolutely  refusing  to  cross  the  bor- 
der, and  thus  the  expedition  ended. 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  299 

During  the  fall  of  the  year  of  1813  first  one 
group  and  then  another  of  the  troops  employed  un- 
der General  Jackson  in  the  Creek  War,  mutinied  re- 
spectively. In  the  Second  Florida  War  against  the 
Seminoles,  the  Missouri  volunteers  ran  away  and 
hid  in  a  swamp ;  all  the  pleading  of  General  Taylor 
could  not  induce  them  to  return  to  the  fighting. 

The  militia  mutinied: 

At  Morristown  in  January,  1781 ; 

At  Pompton,  New  Jersey,  the  same  month; 

At  Lancaster,  in  June,  1783; 

On  the  march  to  Detroit  in  June,  1812; 

At  Detroit,  Michigan,  in  July,  1812; 

On  the  march  to  the  Wabash  River  in  August, 
1812; 

On  the  march  to  the  Maumee  River,  the  same 
month ; 

Before  the  Battle  of  Queenstown  in  August; 

En  route  from  Plattsburg  in  November,  1812; 

At  Fort  Strother,  Florida,  in  November,  1813; 

In  the  retreat  to  BufTalo  in  December,  1813; 

At  the  Withlacoochee  River,  December  13,  1835; 

At  Charlestown,  West  Virginia,  in  1861 ! 

The  official  record  states  that  the  desertions  from 
the  armies  of  the  United  States  during  the  Civil 
War  were  199,000.  But  this  is  not  the  full  truth. 
This  number  includes  only  the  desertions  after  men 
were  in  the  formal  authorised  armies  of  the  United 


300  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

CITIZEN   SOLDIERY   AGAINST   TRAINED   TROOPS 

Civil  War 

During  the  first  year  of  the  war,  the  Confederacy,  because  of  their 
initiative  in  beginning  to  prepare  at  an  earlier  date,  had  better 
trained  troops.  During  the  last  two  years  of  the  war,  the  Union 
because  of  its  greater  supply  of  men  had  more  trained  troops  than 
the  Confederates. 

The  First  Battle  of  Bull  Run  was  described  by  the  Count  von 
Moltke,  the  Prussian  military  observer,  as  a  "contest  of  two  armed 
mobs." 

A.  Because  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  volunteer  system,  less  than 
half  of  these  ever  became  effective  troops.  One  out  of  ten  were 
discharged  because  they  were  unfit  to  serve;  one  out  of  every  five 
deserted.  We  have  paid  as  a  result  of  this  system  $9,800,000,000, 
while  it  would  have  cost  us  less  than  $500,000,000  if  it  had  been 
conducted  on  a  military  instead  of  a  political  basis,  even  at  the 
rate  of  expense  of  the  present  European  War. 

B.  The  largest  estimate  made  of  all  the  enlistments  of  the  Con- 
federate army.  Many  good  authorities  place  the  number  at  from 
seven  to  eight  hundred  thousand. 

Spanish-American  War 

C.  But  52,000  of  these  were  ever  out  of  the  United  States,  and 
only  about  26,000  ever  saw  a  gun  fired  at  the  enemy. 

In  addition  to  our  281,000  men,  we  had  the  service  of  several 
thousand  Cuban  revolutionists,  who  rendered  aid  to  our  forces  at 
a  critical  time. 

D.  The  Spanish  forces  were  200,000,  but  very  poorly  commanded. 
An  efficient  general  at  the  head  of  the  Spanish  forces  in  Cuba,  act- 
ing energetically,  could  have  annihilated  our  little  invading  force 
of  17,000  men  with  but  little  trouble. 


THE  MINUTE  MEN 


301 


(iiizen  Soldi ery  agafnsl  Tra  i  ned  Troops 

Cri/fl  War 


a 

3 

fnanfcn  Omerfcan 
War 


O-US.Ormy-  sp/gooo 
BrCbnfederoUe- i.ooo.ooo 


C-  U.&A-Omy-wpoo 
D.  -J/Kuvlsti  Qrmy-jtooooo 


302  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

States.  It  does  not  include  desertions  from  militia 
groups  training  for  entrance  into  the  Union  Armies. 

In  reality  the  number  of  desertions  totalled  526,- 
000  men.  This  statement  is  made  on  the  authority 
of  a  man  who  has  been  chief  of  staff  of  the  Army 
of  the  United  States  and  commander  of  one  of  the 
large  divisions.  It  has  been  stated  on  the  floor  of 
the  Senate  that  the  number  of  desertions  was  even 
greater  than  this — that  the  true  number,  though 
suppressed  by  the  War  Department,  probably 
reached  the  shameful  figure  of  seven  or  eight  hun- 
dred thousand  men.  This  is  no  doubt  an  exagger- 
ated estimate.  Nevertheless,  compare  this  526,000 
with  the  number  of  desertions  from  the  Prussian 
army  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War.  Their  war 
records  show  that  during  the  entire  campaign  of 
1870  and  1 87 1  but  17  men  deserted. 

The  volunteer  system — as  a  system — has  failed 
in  that  which  we  have  held  most  dear — the  ideal  of 
service. 

This  does  not  refer  to  the  individual  volunteer 
who  stays  with  the  army.  After  eighteen  months' 
or  two  years'  training  the  American  becomes  the 
finest  soldier  in  the  world! 

Volunteers  are  composed  of  three  classes :  First, 
those  who  enlist  because  of  patriotism,  of  a  real  de- 
sire to  serve  their  country.  How  small  this  num- 
ber is  can  be  wisely  estimated  from  the  number 
who  remain  to  become  real  effectives.    Experience 


THE  MINUTE  MEN 


303 


Cilfren  Mi  If  tia  per  Mf  Ufon  Population 


CL-Switzerland 
B-AucStralfa 

new  dystcm 

C-Australfa 

old  tSy$tem 

D-Canada 
E- British  Lstes 
F'UiSA. 


Qr/32,tf32 

B~  56,819 

C-  igpy 

■O—0tU9.- 

e  mo 

Switzerland  is  the  most  protected  country  in  the  world,  because 
of  its  obligatory  military  system,  in  proportion  to  its  area  and  pop- 
ulation. 

Australia's  new  system  is  based  upon  the  system  of  Switzerland. 
Australia's  old  system  was  a  volunteer  system  similar  in  that  respect 
to  our  State  Militia. 

Canada's  national  citizen  soldiery  and  England's  Territorial  force 
are  based  upon  the  volunteer  system. 
In  all  cases  these  militia  are  trained  without  pay. 
Our  past  experiences  prove  that  all  efforts  to  secure  a  satisfactory 
army  of  defence  by  the  volunteer  system  have  failed  in  times  of 
peace. 

All  our  past  experiences  prove  that  a  volunteer  army  enlisted  after 
a  war  begins  is  unfit,  even  harmful,  during  the  first  year  of  war. 
Our  citizens  more  than  those  of  any  other  country  now  employing 
the  volunteer  system  fail  to  recognise  the  fact  that  they  owe  a 
duty  to  their  government. 

Every  million  Australians  furnishes  19,000  soldiers;  every  million 
Canadians  furnishes  9,000;  every  million  British  furnishes  7,000. 
Every  million  Americans  furnish  but  1,000. 

It  is  useless  to  attempt  any  plan  of  preparation  in  times  of  peace, 
so  as  to  be  able  to  defend  ourselves  should  war  come,  by  the 
volunteer  system. 


304.  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

shows  that  our  greatest  proportion  of  effectives  ever 
attained  was  19.6  per  cent,  and  our  smallest  pro- 
portion, one  per  cent.  Second,  those  who  enlist 
because  they  believe  there  will  be  little  or  no  fight- 
ing, that  the  campaign  will  be  a  joyful  lark,  that 
the  war  will  soon  be  over,  that  they  can  return  as 
the  heroes  of  their  respective  communities.  These 
desert  at  the  first  opportunity.  Third,  those  who 
enlist  for  the  sake  of  bounties — desert  and  re-enlist, 
and  those  who  hold  off  for  ever  increasing  bounties. 
In  every  war  the  United  States  has  waged  we  have 
been  compelled  at  each  succeeding  call  for  volun- 
teers to  increase  the  bounties. 

We  began  in  1776  with  a  bounty  of  $20;  soon  it 
was  increased  to  $20  and  a  hundred  acres  of  land. 
But  as  this  failed  to  bring  sufficient  troops  and  as 
those  volunteering  were  so  inefficient,  Congress  au- 
thorised Washington  in  1779  to  give  a  bounty  of 
$200  to  each  veteran  who  would  re-enlist.  The 
states  did  still  better — or  worse.  New  Jersey  add- 
ed $250  to  the  Congressional  bounty  and  Virginia 
made  the  bounty  $750  and  a  hundred  acres  of  land. 
The  following  year  New  Jersey  actually  paid  $1,000 
in  addition  to  the  $200  of  the  continental  allowance. 
The  system  of  bounties  means  but  one  thing,  that, 
even  during  that  time  which  we  hold  above  all  other 
times  to  have  been  the  most  patriotic  in  the  history 
of  our  people,  volunteers  could  not  be  induced  to  en- 
list unless  they  could  secure  from  $200  to  $1,000,  a 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  305 

portion  of  it  down  in  cash — always  with  the  oppor- 
tunity of  deserting  20  or  30  days  later  and  re-enlist- 
ing and  securing  another  bounty.  This  was  so  well 
understood  that  Congress  in  authorising  Washing- 
ton to  increase  a  certain  bounty  advised  that  he 
should  use  his  discretion  in  keeping  the  matter  se- 
cret as  long  as  he  deemed  it  necessary. 

And  the  bounty  system  of  the  Revolutionary 
War  did  not  extend  to  the  militia  only.  To  secure 
a  sufficient  number  of  officers  Congress  was  finally 
forced  in  1779  to  advocate  that  each  officer  continu- 
ing in  command  of  troops  to  the  end  of  the  war 
should  receive  a  bounty  of  half  pay  for  his  entire 
life. 

This  same  folly  of  giving  bounties  was  repeated 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War.  Hundreds  of 
men,  thousands  of  men  enlisted,  received  their  cash 
bounty,  deserted,  re-enlisted  again  in  another  com- 
munity or  under  another  name,  received  another 
cash  bounty  and  deserted.  The  process  was  re- 
peated again  and  again.  In  fact,  there  is  an  official 
confession  of  one  man  who  enlisted  32  times,  re- 
ceived 32  different  bounties,  and  evidently  deserted 
at  least  31  times. 

And  in  1862  President  Lincoln  discovered  that, 
although  the  United  States  Government  was  pay- 
ing daily  for  140,000  men  in  Pope's  army,  Pope 
could  find  only  60,000. 

There  is  an  ideal  of  service!    There  is  such  a 


306  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


thing  as  patriotism!  But  the  patriotism  of  volun- 
teers is  not  greater,  nor  as  great,  as  that  of  regular 
troops. 

"Men  may  speculate  as  they  will;  they  may  talk 
of  patriotism ;  they  may  draw  a  few  examples  from 
ancient  history,  of  great  achievements  performed 
by  its  influence,  but  whoever  builds  upon  them,  as 
a  sufficient  basis  for  conducting  a  long  and  bloody 
war,  will  find  himself  deceived  in  the  end.  ...  I 
do  not  mean  to  exclude  altogether  the  idea  of 
patriotism.  I  know  it  exists.  .  .  .  But  I  will  ven- 
ture to  assert  that  a  great  and  lasting  war  can 
never  be  supported  on  this  principle  alone."  Wash- 
ington to  John  Bannister,  1778. 

Volunteers  have  failed  in  efficiency  in  battle! 

In  the  hundreds  of  battles  and  engagements  of 
our  various  wars,  the  untrained  militia  have  mu- 
tinied, deserted,  or  failed  in  every  single  engage- 
ment, except  that  of  Bunker  Hill. 

The  first  campaign  of  the  Revolutionary  War — 
the  movement  on  Canada — came  to  nought,  al- 
though Arnold  had  finally  taken  750  men,  out  of 
the  two  divisions  of  4,100  men  which  began  the 
campaign,  up  the  steep  ascent  and  demanded  the 
surrender  of  Quebec.  He  was  forced  to  make  the 
attack  without  a  day's  delay — without  waiting  for 
reinforcements — because  three  of  his  captains  and 
many  of  his  men  refused  to  stay  and  gave  him  no- 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  307 

tice  that  they  would  leave  after  the  expiration  of 
their  terms  of  enlistment.  The  term  of  enlistment 
was  to  end  in  three  days.  And  they  made  this  re- 
fusal after  having  struggled  through  the  Maine 
woods  to  get  to  Quebec.  Of  the  750  men,  486 
were  killed,  wounded  or  captured. 

During  that  year  there  had  been  under  the  pay  of 
Congress  and  in  the  militia  of  the  southern  colonies 
37,600  half -trained  volunteers.  Yet  the  only  re- 
sult was  a  disastrous  expedition  to  Canada. 

Although  89,600  volunteers  were  trained  during 
the  second  year  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  they 
were  so  inefficient  they  could  take  no  effective  ac- 
tion against  the  enemy,  although  there  were  less 
than  30,000  British.  Because  of  desertion,  mutiny 
and  inefficiency,  the  army,  at  the  close  of  the  year, 
had  again  dwindled  to  but  a  few  thousand  men. 

During  the  third  year  of  the  war  there  were  em- 
ployed a  total  of  68,700  men.  The  only  victory  was 
that  of  General  Gates,  when  a  large  percentage  of 
regular  troops  were  used ;  otherwise  the  68,700  men 
were  absolutely  unable  to  take  any  effective  step 
against  the  33,000  Britishers.  The  year  ended  in 
the  retreat  of  a  dwindling  army  to  Valley  Forge. 

During  1779  more  than  44,000  men  were  under 
training,  as  against  34,000  British,  yet  nothing  was 
accomplished. 

In  1780  General  Gates  was  defeated  at  Camden 
even  though  his  army  was  much  greater  than  that 


308 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

of  Cornwallis.  The  militia  again  ran  away  in  a 
most  disgraceful  manner.  Though  43,000  men  had 
been  under  arms  during  1780,  little  of  consequence 
had  been  accomplished,  and  Washington's  effectives 
had  dwindled  to  5,000  by  the  end  of  the  year. 

The  actual  war  closed  in  1781,  not  through  the 
efficiency  of  the  American  army  reduced  to  less 
than  5,000  effective  troops  under  the  command  of 
Washington,  but  to  the  French  troops  under  La- 
fayette, the  French  fleet  and  the  arrival  of  Rocham- 
beau  with  6,000  additional  veteran  French  troops. 
It  was  without  doubt  the  assistance  of  the  Comte 
de  Grasse,  of  de  Barasse,  of  Rochambeau,  and  of 
Lafayette,  together  with  their  fleets,  their  thou- 
sands of  trained  veterans,  which  finally  effected 
the  surrender  of  Cornwallis's  men.  Such  is  the 
actual  record  of  half-trained  volunteers  during  the 
seven  years  of  the  life-and-death  struggle  of  the 
American  colonies  for  independence. 

As  a  result  of  our  inefficient  militia  395,000  men 
were  required  in  the  War  of  the  Revolution,  yet 
the  largest  number  ever  concentrated  for  battle 
was  5,763  men  under  General  Gates  at  Saratoga; 
and  when  the  fate  of  the  colonies  hung  in  the  bal- 
ance, Washington's  army  at  Trenton  and  Prince- 
ton was  less  than  4,000  men. 

Washington  in  his  letter  to  Congress  pointing 
out  the  evils  and  danger  of  the  volunteer  system, 
asserted  that  Canada  would  have  been  won  to  the 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  309 

colonies,  except  for  the  action  of  the  militia.  Writ- 
ing to  the  President  of  Congress,  September  2, 
1776,  he  said  that 

".  .  .  no  dependence  could  be  put  in  a  militia  or 
other  troops  than  those  enlisted  and  embodied  for 
a  longer  period  than  our  regulations  heretofore 
have  prescribed.  I  am  persuaded,  and  as  fully 
convinced  as  I  am  of  any  one  fact  that  has  hap- 
pened, that  our  liberties  must  of  necessity  be  greatly 
hazarded,  if  not  entirely  lost,  if  their  defence  is 
left  to  any  but  a  permanent  standing  army;  I  mean 
one  to  exist  during  the  war." 

On  the  24th  of  September,  1776,  he  wrote: 

"To  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is  as- 
suredly resting  upon  a  broken  staff." 

And  later  on,  August  20,  1780,  after  five  years 
of  failures,  Washington  again  wrote  Congress : 

"It  may  be  easily  shown  that  all  the  misfortunes 
we  have  met  with  in  the  military  line  are  to  be  at- 
tributed to  this  cause  (failure  of  the  militia)." 

And  again  during  the  same  year,  writing  of 
Gates's  defeat  at  Camden,  Washington  stated: 

"This  event,  however,  adds  itself  to  many  others, 
to  exemplify  the  necessity  of  an  army,  and  the 
fatal  consequences  of  depending  on  militia.  Regu- 
lar troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies  of  mod- 
ern war,  as  well  as  for  defence  as  offence;  and 
whenever  a  substitute  is  attempted,  it  must  prove 
illusory  and  ruinous.    No  militia  will  ever  acquire 


310  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

the  habits  necessary  to  resist  a  regular  force  .  .  . 
the  firmness  requisite  for  the  real  business  of 
fighting  is  only  to  be  attained  by  a  constant  course 
of  discipline  and  service.  /  have  never  yet  been 
witness  to  a  single  instance  that  can  justify  a  dif- 
ferent opinion;  and  it  is  most  earnestly  to  be  wished 
that  the  liberties  of  America  may  no  longer  be 
trusted,  in  any  material  degree,  to  so  precarious 
a  dependence." 

Morgan,  explaining  why  he  placed  his  militia  in 
a  certain  position  at  the  Battle  of  Cowpens,  as- 
serted: 

"I  would  not  have  a  swamp  in  view  of  militia 
on  any  consideration ;  they  would  have  made  for  it, 
and  nothing  could  have  detained  them  from  it. 
.  .  .  Had  I  crossed  the  river,  one-half  of  the  mili- 
tia would  immediately  have  abandoned  me." 

The  War  of  1812  opened  with  the  surrender  at 
Detroit  of  the  American  garrison  of  1,800  men, 
mostly  volunteers  and  militia  to  300  British  regu- 
lars and  400  militia,  without  so  much  as  firing  a 
single  shot  in  defence  of  the  garrison. 

The  Hopkins  expedition  of  4,000  volunteers,  the 
General  Dearborn  expedition  of  5,700,  the  Gen- 
eral Smith  expedition  of  4,500,  the  forces  under 
General  Harrison,  and  the  3,100  men  under  Gen- 
eral Wadsworth  all  came  to  naught  because  of 
mutiny,  desertion  and  inefficiency — in  fact,  during 
1812,  the  American  forces  of  a  little  more  than 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  311 

64,000  men  accomplished  nothing  in  face  of  the 
active  British  force  which  did  not  exceed  1,400 
men — one-third  of  whom  were  boys  and  old  men  fit 
only  for  garrison  duty. 

This  is  the  record  of  the  inefficiency  of  our  mili- 
tia for  the  first  year  of  the  War  of  1812. 

In  the  year  181 3,  the  forces  under  Genera!  Har- 
rison, which  had  been  limited  by  Congress  to  7,000 
men  and  the  forces  under  Winchester  of  3,000 
men  won  victories  at  the  Thames ;  and  immediately 
following  the  success  the  usual  blunder  was  made 
— the  army  disbanded  and  the  campaign  was  given 
up.  Though  50,000  militia  had  been  called  out 
within  16  months  to  defeat  Proctor's  little  force, 
the  entire  result  was  nothing. 

Though  a  large  American  force  of  militia  was 
stationed  in  northern  New  York  to  defend  Buffalo 
and  the  surrounding  country,  a  British  force  of 
less  than  650  men,  regulars,  Indians  and  militia 
combined,  absolutely  put  to  route  3,000  militia. 
General  Cass,  in  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
stated  that  all  except  a  very  few  of  them  behaved 
in  the  most  cowardly  manner.  They  fled  without 
discharging  their  muskets. 

In  the  Champlain  region,  General  Hampton, 
with  5,000  volunteers,  was  defeated  by  800  Cana- 
dian militia  and  Indians. 

The  army  of  General  Wilkinson,  an  advance 
guard  of   1,700  men  with  6,300  reinforcements, 


312  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

ran  back  to  their  boats,  abandoning  their  campaign 
on  Montreal,  after  having  been  attacked  by  800 
British  regulars  at  Chrystler's  Fields.  In  fact, 
13,000  American  volunteers  were  absolutely  driven 
back  by  an  enemy  less  than  2,000. 

During  the  same  year  there  were  on  the  Chesa- 
peake 66,000  enlisted  militia.  The  British  Admiral 
Warren  with  but  1,500  men  destroyed  Hampton 
after  previously  capturing  and  destroying  French- 
town,  Havre  de  Grace,  Georgetown  and  Frederick- 
town,  and  the  66,000  militia  offered  no  aid  at  all 
to  the  citizens  who  tried  to  protect  their  property. 

The  year  181 3  ended  with  the  United  States 
having  employed  130,000  men,  having  not  more 
than  14,000  or  15,000  British  to  oppose  them,  yet 
leaving  a  record  of  nothing  but  defeats. 

The  year  18 14  opened  by  General  Wilkinson 
making  another  effort  to  invade  Canada  with  4,000 
men.  They  were  repulsed  by  a  force  of  180  British- 
ers. The  attempted  invasion  accomplished  nothing 
except  added  disgrace  for  the  American  forces. 

At  Bladensburg,  a  short  distance  from  Wash- 
ington, more  than  5,000  American  militia  deserted 
and  ran  before  1,500  British  troops  poorly  equipped 
with  but  four  little  guns  which  they  were  com- 
pelled to  drag  up  the  incline  themselves  because 
they  had  no  horses.  The  mass  of  militia  fled  at 
this  battle  without  ever  firing  a  shot.  The  Amer- 
ican loss  was  but  8  killed  and  11  wounded.    Thus 


THE  MINUTE  MEN  313 

ended  the  disgraceful  record  of  our  militia  during 
the  actual  War  of  1812  and  1814. 

The  Indian  War  against  the  Seminoles  shows 
that  it  required  60,000  militia  and  seven  years  of 
mutiny,  desertion  and  fighting  to  defeat  1,200  In- 
dians. 

The  militia  deserted  and  ran  away : 

On  Long  Island  in  August,  1776; 

At  the  evacuation  of  New  York  one  month  later; 

At  the  Battle  of  Brandywine  in  1777; 

At  Guilford  Court  House,  1781 ; 

At  the  Battle  of  Burwell's  Ferry  in  April,  the 
same  year; 

At  Williamsburg  a  day  later; 

Near  Fort  Wayne  in  October,  1790; 

In  Dart  County,  Ohio,  in  1791; 

En  route  to  the  Racine  River  in  1813; 

At  Sackett's  Harbour  three  months  later; 

At  French  Creek  seven  months  later; 

At  Chrystler's  Fields  ten  days  later ; 

At  the  burning  of  Buffalo,  December  30,  1812; 

At  the  burning  of  Lewiston,  the  same  month; 

At  the  Battle  of  Bladensburg  and  the  burning 
of  the  capitol  in  1814; 

At  the  Battle  of  New  Orleans,  1815; 

At  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  1861. 

"Our  Civil  War  is  often  erroneously  cited  as 
illustrating  the  might  of  the  citizen  soldier  sud- 
denly called  to  the  defence  of  his  country.     On 


314  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

the  contrary,  it  well  illustrated  the  weakness  of 
the  untrained  citizen  soldier,  and  the  length  of  time 
required  to  train  him.  In  the  first  months  of  the 
war,  untrained  citizens  of  the  North  met  the  un- 
trained citizens  of  the  South,  and  both  were  armed 
mobs  as  easily  disorganised  by  victory  as  by  de- 
feat. During  the  second  year  of  the  war  training 
began  to  tell  on  both  sides,  as  can  be  seen  in  the 
character  of  the  campaigns  and  battles.  In  the 
fined  years  of  the  war  these  volunteers  were  as  good 
soldiers  as  ever  marched  to  war."  l 

The  first  year  of  the  Civil  War  Congress  and  the 
President  trusted  to  volunteers  and  militia.  Al- 
though during  1861  we  enlisted,  trained  and  paid 
for  669,000  men,  we  were  able  to  bring  together  at 
Bull  Run  but  28,500  men,  all  of  whom  excepting 
800  were  volunteers  and  militia.  Many  of  the  militia 
ran  away  in  panic  and  could  not  be  stopped  until 
they  had  reached  the  Potomac,  some  twenty-five 
miles  away. 

The  second  year  of  the  Civil  War  showed  al- 
most as  great  inefficiency  of  the  militia  as  the  first. 
Summing  up  the  results  of  the  first  and  second 
periods  of  1862,  Upton  states: 

"The  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  the  James  River  to  Washington  and  Alex- 
andria, the  invasion  of  Maryland  and  the  retreat 
of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  to  Louisville  produced  a 


THE  MINUTE  MEN 315 

depression  in  the  public  mind  nearly  as  great  as 
that  which  succeeded  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run."  2 

In  every  war,  in  which  half -trained  militia  and 
volunteers  have  been  put  to  the  test,  they  have 
mutinied,  deserted,  and  run  away  from  battle. 

Moreover,  during  the  seventy  years  from  the 
beginning  of  the  War  of  1812  to  the  second  year 
of  our  Civil  War,  one-fourth  of  all  the  states  then 
forming  the  Union  actually  defied  the  authority  of 
the  United  States,  defied  the  authority  of  the  Pres- 
ident as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  refusing 
to  aid  the  United  States  with  their  militia,  even 
when  its  armies  were  in  danger. 

"If  I  was  called  upon  to  declare  upon  oath 
whether  the  militia  had  been  most  serviceable  or 
hurtful,  upon  the  whole,  I  should  subscribe  to  the 
latter."  3 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  314.  Report  of  the  Army  Committee  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  League,  including:  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stim- 
son,  ex-Secretary  of  War ;  Colonel  William  C.  Church,  edi- 
tor Army  and  Navy  Journal;  Captain  Matthew  Hannah; 
General  Francis  V.  Greene;  Major  George  Haven  Putnam; 
Colonel  S.  Creighton  Webb,  and  others. 

2  Page  315.  Upton,  "Military  Policy  of  the  United 
States." 

3  Page  315.    George  Washington. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE   PRICE   WE   HAVE   PAID 

ALL  the  blunders  of  our  wars — the  enormous 
percentage  of  useless  men,  the  extraordinary 
cost,  the  wasteful  prolongation  of  each  war,  the 
wholesale  murder  of  half-trained  soldiers — have 
been  due:  first,  to  our  ridiculous  political  military 
system;  and  second,  to  our  mistake  and  vain  belief 
in  the  value  of  citizen  soldiers. 

Upton  says:  "The  same  mistake  in  statesman- 
ship, which  in  time  of  peace  gives  us  a  nonexpan- 
sive  military  establishment,  is  certain  to  bring 
about  in  time  of  war  useless  sacrifice  of  human  life, 
unlimited  waste  of  money,  and  national  humilia- 
tion." 

During  the  Revolutionary  War  the  colonies  were 
subjected  to  seven  years'  struggle,  suffering  and 
devastation.  But  one  year  would  have  been  neces- 
sary had  Congress  allowed  Washington  to  actually 
command  the  armies  under  him.  In  July,  1775, 
there  were  17,000  men  under  Washington;  the 
British  effectives  were  less  than  6,500.  Dur- 
ing the  next  five  months  37,500  American  troops 

316 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  317 

were  enlisted.  If  these  had  been  under  military 
instead  of  Congressional  control  and  if  they  had 
been  properly  trained  and  equipped,  they  could 
have  defeated  the  British  forces — could  have  cap- 
tured them  or  driven  them  off  the  continent  within 
six  months;  and  we  would  have  had  time  to  pre- 
pare before  England  could  have  sent  more  troops. 

We  would  have  been  spared  six  years  of  struggle 
and  waste ;  we  would  have  been  spared  the  terrible 
winter  at  Morristown  and  the  sufferings  at  Valley 
Forge;  we  would  have  saved  millions  and  millions 
of  dollars! 

Washington  in  1780  said:  "Had  we  kept  a 
permanent  army  on  foot,  the  enemy  could  have 
had  nothing  to  hope  for,  and  would  in  all  probabil- 
ity have  listened  to  terms  long  since." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  1812  the  Brit- 
ish had  but  4,500  effectives  on  the  entire  North 
American  continent.  We  then  had  an  army  of 
6,700  men.  If  Congress  had  kept  our  men  in  con- 
dition— properly  organised  and  officered  and  prop- 
erly supplied  with  ammunition — they  could  have 
defeated  the  British  within  six  months.  We  pro- 
vided 65,000  untrained  men  the  first  six  months, 
but  these  were  unable  to  gain  a  single  victory  over 
the  1,450  men  they  had  to  oppose.  The  war  would 
have  been  over  in  six  months  instead  of  two  years 
later;  and  we  would  have  been  spared  the  shame 


318  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

of  Detroit,  the  dishonour  of  the  Lake  Champlain 
campaigns,  and  the  disgrace  at  Bladensburg  and 
the  burning  of  Washington. 

If  we  had  had  but  10,000  trained  troops  the  war 
could  have  ended  victoriously  in  six  months. 

Huidekoper,  referring  to  the  War  of  1812, 
writes : 

"Had  Congress  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  de- 
clared that  all  men  owed  their  country  military 
service  and  raised  the  army  to  35,000,  by  volunteer- 
ing or  by  drafting  for  service  'during  the  war,' 
such  a  force  after  six  months'  training  could  easily 
have  occupied  Canada  and  terminated  the  war  in 
one  campaign/' 

If,  when  South  Carolina  seceded,  Congress  had 
acted  immediately — had  at  once  put  our  little  regu- 
lar army  into  condition  and  had  immediately  called 
for  two  hundred  fifty  thousand  volunteers — our 
276,000  men  could  have  had  seven  months'  train- 
ing by  July  30,  1 86 1,  at  which  time  the  Confeder- 
acy had  less  than  60,000  troops  with  from  two  to 
four  months'  training.  These  276,000  trained 
troops,  well  equipped,  could  have  put  down  the  Re- 
bellion in  one  year.  But  Congress  did  nothing  until 
five  months  after  the  Confederacy  elected  their 
president,  nothing  until  four  months  after  the  Con- 
federacy issued  its  call  for  a  hundred  thousand 
volunteers,  nothing  until  35,000  of  these  had  al- 
ready had  three  months'  training. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


319 


Excessive  prolongation  and  Devastation 

due  10  TMal  Time  or  UcS!  Wtn* 

Political  Militarism 


tScmi'nole 
War 


War  of 
Revo/uf/on 


Aryeanr 
Civ//  Utrr 


Warcf/S/2 
/Mexican  i'/tyeanr 

gy3yea/ir 


i/yea/v 


7year<s 


A 


7yeatv 


\/yr    | 


2Gycanf 


Syrs-// months 
£faaB&(C  T&rminritinn  nf  nnr   U/nr,r  -  A 


The  Revolutionary  War  lasted  seven  years,  the  War  of  1812  lasted 

two  years  six  months,  the  Mexican  War  two  years  four  months, 

the    First    Seminole    War   three    months,    Second    Seminole    War 

seven  years,  the  Black  Hawk  War  five  months,  Gvil  War  four 

years,  Spanish-American  War  three  months,  Philippine  War  two 

years  four  months. 

We  have  been  at  war,  twenty-six  full  years  of  twelve  months  each 

out  of  140  years. 

If  we  include  a  few  of  the  campaigns  against  the  Indians,  we  find 

that  we  have  been  at  war  one  entire  year  of  twelve  months  out  of 

every  five  years  from  1775  to  1915. 

If  we  had  adopted  and  maintained  a  rational  and  efficient  military 

system,  we  could  have — according  to  Washington,  Upton  and  Huide- 

koper — successfully  terminated  the  Revelutionary  War  in  one  year, 

the  War  of  1812  in  six  months,  the  Mexican  War  in  one  year,  the 

Second  Seminole  War  in  six  months,  the  Civil  War  in  two  years 

or  less,  and  the  Philippine  War  in  six  months. 

This  shows:  that  George  Washington,  who  is  the  most  trustworthy 

authority  on  the  Revolutionary  War,  and  that  Upton,  who  is  the 

greatest  authority  on   our   Civil   War,   believed,  and   that   Huide- 

koper,  the  greatest   military  authority  of   our  day,   now   believes 

that  we  have  wasted  just  nineteen  years  and  one  month  out  of  the 

twenty-six  years  we  have  been  at  war. 


320  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Upton,  writing  of  the  body  of  national  volun- 
teers that  had  been  organised  to  take  the  place 
of  the  militia  in  the  War  of  1812,  states  that, 
had  that  system  come  down  to  us — each  regiment 
with  a  professional  soldier  at  its  head — our  Civil 
War  would  have  been  finished  in  half  the  time, 
with  the  employment  of  but  300,000  men. 

Almost  one-fifth  of  the  140  years  from  1775  to 
1 91 5  have  seen  us  engaged  in  actual  warfare.  In 
fact,  if  we  include  a  few  of  the  small  campaigns 
against  the  Indians,  we  find  that  we  have  been  at 
war  one  entire  year  of  twelve  months  out  of  every 
five  years. 

The  Revolutionary  War  lasted  seven  years,  the 
War  of  1812  two  years  six  months,  the  Mexican 
War  two  years  four  months,  the  First  Seminole 
War  three  months,  Second  Seminole  War  seven 
years,  the  Black  Hawk  War  five  months,  Civil 
War  four  years,  Spanish-American  War  three 
months,  Philippine  War  two  years  four  months. 
Thus  we  have  been  at  war  26  full  years  of  twelve 
months  each  out  of  140  years. 

If  we  had  adopted  and  maintained  a  rational 
and  efficient  military  system,  we  could  have — ac- 
cording to  Washington,  Upton  and  Huidekoper — 
successfully  terminated  the  Revolutionary  War  in 
one  year,  the  War  of  18 12  in  six  months,  the 
Mexican  War  in  one  year,  the  Second  Seminole 
War  in  six  months,  the  Civil  War  in  two  years  or 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  821 

less,  and  the  Philippine  War  in  six  months.  This 
shows  that  George  Washington,  who  was  the  most 
practical  and  trustworthy  authority  on  the  Revo- 
lutionary War,  and  that  Upton,  who  was  the  great- 
est authority  on  our  Civil  War,  believed,  and  that 
Huidekoper,  the  greatest  military  authority  of  our 
day,  now  believes  that  we  have  wasted  just  ip  years 
and  one  month  out  of  the  26  years  we  have  been 
at  war.  What  folly  to  waste,  because  of  a  ludi- 
crous military  system,  one  whole  generation  of 
peace,  burdening  the  nation  for  19  years  and  one 
month,  by  years  of  suffering,  untold  hardships, 
unnecessary  waste  of  moneys,  of  business,  of  pros- 
perity and  of  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  men. 

Huidekoper  states :  our  wars  have  been  "outrage- 
ous extravagances"  in  men  and  in  money. 

And  what  have  we  paid  in  waste  of  money? 

A  voluntary  system  is  based  on  the  immoral  idea 
that  no  citizen  owes  a  duty  to  the  government 
which  protects  his  property,  his  business,  himself 
and  his  family.  It  is  based  on  the  vicious  idea 
that  no  man  is  by  honour  bound  to  pay  his  just 
obligations  unless  it  suits  his  frame  of  mind  or 
unless  he  can  be  bribed  to  do  so.  From  this  basis 
arises  the  political  system  which  induces  the  fetv 
— by  calls  to  patriotism,  by  bounty  bribes,  and  by 
promises  of  pensions — to  bear  the  burden  of  all. 


822  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Because  volunteers  are  unfit  when  most  needed, 
there  is  the  enormous  waste  in  training,  in  feed- 
ing and  in  drilling  men,  who  must  later  be  dis- 
charged because  of  physical  inability.  Under  the 
universal  training  system,  these  men  would  not  be 
taken  into  the  army  in  the  first  place.  The  nation 
would  thus  be  saved  the  extra  time  of  their  officers, 
the  waste  of  money  in  feeding,  the  waste  of  time 
and  effort  and  money  in  training. 

"Certain  I  am  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  keep 
50,000  to  100,000  in  constant  pay  than  to  depend 
upon  half  the  number  and  supply  the  other  half 
occasionally  by  militia.  The  time  the  latter  are  in 
pay  before  and  after  they  are  in  camp,  assembling 
and  marching,  the  waste  of  ammunition,  the  con- 
sumption of  stores,  which  they  must  be  furnished 
with  or  sent  home,  added  to  other  incidental  ex- 
penses consequent  upon  their  coming  and  conduct 
in  camp,  surpass  all  idea  and  destroy  every  kind 
of  regularity  and  economy,  which  you  could  es- 
tablish among  fixed  and  settled  troops."  .  .  . 

"We  have  had,  a  great  part  of  the  time,  two  sets 
of  men  to  feed  and  pay — the  discharged  men  going 
home,  and  the  levies  coming  in."  * 

What  is  the  record  of  the  money  wasted? 

The  Revolutionary  War  has  cost  us  440  mil- 
lion dollars.  During  the  first  year  the  37,000  con- 
tinental soldiers  comprised  a  force  469%  greater 
than  the  total  British  effectives  then  here, — a  force 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


323 


Our  Losses  of  Citizen  soldiery 

C/v/i  War 


tf/iantefi  -Amer/cafi 
wop 


A- 13*5,532  -  UcT  Lof<se<y     C-2&9/-  c/cTcTo/oYercr 
B.-tooo,  ooo  -  All  Confederates  actually  engaged 

Ever  EnliJted   D.~6,5M^Deaafronjf?ffiffng 

ana  cf/cXneeKr 

Civil  War 

A.  Our  losses — due  to  a  great  extent  to  the  volunteer  system  of 

half-trained  soldiery  were: 

Total  losses  from  dead  of  all  causes 359,528  (i) 

Total   desertions    526,000 

Men  discharged  for  disability  250,000 

Number  wounded   248,014  (2) 

Total  losses  1,383,582 

1.  From  Heitman,  Volume  II,  Page  286. 

2.  Estimated  at  the  rate  of  3.7  men  to  each  man  killed  in  action. 
This  is  the  lowest  rate  ever  known  in  any  great  war.  Our  wounded 
were  probably  4.5  men  wounded  to  each  man  killed,  which  would 
give  an  increase  of  more  than  25  per  cent,  of  248,014. 

Spanish-American  War 

D.  Total  number  of  dead  from  fighting  and  sickness,  about  6,500, 
although  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898  and  1899  gives  the  total 
of  7,043.  These  reports,  however,  duplicate  the  few  deaths  of 
volunteers  in  Cuba. 


324 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

221%  more  than  the  entire  British  force,  sick  and 
well.  If  they  had  been  properly  trained  and 
equipped,  the  war  would  have  been  ended  in  twelve 
months  and  the  cost  of  that  war — even  at  the  per 
soldier  rate  of  Germany's  stupendous  expense  in  the 
present  war — would  have  been  only  a  little  over 
30  million  dollars  instead  of  the  440  millions  the 
war  has  cost  us.  In  other  words,  we  would  have 
saved  410  millions  out  of  440  millions. 

The  War  of  18 12  has  cost  us  $132,000,000.  If, 
when  the  war  began,  we  had  a  force  of  but  ten 
thousand  trained  soldiers,  that  force  would  have 
been  598%  greater  than  all  the  British  effectives 
we  were  compelled  to  meet  during  that  first  year. 
The  war  would  have  been  closed  in  one  year — 
probably  in  six  months — and,  even  at  the  present 
per  soldier  rate  of  the  European  expense,  it  would 
have  cost  but  $8,280,000.  We  would  have  saved 
124  millions  out  of  the  expenditure  of  132  mil- 
lions. 

The  Second  Florida  War  cost  us  $69,000,000. 
General  Scott  begged  Congress  for  3,000  efficient 
troops  instead  of  the  60,000  militia  and  volunteers. 
The  three  thousand  troops  asked  for  by  General 
Scott  would  have  been  250%  of  the  Indian  force. 
They  could  have  defeated  the  twelve  hundred  In- 
dians in  six  months  at  least,  and  the  war  would 
have  cost  less  than  3  millions,  even  at  the  present 
European  rate  of  expense,  instead  of  nearly  70 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  325 

millions.  Out  of  the  70  millions  spent  we  could 
have  saved  67  millions. 

The  Mexican  War  has  cost  us  137  millions. 
The  total  force  that  invaded  Mexico  was  less  than 
11,000  men.  If  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  Gen- 
eral Scott  had  had  22,000  trained  soldiers — a  force 
twice  as  great  as  the  number  that  actually  decided 
the  war — the  war  would  have  ended  in  one  year 
and  would  have  cost,  even  at  the  present  European 
rate  of  expense,  but  16  million  dollars  instead  of 
137  millions.  We  could  have  saved  125  millions 
out  of  the  137  millions  that  have  been  spent. 

The  Civil  War  cost  us  $9,800,000,000.  Upton 
states :  that  the  war  could  have  been  closed  in  two 
years  with  three  hundred  thousand  trained  men. 
And  this  force  would  have  been  400%  greater 
than  the  Confederacy  could  have  mustered,  had  we 
had  a  trained  army  of  but  fifty  thousand  men  to 
interfere  with  their  preparations  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war.  The  cost  of  this  army  of  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men  for  two  years,  at  the  rate  of 
present  expenditures  in  Europe  would  have  been 
but  496  millions.  Up  to  the  present  day,  we  would 
have  saved  $9,332,000,000  on  the  Civil  War  alone. 

The  Spanish-American  War  has  cost  us  to  date 
$367,000,000.  If  we  had  had  a  trained  army  of  one 
hundred  thousand  men  in  1898,  there  would  have 
been  no  necessity  of  calling  out  250,000  volunteers 
and  militia.     One  hundred  thousand  men  are  al- 


326 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

most  200%  of  all  the  forces  we  ever  had  on  foreign 
soil  during  the  war.  The  cost  of  the  war,  at  the 
rate  of  present  European  expenditures,  would  have 
been  but  27  million  dollars  instead  of  367  millions 
— a  saving  of  340  million  dollars. 

The  total  cost  of  our  wars  up  to  the  present  time 
— including  pensions — has  been  nearly  10,976  mil- 
lions. If  we  had  had  an  obligatory  system  and  if 
our  wars  had  been  conducted  even  as  expensively 
as  the  present  European  War,  it  is  estimated  that 
the  cost  would  have  been  582  million  dollars  instead 
of  10  billion  976  million.  We  would  have  saved  the 
entire  10  billion  dollars,  and  out  of  976  millions  we 
would  have  saved  494  millions. 

What  folly  to  waste  $1 0,393, 000,000  out  of  ex- 
penditures of  $10,976,000,000. 

And  because  of  our  ludicrous  military  system, 
we  have  paid  in  billions  of  dollars  of  waste  during 
peace  times  as  well  as  during  war  times. 

The  peace  expenses  of  our  military  system  from 
1 79 1  to  1 9 1 4  have  been  $8,7 1 8,000,000.  The  reports 
of  the  Secretaries  of  War  show  that  we  have  had 
but  2,488,000  annual  soldiers  during  these  periods. 
Hence  the  yearly  soldier  cost  during  peace  times 
has  been  $3,504  per  soldier.  And  more  than  half 
of  this  is  for  pensions.  During  peace  times,  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  the  annual  soldier 
cost  of  each  man  and  the  proportionate  soldier 
cost  of  each  French  soldier  was  $249  annually. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


327 


Excessive  Cost  or  Wufs  with  tifiien  Soldfeiy 


7t>tal  Money  tspent  on  OurWar<? 

*  tO.97f,5O/.000 

Total  Wa&te 

t  iO.393,0001000 


OMOtrr 


What  They  Should  Have  Co&t-J 


Qevofutfon 
t  ± 


dpanjd/7       Afex/can      /&/?    <3tmfnoJe 


2__n 


■9«96.MQW0 


43Q700.00Q       *2Z40Cl00g        */&6Q000     4 &S0.O0O  St//jqoof 


These  figures  seem  so  small  as  to  make  one  doubt  the  value  of  the 
estimate. 

The  estimate  is  secured  by  multiplying  the  number  of  men  as  esti- 
mated by  George  Washington,  Upton  and  Huidekoper,  that  would 
have  been  required  under  an  efficient  military  system  by  the  number 
of  years  which  these  same  authorities  estimate  would  have  been 
necessary  to  terminate  these  wars.  This  gives  the  total  number  of 
annual  soldiers  for  each  war,  respectively. 

The  cost  of  each  annual  soldier  is  estimated,  including  the  propor- 
tionate cost  of  transportation  and  ammunition,  at  the  extraordinary 
rate  at  which  Germany  spends  money  on  her  soldiers  during  the 
Present  war. 

Certainly  this  is  an  overestimate  rather  than  an  underestimate. 
Ammunition  and  the  means  of  transportation  in  the  Civil  War,  the 
Mexican  War,  and  the  War  of  the  Revolution  were  not  as  ex- 
pensive as  they  are  in  Germany  to-day,  nor  was  ammunition  then 
used  at  the  rate  at  which  ammunition  is  used  to-day. 


328  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

We  have  paid  on  an  average  $3,504  per  year  per 
peace  soldier  from  1791  to  19 14 — an  unbelievable 
figure,  did  not  the  facts  bear  it  out. 

That  France  has  received  something  for  what 
she  has  spent  is  proven  by  the  conduct  of  her  sol- 
diers during  the  present  war. 

If  we  had  based  our  military  system  upon  the 
highest  ideal — the  ideal  that  every  citizen  owes  a 
duty  to  the  government  which  protects  him — we 
could  have  maintained  each  year  an  army  twice  as 
large  as  the  army  we  actually  had  during  that 
year  and  we  could  have  maintained  the  larger  army 
at  17.6%  of  the  cost  we  actually  paid  for  the  smaller 
force. 

We  could  have  maintained  during  the  first  twen- 
ty years  of  our  national  existence,  1789- 1809,  an 
annual  army  of  15,000  men — twice  as  large  as  the 
force  we  actually  had ;  for  the  next  fifty  years,  1809 
to  1859,  we  could  have  had  an  annual  army  of  25,- 
000  trained  men,  a  force  225%  of  what  we  actually 
averaged  during  those  years;  for  the  next  twenty 
years,  1859  to  1879,  we  could  have  maintained  an 
army  of  50,000 — a  force  250%  greater  than  we  had ; 
and  for  the  last  35  years,  1880  to  191 5,  we  could 
have  maintained  100,000  trained  men  each  year — 
202%  of  what  we  have  actually  averaged  for  those 
years — and  all  these  would  have  cost  us — at  the  rate 
France  and  other  European  nations  have  paid  for 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  329 

soldiery  during  peace  times — 17.6%  of  the  money 
we  have  actually  paid  for  very  inferior  forces. 

In  other  words,  under  the  obligatory  system,  we 
could  have  had  from  1791  to  the  present  day,  a 
trained  army  twice  as  great  as  that  which  we  have 
had  each  year,  and  it  would  have  cost  us  for  all 
those  years  but  one  and  a  half  billion  instead  of 
eight  and  a  half  billion  dollars.  And  moreover,  if 
we  had  had  such  a  force,  75%  of  the  expenses  of 
the  War  of  1812,  of  the  Second  Seminole  War,  of 
the  Mexican  War,  of  the  Civil  War,  of  the  Span- 
ish-American War,  and  of  the  Philippine  War, 
would  have  been  saved.  In  fact,  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  there  never  would  have  been  a  War 
of  18 12,  nor  a  Mexican  War,  nor  a  S panish- Amer- 
ican War  if  we  had  a  military  system  and  armies 
similar  to  those  just  indicated. 

Our  own  history  furnishes  us  with  a  sufficient 
basis  for  such  a  conclusion. 

At  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  we  were  in  as 
great  danger  of  going  to  war  with  France  and  Aus- 
tria over  the  imperial  occupation  of  Mexico  as  we 
had  been  in  danger  of  going  to  war  with  England 
in  181 1,  or  in  danger  of  going  to  war  with  Mexico  in 
1845.  But  because  we  had  a  regular  army,  and 
a  million  additional  men  who  had  become  veterans 
because  of  their  two  and  three  years*  training  in 
the  Civil  War,  both  France  and  Austria  backed 


330  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

down,  withdrew  from  Mexico,  and  there  was  no% 
war. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  yearly  living  cost  of 
each  soldier  was  less  during  our  War  of  the  Revo- 
lution, less  during  our  War  of  1812,  less  during 
the  Mexican  War  and  even  less  during  the  Civil 
War,  than  it  is  to-day.  It  is  also  certain  that  a  sol- 
dier of  to-day  uses  more  ammunition  than  did  a  sol- 
dier even  a  generation  ago,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
soldier  of  140  years  ago.  It  is  certain  that  the 
average  per  soldier  cost  of  the  present  day's  am- 
munition is  a  thousand  times  greater  than  it  was 
during  the  Revolutionary  War  or  during  the  War 
of  1 812,  and  perhaps  200  times  as  expensive  as  it 
was  during  our  Civil  War. 

i  We  gasp  at  the  tens  of  millions  of  dollars  thrown 
away  every  day  in  Europe  through  the  use  of  gi- 
gantic and  expensive  explosive  shells;  we  stand 
aghast  at  what  we  consider  the  extravagant  cost  of 
the  transportation  systems  of  the  present  armies 
fighting  in  Europe. 

But — including  the  proportionate  per  soldier  cost 
of  all  the  expensive  ammunition  used  to-day  and 
the  proportionate  per  soldier  cost  of  the  expensive 
transportation  system  needed  at  the  present  time 
— the  annual  soldier  cost  of  each  Russian  soldier 
in  the  present  war  is  but  $661,  of  each  French  sol- 
dier $774,  of  each  German  soldier  $828,  and  of 
each  English  soldier  $921,  while  the  average  annual 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  331 

soldier  cost  of  every  soldier  who  ever  enlisted  in  the 
Civil  War  has  been  $3,6//.  Under  our  voluntary 
system — with  its  enormous  waste  in  the  training 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  and  then  discharging 
them,  with  its  enormous  and  vicious  bounties  paid 
over  and  over  again  to  men  who  enlist,  desert,  and 
re-enlist  and  desert  again, — our  annual  soldier  costs 
have  always  been  "outrageous." 

The  average  annual  soldier  cost  of  every  man  ever 
enlisted  for  the  Spanish- American  War  was  $4,354, 
at  the  rate  money  has  been  spent  for  the  109  days 
of  that  war. 

In  the  Civil  War  expensive  ammunition  such  as 
is  used  to-day  was  not  used,  and  in  the  Spanish- 
American  War  there  were  not  more  than  26,000 
men  out  of  the  280,000,  who  were  ever  employed  in 
using  ammunition  against  the  enemy. 

But  even  these  gigantic  annual  soldier  extrava- 
gances are  small  compared  to  the  actual  cost  of 
each  effective  man.  These  figures  just  quoted  give 
the  average  annual  soldier  cost  of  every  man  who 
ever  enlisted  during  the  Civil  War  and  the  Span- 
ish-American War,  respectively.  The  annual  sol- 
dier cost  of  the  largest  number  of  effectives  we 
have  been  able  to  get  together  at  any  one  time 
during  each  war  is  quite  a  different  matter. 

The  lowest  annual  soldier  cost  of  an  effective 
soldier  in  the  War  of  1812  was  $9,320;  at  the  rate 
money  was  spent  during  the  Spanish-American 


332  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

EXCESSIVE    COST   OF   CITIZEN    SOLDIERY — ANNUAL 
'      SOLDIER   COST 

Notes  to  Chart. 

i.  The  sum  total  of  each  nation's  yearly  war  expenses  divided  by 
the  sum  total  of  the  annual  soldiers  called  by  that  nation  to  the 
battle  front  or  put  into  training  camps.  Consequently  this  includes 
the  proportionate  soldier  cost  of  the  excessively  expensive  trans- 
portation system  of  the  present  day  and  proportionate  soldier  cost 
of  enormously  expensive  ammunition. 

2.  The  total  war  cost  up  to  the  present  day  of  each  war  respectively 
apportioned  among  the  total  number  of  men  ever  enlisted.  This 
shows  the  excessive  costs,  due  to  training  men  for  months  and  then 
being  forced  to  discharge  them  because  of  disability,  or  due  to 
bounties,  desertions  and  pensions. 

3.  The  annual  soldier  cost  (at  the  rate  money  has  been  spent  for 
the  109  days  of  the  war),  as  apportioned  among  the  52,000  men  who 
were  outside  of  the  United  States.  Only  about  half  of  these  ever 
were  in  a  position  to  see  a  gun  fired  at  the  enemy. 

4.  Total  Union  war  expenses  apportioned  among  the  soldiers  under 
General  Pierce's  command  at  Big  Bethel,  those  engaged  at  Rich 
Mountain,  Carrick's  Ford;  those  under  General  Patterson,  near 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  those  who  were  finally  gathered  under  Gen- 
eral McDowell's  command  at  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run — a  total  force 
of  about  40,000  men.  Only  28,500  Union  troops  were  finally  con- 
centrated at  the  First  Battle  of  Bull  Run. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


333 


#5*997 


Excessive  Cost  Cftiien  Soldiery 
Annual  Soldier  Cost 


mm 


Annua/  tfo/dter 

Co<stof 
Each  Man 

Enlietea  t 


9  P.3U 


Annual  doia/er 
Cost  of  Each  (So/cf/er 
in  Present  War  f 


fifffff  *77V  *&s  *££* 


lxwe<st  Annual  Out 

I  of  | 

Each  Effective 

doJd/er 


43677 


$M/0 


C/'V/J 
War 


S/ian. 
Amer. 
War 


War 

of 

/S/2 


Span. 
Amer. 
War 

3 


fstTbm 
Cfvil 
war 


334  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

CITIZEN   SOLDIERY   DESERTIONS 

Civil  War,  1861-1865 

Total  Union  enlistments 2,673,341 

Total  Union  desertions,  according  to  suppressed  reports...    526,000 
It  has  been  claimed  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  that  even  this  num- 
ber is  below  the  actual  number. 
Record  of  desertions  made  public 199,000 

Franco-Prussian  War,  1870-1871 

Prussian   Army   mobilized 640,000 

Number  of  desertions 17 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


335 


cniien  Soldiery  Desertions 

CM/ War  /36/-/SC5 


Desertions  w,-n  %  of  All  Enlistments 
Report  duppresjecf  by  War  Dept. 


De&errfontf    7,v% 
o/M  Enlistments- 

Public 
Records 


Prussian  Army 
franco-Prussian 
War 

fS70  -/S7/ 

Desertions: 
■jfroP  /  °/o 


336  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

War,  the  annual  per  soldier  cost  of  each  effective 
was  $23,584.  And  during  the  first  year  of  the 
Civil  War,  the  annual  soldier  cost  of  each  effective 
— even  including  those  who  ran  away  from  battle 
—was  $32,997! 

Compare  this  $33,000  with  $920,  the  highest 
average  annual  soldier  cost  of  any  soldier  of  any 
nation  at  present  engaged  in  war — and  the  $920 
includes  the  proportionate  per  soldier  expense  of 
the  most  costly  ammunition  ever  used. 

And  what  have  we  paid  in  men? 

Because  of  the  voluntary  system  the  government 
must  try  out  millions  of  men,  discharging  hundreds 
of  thousands  because  of  physical  disability.  More 
than  250,000  men  were  discharged  for  this  cause 
in  the  Civil  War  alone.  Under  the  voluntary  sys- 
tem, with  no  registration  of  citizens,  thousands, 
even  hundreds  of  thousands  accept  bounties,  desert 
and  cannot  be  found  until  they  apply  for  pensions. 
In  the  Civil  War  our  desertions  were  526,000  men 
— 19.7%  of  all  the  men  who  ever  enlisted. 

By  long,  tedious,  waste  fully  costly  processes,  we 
have  enlisted  and  employed  during  our  26  years 
of  wars  only  604,000  annual  regulars.  If  we  had  in 
the  beginning  adopted  a  sensible  military  policy  and 
maintained  a  small  and  efficient  army,  such  as  has 
been  previously  indicated,  not  only  would  we  have 
saved  billions  of  dollars  in  war  time  and  billions 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  337 

of  dollars  in  peace  time,  but  we  would  not  have 
been  compelled  to  employ  at  enormous  waste  of 
time  and  money  3,490,000  extra  militia  and  volun- 
teers— men  who  are  more  harmful  than  beneficial 
up  to  the  time  that  they  have  become  veteran  sol- 
diers by  a  year  or  more  of  training. 

Our  waste  in  feeding  and  training  useless  men 
in  the  Spanish-American  War  was  81.4%;  in  the 
Mexican  War,  89.8% ;  in  the  War  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, 91.4%;  in  the  first  year  of  the  Civil  War, 
94.1%;  and  in  the  War  of  1812,  99%. 

What  business  house  would  conduct  its  business 
in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  keep  on 
its  pay  roll  1,000  men  for  the  sake  of  securing  the 
labour  of  186  men?  Yet  this  is  the  best  record  we 
have  ever  shown  in  any  war  in  obtaining  effectives. 

Because  of  the  voluntary  system,  unprepared 
men  are  taken  into  camps,  cencentrated  in  close 
unprepared  quarters,  and  as  no  adequate  hospital 
and  sanitary  corps  are  ready  to  take  charge  of 
these  volunteers,  sickness  breaks  out  and  thousands 
die  unnecessarily. 

During  the  Mexican  War  17%  to  2j%  of  all  en- 
listed men  were  ill ;  General  Scott,  writing  of  <5,ooo 
soldiers  at  Chapultepec,  stated  that  2,000  out  of  the 
6,000  were  too  ill  to  be  of  service. 

In  the  Spanish-American  War  those  who  died 
from  sickness  and  disease  were  710%  of  the  en- 
tire number  killed  in  battle  and  of  those  who  died 


338  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


citizen  soldiery:  excessive  cost  in  men 

The  value  of  an  army  is  not  in  having  its  soldiers  or  its  companies 
separated  by  hundreds  of  miles,  but  in  having  them  at  one  place 
at  one  time. 

First  Year  Civil  War 

Out  of  669,000  enlisted  during  1861,  only  about  40,000  were  ever 

engaged  in  battle  or  even  in  skirmishes. 

The  rest  were  pure  waste. 

Of  the  28,000  at  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  many  had  been  in  training 

but  thirty  days. 

War  of  1812 

Though  the  United  States  Government  enlisted  527,000  men,  it 
was  able  to  obtain  but  55,000  of  these  during  any  one  year. 

The  largest  number  of  effectives  ever  concentrated  in  battle  was  a 
little  over  3,000,  at  the  Battle  of  Lundy's  Lane. 
Enlisted,  527,000;  greatest  effective  army,  3,000. 

War  of  the  Revolution 

Though  the  Colonies  enlisted  395,000  men  in  seven  years,  the  great- 
est total  effective  during  any  one  year  was  34,000,  but  these  were 
never  together  at  any  one  place  at  one  time.  The  largest  number 
of  effectives  ever  concentrated  for  battle  was  at  Saratoga,  where 
between  five  thousand  and  six  thousand  men,  under  General  Gates, 
defeated  Burgoyne. 

This  demonstrated  what  five  thousand  men  could  do  when  brought 
together. 

The  entire  war  demonstrated  what  395,000  men  could  not  do  when 
serving  at  different  times  and  at  different  places. 

Spanish-American  War 

Only   52,000— of  the  279,000  men   enlisted — ever  left  the  United 
States,  or  set  foot  on  foreign  soil  during  this  war. 
If  we  had  had  a  military  system  upon  which  we  could  have  de- 
pended without  fear,  the  enlistment  and  consequent  waste  of  the 
other  207,000  men  would  have  been  saved. 

Mexican  War 

Though  the  United  States  enlisted  104,000  men,  there  were  never 
more  than  21,000  under  training  together  at  the  same  time,  and 
less  than  half  of  these  were  effective. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


339 


Citizen  Soldiery 
Excessive  Cost  f n  Men 


fst  Year 
CMI  War 


War  of 
Revolution 


\ 

tS/ianfch 
American 
War 

195000men 

Mexican 
War 

?7P.7S3n2en 

814% 

Wa&te 

91,1/ % 

Waste 

Wurmen 

89.8% 
Wacrte. 

A 
19.000 

A 

moo 

A  -Largest  total  Effectives  Qt  any  one  //we 


340  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

DEATH  OF  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY  DUE  TO  SICKNESS 

"Large  bodies  of  men  who  are  not  soldiers,  under  officers  who  have 
had  little  or  no  military  training,  cannot  be  brought  together  and 
held  for  many  weeks  in  camp  and  remain  healthy.  If  the  water 
supply  is  not  abundant  or  is  not  good,  if  the  thoroughly  well- 
established  rules  of  sanitation  are  not  observed;  if  the  discipline 
of  the  camp  puts  little  restriction  on  drunkenness  and  immorality; 
if  the  soldier  does  not  know  how  to  live,  and  his  officers  do  not 
watch  him  and  teach  him;  if  his  food  is  poorly  cared  for  and 
badly  cooked,  and  he  is  permitted  to  eat  and  drink  anything  and 
everything  he  can  find,  sickness  will  certainly  prevail.  If,  as  at 
Camp  Thomas,  a  regiment  can  go  for  ten  days  without  digging 
sinks ;  if  the  sinks  dug  are  not  used  or  they  quickly  overflow  and 
pollute  the  ground;  if  practically  no  protection  is  afforded  against 
the  liquor  sellers  and  prostitutes  of  neighboring  places;  if  com- 
mands are  crowded  together  and  tents  seldom  struck,  or  even 
never  during  the  occupation  of  the  camp;  if  no  one  is  called  to 
account  for  repeated  violation  of  sanitary  orders,  it  cannot  be  but 
that  typhoid  fever,  once^  introduced  will  spread,  rapidly,  widely." — 
Report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  Investi- 
gate the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain. 
"What  the  country  needs  to  know  now  is  that  in  actual  warfare 
the  volunteer  is  a  nuisance,  that  it  always  takes  one  regular  to 
offset  his  mistakes,  to  help  him  cook  his  rations,  and  to  teach  him 
to  shelter  himself  and  to  keep  himself  clean." — Richard  Harding 
Davis. 

Notes  to  Chart. 

i  and  2.  Though  their  proportions  are  essentially  true,  the  figures 
here  are  not  exact,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  report  of  the  Adjutant- 
General  for  1808  lists  only  the  deaths  which  occurred  between 
May  1st  and  September  30th,  while  the  Statistical  Exhibit  issued 
by  the  Adjutant-General  on_  December  13,  1809,  gives  the  total 
deaths  of  volunteers,  thus  twice  listing  the  small  number  of  deaths 
of  volunteers  who  were  in  actual  service. 

The  first  report  gives  the  total  deaths  from  May  1st  to  September 
30th  as  2,910,  only  345  of  which  resulted  from  being  killed  in  action 
or  from  wounds  received  in  action.  The  Exhibit  gives  the  total 
deaths  of  volunteers  as  4,137,  only  279  of  which  were  killed  in 
action  or  fatally  wounded.  Total  deaths  from  all  causes  not 
making  allowance  for  small  number  listed  twice,  7,043. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


341 


Dealli  or  Cflfzen  Sol <l iery 
due  lo  Sickness 


C/v/J  War 


Nex/con 
War 


2UQ,5S6 

from 

<S/cX/7edv 


WOP 


j  1 0,070 

from 
Battle 


6.353 
from 
<Sfcknes<f 
1 


from 

Batrid 


342  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

from  wounds  received  in  battle.  In  the  Civil  War 
200,000  men  died  of  sickness  and  disease  and  49,- 
000  more  died  from  causes  other  than  being  killed 
in  battle  or  from  wounds  received  in  battle.  There 
were  in  the  Civil  War  more  than  6,000,000  re- 
corded cases  of  sickness. 

And  what  have  we  paid  in  blood? 

Saddest  and  most  costly  of  all  is  the  great 
slaughter  of  untrained  and  poorly  equipped  men 
when  opposed  by  a  trained  and  well-equipped  en- 
emy. In  our  war  with  Mexico,  we  lost  by  death  in 
battle  or  death  by  sickness  one  man  out  of  eight. 
In  the  Spanish-American  War,  although  not  more 
than  26,000  of  the  two  hundred  eighty  thousand 
enlisted  ever  saw  a  gun  fired  at  the  enemy,  yet  2,- 
910  were  lost  in  that  war — almost  one-seventh  of 
the  number  engaged  in  actually  fighting  the  enemy. 
Much  of  this  loss  was  due  to  the  fact  that  our 
small  hospital  corps,  perhaps  sufficient  for  our 
regular  army  of  26,000,  was  absolutely  unable  to 
care  for  an  army  of  nearly  three  hundred  thou- 
sand. 

Our  losses  in  men  discharged  because  of  dis- 
ability, our  losses  in  captured,  our  losses  in 
wounded,  our  losses  in  battle  and  losses  by  death 
from  sickness  in  the  Civil  War  were  1,300,000  men 
— a  number  not  only  equal  to  all  the  Confederate 
soldiers  ever  under  arms  but  30%  greater  than 
their  entire  army. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  343 

Armies  composed  of  regiments  of  regulars  and 
volunteers  do  not  work  in  harmony  in  battle;  the 
number  of  killed  and  wounded  are  infinitely  greater 
than  they  are  in  a  trained  army  of  similar  size. 
Veteran  soldiers  remain  calm — attempt  no  rash 
feats  and  consequently  sustain  comparatively  small 
losses. 

In  the  Civil  War  we  lost  110,070  men  killed  in 
action  or  dead  as  a  result  of  wounds  received  in 
action  and  249,458  from  disease  and  causes  other 
than  wounds  in  battle :  a  total  Union  loss  of  SS9r 
528  dead. 

The  present  war  in  Europe  is  a  bloody  war.  We 
gasp  at  the  British  losses  of  August,  19 14.  Dur- 
ing the  terrific  battle  at  Mons  and  during  the  re- 
treat to  the  Marne  the  British  lost  22.8%  of  their 
men. 

History,  literature  and  painting  have  made 
memorable  for  all  time  the  terrible  slaughter  dur- 
ing the  Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade  at  Balaklava. 
The  Light  Brigade  lost  37%  of  its  men!  Yet  in 
the  Civil  War  at  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  One 
Hundred  Fifty-seventh  New  York  lost  61%  of  its 
men ;  Seventy-sixth  New  York  62%,  One  Hundred 
Sixty-second  Pennsylvania  62%,  Seventy-fifth 
Pennsylvania  63%,  One  Hundred  Seventh  Penn- 
sylvania 65%,  One  Hundred  Fiftieth  Pennsylvania 
65%,  One  Hundred  Seventh  New  York  70%,  One 
Hundred  Forty-seventh  New  York  70%,  One  Hun- 


344  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

EXCESSIVE  COST  OF  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY  IN  MEN  KILLED 

History,  literature  and  painting  have  made  memorable  for  all  time 

the  terrible  slaughter  at  the  Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade. 

The  Light  Brigade  lost  37  per  cent,  of  its  men ! 

At  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  the  per  cent,  of  the  men  lost  was: 

157th  New  York 61 

76th  New  York. 62 

i62d  Pennsylvania  62 

75th  Pennsylvania 63 

107th  Pennsylvania   65 

150th   Pennsylvania 65 

107th  New  York 70 

147th  New  York 70 

151st    Pennsylvania 71 

24th  Michigan 73 

149th  Pennsylvania  74 

2d    Wisconsin 77 

16th  Maine ' 84 

The  Battle  of  Chickamauga,  in  which  120,000  men  were  engaged  on 
both  sides,  and  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  in  which  120,000  men 
were  engaged  on  both  sides,  were  almost  as  bloody  as  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg.  In  fact,  one  authority  called  Chickamauga  the 
"bloodiest  battle  of  history." 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


345 


Excessive  Cost  of  Citizen  Soldiery 
in  Men  Killed 


37% 


The 
Charge 
or  trie 
Light 
Brigade 


St/% 


73% 


74/% 


77% 


2b  tn 

MicMgan 
Regiment 


iWth 
Penmytvan/Q 
Ue$iment 


2nd 
Wticons/n 


tctn 

Maine 


Qegiment  &e$iment 


Battle  of  Getty&huig-/ 


/-Nine  Other  Gegfmente  Losr£rom6i%to7J%Jcmea 


346  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

EXCESSIVE   COST  OF  CITIZEN   SOLDIERY   IN   DEATH 
CASUALTIES 

Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
was  considered  the  most  costly  war  in  history.  Japan  then  lost 
both  in  battle  and  by  sickness  but  3.8  per  cent,  of  her  men. 
The  entire  number  of  British  dead  in  the  present  war,  up  to 
December  1,  1915,  was  but  4  per  cent,  of  the  armies  she  had  organ- 
ised up  to  that  time. 

Russia's  dead  up  to  December  1,  1915,  were  but  6.4  per  cent,  of 
her  armies. 

Germany,  by  the  use  of  trained  soldiers,  has  accomplished  a 
greater  invasion  of  Belgium,  France,  Poland  and  the  Balkans  than 
we  accomplished  during  our  Civil  War  in  invading  the  South.  Yet 
to  accomplish  these  invasions  in  three  different  directions,  it  has 
cost  her  a  loss  in  dead  of  but  8  per  cent,  of  her  men. 
It  may  be  objected  that  all  of  these  armies  have  not  been  in  bat- 
tle; neither  were  all  of  our  soldiers  of  the  Civil  War  ever  in  battle. 
Of  the  660,000  men  of  1861,  not  over  40,000  ever  took  part  in  battle. 
To  accomplish  in  1864- 1865  a  lesser  invasion  of  the  South — an 
invasion  in  one  direction  only — cost  us  13.4  per  cent,  of  all  the  men 
ever  enlisted  in  the  Union  armies,  even  including  the  half  million 
who  deserted  and  the  quarter  million  who  were  discharged  for 
disability,  19.9  per  cent,  of  all  the  actual  Union  forces,  and  25.6 
Per  cent,  of  the  armies  we  had  in  1864  o,nd  1865,  the  two  years 
during  which  the  invasion  was  executed. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID 


347 


Excessive  Cost  of  Citizen  Soldiery 

in 

Death  Casualties 


C/v/J  War 


Paper 
Forces 


Present 
European  War 


German 
dead 

fiu<5S0- 
3apane<se 
War  2 

6,V% 

Ru&ian 

dead 

5,t% 

Japanese 

dead 

Britten 
dead 

/3,4% 

Union 
dead 


Actual 
Forces 

14 


W,9% 

Union 

dead 


348  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

dred  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania  71%,  Twenty- fourth 
Michigan  73%,  One  Hundred  Forty-ninth  Penn- 
sylvania 74%,  Second  Wisconsin  JJ% ,  Sixteenth 
Maine  84%. 

And  the  Battle  of  Chickamauga  where  128,000 
men  were  engaged  on  both  sides  and  the  Battle  of 
Chancellorsville  where  120,000  men  were  engaged 
on  both  sides,  were  almost  as  bloody  as  the  Battle 
of  Gettysburg.  In  fact  one  authority  calls  Chicka- 
mauga the  "bloodiest  battle  of  history." 

Even  when  we  compare  the  death  losses  of  en- 
tire wars  or  entire  campaigns,  we  find  the  percent- 
age of  death  of  citizen  soldiery  to  be  far  greater 
than  the  percentage  of  death  of  regulars. 

Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  was  considered  the  bloodiest 
of  history.  Yet  in  per  cent,  of  men  actually  lost 
it  does  not  compare  with  our  losses  in  the  Civil 
War. 

Japan  lost  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  both  in 
battle  and  by  sickness,  but  3.8%  of  her  men. 

The  entire  number  of  British  dead  up  to  De- 
cember 1st,  191 5,  was  but  4%  of  the  armies  she 
had  organised  at  that  time. 

It  may  be  objected  that  all  the  British  armies 
were  not  in  battle;  but  neither  were  all  of  our  sol- 
diers of  the  Civil  War  ever  in  battle.  Of  the  660,- 
000  men  of  1861,  not  over  40,000  ever  took  part  in 
battle. 


THE  PRICE  WE  HAVE  PAID  349 

Russia's  dead  up  to  December  1st,  191 5,  were 
but  6.4%  of  her  armies. 

Germany,  by  the  use  of  trained  soldiers,  has  ac- 
complished a  greater  invasion  of  Belgium,  France, 
Poland  and  the  Balkans  than  we  accomplished  dur- 
ing our  Civil  War  in  invading  the  South.  Yet  to 
accomplish  these  invasions  in  three  different  direc- 
tions has  cost  her  a  loss  in  dead  of  but  8%  of  her 
men. 

To  accomplish  in  1864  a  smaller  invasion  of  the 
South — an  invasion  in  one  direction  only — cost  us 
2 5-6%  °f  the  armies  we  had  in  1863  and  1864 — 
the  years  during  which  the  invasion  was  executed. 

In  the  number  of  men  required  to  win  victory, 
in  the  unnecessary  years  of  suffering  and  devasta- 
tion, in  the  excessive  annual  soldier  cost,  in  the 
total  money  waste,  in  losses  by  disability  and  de- 
sertion and  capture,  in  losses  by  death  in  battle,  in 
losses  by  death  from  sickness,  the  volunteer  army 
system  is  the  most  useless,  the  most  wasteful,  the 
most  costly,  the  most  bloody! 

All  history  proves  it. 

Why  propose  to  continue  the  folly? 

1  Page  322.    George  Washington. 


CHAPTER  III 

TRAGIC   COMEDY 

THE  comic- tragedy  of  it  all — the  comedy  of 
our  military  blunders  and  the  tragedy  of  our 
waste  of  money  and  men — has  been  due  to  political 
militarism.  Congress  has  never  been  able  to  real- 
ise, except  when  forced  to  do  so  under  great  stress 
and  after  months  and  even  years  of  disaster,  that 
the  military  is  an  executive  function  and  not  a 
legislative  one. 

The  folly  began  when  Washington  first  took 
command  at  the  beginning  of  the  Revolutionary 
War.  The  Continental  Congress  then  recom- 
mended that  the  officers  of  each  company  should 
be  elected  by  the  rest  of  the  company.  Washing- 
ton, the  Commander-in-Chief,  had  not  the  power  to 
choose  the  officers  to  govern  the  companies  of 
which  he  was  the  head.  Moreover,  Congress  sit- 
ting in  Philadelphia — a  two  weeks'  journey  in 
those  days  from  Boston  where  Washington  had 
his  command — refused  to  accept  Washington's  ad- 
vice as  to  the  term  of  enlistment  or  the  size  of  the 
army.    In  fact,  Congress  actually  forbade  Wash- 

350 


TRAGIC  COMEDY  301 

ington  organising  an  army  larger  than  22,000  men ; 
and  forbade  the  New  York  division  being  made 
larger  than  5,000. 

As  Washington  was  about  to  move  to  defend 
New  York,  Congress  ordered  him,  in  spite  of  his 
protests,  to  send  nearly  half  of  his  army  to  re-in- 
force  the  Canadian  expedition,  which  had  already 
failed — compelled  him  to  do  this,  reducing  his  army 
to  about  5,300,  though  he  had  to  confront  an  enemy 
numbering  from  27,000  to  30,000.  When  Congress 
finally  realised  what  it  had  done,  it  called  out  6,000 
militia  in  June,  who  were  supposed  to  train,  arm, 
prepare  for  battle,  win  the  war,  and  be  back  home 
again  by  the  last  of  November. 

Even  after  five  years  of  fighting — after  defeat 
after  defeat — Congress  decided  to  reduce  the  size 
of  the  army,  though  we  then  had  no  efficient  means 
of  combating  the  English  forces  which  had  won 
success  after  success  for  five  years. 

•  To  cap  the  climax,  Congress  authorised  armies, 
but  declared  it  had  no  power  to  provide  men  with 

'  food  and  clothing.  Consequently  Connecticut  regi- 
ments and  Pennsylvania  regiments  mutinied  and 
1,300  men  threatened  to  march  on  Congress.  Then 
the  political  debaters,  seized  with  fear,  capitulated 
not  to  the  military  power,  but  to  a  mob  of  men 
who  had  become  desperate  because  they  were  starv- 
ing. 

During  the  War  of  181 2,  Congress  again  failed 


352  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

in  every  way  to  understand  the  needs  of  the  army. 
There  was  no  forethought — there  was  not  even 
afterthought. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1813  and  for  six 
months  during  18 14  there  had  been  a  British  force 
of  three  thousand  men  and  a  British  fleet  in  Chesa- 
peake Bay  within  a  few  hours'  march  of  Washing- 
ton. Yet  neither  Congress  nor  President  Madison 
did  a  single  thing  to  strengthen  the  defence  of  the 
capital  during  the  entire  twelve  months;  in  reality 
no  real  appeal  was  made  for  new  militia  to  defend 
the  capital  until  two  days  before  they  were  ex- 
pected to  fight.  The  general  in  command,  report- 
ing to  Congress  on  the  mob  assembled,  described 
them  as  without  officers,  devoid  of  discipline,  and 
without  any  knowledge  of  service.  Another  gen- 
eral, reporting  on  the  Battle  of  Bladensburg,  wrote 
that  he  could  not  call  it  a  battle,  it  was  merely  a 
disgrace. 

In  the  campaign  against  the  Creeks  in  181 3,  Jack- 
son was  just  on  the  point  of  success  when  he  was 
compelled  to  withdraw  because  Congress  had  not 
and  would  not  furnish  supplies  and  food  to  his  sol- 
diers. Even  after  a  crushing  defeat  of  the  Indians 
he  was  compelled  to  remain  ten  days  at  Fort 
Strother  debating  with  his  troops.  They  acted  al- 
most as  badly  as  the  men  in  Congress.  First,  the 
militia  mutinied  and  the  volunteers  had  to  bring 
them  to  order  with  their  guns.     Then  the  volun- 


TRAGIC  COMEDY 353 

teers  mutinied  and  the  militia  had  to  do  the  same  for 
the  volunteers.  The  debating  being  over  and  the 
militia  and  volunteers  each  having  proven  to  the 
other  that  each  in  turn  could  quell  the  other,  the 
army  disbanded  and  went  home.  The  Creeks 
warred  on. 

In  the  Seminole  War — the  second  war — 60,000 
volunteers  were  enlisted  to  defeat  less  than  1,200 
Indians.  Becoming  disgusted  with  the  volunteers, 
General  Scott  asked  Congress  to  get  rid  of  the  60,- 
000  and  give  him  3,000  trained  troops.  Congress, 
adhering  to  its  belief  that  untrained,  unfed  troops 
were  always  better  fighters  than  trained  troops 
well  fed,  became  very  indignant  and  relieved  Gen- 
eral Scott  of  his  command.  Marvel  of  political 
militarism — a  nation  of  17,000,000  inhabitants  send- 
ing forth  60,000  troops,  warring  seven  years  at  a 
cost  of  $69,000,000  to  defeat  1,200  Indians! 

Our  Mexican  War,  from  the  military  standpoint, 
was  more  successful  than  any  other  war  we  have 
ever  waged  up  to  the  Spanish-American  War.  But 
it  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  President  and  the 
Congress  were  so  far  away  from  the  army  that 
their  meddling  did  not  interfere  as  much  as  usual. 
Even  at  that  time,  after  all  the  failures  of  the 
past,  President  Polk  in  his  message  to  Congress 
said  that: 

"A  volunteer  force  is  beyond  question  more  ef- 
ficient than  any  other  description  of  citizen  sol- 


354  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

diers;  and  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  a  number 
far  beyond  that  required  would  readily  rush  to 
the  field  upon  the  call  of  their  country." 

When  General  Taylor  made  his  advance  upon 
Monterey,  he  was  compelled  to  leave  6,000  volun- 
teers behind  because  not  a  single  wagon  had 
reached  him.  General  Scott,  after  getting  his  troops 
in  shape,  found  that  many  of  them  had  decided  to 
go  home,  and  because  of  the  idiocy  of  Congress, 
nothing  could  be  done  to  prevent  them  from  going. 
Consequently  on  May  4th,  1847,  seven  of  his  vol- 
unteer regiments  were  sent  back  to  New  Orleans 
without  having  been  of  any  use  to  the  army.  Al- 
though Scott  drilled  and  trained  some  104,000 
men,  when  he  advanced  into  Mexico  to  do  fighting, 
his  army  was  reduced  to  less  than  10,000  men. 

No  loyal  American  can  look  back  upon  the  fol- 
lies of  Congress  during  the  early  part  of  1861 
without  a  blush  of  shame. 

By  February  1st,  1861,  seven  states  had  seceded 
— one  of  them — South  Carolina — had  seceded  42 
days  previously.  By  February  4th,  they  had  elect- 
ed a  president  and  a  vice  president;  by  the  28th 
they  had  authorized  the  president  of  the  Confed- 
erate States  to  issue  a  call  for  a  hundred  thousand 
men ;  by  the  eighth  of  April,  they  had  equipped  35,- 
000  men ;  a  week  later  thev  had  seized  all  the  arse- 
nals  within  their  reach  and  all  forts  in  the  south- 
ern states. 


TRAGIC  COMEDY  355 

And  what  has  Congress  done  ?    Nothing ! 

What  did  President  Lincoln  do?  Even  he  did 
not  issue  a  call  for  a  single  volunteer  until  Jeffer- 
son Davis  had  35,000  men  enlisted  and  under  train- 
ing. And  even  then,  though  the  armed  forces  of 
the  Confederacy  were  almost  in  sight  of  Washing- 
ton, though  the  outbreak  in  Baltimore  had  made 
the  capture  of  the  capitol  possible,  Lincoln  did  not 
call  out  the  militia  to  defend  the  capitol,  but  to 
serve  only  in  offensive  warfare — to  "repossess 
forts,  places  and  property  which  had  seceded  from 
the  Union." 

Congress  knew  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1861, 
that  we  had  an  army  of  but  16,000  men.  By  the 
5th  of  April  no  material  increase  had  been  made  in 
the  size  of  the  Union  army,  although  the  rebel 
government  had  an  army  twice  the  size  of  the  Un- 
ion army,  and  the  rebellion  had  covered  560,000 
square  miles  of  territory.  The  Union  army  at  that 
time  could  have  furnished  but  one  soldier  to  re- 
conquer each  33  square  miles  of  rebel  territory. 

The  Confederate  army  was  enlisted  for  twelve 
months,  but  because  of  a  law  over  60  years  old, 
which  Congress  had  failed  to  repeal,  President 
Lincoln  could  not  call  volunteers  or  militia  for  a 
longer  period  than  ninety  days.  Hence  the  75,000 
volunteers  called  by  President  Lincoln  on  April 
15th,  were  to  be  permitted  to  go  home  at  the  very 
moment  at  which  the  Confederate  army  of  100,000 


356  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

would  be  trained,  equipped  and  ready  for  eight 
months'  additional  service. 

Congress  convened  July  4th,  and  as  soon  as  Con- 
gress began  to  act  it  began  to  blunder.  Two 
hundred  fifty  thousand  men  were  again  enlisted 
under  a  system  which  permitted  the  men  to  elect 
their  own  officers.  Later,  in  authorising  the  larger 
army  of  volunteers,  Congress  gave  the  governor  of 
each  state  the  right  to  appoint  the  officers  for  the 
companies  of  his  state.  Congress  thus  prohibited 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Armies  of  the  Union,  from  even  desig- 
nating a  single  field  officer  of  a  single  volunteer 
regiment. 

When  Congress  met,  the  75,000  men,  called  out 
by  President  Lincoln,  had  had  at  least  a  few  days' 
training  and,  within  a  few  weeks,  their  terms  of 
enlistment  would  end  and  they  would  go  home. 
Consequently  Congress  insisted  that  these  men 
must  fight  at  once  before  leaving.  It  did  not  matter 
whether  the  nation  was  ready  to  open  a  campaign 
or  not.  Those  soldiers  had  been  trained  for  thirty 
days  or  more,  they  had  been  fed  for  a  longer  time. 
They  should  fight  before  the  ninety  days  was  up. 
Hence  Congress  was  compelled  to  provide  a  battle 
for  them.  The  result  was  the  disastrous  defeat  at 
the  Battle  of  Bull  Run. 

By  the  end  of  1861,  Congress  had  paid  out  $238,- 
000,000  for  670,000  troops;  Congress  had  got  to- 


TRAGIC  COMEDY  357 

gether  28,000  men  at  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run — 
many  of  whom  had  had  but  thirty  days  of  train- 
ing, and  most  of  whom — with  the  exception  of  800 
of  the  regular  army — ran  away  in  panic. 

Even  so  wise  a  man  as  President  Lincoln  proved 
himself  incapable  of  directing  armed  forces.  In 
1862,  because  of  President  Lincoln's  interference 
with  McClellan's  plan  of  uniting  his  forces  with 
those  of  General  McDowell,  the  best  chance  of 
success  was  thrown  away.  Only  in  1863,  when 
President  Lincoln  and  Congress  turned  matters 
over  to  General  Grant  to  do  absolutely  as  he 
pleased,  did  matters  mend. 

When  the  Spanish-American  War  began  it  was 
found  that  regiments  which  should  have  had  ten 
companies  had  only  eight  and  that  these  companies 
had  only  six  out  of  each  ten  men  they  should  have 
had. 

"There  were  no  brigades,  no  divisions,  and  worst 
of  all,  no  plans,  nor  could  any  be  formulated  for 
the  very  excellent  reason  that  Congress,  with  its 
usual  short-sightedness,  had  restricted  its  appro- 
priation to  national  defence  and  to  that  one  ob- 
ject alone.  No  money  was  available  for  offensive 
operations,  the  only  kind  which  could  possibly  be 
used  against  the  Spanish  possessions  in  both  hem- 
ispheres." 1 

On  March  2,  1896,  Congress  requested  Spain 
to  recognise  the  independence  of  Cuba.    But  Con- 


358  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

gress  took  no  action  whatever  to  prepare  for  war 
until  March  9,  1898,  just  two  years  and  eleven  days 
later.  Two  years  and  eleven  days ! — even  then  Con- 
gress did  nothing  toward  the  organisation  of  the 
army.  Fifty- five  days  after  the  appropriation  was 
voted,  Congress  awoke  to  the  fact  that  an  army  as 
well  as  money  was  needed.  Naturally  at  that  late 
hour,  Congress  re-committed  the  old  blunders. 
Again  it  took  the  power  of  the  appointment  of 
officers  of  volunteer  companies  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States  and  turned  it  over  to  the  governors  of  the 
various  states. 

So  inefficient  was  the  training  that  General 
Miles  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  30 
to  40  per  cent,  of  the  fourteen  regiments  of  volun- 
teers which  he  commanded  were  absolutely  \xnA 
drilled,  that  there  were  300  men  in  one  regiment, 
each  of  whom  had  never  in  all  his  life  even  fired  a 
gun.  These  men  might  have  had  at  least  ninety 
days  of  shooting  practice  but  for  lack  of  of- 
ficers ;  and  Congress  had  failed  over  and  over  again 
to  respond  to  the  recommendations  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  more  officers. 

This  lack  resulted  also  in  great  confusion  when 
troops  assembled  in  Florida  for  embarkation.  A 
few  sentences  from  the  account  of  then  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Roosevelt  indicates  the  scramble  of  the 
troops  for  the  transports. 


TRAGIC  COMEDY 359 

"As  the  number  and  capacity  of  the  transports 
were  known,  or  ought  to  have  been  known,  and  as 
the  number  and  size  of  the  regiments  to  go  were 
also  known,  the  task  of  allotting  each  regiment  or 
fraction  of  a  regiment  to  its  proper  transport,  and 
arranging  that  the  regiments  and  transports  should 
meet  in  due  order  on  the  dock,  ought  not  to  have 
been  difficult.  However,  no  arrangements  were 
made  in  advance;  and  we  were  allowed  to  shove 
and  hustle  for  ourselves  as  best  we  could,  on  much 
the  same  principles  that  had  governed  our  prepa- 
rations hitherto.  .  .  . 

"We  were  ordered  to  be  at  a  certain  track  with 
all  our  baggage  at  midnight,  there  to  take  a  train 
for  Port  Tampa.  At  the  appointed  time  we  turned 
up,  but  the  train  did  not.  The  men  slept  heavily, 
while  Wood  and  I  and  various  other  officers  wan- 
dered about  in  search  of  information  which  no  one 
could  give.  We  now  and  then  came  across  a  brig- 
adier-general  or  even  a  major-general;  but  no>- 
body  knew  anything.  Some  regiments  got  aboard 
the  trains  and  some  did  not,  but  as  none  of  the 
trains  started,  this  made  little  difference.  At  three 
o'clock,  we  received  orders  to  march  to  an  entirely 
different  track,  and  away  we  went.  No  train  ap- 
peared on  this  track  either ;  but  at  six  o'clock  some 
coal-cars  came  by,  and  these  were  seized.  .  .  . 

"Finally,  after  hours  of  search,  the  first  Volun- 


360  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

teen  Cavalry  were  allotted  to  the  transport  Yu- 
catan. .  .  . 

"At  the  same  time  I  happened  to  find  out  that 
she  had  previously  been  allotted  to  two  other  regi- 
ments— the  Second  Regular  Infantry,  and  the  Sev- 
enty-first New  York  Volunteers,  which  latter  regi- 
ment alone  contained  more  men  than  could  be  put 
aboard  her.  Accordingly,  I  ran  at  full  speed  to 
our  train,  leaving  a  strong  rear  guard  with  the 
baggage,  I  double-quicked  the  rest  of  the  regiment 
up  to  the  boat,  just  in  time  to  board  her  as  she 
came  into  the  quay,  and  then  to  hold  her  against 
the  Second  Regulars  and  the  Seventy-first,  who  had 
arrived  a  little  too  late,  being  a  shade  less  ready 
than  we  were  in  the  matter  of  individual  initiative. 
There  was  a  good  deal  of  expostulation,  but  we  had 
possession,  and  as  the  ship  could  not  contain  half 
of  the  men  who  had  been  told  to  go  aboard  her,  the 
Seventy-first  went  away,  as  did  all  but  four  com- 
panies of  the  Second." 

Compare  this  with  the  fact  that  Napoleon  had 
his  army  so  trained  that  he  could  embark  133,000 
troops  in  three  hours. 

Much  of  the  confusion  and  mismanagement  of 
the  volunteer  troops  of  the  Spanish- American  War 
was  due  to  the  lack  of  efficient  officers.  State  gov- 
ernors often  appointed,  merely  because  of  friend- 
ship or  political  influence,  many  men,  who  were  ab- 
solutely unqualified  to  lead  troops,  as  company  and 


TRAGIC  COMEDY  361 

regimental  officers.  When  the  War  Department 
begged  Congress  for  authority  to  issue  commis- 
sions to  retired  army  officers  of  experience  so  that 
they  might  again  enter  active  service,  Congress  em- 
phatically denied  the  petition,  believing  that  in- 
experienced, untried  political  friends  of  state  gov- 
ernors would  render  better  service.  The  results 
were  deplorable.  Men  went  for  days  without  food, 
while  food  at  the  same  time  lay  decaying  and  spoil- 
ing within  a  few  miles  of  them. 

There  was  great  disorganisation  of  the  commis- 
sary department,  due  to  the  fact  that  men  who  had 
been  trained  to  handle  supplies  for  the  small  army 
of  30,000  were  absolutely  at  sea  in  attempting  to 
handle  supplies  for  270,000.  Food  could  not  be 
taken  from  the  storehouses,  even  though  in  sight 
of  starving  soldiers,  without  military  authority — 
unless  one  wished  to  run  the  risk  of  court  martial. 

One  young  captain  at  Chickamauga  did  run  this 
risk.  Assuming  command  of  wagons  and  teams  of 
mules,  he  drove  to  the  station,  brought  back  food 
which  had  been  lying  for  days  on  the  platform  in 
the  sun,  and  consequently  gained  the  everlasting 
thanks  of  the  entire  company. 

Merely  because  there  were  not  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  officers  to  train  the  men,  to  lay  out  and  pro- 
vide sanitary  camps,  77,000  men  were  crowded  at 
Camp  Thomas,  which  could  not  suitably  accommo- 
date more  than  19,000  troops.    And  the  conditions 


362  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

at  Camp  Alger  were  so  bad  that  they  caused  a 
scandal.  As  a  result  of  the  mismanagement  due  to 
Congress's  lack  of  understanding  of  army  condi- 
tions, trouble  among  the  men  broke  out.  It  is 
impossible  to  bring  together  thirty  or  sixty  thou- 
sand men  whose  life  habits  are  different,  concen- 
trate them  in  a  camp  without  sufficient  officers 
trained  in  handling  men,  subject  them  to  regular 
rules,  to  discipline,  to  diet,  to  duties,  without  trouble 
and  without  sickness. 

Congress's  action  in  the  Philippine  War  was  no 
more  commendable.  The  refusal  of  Congress  in 
the  first  place  to  enlist  men  until  such  a  time  as  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  army  deemed  it  wise 
to  discharge  them,  left  General  Otis  for  ten  months 
with  3,722  men — whom  he  was  entitled  to  com- 
mand— to  face  some  35,000  Philippine  revolution- 
ists. 

Even  in  late  years  Congress  by  not  giving  heed 
to  the  pleas  of  the  War  Department  for  a  larger 
commissary  staff  has  left  men  on  duty  in  the  Phil- 
ippines three  and  four  days  without  food  and  often 
under  the  hot  sun  without  even  water,  as  a  result 
of  which  the  tongues  and  lips  of  the  men  have  been 
so  swollen  they  could  not  speak  or  eat  for  forty-eight 
hours. 

"Congress  is  chiefly  responsible  for  the  bad  ad- 
ministration of  the  army  and  its  organisation. 
They  have  often  been  appealed  to  to  reconstruct 


TRAGIC  COMEDY  363 

the  army  on  modern  principles,  and  they  have  failed 
to  do  so;  and  until  this  is  done  the  evils  we  have 
encountered  will  recur  again,  and  we  will  never  be 
able  to  take  our  place  beside  other  military  nations 
until  we  do  that."  2 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  357.  Huidekoper,  in  "The  Military  Unprepared- 
ness  of  the  United  States." 

2  Page  363.  General  Sanger,  in  report  of  Investigating 
Committee  appointed  by  the  President  to  investigate  the 
conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  war  with  Spain. 


PART  SIX:  WILL  THE  PROPOSED 
PLANS  PROTECT? 


PART  SIX:    WILL  THE  PROPOSED 
PLANS  PROTECT? 

CHAPTER  I 

DEALING  IN   FUTURES — DANIELS 

INASMUCH  as  the  administration  had,  by  De- 
cember 191 5,  been  face  to  face  with  six  inter- 
national crises  in  thirty-one  months  one  marvels 
that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy's  recommendation  to 
Congress  did  not  sound  a  stronger  note  for  imme- 
diate defence.  Three  of  these  crises  actually  re- 
quired naval  action  and  each  of  the  others  might 
have  led  our  nation  into  war.  All  had  occurred 
during  the  time  Mr.  Daniels  had  been  Secretary  of 
the  Navy. 

The  present  administration  in  May,  1913,  actu- 
ally expected  at  any  hour  an  attack  upon  Manila 
by  Japan,  and  feverishly  prepared  for  it;  the  ad- 
ministration, on  April  22,  1914,  sent  a  fleet  to  Mex- 
ico and  occupied  Vera  Cruz;  in  April,  1915,  Sec- 
retary Daniels  had  to  order  a  battleship  to  the  Gulf 
of  California  to  get  four  Japanese  warships  out 
of  Turtle  Bay  where  Japanese  marines  were  sur- 
veying the  country;  in   1915,   Secretary   Daniels 

307 


368 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

sent  an  expedition  to  Hayti;  moreover,  during  the 
last  few  months,  the  administration  has  had  to 
twice  request  the  recall  of  the  ambassador  of  one 
world  power,  has  had  to  request  the  recall  of  the 
naval  and  military  attaches  of  one  of  the  greatest 
naval  powers  of  the  world,  and  was  for  several 
months  almost  on  the  diplomatic  breaking-point 
with  that  power,  and  is  now  engaged  in  a  dangerous 
punitive  invasion  of  Mexico. 
.  It  is  indeed  remarkable  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  should  seemingly  forget  his  eventful  experi- 
ences all  crowded  into  thirty-one  short  months,  and 
propose  a  plan  which  makes  little  provision  for  the 
immediate  future,  indicating  that  we  should  not 
prepare  for  1917  or  1918,  but  for  1922  and  1923. 

The  scheme  of  Secretary  Daniels  proposes  a  so- 
called  increasingly  progressive  upbuilding  of  the 
navy;  that  is,  less  to  be  done  in  19 17  than  in  19 18, 
less  in  1918  than  1919,  and  so  on.  The  entire  plan 
of  Secretary  Daniels  lays  stress  on  preparing  tc 
defend  ourselves  against  attack  five  years  after 
1923 —  thus  after  1928. 

And  why  1928?  Because  Secretary  Daniels'  pro- 
gram is  not  a  building  program  but  a  voting  pro- 
gram. Not  one  of  the  ships  that  Secretary  Dan- 
iels proposes  will  be  finished  before  192 1  or  1922 
if  constructed  at  the  rate  our  ships  have  been  con- 
structed during  the  past  ten  years.  We  are  often 
told  that  a  ship  can  be  built  in  three  years.    It  can ; 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS       369 

but  two  years  often  elapse  between  the  voting  of  a 
ship  and  the  laying  of  the  keel.  One  of  Secretary 
Daniels'  excuses  for  not  recommending  more  bat- 
tleships at  present  is  that  we  have  not  yards  in 
which  to  build  them.  The  General  Board,  how- 
ever, shows  that  two  or  three  other  yards,  espe- 
cially the  one  at  Mare  Island,  California,  could  be 
put  into  condition  to  build  large  battleships  in 
from  seven  to  nine  months.  Nine  months  seems  a 
long  time  when  we  think  of  our  immediate  needs 
but  nine  months  is  less  than  five  years. 

As  Secretary  Daniels  presents  his  plan  to  the 
public  he  leads  us  to  believe  that  his  plan  will  pro- 
vide ten  new  battleships  by  1923.  The  real  truth 
is  that,  according  to  his  voting  program,  the 
strength  of  the  navy  will  not  be  increased  at  all  by 
1923.  The  ten  ships  he  proposes  will  not  be  fin- 
ished until  1928  and  by  that  time  many  of  the  ships 
which  are  now  efficient  will  be  out  of  date.  So 
that  by  1928  our  navy  will  be  just  as  inefficient  as 
it  is  to-day. 

Secretary  Daniels  has  publicly  announced  that 
the  program  of  his  reforms  has  been  greatly  hin- 
dered because  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  Secretaries 
of  the  Navy  preceding  him.  This  announcement 
led  us  to  expect  that,  in  this  time  of  world  struggle 
and  national  danger,  Secretary  Daniels  would  have 
proposed;  first,  to  eliminate  the  two  great  existing 
causes  of  inefficiency;  and  secondly,  to  put  our  pres- 


370 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

ent  equipment  and  personnel  in  fit  condition  for 
service  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  two  great  causes  of  past  and  present  ineffi- 
ciency have  been  and  are;  first,  the  criminal  waste 
of  funds  due  to  political  mis-management  and  to 
pork-barrelling  in  favour  of  useless  navy  yards; 
and,  second,  the  ridiculous  organisation  of  the  navy, 
under  which  no  young  man  can  expect  any  consid- 
erable advancement  before  he  has  reached  the  age  of 
ninety-seven. 

Secretary  Daniels  proposes  no  plan  for  remedy- 
ing the  latter,  and  emphatically  asserts  that  he  will 
insist  on  keeping  open  every  one  of  the  useless, 
wasteful  navy  yards — he  even  asserts  that  those 
which  previous  Secretaries  of  the  Navy  have  closed 
will  be  reopened. 

To  put  the  present  navy,  its  equipment,  and  its 
personnel  in  fit  condition  to  be  of  service,  we 
should :  first  increase  the  personnel  to  meet  at  least 
the  present  needs,  even  if  we  do  not  provide  for  men 
to  be  trained  to  man  the  ships  we  shall  soon  have 
ready  to  put  into  commission;  secondly,  provide  a 
sufficient  store  of  reserve  ammunition;  thirdly,  or- 
der the  construction  of  a  sufficient  number  of  am- 
munition ships  and  repair  ships,  so  that  our  present 
fleet  may  fight,  if  called  upon  to  do  so,  as  efficiently 
as  possible. 

What  does  Secretary  Daniels  wish  to  have  done 
in  the  next  eighteen  months  to  meet  these  needs? 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS        371 

Every  one  who  knows  anything  about  our  navy 
knows  that  we  are  woefully  short  of  men;  short, 
even  for  the  ships  we  have  at  present.  Secretary 
Daniels'  Assistant-Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Franklin 
Roosevelt,  a  short  time  ago,  stated  officially  that  we 
were  eighteen  thousand  men  short  of  what  we 
should  have.  Admiral  Fiske  testifies  that  we  need 
20,000  men  to  man  all  the  ships. 

These  men  cannot  be  trained  in  a  day,  a  month, 
or  in  two  months,  or  even  two  years.  Moreover,  in 
case  of  war  we  ought  not  to  take  a  single  officer 
from  the  navy  to  train  them.  Of  course,  we  are 
not  at  war ;  but  a  navy  is  of  real  value  to-day  only 
if  it  is  ready  for  war ! 

If,  when  war  broke  out  in  19 14,  it  had  taken  Eng- 
land sixty  days  to  get  her  navy  ready  not  only  the 
whole  history  of  this  war  but  the  whole  history  of 
the  world  would  have  been  different.  During  those 
sixty  days  Germany  could  have  occupied  the  Chan- 
nel ;  bombarded  the  northern  coast  of  France ;  cap- 
tured Paris ;  prevented  England  ever  sending  a  sin- 
gle soldier  to  the  continent  and  landed  500,000 
men  in  England  before  England  could  have 
equipped  150,000  men. 

To  advise  that  we  spend  millions  upon  millions 
for  ships  and  to  refuse  to  recommend  sufficient 
men  to  handle  those  ships  in  time  of  war  is  folly. 
According  to  the  opinion  of  many  experts  we  are 
now  20,000  men  short.     The  ships  to  be  commis- 


372  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

sioned  in  the  next  six  months  will  require  3,949  ad- 
ditional men  and  those  ships  to  be  commissioned 
early  in  1917  will  require  3,809  more  men.  Con- 
sequently before  another  act  of  Congress  becomes 
effective  we  shall  need  to  make  our  navy  of  fight- 
ing value,  27,758  more  men  than  we  have  at  pres- 
ent. And  what  is  the  use  of  having  a  navy  if  it 
cannot  be  manned  so  as  to  defend  us  in  case  of 
need? 

To  meet  these  needs,  Secretary  Daniels,  abso- 
lutely ignoring  the  suggestions  and  advice  of  ex- 
perts, asks  for  but  7,500  additional  men  up  to  July 
1,  19 1 7,  a  year  and  a  half  in  the  future.  The  sug- 
gestions of  the  General  Board  on  this  matter  were 
most  modest  and  reasonable.  They  were  made  by 
men  who  have  commanded  ships  in  action, — officers 
who  know  how  many  men  are  needed  and  what  the 
results  are  in  case  of  war  if  there  are  not  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  trained  men.  The  General  Board 
asked  for  15,000  men  only.  Yet  Secretary  Daniels 
cut  this  number  down  to  7,500. 

Considering  that  new  men  should  be  in  training 
so  as  to  be  ready  for  the  new  ships  under  con- 
struction, we  realise  that  Secretary  Daniels  has 
asked  for  only  about  one- fourth  the  number  of  men 
absolutely  necessary! 

Now  as  to  ammunition  supply! 

There  is  a  request  for  but  eight  million  dollars 
for  reserve  ammunition.     That  amount  has  been 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS        373 

used  on  the  battlefields  of  Europe  in  a  few  hours. 

Eight  million  dollars  for  reserve  ammunition  is 
to  the  layman  an  enormous  sum.  How  far  will  it 
go?  If  we  choose  only  the  ten  best  ships  that  may 
be  called  upon  to  use  this  ammunition  and  deter- 
mine the  amount  of  ammunition  the  twelve  and 
fourteen  inch  guns  of  those  ten  ships  would  re- 
quire, making  no  allowance  at  all  for  all  other  guns 
on  those  ships  or  for  any  of  the  guns  on  all  the 
other  ships  of  our  entire  navy,  this  eight  million 
dollars  reserve  ammunition  would  last — if  these 
ships  were  engaged  in  battle  firing  by  salvos,  the 
only  effective  method  of  firing  at  present,  firing  at 
long  range,  at  much  slower  rate  than  admirals  of 
the  navy  state  would  be  necessary  for  those  ships 
to  hold  their  own  against  foreign  battleships — this 
reserve  ammunition,  this  eight  million  dollars* 
worth,  would  last  just  four  hours  fifty-two  min- 
utes. 

Every  shell  of  the  reserve  ammunition  could  be 
used  at  slow  fire  at  long  range  in  that  time!  If  the 
guns  were  fired  a  little  faster — 33^  per  cent,  more 
rapidly,  not  equal  to  their  maximum  rapidity  of  fire 
by  any  means — the  entire  eight  million  dollars' 
worth  of  ammunition  would  be  used  up  in  three 
hours  and  fourteen  minutes! 

But  if  the  opposing  fleet  outnumbered  our  ten 
ships  and  should  force  us  into  battle  at  short 
range,  the  fire  to  be  effective  would  have  to  be 


374 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

much  more  rapid.  If,  then,  the  number  of  shells 
fired  per  minute  is  estimated  at  the  normal  rate 
of  fire  at  short  range,  making  all  allowances  for 
possible  delays,  this  eight  million  dollars'  ammuni- 
tion for  the  big  guns  of  these  ten  ships  only,  would 
last  just  ninety-six  minutes. 

When  attacked  our  only  chance  of  saving  our- 
selves would  rest  with  our  navy.  Yet  Secretary 
Daniels,  in  direct  opposition  to  the  advice  of  the 
General  Board,  proposes  but  two  new  battleships 
a  year;  and  such  ships  as  he  proposes  will  be  in- 
efficient because  of  their  slowness. 

The  Bluecher  was  lost  in  the  North  Sea  battle 
only  because  she  was  too  slow — the  other  German 
ships  were  saved  by  their  speed.  Yet  Secretary 
Daniels  proposes  that  our  new  $18,000,000  battle- 
ships shall  have  a  maximum  speed  two  and  a  half 
miles  an  hour  less  than  the  Bluecher. 

Colonel  Roosevelt,  when  president,  did  more  to 
build  up  our  navy  than  any  president  we  ever  had. 
And  under  him  it  accomplished  feats  which  naval 
experts  of  all  nations  declared  could  not  be  ac- 
complished. Because  of  the  fact  that  a  battleship 
as  a  fighting  machine  is  of  little  value  after  its 
twelfth  year,  he  realised  that  the  standard  then  at- 
tained could  not  be  maintained  unless  new  ships 
were  added  each  year.  Consequently  he  fought 
for  a  construction  plan  providing  four  battleships 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS        375 

a  year  for  several  years.  Congress  compromised 
on  two  battleships  per  year ;  but  even  this  plan  was 
dropped,  so  that  for  five  years  we  have  been  lag- 
ging woefully  behind  in  our  construction  pro- 
gramme, and  our  navy  as  a  result  has  rapidly  dete- 
riorated. 

The  proposed  plan  of  Secretary  Daniels  advo- 
cates nothing  to  aid  us  in  catching  up  with  what  we 
should  have  had,  had  previous  plans  not  been  dis- 
continued. 

When  we  are  so  far  behind,  how  can  a  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  presume  to  assert  that  adding  two  bat- 
tleships a  year  to  our  navy  for  the  next  five  years 
will  put  us  in  fit  condition  to  defend  ourselves 
from  other  powers  which  have  added  and  are  add- 
ing three  and  four  each  year. 

According  to  the  present  proposed  programme, 
we  shall  merely  waste  millions  on  battleships  which 
when  finished  will  be  outclassed  in  speed  and  out- 
numbered two  to  one  by  the  new  ships  which  other 
nations  are  now  building — even  though  we  do  not 
count  the  ships  they  built  while  we  were  idle. 

Here  again  Secretary  Daniels  does  not  follow  the 
wise  suggestion  of  the  General  Board — of  men  of 
experience  in  naval  matters  who  recognised  the 
pressing  need  of  quickly  constructing  great  battle- 
ships and  battle  cruisers  to  immediately  build  up 
the  navy  so  that  we  might  have  an  adequate  de- 
fence as  soon  as  possible.     As  previously  stated, 


376 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Secretary  Daniels'  recommendations  for  ships  are 
increasingly  progressive.  In  his  five  years'  plan 
less  is  to  be  done  the  first  two  years  than  after- 
wards. The  General  Board  even  in  their  October 
report,  which  Secretary  Daniels  requested  should 
be  made  to  conform  to  his  ideas,  advises  that  more 
ships  be  authorised  the  first  two  years  and  less  dur- 
ing the  following  years. 

The  board,  in  their  original  report  advised 
four  battle  cruisers,  four  dreadnoughts  and  six 
scouts  for  immediate  construction.  Secretary  Dan- 
iels on  the  other  hand  recommends  but  two  dread- 
noughts, two  battle  cruisers  and  three  scouts  the 
first  year.  Even  the  "fettered"  report  of  the  Board 
made  in  October,  even  when  limited  to  the  same 
amount  of  money  that  Secretary  Daniels  recom- 
mended should  be  spent,  recommends  four  battle- 
ships, three  dreadnoughts,  and  four  scouts  the  first 
year!  The  General  Board  saw  the  wisdom  of 
recommending  the  construction  of  almost  double 
the  number  of  capital  ships  the  first  year  and  of 
limiting  the  construction  during  the  fourth  and  fifth 
years.  The  most  dominant  feature  of  Secretary 
Daniels'  plan  is  the  policy  of  doing  as  little  as  pos- 
sible at  present  and  of  promising  as  much  as  pos- 
sible for  the  indefinite  future. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  asks  but  two  million 
dollars  for  aviation.    An  amount  equal  to  this  is 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS        377 

spent  every  week  in  England  and  France  producing 
new  aeroplanes  for  the  western  battle  line  only. 

Perhaps  the  average  American  citizen  does  not 
realise  that  our  present  battle  fleet  would  go  into 
combat  with  a  foreign  power  absolutely  blind. 
Every  Admiral  of  the  navy  has  emphasised  the  fact 
that  our  battleships  could  not  successfully  combat 
an  enemy's  fleet  of  the  same  size,  because  we  have 
no  aeroplanes  to  determine  the  advances  and  lo- 
cation of  the  attacking  fleet.  Senator  Fletcher, 
who  has  thoroughly  studied  this  phase  of  the 
Navy's  needs,  insists  that  we  should  have  676  aero- 
planes to  properly  equip  our  present  navy.  Every 
navy  manoeuvre  we  have  had  in  the  last  five  years 
has  been  conducted  as  it  would  have  been  con- 
ducted twelve  years  ago.  For  the  purposes  of  imme- 
diate defence,  and  by  immediate  defence,  we 
mean  within  the  next  two  years,  the  proposed  aero- 
plane equipment  of  Secretary  Daniels  is  ridicu- 
lously small. 

Russia  appropriated  twenty-two  millions  for  aer- 
oplanes and  dirigibles  even  in  191 3  when  no  one  in 
Europe  expected  that  war  would  come  for  five  or 
ten  years. 

Another  essential  need  of  the  Navy  is  the  pro- 
vision of  fast  coal  and  oil-fuel  supply  ships.  Dread- 
noughts and  battle  cruisers  cannot  be  spared  from 
the  battle  line  in  the  midst  of  a  combat  to  run  home 
to  naval  stations  for  their  fuel. 


379 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

"To  send  a  fleet  thus  blind  and  crippled  into  hos- 
tile waters  would  be  to  invite  destruction.  We  have 
an  altogether  insufficient  number  of  fuel-ships,  and 
practically  no  scouts."  * 

Yet  Secretary  Daniels  provides  for  no  fuel  ships 
until  1918;  and  then  the  plan  proposes  the  construc- 
tion of  only  one  fuel  ship  during  the  entire  period 
of  jive  years. 

We  are  woefully  lacking  in  ammunition  supply 
ships.  The  General  Board  advised  the  immediate 
construction  of  ammunition  ships  and  repair  ships 
as  these  are  essentially  necessary  to  a  fleet  in  ac- 
tion. Yet  no  additional  ammunition  ships  to  car- 
ry and  transfer  ammunition  to  battle  cruisers  and 
dreadnoughts  at  sea  are  to  be  provided,  according 
to  the  Secretary's  plan,  until  1920. 

But  most  astounding  of  all  is  the  proposal  in 
Secretary  Daniels'  plan  to  build  new  battleships 
which  will  not  have  a  speed  of  more  than  21  knots. 
One  can  only  guess  at  the  cause  of  this  policy.  The 
European  War  has  proven  that  a  battleship  of 
twenty-one  knots  is  80%  inefficient.  It  is  too 
slow,  if  outnumbered,  to  get  away  from  the  ene- 
my; and  it  is  too  slow  to  keep  up  with  an  enemy 
if  the  enemy  tries  to  get  away.  It  is  too  slow  to 
move  in  and  out  adjusting  its  range  to  the  enemy's 
moving  battleships — in  fact,  it  is  almost  useless. 
The  Nevada  has  just  been  tested;  it  has  a  speed 
less  than  twenty-two  knots  per  hour. 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS        379 

While  speed  is  vital  to  both  sides  in  a  running 
fight,  it  has  marked  advantages  in  any  engagement. 
The  faster  fleet  can  bombard  or  seize  a  strategic 
point  with  impunity ;  it  can  fight  or  run,  as  its  com- 
mander may  will;  when  fleets  engage  in  parallel 
lines  it  can  steam  away  from  the  enemy's  slower 
ships  and  concentrate  its  fire  on  the  head  of  his  col- 
umn, thus  destroying  it  in  detail. 

More  amazing  still  is  Secretary  Daniels'  expla- 
nation of  this  recommendation.  The  engines  are 
to  be  planned  for  endurance  rather  than  for  speed. 
We  have  always  supposed  we  were  creating  a  navy 
for  defence;  but  this  explanation  contains  a  subtle 
suggestion  that  Secretary  Daniels  thinks  our  new 
battleships  are  to  make  long  cruises — evidently  of- 
fensive warfare.  For  defensive  warfare  we  need 
battleships  of  great  speed,  capable  of  moving 
quickly  from  one  portion  of  our  coast  to  another 
to  meet  an  attack  wherever  it  may  be  planned. 

The  policy  of  Secretary  Daniels  in  reopening 
the  unused  and  useless  navy  yards  which  have  been 
closed  by  previous.Secretaries  of  the  Navy,  is  open 
to  censure  as  a  useless  waste.  His  additional  pro- 
posal now,  to  keep  all  these  navy  yards  open  and 
to  establish  armour  and  projectile  factories  there,  is 
certainly  open  to  severe  criticism. 

First,  whether  unintentionally  or  not,  this  is  an 
appeal  to  the  pork-barrel  men.  This  is  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  within  five  days  after  Congress 


880  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

convened,  Senator  Tillman — idol  of  the  pork  bar- 
rellers — the  same  man  who  secured  millions  for  the 
useless  navy  yards  at  Port  Royal  and  Charleston 
— who  comes  from  the  South  from  a  state  adjoin- 
ing that  from  which  Secretary  Daniels  comes — 
states  that  do  not  believe  in  a  navy  but  in  navy 
yards — proposed  to  introduce  a  bill  asking  Con- 
gress to  appropriate  eleven  million  dollars  for  a 
factory  and  site  to  make  armour  and  ammunition. 
It  was  this  enthusiastic  advocate  of  navy  yards  who 
led  Congress  to  purchase  a  dear  little  navy  yard 
site  in  his  native  state  and  to  spend  nearly  three 
millions  upon  it;  it  was  the  same  enthusiast  who 
induced  Congress  to  create  another  navy  yard  for 
large  battleships  only  a  few  miles  away  from  the 
first  and  to  waste  another  five  millions  on  it.  Yet, 
after  all  this  expenditure,  it  is  so  poorly  constructed 
that  it  is  of  little  value — only  for  torpedo  boat  de- 
stroyers and  gun-boats. 

Secondly,  in  the  present  great  emergency,  it  is 
unwise  to  postpone  the  purchase  of  large  projec- 
tiles— the  most  essential  ammunition  in  modern 
combat — until  they  can  be  manufactured  by  gov- 
ernment factories,  which  do  not  as  yet  exist. 

From  what  we  already  know  of  the  construc- 
tion by  the  government  of  factories  already  built, 
we  can  judge  that  the  building  of  these  new  fac- 
tories will  not  take  months  but  years.  Many  a  cit- 
izen of  the  United  States  has  grown  grey  during 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS         381 

the  construction  of  a  government  post  office,  re- 
quiring only  ordinary  building  materials.  In  con- 
structing ammunition  plants,  not  only  will  time  be 
consumed  in  building  the  factories;  but  factories 
for  the  manufacture  of  large ,  projectiles  require 
great,  complex,  delicate  machines  to  make  the  pro- 
jectiles. 

Certainly  we  should  establish  government  fac- 
tories and  establish  them  as  soon  as  possible.  In 
the  future  we  must  be  independent  of  private  manu- 
facture. But  it  is  one  thing  to  propose  to  build 
government  ammunition  factories,  and  quite  an- 
other matter  to  propose  that  we  are  to  postpone  sup- 
plying ourselves  with  an  adequate  reserve  of  am- 
munition until  those  factories  are  completed!  In 
our  present  condition  we  need  the  products  of  both 
governmental  and  private  factories.  Both  com- 
bined cannot  supply  us  with  enough  ammunition! 

Private  factories  in  the  United  States  manufac- 
turing large  projectiles  could  now  obtain  European 
contracts  for  200%  or  300%  their  present  out- 
put. //  they  could  only  get  the  materials,  the 
chemists  and  the  machines,  to  make  them.  Will 
they,  while  making  a  good  profit,  sell  their  machines 
to  the  government?  Will  they  manufacture  these 
machines  for  the  government  when  they  cannot 
now  turn  out  half  enough  for  their  own  use?  The 
manufacturer,  the  engineer,  the  expert  mechanic, 
readily  understands  the  folly  of  the  proposal. 


382  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

The  argument  of  Secretary  Daniels  and  of  Sena- 
tor Tillman  in  favour  of  government-owned  ammu- 
nition plants  is  that  "We  are  now  at  the  mercy  of 
the  private  manufacturers."  We've  had  experi- 
ence in  the  past.  It's  bad  enough  to  be  at  the  mercy 
of  the  private  manufacturers;  but  there's  no  hope 
at  all,  if  left  to  the  mercy  of  the  pork  barrellers. 

In  naval  appropriations  alone,  during  the  last 
thirty  years,  the  pork  barrellers  have  sluiced  $500,- 
000,000.  We  may  pay  high,  when  at  the  mercy  of 
the  private  manufacturers,  but  we  get  something! 
At  the  mercy  of  the  pork  barrellers,  we  have  got 
little  or  nothing! 

Even  the  peace-loving  socialist  and  hater  of  rich 
men,  Charles  Edward  Russell,  after  a  trip  to  Eu- 
rope, realises  that  the  essential  thing  is  to  prepare 
and  prepare  quickly;  no  matter  what  the  cost,  no 
matter  how  many  millions  private  manufactur- 
ing concerns  may  make  out  of  legitimate  manufac- 
turing work. 

After  all,  is  it  not  better — allowing,  let  us  say, 
one  hundred  million  dollars'  profit — to  have  private 
manufacturing  concerns  already  equipped  make  the 
big  guns  and  big  ammunition  we  need  and  actually 
get  something  for  money  spent,  rather  than  be 
"porkbarrelled"  out  of  five  hundred  million  dollars 
and  get  nothing  for  it,  except  unpreparedness  and 
jthe  risk  of  having  to  pay  some  foreign  power  an 


DEALING  IN  FUTURES— DANIELS        383 

indemnity  of  five  thousand  million  dollars  to  save 
our  coast  cities  from  bombardment? 

Thirdly,  nothing  could  be  more  convenient  to  an 
attacking  force  than  to  locate  our  proposed  great 
armour  plants  and  large  projectile  factories  in  navy 
yards  on  the  coast,  as  Secretary  Daniels  proposes 
to  do,  where  they  can  be  conveniently  bombarded, 
destroyed  or  captured  by  an  attacking  fleet. 

Certainly,  this  last  proposition  is  most  unwise 
and  impractical,  though  perhaps  politic. 

QUOTATION  REFERENCE 
x  Page  378.    Rear- Admiral  Austin  M.  Knight. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   WILSON-GARRISON   BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN 

FORMER  Secretary  of  War  Garrison  stands  in 
distinct  contrast  to  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
Daniels.  He  has  rendered  one  great  service  to  his 
country  by  emphasising  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  should  not  depend  for  its  protection  upon  48 
different  little  armies  under  the  control  of  48  differ- 
ent governments,  but  upon  one  army  under  the  di- 
rect control  of  the  United  States.  It  is  to  be  re- 
gretted, however,  that  former  Secretary  Gar- 
rison was  not  permitted  to  submit  a  plan  in 
accordance  with  his  ideas. 

It  is  still  more  regrettable  that  the  head  of  an 
administration  should  oppose  a  plan  which  his  Sec- 
retary of  War,  after  two  years  of  conscientious 
study,  found  necessary. 

However,  as  American  citizens,  seeking  above  all 
else  to  provide  adequate  defence  for  ourselves,  we 
must  consider  former  Secretary  Garrison's  plan 
from  the  standpoint  of  what  it  proposed,  and  not 
from  the  standpoint  of  what  former  Secretary  Gar- 
rison desired  to  propose.    Although  Mr.  Garrison 

384 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN       385 

has  resigned,  his  plan  is  here  considered  because, 
without  doubt,  it  is  stronger  than  any  plan  which 
will  be  approved  by  the  present  Congress. 

The  Chamberlain  Senate  bill,  while  stronger  in 
some  features  than  the  Garrison  plan,  is  weak  in 
that  it  opens  the  way  for  and  establishes  another 
precedent  in  favor  of  political  grafting  in  connec- 
tion with  the  supervision  of  the  militia.  The  Hay 
House  Bill  is  of  course,  not  worthy  of  serious  con- 
sideration except  as  an  aid  to  the  enemies  of  de- 
fence and  a  "good  thing  for  the  pork  barrellers." 

Mr.  Garrison  proposed  a  plan  which  outlines  a 
five-year  policy  for  progressively  increasing  the 
military  forces  of  the  United  States. 

But,  as  in  the  case  of  the  naval  plans,  the  most 
essential  question  is :  What  is  proposed  to  eliminate 
the  present  weaknesses  and  what  additions  are  pro- 
posed for  the  first  and  second  years  ? 

The  present  weaknesses  are:  (i)  inability  to 
quickly  mobilise,  (2)  extravagant  waste  of  funds, 
and  (3)  unbalanced  organisation.  Former  Secre- 
tary Garrison's  proposed  plans,  if  carried  into  ef- 
fect, would  augment  each  of  these  weaknesses. 

First,  every  one  who  knows  anything  about  mo- 
bilisation from  General  Wood  down  to  the  least 
important  officer,  has  agreed  that  it  will  take  at 
least  thirty  days  to  mobilise  our  little  army  of  thirty 
thousand  men. 

"Our  army  needs  complete  reorganisation — not 


386  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

merely  enlarging — and  the  reorganisation  can  only 
come  as  the  result  of  legislation.  A  proper  general 
staff  should  be  established.  Above  all,  the  army 
must  be  given  the  chance  to  exercise  in  large  bod- 
ies. Never  again  should  we  see,  as  we  saw  in  the 
Spanish  War,  major-generals  in  command  of  di- 
visions who  had  never  before  commanded  three 
companies  together  in  the  field."  x 

According  to  the  present  organisation,  the  sol- 
diers are  distributed  in  tiny  little  camps  all  over  the 
United  States.  Secretary  Garrison  is  to  continue 
the  use  of  all  these  useless  army  posts.  The  thirty 
thousand  men,  instead  of  being  concentrated  in  a 
few  main  camps,  as  advised  by  all  army  experts, 
are  to  be  kept  in  just  as  divided  and  separated  a 
condition  as  possible,  thus  preventing  any  improve- 
ment toward  a  more  rapid,  more  efficient  method  of 
mobilisation. 

Second,  former  Secretary  Garrison's  plan,  by 
continuing  these  expensive  army  posts,  continues 
the  wasteful  expenditure  on  these  posts.  This  is 
one  of  the  reasons  why  the  United  States  pays 
$1,000  a  year  per  soldier  while  Switzerland  gets  a 
better-trained  and  better-equipped  soldier  for  $13. 

Thirdly,  former  Secretary  Garrison's  plan  makes 
no  satisfactory  proposal  for  reorganisation.  He 
urges  the  enlistment  of  400,000  men  in  a  volunteer 
army  but  makes  no  proposal  that  will  give  us  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  trained  officers. 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN      387 

Not  only  does  former  Secretary  Garrison's  plan 
propose  to  continue  the  three  great  evils  of  our 
present  army  organisation  and  present  criminal 
waste,  but  his  plan  neglects  to  propose,  or  at  least 
to  lay  emphasis  upon,  the  needs  and  the  means 
of  remedying  our  greatest  deficiencies  in  equipment 
and  men. 

We  hope  for  preparation  that  will  enable  us  to 
defend  ourselves  in  1917,  as  well  as  in  1919  and 
1920.  No  foreign  nation  liable  to  attack  us  will 
stand  sweetly  by,  patiently  waiting  five  or  six  years, 
until  we  are  more  efficiently  equipped  to  resist  them. 
Austria  did  not  wait  until  the  Russian  munition 
factories  were  completed;  Germany  did  not  wait 
until  France  had  recovered  from  the  military  crisis 
of  1913. 

We  must  first  efficiently  organise  and  make  ready 
for  defence  such  means  and  forces  as  we  already 
have,  before  dreaming  of  untried  and  questionable 
plans  of  defence  to  be  worked  out  two  or  three  years 
hence. 

We  need  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  man  the 
262  coast  defence  guns  which  we  now  have  mounted 
but  without  a  single  man  trained  to  use  them. 

We  need  aeroplanes  to  give  eyes  to  the  army. 

We  need  concentration  of  our  regular  army  of 
thirty-four  thousand  mobile  troops  so  that  rapid 
mobilisation  may  be  possible. 

We  need  big  howitzers  and  rapid-fire  guns  as 


388  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

good  as  those  employed  in  Europe  and  a  sufficient 
number  of  them  to  equip  our  present  army. 

We  need  ammunition  for  the  guns  we  now  have 
and  ammunition  for  the  new  guns  to  be  provided. 

What  does  former  Secretary  Garrison's  plan  pro- 
pose to  do  to  meet  these  immediate  needs? 

The  first  land  resistance  we  could  make  against 
an  attacking  force  would  be  from  our  coast  forts 
and  our  coast  defences.  As  already  stated,  we  have 
262  guns  mounted,  ready  for  use,  without  sufficient 
ammunition  and  without  a  single  individual  trained 
to  man  them.  Three-fifths  of  these  262  guns  are 
gigantic  twelve-  and  fourteen-inch  monsters.  Sena- 
tor Thomas  at  the  time  of  the  Senate  Investigation 
stated  that  he  deemed  it  "criminal"  to  provide  no 
men  for  these  guns. 

General  Weaver,  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  Di- 
vision, admitted  in  testifying  that  the  coast  artillery 
was  13,671  men  short  in  1914.  It  is  estimated  that 
we  are  now  seventeen  thousand  men  short  for  coast 
defence  operations,  to  say  nothing  of  the  men  who 
will  be  needed  to  man  the  new  guns  about  to  be 
placed  in  position. 

"If  at  this  minute  every  one  of  the  90,000  regular 
soldiers  in  the  United  States  cavalry,  infantry, 
coast  and  field  artillery  were  assembled  in  New 
York  City,  there  would  not  be  enough  men  to  man 
the  guns  there  on  a  war  footing."  2 

The  Garrison  plan,  to  meet  this  present  "criminal 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN      389 

lack"  of  men  and  to  provide  men  for  the  new  guns 
to  be  installed  during  the  next  year,  asks  for  but 
5,720  men. 

The  next  resistance  our  land  forces  might  offer 
to  invaders  would  have  to  be  directed  in  accord- 
ance with  information  furnished  our  army  by  aero- 
plane scouts.  England  and  France  together  now 
use  on  the  western  battle  line  2,700  aeroplanes. 
Ex-Secretary  Garrison  asked  for  48  aeroplanes  for 
the  next  year  and  a  half, — almost  enough  to  poorly 
equip  the  army  of  Uruguay. 

Our  coast  forts  are  without  ammunition,  both  on 
the  Pacific  and  on  the  Atlantic. 

The  army  is  absolutely  unequipped  so  far  as  up- 
to-date  field  guns  are  concerned. 

The  great  strain  of  former  Secretary  Garrison's 
proposal  is :  increase  the  number  of  untrained  men, 
— not  more  trained  men  and  better  equipment. 

The  recruits  are  to  be  divided  into  three  classes: 
the  regular  army;  the  state  militia;  and  the  new 
national  militia,  designated  as  the  Continental 
Army. 

According  to  reported  plans  of  the  former  Secre- 
tary of  War,  it  appears  in  big  black-faced  type  that 
we  are  to  have  a  regular  army  of  140,000  men  to 
defend  us.  Of  the  ten  new  infantry  regiments 
seven  are  to  be  kept  in  the  United  States.  These  are 
to  be  organised  on  a  "peace-basis,"  which  means  820 


390 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

men  to  a  regiment.  Seven  of  these  skeletonised 
regiments  will  give  us  5,470  men. 

If  one  carefully  reads  the  proposal  one  soon  re- 
alises that  the  increase  advocated  for  the  regular 
mobile  army  in  the  United  States  is  but  10,540 
men, — both  infantry  and  artillery.  Our  present  mo- 
bile army  in  the  United  States  is  but  34,798  men. 
The  addition,  then,  of  10,540  men  will  give  us  ex- 
actly 45,338  men  in  the  mobile  army  of  the  United 
States  for  home  defence,  not  quite  the  140,000  men 
talked  about.  Thus  under  the  plans  for  an  "enor- 
mously" increased  army,  we  shall  have,  in  a  year 
and  a  half,  45,338  men  in  the  mobile  army — one- 
half  the  army  of  Chile. 

The  General  Staff  and  the  War  College  is  com- 
posed of  the  greatest  army  experts  of  this  coun- 
try,— men  who  have  had  practical  experiences  of 
from  twenty  to  fifty  years.  They  proposed  a 
trained  army  of  240,000  men. 

Former  Secretary  Garrison  asked  that  only  nine 
thousand  additional  militia  be  recruited  during  the 
next  year  and  a  half  from  the  forty-eight  states  of 
the  Union. 

The  piece  de  resistance  of  former  Secretary  Gar- 
rison's plan  is  the  proposal  to  recruit  a  Continental 
Army  of  four  hundred  thousand  men  in  three  years. 
These  men  are  to  sign  for  six  years'  service,  and  are 
to  be  trained  for  the  first  three  years  only — two 
months'  training  each  year. 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN       391 

Every  sane-thinking  man  who  was  in  the  Platts- 
burg  training  camp  went  home  convinced  that  he 
had  been  greatly  benefited  by  the  training  but  that, 
even  after  six  months'  training,  he  would  still  be 
unfit  to  stand  any  severe  military  service.  What  we 
need  is  an  army  of  defence,  not  an  untrained  ex- 
cuse of  one  that  will  be  useful  only  in  deceiving  us 
as  to  our  state  of  preparedness  and  security,  and 
valuable  only  in  eating  up  appropriations. 

The  idea  of  the  Continental  Army  is  superb,  if 
it  would  only  work. 

All  history  proves  such  an  army  is  always  use- 
less; and  that  the  only  efficient  feature  about  half- 
trained  men  opposing  regulars  is  the  ease  with 
which  the  opposing  regulars  "murder"  the  citizen 
army.  England  is  proving  it  for  us  again  to-day 
— one  man  dead  out  of  every  four.  George  Wash- 
ington, Light  Horse  Harry  Lee,  General  Grant, 
General  Lee,  Lord  Roberts,  General  Francis 
Greene,  have  all  advised  over  and  over  again 
against  the  use  of  citizen  soldiery. 

Not  only  is  there  a  question  as  to  the  efficiency  of 
men  trained  for  two  months,  but  there  is  a  question 
as  to  whether  they  can  even  be  enrolled. 

A  few  years  ago  a  certain  plan  was  launched  for 
the  creation  of  a  reserve  army  of  the  United  States. 
Its  men  were  also  to  be  obtained  by  the  volunteer 
system.  The  Secretary  of  War  at  the  end  of  two 
years  announced  that  a  reserve  army  of  the  United 


AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 


States  had  been  created — numbering  sixteen  men! 

The  idea  of  the  Continental  Army  is  to  form  a 
volunteer  army  with  limited  training,  under  the 
supervision  of  the  United  States  instead  of  under 
the  direction  of  the  individual  states,  as  are  the 
militia.  After  many  years,  the  militia  of  the 
forty-eight  states  have  been  able  to  enlist  less  than 
120,000  men  and  able  to  half -prepare  60,000  men 
for  service.  None  of  the  inducements  that  have 
been  offered  by  the  State  Militia  can  be  offered  in 
enlisting  young  men  in  a  Continental  Army. 

The  militia  have  the  inducement  of  a  club  house 
without  expense.  Many  of  them  have  gymnasia, 
swimming  tanks,  shower  baths,  and  recreations  and 
card  rooms.  A  man  entering  the  militia  can  choose 
any  regiment  he  pleases.  A  company  can  be  formed 
of  intimate  chums  and  friends.  The  militia  train- 
ing almost  never  interferes  with  business  duties. 
The  militia  are  organised  so  that  promotion  from 
the  ranks  is  very  rapid.  Every  man  has  a  chance 
of  becoming  an  officer. 

Ex-Secretary  Garrison's  own  testimony  before 
the  Investigating  Committee  indicates  that  he  him- 
self did  not  believe  his  proposed  volunteer  system 
would  furnish  the  men  he  had  asked  for. 

The  question,  then,  arises  as  to  how  we  can  pos- 
sibly enlist,  by  a  voluntary  system,  without  any 
special  inducements,  133,000  men  each  year,  whether 
for  a  Continental  or  for  any  other  kind  of  an  army. 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN      393 

It  has  been  difficult  to  enlist  even  a  few  thousand  or 
a  few  hundred  in  the  regular  army  each  year. 

And  even  the  number  enlisted  has  been  reduced 
by  death,  by  desertion  and  by  disability.  Experi- 
ence, even  in  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States, 
has  shown  that  often  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  new 
recruits  desert  during  the  first  year,  that  fifteen 
per  cent,  of  the  entire  mobile  army  are  sometimes 
lost  annually  by  disability. 

In  1909  our  army  numbered  76,049  men.  The 
mobile  forces  were  about  51,000.  But  there  were 
almost  5,000  desertions  from  the  mobile  army  dur- 
ing that  year.  There  were,  in  exact  number,  just 
4,993  desertions — nearly  ten  per  cent,  of  the  entire 
mobile  army. 

On  the  other  hand,  during  the  same  year,  there 
were  7,174  men  discharged  because  of  disability,  so 
that  the  mobile  army  of  the  United  States  lost,  dur- 
ing the  year  by  desertion  and  disability,  24  per  cent, 
of  the  entire  force.  And  this  after  those  who  were 
supposed  to  be  unfit  for  service  had  been  eliminated 
by  rejection  at  the  time  of  enlistment.  In  19 10, 
for  example,  of  all  those  who  made  application  to 
enlist,  81%  were  rejected  because  of  physical  disa- 
bility.   In  191 1  more  than  72%  were  rejected. 

After  thirty  years  the  state  militia  with  all  their 
inducements  have  now  enrolled  less  than  120,000 
men. 

Two  and  a  half  years'  experience  in  organising 


394  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

a  reserve  army  and  thirty  years'  experience  in  en- 
listing militia  in  forty-eight  different  states  indi- 
cate that  the  system  of  voluntary  enlistment  pro- 
posed by  former  Secretary  Garrison  will  not  work ! 

The  plan  as  a  whole  proposed  a  Garrison-Bryan- 
ized  army — "citizenry  springing  to  arms  and  fight- 
ing after  two  to  six  months'  training." 

Ex-Secretary  Garrison's  plan  ignores  the  advice 
of  experts  and  proposes  a  plan  for  a  citizen  soldiery 
when  all  history  proves  that  such  armies  are  useless 
and  costly  in  money  and  blood. 

"The  War  Department  has  closed  its  ears  to  all 
advice  which  does  not  consort  with  the  political 
policy  it  has  adopted.  Facts  were  presented  to  the 
department  by  experts  from  the  Army  College  and 
members  of  the  General  Staff.  Facts  have  been  ig- 
nored in  the  Continental  Army  scheme."  3 

The  Continental  Army,  even  if  the  War  Depart- 
ment is  able  to  enlist  the  soldiers,  will  be  inefficient 
because  improperly  trained. 

"The  fallacy  of  this  Continental  Army  scheme  is 
not  in  its  numbers  so  much  as  in  its  disregard  of 
the  need  of  adequate  training. 

"Physical  endurance  becomes  a  paramount  vir- 
tue. An  army  ill-equipped  and  unseasoned  in  prac- 
tice exposes  its  vital  weakness  the  moment  it  is  sub- 
mitted to  attack.  Such  an  army  is  worse  than  use- 
less ;  it  is  criminal. 

"Those  who  understand  army  matters  can  hardly 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN      395 

refrain  from  smiling  at  the  notion  of  conferring 
an  adequate  military  training  upon  men  in  two 
months,  this  period  being  followed  by  ten  months 
of  entire  suspension  from  service.  Would  such 
a  system  work  anywhere  else?  Go  into  any  pro- 
fession. Would  it  be  possible  for  a  man  to  become 
a  lawyer  by  applying  himself  to  law  two  months  a 
year?  Would  he  be  esteemed  competent?  Would 
clients  put  any  confidence  in  him?  Quite  the  same 
thing  applies  in  the  army.  The  plan  is  devoid  of 
sense."  4 

The  one  great  lesson  of  the  war  in  Europe  is 
that  modern  war  is  a  war  of  machines  and  science; 
and  not  a  war  of  men,  only  in  so  far  as  they  are 
equipped  with  modern  machines  of  war  and  trained 
to  use  them.  This  fact  former  Secretary  Garrison 
failed  to  grasp.  His  plan  proposed  a  maximum  of 
poorly  trained  men  with  the  least  emphasis  possible 
on  the  equipment  and  supplies.  The  most  efficient 
army  of  to-morrow  will  be  the  one  that  is  supplied 
with  the  greatest  machines  and  instruments  of  war 
manipulated  by  the  smallest  possible  number  of 
trained,  experienced,  skilful  men. 

"Maintain  a  potential  preparedness  for  war  in 
which  fighting  is  done  by  machines,  not  men."  5 

This  does  not  mean  that  our  present  army  is  suf- 
ficient in  numbers;  it  is  pitifully  small,  ridiculously 
small.    We  must  increase  it.     We  should  have  an 


396  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

infinitely  larger  army,  even  though  we  were  not  in 
danger  of  foreign  attack. 

Our  republic  is  but  127  years  old.  Yet  it  has 
been  necessary  to  employ  our  regular  army  one 
hundred  different  times  to  put  down  rebellion,  in- 
surrection and  riots  and  to  repel  foreign  invasion. 
Our  trained  army  must  be  composed  of  the  best- 
trained  bodies  and  the  best-trained  minds  of 
America.  It  should  be  an  honour  to  qualify  for  it. 
No  mother  wants  to  rear  a  son  to  be  a  soldier  and 
a  cad;  but  every  mother  should  be  proud  to  rear  a 
son  to  be  a  soldier  and  a  man — able  to  protect  her 
and  his  sisters  if  attacked! 

"All  we  want  is  peace;  and  toward  this  end  we 
wish  to  be  able  to  secure  the  same  respect  for  our 
rights  from  others  which  we  are  eager  and  anxious 
to  extend  to  their  rights  in  return,  to  insure  fair 
treatment  to  us  commercially,  and  to  guarantee  the 
safety  of  the  American  people."  6 

And  there  is  still  need  for  armed  protection,  and 
there  will  be  for  many  a  generation. 

Historians  tell  us  that  if  we  patch  together  the 
days  and  hours  during  which  no  nation  has  been  at 
war  with  any  other  nation,  we  will  find  that  this 
earth  of  ours  in  the  last  three  thousand  years  has 
had  just  two  hundred  three  years  of  peace  and 
2,797  years  of  war. 

Neither  is  to-day  a  time  of  peace;  as  one  may 
note  by  glancing  at  Hayti,  Mexico,  Japan,  Great 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN      397 

Britain,  France,  Italy,  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Turkey,  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Belgium, 
India,  Canada,  Australia  and  half  of  Africa — in  all 
of  which  eight  hundred  millions  of  people  live,  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  affected  by  war. 

Moreover,  universal  peace  will  not  be  ushered  in 
by  July,  1917. 

We  should  have  an  army  equal  in  size,  at  least, 
to  that  of  Paraguay,  Uruguay,  Peru  or  Liberia. 
In  this  enormous  country  of  ours,  with  its  popula- 
tion of  100,000,000,  even  the  pacifists  should  not 
oppose  a  regular  army  of  five  hundred  thousand 
men.  Even  an  army  of  that  size  would  be  but 
twice  as  large  as  that  of  Holland,  whose  territory 
is  the  size  of  Maryland  only,  and  a  little  larger  than 
the  standing  and  reserve  army  of  Switzerland 
which  is  about  half  the  size  of  Maine. 

Neither  little  Holland,  with  one  of  the  best- 
trained  small  armies  in  Europe,  nor  Switzerland 
where  every  school  boy  is  compelled  to  take  mili- 
tary training  and  every  man  of  military  age  is  an 
active  member  of  the  reserve,  have  been  made  mili- 
taristic and  bloodthirsty,  even  by  generations  of 
military  training. 

"In  this  country  there  is  not  the  slightest  danger 
of  an  over-development  of  the  warlike  spirit,  and 
there  never  has  been  any  such  danger.  In  all  our 
history  there  has  never  been  a  time  when  prepared- 
ness for  war  was  any  menace  to  peace." 7 


398  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

Sane  military  preparation  does  not,  has  not  and 
will  not  lead  to  militarism.  It  is  not  the  training 
that  gives  a  nation  war  lust;  it  is  false  ambition, 
national  conceit  and  the  spirit  of  conquest — thriv- 
ing on  an  international  scale — that  degrades  a 
people. 

There  are  plans  of  defence  and  plans  of  defence. 

There  are  plans  of  defence  which  aim  to  benefit 
all  the  people  by  protecting  all  their  resources. 

There  are  plans  of  defence  which  aim  to  benefit 
a  few  people  by  pork-barrelling  appropriations. 

And  there  are  plans  of  defence  which  aim  to 
benefit  the  government  by  leading  the  people  to  be- 
lieve that  they  are  to  have  that  which  they  demand. 

"Congress  is  going  to  be  made  the  recipient  of  a 
military  recommendation,  not  such  as  it  should  re- 
ceive, but  such  as  it  is  deemed  likely  Congress  will 
feel  like  adopting. 

"Based  upon  the  number  of  troops  which  the  dif- 
ferent great  powers  can  land  on  our  shores  in  the 
event  we  lose  control  of  the  sea,  we  should  have  a 
regular  army,  or  troops  of  the  first  line  of  a  certain 
strength.  This  strength  has  been  determined  by 
the  War  College,  and  this  is  the  programme  that 
the  Secretary  should  submit  to  Congress  and  let 
Congress  take  the  responsibility  of  either  providing 
for  it  or  refusing  to  do  so.  Instead  of  this  he  has 
to  formulate  a  policy  which  is  intended  to  cover  up 


WILSON'S  BRYANIZED  ARMY  PLAN      399 

the  deficiencies  of  Congress.     It  is  a  political  re- 
port, not  a  military  report."  8 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  386.  From  speech  of  Colonel  Theodore  Roose- 
velt, delivered  in  Chicago  sixteen  years  ago. 

2  Page  388.  Colonel  H.  O.  S.  Heistand,  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral, U.  S.  Army. 

3  Page  394 ;  4  page  395.  Colonel  William  C.  Church,  mem- 
ber Army  Committee  of  the  National  Security  League,  and 
editor  Army  and  Navy  Journal. 

5  Page  395.    Report  of  interview  with  Thomas  Edison. 

6  Page  396.  From  ex-President  Roosevelt's  message  to 
Congress,  December,  1901 — fifteen  years  ago. 

7  Page  397.  From  address  of  Colonel  Theodore  Roose- 
velt, delivered  eighteen  years  ago. 

8  Page  399.    (  See  note  3.) 


CHAPTER  III 

BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM 

THERE  is  a  Belgium  of  Europe  and  there  is  a 
"Belgium"  of  the  United  States. 

The  Belgium  of  Europe  stood  in  relation  to  con- 
tinental Europe  in  19 14  as  the  Belgium  of  the 
United  States  stands  in  relation  to  continental 
United  States  to-day. 

Perhaps  no  more  vivid  and  concrete  illustration 
of  our  unpreparedness  can  be  presented  than  a  com- 
parison of  the  forces  which  the  Belgium  of  Europe 
had  for  defence  in  August,  19 14,  with  those  which 
the  "Belgium"  of  the  United  States  may  have  by 
July,  1917. 

The  Belgium  of  the  United  States  embraces  the 
eastern  third  of  Massachusetts,  southern  Rhode  Is- 
land, southern  and  middle  Connecticut,  reaching  up 
to  and  including  Springfield,  Mass.,  northern  New 
Jersey.  This  "Belgium"  of  the  United  States  in- 
cludes the  cities  of  Boston,  Cambridge,  Lowell, 
Providence,  New  York,  Bridgeport,  New  London, 
Jersey  City  and  Hoboken. 

There  are  many  astounding,  even  amazing  simi- 

400 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  401 

larities  between  the  19 14  Belgium  of  Europe  and 
the  present  "Belgium"  of  the  United  States. 

First — The  Belgium  of  Europe  had  the  most 
representative  government  of  any  nation  of  Con- 
tinental Europe,  not  excepting  Switzerland;  we 
have  the  most  representative  government  of  the 
American  continent. 

Second — The  area  of  the  Belgium  of  Europe  is 
11,300  square  miles;  that  of  the  "Belgium"  of  the 
United  States,  10,900  square  miles. 

Third — the  population  of  European  Belgium  in 
1914  was  8,060,000;  the  population  of  our  Ameri- 
can "Belgium"  is  8,005,000. 

Fourth — The  Belgium  of  Europe  was  the  most 
densely  populated  portion  of  Continental  Europe; 
our  American  "Belgium"  is  the  most  densely  popu- 
lated portion  of  Continental  America. 

Fifth — The  per  capita  wealth  of  European  Bel- 
gium was  greater  than  that  of  any  other  country  of 
Continental  Europe.  The  per  capita  wealth  of  our 
American  "Belgium"  is  greater  than  that  of  any 
other  section  of  Continental  America. 

Sixth — The  countries — large  producers  of  manu- 
factured and  agricultural  products,  Germany  espe- 
cially— bordering  upon  and  beyond  the  Belgium  of 
Europe — depended  upon  Antwerp  for  the  exporta- 
tion of  their  goods ;  the  states  of  the  United  States 
— large  producers  of  manufactured  and  agricul- 
tural products — bordering  upon  and  beyond  our 


402  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

THE    BELGIUM    OF    EUROPE    AND    THE    BELGIUM    OF 
THE   UNITED   STATES 

A.  The  Belgium  of  Europe  had  in  1914  a  population  of  8,060,000. 
The  Belgium  of  the  United  States  has  a  population  of  8,050,000. 

B.  The  Belgium  of  the  United  States  embraces  the  eastern  third 
of  Massachusetts,  southern  Rhode  Island,  southern  and  middle 
Connecticut,  reaching  up  to  and  including  Springfield,  Mass.,  north- 
ern New  Jersey.  This  Belgium  of  the  United  States  includes  the 
cities  of  Boston,  Cambridge,  Lowell,  Providence,  New  York, 
Bridgeport,  New  London,  Jersey  City  and  Hoboken. 

C.  In  1914,  Belgium,  to  protect  herself  against  invasion,  had  an 
army  totalling  371,000 — 40  per  cent,  trained  men  and  60  per  cent, 
partially  trained  men. 

In  1917,  we  may  have  308,000  men — 17  per  cent,  trained,  83  per  cent, 
untrained — if  every  man  proposed  by  Former  Secretary  Garrison's 
plan  enlists  and  trains;  and  Mr.  Garrison's  plan  provides  for  more 
men  than  either  the  Chamberlain  Senate  Bill  or  the  Hay  House  Bill. 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM 


403 


Belgium  of  Europe 

and 

Belgium  of  The  United  Stares 


B. 

a 


'-Population'- 


-Area6\ 
-Ar/n/es] 


404  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

American  "Belgium" — depend  upon  New  York  as  a 
port  of  export. 

Seventh — Just  beyond  the  Belgium  of  Europe, 
were  the  greatest  steel  works  of  Europe;  just  be- 
yond the  borders  of  the  "Belgium"  of  the  United 
States — in  Pennsylvania — are  the  greatest  steel 
works  of  America. 

Eighth — In  the  Belgium  of  Europe — in  Ghent 
and  others  cities — were  located  the  greatest  cotton 
and  spinning  factories  of  Continental  Europe;  in 
the  "Belgium"  of  the  United  States — in  eastern 
Massachusetts — are  located  the  greatest  cotton  and 
weaving  factories  of  Continental  United  States. 

Ninth — Antwerp  was  the  biggest  near-Atlantic 
port  of  Continental  Europe;  New  York  is  the  big- 
gest Atlantic  port  of  Continental  America. 

There  is  no  need  to  rehearse  what  happened  to 
Belgium  in  22  days  in  1914.  What  did  happen, 
however,  has  made  us  think.  It  started  a  campaign 
for  adequate  defence  which  has  in  one  year  secured 
the  general  approval  of  our  citizens.  This  approval 
has  become  so  widespread  and  so  strong  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  and  Secretary  Daniels  have  been  forced 
to  absolutely  reverse  their  positions  of  twelve 
months  ago. 

We  now  wish  to  know  what  adequate  defence 
means.  We  now  wish  to  know  what  would  prob- 
ably happen  if  an  attack,  similar  to  that  launched 
against  the  Belgium  of  Europe  in  1914,  should  be 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  405 

made  upon  our  American  "Belgium,"  to-day,  or  a 
year  or  two  hence,  say  in  191 7  or  1918.  We  now 
wish  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  plans  pro- 
posed by  Secretary  Daniels  and  former  Secretary 
Garrison  will  adequately  protect  our  "Belgium"  by 
19 1 7 — provided,  each  and  every  recommendation  of 
Secretary  Daniels  and  former  Secretary  Garrison 
should  be  at  once  adopted  by  Congress — provided 
each  and  every  recommendation  should  be  carried 
out  with  amazing  quickness.  Although  Secretary 
Garrison  has  resigned,  his  plan  is  considered  be- 
cause, without  doubt,  it  is  stronger  than  any  plan 
which  will  be  approved  by  the  present  Congress. 

The  invasion,  defence,  and  devastation  of  Bel- 
gium of  Europe  are  facts.  By  this  comparison,  we 
will  have  as  a  basis  of  judgment,  the  facts  of  that 
which  did  occur — not  the  supposition  of  that  which 
might  have  occurred. 

Compare  the  forces  Belgium  had  in  1914  to  de- 
fend her  area  and  population  with  the  forces  we 
may  have  in  19 17 — if  all  our  proposed  plans  carry — 
to  defend  an  equal  area  and  an  equal  population. 

Compare  the  number  of  trained  and  partially 
trained  soldiers  Belgium  had  with  the  number  of 
trained  and  partially  trained  soldiers  we  may  have 
by  19 1 7. 

Compare  the  preparation  of  Belgian  forces  with 
the  preparation  of  our  forces. 

Compare  the  areas  from  which  the  Belgian  forces 


406 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

had  to  be  mobilised  with  the  areas  from  which  our 
forces  will  have  to  be  mobilised. 

Compare  the  greatest  distance  Belgian  soldiers 
had  to  be  transported  to  the  distances  our  soldiers 
will  have  to  be  transported. 

Compare  the  efficiency  and  quickness  of  the  mo- 
bilisation of  the  forces  that  defended  Belgium,  with 
our  last  three  efforts  at  mobilisation. 

Then  ask:  if,  to  defend  an  equal  area  with  an 
equal  population,  we  will  have  by  July,  191 7,  even 
if  all  our  hopes  as  to  proposed  plans  should  come 
true,  a  chance  of  victory  against  an  invading  army 
similar  to  that  which  invaded  Belgium. 

This  is  the  only  concrete  practical  way  of  deter- 
mining whether  or  not  the  plans  of  former  Secre- 
tary Garrison  and  Secretary  Daniels  will  give  us 
adequate  protection  even  if  carried  out  to  the  letter 
with  amazing  celerity. 

First,  as  to  the  size  of  armies:  Belgium  had  a 
regular  and  reserve  army  and  a  Guarde  Civique, 
the  soldiers  of  which  had  had  about  the  same  train- 
ing as  that  which  our  National  Guard  has  had.  In 
addition,  however,  Belgium  had  the  aid  of  at  least 
45,000  English  soldiers.  These  totalled  371,000 
men. 

As  comparisons  are  here  made  between  the  forces 
Belgium  had  in  19 14  and  those  we  hope  to  have 
within  the  next  fifteen  months  and  as  neither  the 
Chamberlain  Bill  nor  the  Hay  Bill  provides  for  as 


BELGIUM    AND    BELGIUM  407 

many  men  as  does  the  plan  of  former  Secretary 
Garrison,  we  shall,  with  a  certainty,  overestimate 
— by  employing  as  a  basis  of  comparison  the  num- 
ber of  men  former  Secretary  Garrison  hoped  to 
enrol — rather  than  underestimate  the  forces  we 
may  have  by  July  1st,  191 7. 

If  the  full  number  of  men  asked  for  for  the  reg- 
ular army  immediately  enlist,  if  the  9,000  extra 
militia  at  once  enrol  as  members  of  the  National 
Guard,  if  in  the  next  four  months  133,000  men  en- 
list to  form  the  Continental  Army  so  as  to  have  two 
months'  training  during  the  present  summer — if 
all  this  is  accomplished  without  a  hitch,  we  shall  be 
able  to  muster  by  July,  191 7,  an  aggregate  force  of 
308,000 — provided,  of  course,  that  every  man  of 
our  regular  army,  every  man  in  our  reserve  army, 
every  member  of  the  state  militia,  every  volunteer 
of  the  Continental  Army  answers  the  call.  If  all 
these  conditions  are  met,  we  shall  have,  by  July  1, 
19 1 7,  an  army  which  in  numbers  alone  will  be  83% 
of  the  army  Belgium  had  for  its  defence  in  1914. 

We  must  remember,  however,  that  of  our  pro- 
posed ten  regiments  of  infantry — 20,000  men — only 
seven  are  to  be  kept  in  the  United  States  and  that 
these  seven  are  to  be  formed  on  a  peace  basis,  which 
means  but  820  men  in  each  company.  Consequently 
the  20,000  men,  so  far  as  the  defence  of  Continental 
United  States  is  concerned,  dwindles  to  5,740.  The 
figure  308,942  men  is  based  upon  the  supposition 


408  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

that  not  a  single  man  will  be  lost  out  of  our  present 
mobile  army  of  36,787  men,  that  every  one  of  the 
5,740  men  called  for  by  Mr.  Garrison  for  the  United 
States  will  enlist,  that  every  one  of  the  4,800  men 
called  for  by  the  plan  for  the  field  artillery  will  not 
only  enlist  but  will  enlist  in  time  to  be  trained  by 
July  1,  1917,  that  every  man  now  in  the  militia  of 
the  states  will  answer  the  call  of  the  United  States, 
that  the  9,000  additional  militia  asked  for  will  en- 
list, that  the  133,00c  called  for  by  the  Continental 
Army  plan  will  not  only  have  enlisted  but  will  also 
have  had  two  months'  training  this  present  sum- 
mer. 

Second,  as  to  the  training  of  the  soldiers:  Of 
Belgium's  army  of  371,000  men,  96,000  were  trained 
Belgian  soldiers,  and  45,000  were  trained  English 
soldiers,  many  of  whom  had  seen  active  service  in 
South  Africa  and  other  parts  of  the  British  Em- 
pire— in  all  151,000  trained  equipped  men.  The 
balance  of  2305000  were  partially  trained.  By  July 
1,  1917,  if  every  factor  of  Mr.  Garrison's  plans 
should  be  worked  out  perfectly,  we  would  have  in  the 
mobile  army  in  the  United  States  but  45,338  trained 
men,  in  the  reserve  army  perhaps  24  men,  a  total  of 
only  45,362  trained  men.  The  balance  would  be 
composed  of  our  militia,  50  per  cent,  of  whom  have 
never  qualified  as  second-class  marksmen,  and  of 
the  Continental  Army  the  members  of  which  will 
have  had  but  two  months'  training. 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  409 

Belgium,  to  defend  herself  in  1914,  had  371,000 
men — 40  per  cent,  trained  and  60  per  cent,  partially 
trained  men.  We,  to  defend  our  American  "Bel- 
gium," may  have  an  army  of  308,000  men — 17  per 
cent,  trained  and  83  per  cent,  partially  trained  men. 

Third,  as  to  aids  and  equipment:  Belgium  of  Eu- 
rope had,  to  aid  her  army  in  holding  its  battle  lines, 
the  greatest  forts  in  the  world.  The  forts  about 
Liege,  Namur  and  Antwerp  were  large,  new,  strong 
forts.  They  were  extraordinarily  strong,  built 
in  the  three  years  previous  to  the  war.  Military 
experts  of  all  countries,  excepting  Germany  and 
Austria,  had  asserted  that  they  could  never  be 
taken.  The  Belgian  regular  army  was  in  fine  con- 
dition. It  was  well  supplied  with  ammunition.  It 
was  fully  equipped  with  armoured  cars,  armoured 
automobiles,  transport  and  ammunition  trains.  Its 
infantry  was  well  equipped  with  tripod-machine 
guns,  with  bicycle  machine  guns,  and  with  machine 
guns  drawn  by  dogs.  Its  signal  corps  was  in  ex- 
cellent condition. 

Some  Americans  assume  that  Belgium  was  un- 
prepared. Belgium  was  well  prepared.  She  had 
been  preparing  for  three  years.  She  had  been  pre- 
paring ever  since  the  Kaiser  and  the  Kaiserine  paid 
that  official  visit  to  Belgium,  during  which  occurred 
that  memorable  after-dinner  scene  in  King  Albert's 
private  study.  The  Kaiser  and  King  Albert  were 
alone;  and  the  Kaiser,  absorbed  in  the  study  of  a 


410 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

new  relief  map  of  Belgium,  unconsciously  allowed 
his  hand  to  trace  the  line  of  march  from  the  Ger- 
man border  down  over  the  Belgian  valleys  into 
France.  This  caused  King  Albert  to  build  the  new 
forts,  equip  the  Belgian  army  anew,  and  provide  a 
large  reserve  of  ammunition. 

We  on  the  other  hand  have  no  armoured  trains, 
no  sufficient  transportation  system,  and  practically 
no  reserve  ammunition.  Our  army  is  lacking  in 
large  guns.  We  have  not  a  sufficient  number  of 
machine  guns,  even  for  34,000  men — our  present 
mobile  force  in  the  United  States.  We  have  no 
bicycle  machine  guns,  no  dogs  trained  to  take  ma- 
chine guns  quickly  from  one  point  of  a  battle  line  to 
another — trained  to  lie  down  quietly  during  fire. 
We  have  no  armoured  automobiles.  In  fact,  our 
equipment  lacks  in  every  factor.  And,  if  we  do 
not  do  more  than  former  Secretary  Garrison  recom- 
mended to  remedy  our  present  deficiences — it  will 
be  three  or  four  years  before  our  present  army  is 
equipped  with  even  the  minimum  number  of  guns  it 
should  have. 

Fourth,  as  to  mobilisation  areas:  Belgium's 
entire  army  was  resident  on  the  11,300  square 
miles  of  Belgium;  the  English  army  began  land- 
ing within  three  days  after  the  invasion  and 
within  eleven  days  45,000  English  soldiers  had 
landed.  Our  army  is  and  will  be  scattered  over  a 
territory  of  3,027,000  square  miles.     Because  of 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  411 


Mobflizaf  f  on  Areas 


A.  United  6ta,te$   3.027.000  <sq.  mjie& 


B]BC/j$flf/72  //,300  c?g./nf/e* 


A.  Our  prospective  army  of  308,000  (under  the  proposed  Garrison 
plan)  will  be  distributed  over  area  A. 

B.  Belgium's   army — regulars,   reserves  and   Guarde  Civique — were 
all  concentrated  on  area  B. 


412  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

this  our  mobilisation  problem  is  vastly  different 
from  that  which  Belgium  had  to  face. 

Fifth,  as  to  mobilisation  distances:  It  was 
necessary  to  transport  90%  of  the  soldiers  of  the 
Belgian  army  less  than  75  miles  to  perfect  their 
mobilisation.  No  Belgian  soldier  was  moved  more 
than  130  miles.  To  protect  the  same  amount  of 
territory  and  the  same  number  of  people,  our  sol- 
diers from  the  west  would  have  to  be  transported 
three  thousand  miles,  even  those  of  Texas  would 
have  to  be  transported  at  least  1,900  miles. 

Sixth,  as  to  time  and  efficiency  of  mobilisation: 
Belgium  mobilised  her  standing  army  in  72  hours. 
The  English  soldiers  that  fought  in  Belgium 
against  the  German  invasion — not  those  that 
fought  later  in  France — were  all  on  Belgian  soil 
within  eleven  days. 

It  is  worth  while  noting  from  our  past  experience 
just  how  inefficient  we  have  been  in  mobilising  less 
than  13,000  men  of  our  regular  army,  whose  only 
duty  in  peace  times  is  to  keep  in  training  and  to 
remain  at  the  army  posts  ready  for  mobilisation. 
These  experiences  will  indicate  what  difficulty  we 
would  meet  in  mobilising  300,000  men. 

The  war  with  Spain  was  not  an  unexpected  war. 
Two  years  before,  in  1896,  the  Congress  and  the 
Senate  had  requested  Spain  to  recognise  the  inde- 
pendence of  Cuba.  It  was  two  years  later  that  the 
Maine  was  sunk.    Nearly  a  month  more  passed  be- 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM 


413 


Mobilization  Distances 


Belgium: 


Al 


United  States: 


Belgium:  Belgium  mobilised  her  regulars  and  reserves  in  seventy- 
two  hours.  No  soldier  was  moved  a  greater  distance  than  130 
miles. 

United  States:  Our  best  military  authorities  state  that  it  would 
take  nine  months  to  mobilise  the  prospective  half-trained  army  of 
Secretary  Garrison's  plan. 

Our  experiences  in  mobilisation  show  this  to  be  a  very  conserva- 
tive estimate. 

Major-General  Wood,  who  is  a  most  energetic  officer  in  securing 
quick  action,  estimates  that  it  would  take  thirty  days  even  to 
mobilise  our  little  continental  mobile  army  of  34,000  men. 


414  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

fore  Congress  took  action.  Therefore  there  had 
been  plenty  of  time  for  preparation. 

On  March  1 1,  1898,  the  War  Department  began 
its  mobilisation  for  an  invasion  of  Cuba.  Yet  it 
took  us  102  days  to  land  but  16,800  officers  and  men 
in  Cuba;  and  the  transports  crowded  to  full  ca- 
pacity— men  sleeping  on  decks,  packed  in  any- 
where— were  compelled  to  leave  ten  thousand  more 
men  behind  at  Tampa  because  the  War  Department 
in  three  and  a  half  months,  after  two  years'  warn- 
ing, was  unable  to  provide  enough  ships  to  carry 
more  than  16,000  men  from  Florida  to  Cuba. 

Moreover,  it  was  two  weeks  more  before  our 
War  Department  could  get  enough  food  from 
Florida  to  Cuba  to  supply  our  men  for  three  days 
in  advance.  Even  then  the  quality  of  the  food  was 
so  bad  that  hundreds  died  from  eating  it. 

The  War  Department  was  not  able  to  mobilise 
a  single  full  regiment  in  Cuba.  At  San  Juan  the 
regiments  averaged  566  men  each,  though  each 
regiment  should  have  had  1,272  men.  With  two 
years'  warning  and  three  months'  preparation  the 
War  Department  was  able  to  provide  each  regi- 
ment at  San  Juan  with  but  44%  of  the  men  they 
should  have  had. 

Compare  this  with  Germany's  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium or  with  Japan's  landing  in  Chemulpo  Bay  in 
February,  1904.  The  tide  at  Chemulpo  Bay  rises 
and  falls  30  feet.     Four  times  a  day  the  waters 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  415 

rush  in  and  out  like  a  mill  race.  At  low  tide  there 
are  mud  flats  for  miles  around. 

The  Japanese  landing  was  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  War.  Its  success  was  not  the 
result  of  having  learned  by  previous  failures.  The 
Japanese  accomplished  the  entire  landing  in  a  few 
days. 

First,  they  sent  over  corps  of  carpenters 
and  corps  of  blacksmiths.  The  blacksmiths 
set  up  their  forges  near  the  landing  place.  The 
carpenters  built  cleated  wooden  roadways  to  cover 
the  mud  at  low  tide  and  to  float  on  the  water  at 
high  tide.  The  wooden  roadways  were  covered 
with  rice  bags  to  deaden  the  noise  of  landing. 

After  this  the  medical  corps  landed.  Then  the 
horses,  being  let  down  from  the  sides  of  the  boats 
in  slings,  were  put  ashore  at  a  minimum  rate  of  one 
per  minute,  many  at  the  rate  of  two  per  minute. 

Under  the  most  extraordinary  conditions  with 
water  rushing  in  and  out  in  a  torrent,  the  Japa- 
nese in  a  few  days  landed  20,000  men,  2,500  horses 
and  200,000,000  pounds  of  food  and  military 
stores. 

On  March  6,  191 1,  the  Secretary  of  War  under 
President  Taft,  ordered  the  mobilisation  of  a 
manoeuvre  division  at  the  Texas  border.  This 
manoeuvre  division  should  have  had  at  its  full 
strength,  19,200  men.  After  86  days  of  effort,  the 
War  Department  was  finally  able  to  get  together 


416  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

just  12,809  men-  That  was  the  largest  number  of 
men  the  manoeuvre  division  ever  attained. 

Again  in  1913,  orders  were  issued  from  the  War 
Department  on, February  21st  and  February  24th 
for  the  mobilisation  on  the  Texas  border  of  the 
Second  Division  under  Major-General  Carter. 
This  division  should  have  had  at  its  full  strength 
22,565  men.  After  126  days,  the  War  Department 
was  finally  able  to  get  11,28/  men  together.  This 
was  only  52%  of  the  number  the  division  should 
have  had.  And  during  this  mobilisation,  3.4  men 
out  of  every  hundred  deserted,  were  court-mar- 
tialled  or  were  discharged  without  honour.  What 
a  glorious  feat  for  a  nation  of  a  hundred  million 
people — unable  to  mobilise  more  than  11,28/  men 
in  126  days  out  of  a  division  that  should  have  had 
22,565  men!  Moreover,  this  division  brought  with 
it  no  proper  supply  trains,  no  proper  ammunition 
trains;  it  was  short  three  companies  of  engineers; 
it  was  short  one  full  regiment  of  field  artillery;  it 
was  short  field  hospitals;  it  lacked  a  field  signal 
corps ;  it  lacked  ambulance  companies ! 

And  again  on  April  23,  1914,  the  War  Depart- 
ment under  President  Wilson  ordered  General 
Funston  to  sail  from  Galveston — to  take  four  in- 
fantry regiments  to  the  coast  of  Mexico.  These 
four  regiments  should  have  had  7,956  officers  and 
men.  They  actually  had  2,830 — only  36%  of  what 
they  should  have  had.     And  a  large  portion  of 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM 


417 


Protection  to  Lands  and  Ottfzens 
Belgium  and  U.S.A. 


c 

D. 


Belgium 

Belgium 

A -Belgium:  us2  <?oldiers  fierwooo  fiopulation 
BrBelgfum  :34/jtrolcf/enr  fier  too  jgaare  jn/l&s 
C'UsS.A  :        z/ jolcf/enr  /ler/oooopopulati'on 
EhUsSA  :        wtfold/erj/ier  ioo<squaremiI&s 

To  protect  each  million  population  in  1914,  Belgium  had  1454  per 
cent,  more  soldiers  than  we  might  have  under  Garrison's  plan  to 
protect  each  million  of  our  population. 
What  happened  to  Belgium  is  a  fact. 
There  is  no  supposition  about  it. 

Belgium  was  over-run  in  twenty-two  days  by  a  force  not  greater 
in  number  than  that  which  could  easily  be  transported  to  the 
shores  of  the  United  States  in  twelve  days. 


418 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

General  Funston's  original  command  as  well  as 
the  artillery,  cavalry  and  transportation  service 
was  necessarily  left  behind  at  Galveston  because 
there  were  not  sufficient  transports. 

Major-General  Wood,  commander  of  the  Di- 
vision of  the  East,  has  definitely  stated  that  it 
would  take  thirty  days  to  mobilise  our  standing 
mobile  army  of  34,000  men.  How  many  months 
would  it  take  to  mobilise  the  308,000  regulars, 
militia  and  raw  continental  troops  from  all  por- 
tions of  the  United  States? 

Belgium  had  an  army  of  371,000  men  to  protect 
her  11,000  square  miles  of  territory.  She  had 
3,415  soldiers  to  protect  every  hundred  square 
miles.  Our  army,  even  if  Mr.  Garrison's  plans 
should  be  realised,  would  furnish  us  but  10  soldiers 
per  hundred  square  miles. 

Belgium  had  371,000  soldiers  to  protect  8,060,000 
people — 482  soldiers  to  each  ten  thousand  of  the 
population ;  the  army  Mr.  Garrison  hoped  to  have  in 
19 1 7  would  give  us  but  31  soldiers  to  each  ten  thou- 
sand people. 

Belgium  had  in  19 14  an  army  of  120%  of  what 
Mr.  Garrison  hoped  to  have  in  19 17.  Her  propor- 
tion of  trained  soldiers  was  235%  of  what  he  hoped 
we  would  have.  Her  army  was  better  equipped  than 
ours  will  be  in  191 7.  Her  soldiers  were  mobilised 
from  an  area  of  but  11,000  square  miles;  ours  will 
have  to  be  mobilised  from  an  area  of  three  million 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  419 

square  miles;  we  will  have  to  move  many  of  our 
soldiers  from  1,000  to  3,000  miles.  Belgium  mobi- 
lised her  standing  army  in  72  hours ;  the  two  partial 
mobilisations  which  we  have  attempted  in  the  last 
five  years  have  required  86  days  to  get  12,000  men 
together  and  126  days  to  mobilise  11,000. 

What  happened  to  Belgium? 

In  22  days,  350,000  Germans  over-ran  three- 
fourths  of  all  Belgium.  Many  thousands  more, 
during  that  time  and  after  that  time,  marched 
across  Belgium  to  fight  in  France,  but  the  number 
that  over-ran  Belgium  was  never  more  than  350,- 
000.  They  were  victorious  because  they  were  bet- 
ter trained,  better  equipped,  better  organised,  bet- 
ter supplied — not  because  they  were  braver  or  more 
heroic  than  the  Belgians.  They  subdued  in  22  days 
a  territory  nearly  the  size  of  the  "Belgium"  of 
America,  subdued  and  levied  indemnities  upon  a 
population  equal  to  the  population  of  the  cities  of 
New  York,  Boston,  Providence,  New  London, 
Bridgeport,  and  Jersey  City  and  all  the  country  dis- 
tricts of  the  eastern  third  of  Massachusetts,  south- 
ern Rhode  Island,  southern  Connecticut  and  north- 
ern New  Jersey. 

Since  Belgium  in  Europe,  defended  by  an  army 
concentrated  on  11,000  square  miles  of  territory 
— practically  on  the  field  of  battle — was  over-run  in 
22  days,  could  we,  with  an  army  less  in  size,  with 
an   army   having   a   greater   proportion   of    raw 


420  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

troops,  with  an  army  scattered  over  forty-eight 
different  states,  over  3,000,000  square  miles  of 
territory,  with  an  army  many  regiments  of  which 
would  be  1,000,  1,200  and  3,000  miles  distant  from 
the  land  and  people  they  would  be  called  upon  to 
protect,  with  an  army  only  partially  equipped  with 
guns  and  ammunition — expect  success  where  Bel- 
gium failed — expect  victory  so  long  as  the  present 
inefficient  organisation  of  our  army  is  maintained? 

But  would  a  foreign  nation  desiring  to  attack 
the  Atlantic  coast  of  the  United  States  direct  its 
forces  against  the  "Belgium"  of  America? 

Undoubtedly  they  would  attack  where — on  the 
smallest  area  possible — they  could  quickly  seize  our 
largest  ammunition  plants,  strike  at  our  greatest 
cities,  levy  the  greatest  indemnities,  subject  to  mili- 
tary control  our  greatest  financial  institutions,  and 
subdue  the  greatest  proportion  of  the  population. 
They  would  land  their  armies  in  the  "Belgium"  of 
the  United  States  and  their  navies  would  threaten  to 
bombard  Boston,  New  York  and  Philadelphia  un- 
less indemnities  were  immediately  paid.  To  choose 
instead  the  beaches  of  Florida,  or  North  Carolina, 
or  the  shores  of  Maine  would  be  idiocy. 

But  could  not  the  United  States  navy  prevent 
such  invasion? 

Many  of  our  military  authorities  and  many  of 
our  naval  authorities,  those  actually  knowing  what 
the  navy  can  do,  have  stated  that  the  navy  in  its 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM 421 

present  condition  would  be  unable  to  prevent  inva- 
sion. Moreover,  the  report  of  Admiral  Fletcher, 
commander  of  the  Atlantic  fleet,  just  submitted  to 
the  Senate,  so  emphatically  points  out  the  inability 
of  our  navy  to  protect  our  Atlantic  coast,  that  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  hesitated  to  allow  it  to 
be  printed  as  a  public  document. 

In  its  present  deteriorated  condition  our  navy — 
with  its  lack  of  men,  lack  of  sufficient  ammunition 
supply,  lack  of  sufficient  ammunition-ships ;  lack  of 
fuel-ships,  lack  of  aeroplanes,  lack  of  fast  scouts — 
could  not  meet  the  naval  forces  of  any  one  of  the 
great  naval  powers  of  Europe. 

We  have  now  21  ships  of  the  first  and  second 
line  in  service.  We  have  12  more  of  these  ships 
but  they  are  "out  of  commission,',  or  "in  repair," 
or  "in  ordinary."  Of  these  21  ships  10  are  of  the 
first  line  and  11  of  the  second  line.  Two  of  the 
first-line  ships  are  so  old  as  fighting  machines  that 
they  are  to  be  transferred  to  the  second  line  some 
time  in  March.  By  May,  191 7,  six  others  will  be 
more  than  12  years  old,  the  age  at  which  foreign 
nations  consider  a  battleship  almost  useless  as  a 
fighting  machine;  three  additional  ships  will  be  II 
years  old.  The  ships  already  authorised  and  al- 
ready under  construction  are  not  sufficient  in  num- 
ber to  replace  these.  This  is  due  to  the  failure  of 
Congress  during  the  past  few  years  to  maintain  the 
1903  programme.     Consequently  we  shall  be  in 


422  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

worse  condition  by  May,  19 17,  than  we  are  at  pres- 
ent, unless  something  extraordinary  is  done. 

But  how  about  the  ships  Secretary  Daniels  has 
recommended?  Even  if  these  are  voted  immedi- 
ately, it  is  very  probable  that  their  keels  will  not 
even  be  laid  by  July  I,  191 7.  The  fact  is  that  the 
keels  of  most  of  our  battleships  are  not  laid  until 
eighteen  months  or  two  years  after  they  are  voted. 
The  Nevada  and  Oklahoma,  voted  five  years  ago, 
are  riot  yet  in  service.  Not  one  of  the  ships  which 
Secretary  Daniels  recommends  will  be  finished  be- 
fore 1920  or  1 92 1,  unless  extraordinary  haste  is 
made.  Hence,  because  of  the  voting  programme 
of  Secretary  Daniels  and  the  few  ships  already 
authorised  to  take  the  place  of  those  that  will 
year  by  year  lose  their  fighting  value,  our  navy  will 
remain  in  its  present  weakened  condition  until  1920 
at  the  earliest. 

Furthermore,  the  action  of  Secretary  Daniels 
in  reducing  the  amount  of  the  recommendation 
of  the  General  Board  for  ammunition  and  avia- 
tion will  compel  our  ships  to  enter  a  contest,  if  the 
case  should  arise,  without  eyes  and  without  suf- 
ficient shells  with  which  to  fight.  Hence  the 
coast-line  of  our  American  "Belgium"  will  be  open 
to  an  invasion  just  as  the  border  line  of  the  Belgium 
of  Europe  was  open  to  invasion  in  1914. 

Neither  the  naval  programme  of  Secretary  Dan- 
iels nor  the  army  programme  of  former  Secretary 


BELGIUM  AND  BELGIUM  423 

Garrison  nor  the  provisions  of  the  Chamberlin  Bill 
or  the  Hay  Bill  will  provide  adequate  defence  either 
in  19 17  or  1918  even  if  carried  out  to  the  letter  and 
with  astounding  quickness. 


PART  SEVEN:    WHAT  EACH  CITIZEN 

CAN  DO 


PART  SEVEN:    WHAT  EACH  CITIZEN 
CAN  DO 

CHAPTER   I 

AS  TO   EXPERTS 

THE  American  citizen  is  not  a  technical  expert 
in  army  and  navy  matters;  he  does  not  pre- 
tend to  be.  He  has  not  and  will  not  presume  to 
give  advice  to  men  who  have  been  trained  for 
twenty  years  in  naval  construction  and  in  army 
and  navy  organisation  and  management. 

But  the  American  citizen  has  common  sense — a 
goodly  amount  of  it — and  the  revelations  of  the 
last  year  are  making  him  realise  that  we  ought  to 
have  at  the  head  of  our  army  and  navy,  men  who 
have  had  years  of  experience  in  army  and  navy  af- 
fairs,— men  thoroughly,  practically  and  technically 
trained  in  those  lines. 

Moreover,  the  American  citizen  now  knows  that 
billions  have  been  wasted  and  that  millions  are  be- 
ing wasted  every  month;  that  innumerable  blun- 
ders have  been  made  in  the  past  and  that  pro- 
posals, which  would  result  in  still  worse  blunders 
if  carried  out,  are  now  submitted  to  Congress;  that 

427 


428  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

there  has  been  and  is  lack  of  organisation,  lack  of  a 
sensible  system  of  promotion,  lack  of  officers,  lack 
of  men,  lack  of  equipment,  lack  of  ammunition  in 
both  the  army  and  in  the  navy ;  that  there  has  been 
flagrant  negligence,  in  fact  criminal  negligence; 
and  the  American  citizen  is  now  determined  to 
remedy  these  things. 

Primarily  they  have  been  due  to  the  indifference 
of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  a  whole, 
but  that  indifference  is  passing!  Secondly,  they 
have  been  due  to  pork-barrelling  in  Congress;  and 
thirdly,  to  the  appointment  of  politicians  ignorant 
of  the  needs  of  the  army  and  navy  as  the  heads  of 
those  departments. 

Political  secretaries  may  plead  that  they  have 
urged  over  and  over  again  certain  recommenda- 
tions to  Congress  and  that  Congress  has  again  and 
again  turned  a  deaf  ear.  But  why?  Because  of 
the  indifference  of  the  people;  and,  more  than  all 
else,  because  the  men  as  heads  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  Departments,  the  Secretaries  of  the  Navy 
and  the  Secretaries  of  War,  have  not  been  well 
enough  acquainted  with  their  work  to  make  a 
popular  fight  for  that  which  they  recommended. 

Just  as  in  England  in  times  of  peace,  one  sen- 
tence from  Lord  Kitchener  aroused  the  English 
people  more  than  all  the  appeals  of  politicians;  so 
in  America  a  vigourous  presentation  of  the  needs 
of  the  navy  by  an  admiral  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy 


AS  TO  EXPERTS  429 

and  a  strong  presentation  of  the  needs  of  the  army 
by  a  major-general  as  Secretary  of  War  would  have 
done  much  in  the  past  and  would  now  do  much  to 
arouse  the  people. 

If,  in  the  past,  their  recommendations  had  been 
ridiculed  by  indifferent  men  or  sugar-coated  by 
"pork-barrelling"  Congressmen  and  Senators,  their 
long  acquaintance  with  vital  facts  and  their  decades 
of  experience  would  have  made  it  possible  for  them 
to  speak  to  the  people  with  such  concreteness  and 
authority  that  the  people  would  not  have  remained 
indifferent  and  Congress  would  not  have  dared  to 
"pork-barrel." 

Let  us  look  at  the  business  side  of  it.  We  are  a 
hundred  millions  of  people.  We  own  more  than 
three  and  a  half  million  square  miles  of  the  richest 
land  on  the  globe.  Our  wealth  is  a  hundred  and 
eighty  billions  of  dollars — a  hundred  eighty  thou- 
sand millions. 

Our  army  and  navy  exists  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  the  honour  and  lives  of  these  hundred 
million  people;  they  exist  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting three  and  a  half  million  square  miles;  they 
exist  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  one  hundred 
eighty  billion  dollars  of  wealth.  Never  was  wealth 
so  undefended;  and  never  in  the  history  of  the 
world  have  other  nations  been  so  perfectly  armed 
and  in  such  great  need  of  levying  foreign  indemni- 
ties. 


430 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

As  managers,  then,  of  the  army  and  navy,  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
have  a  more  monumental  task  before  them  than 
any  other  two  men  in  the  world.  It  is  their  duty 
to  see  to  it  that  the  army  and  navy  efficiently  pro- 
tect our  people,  our  lands,  our  wealth. 

The  army  and  navy  are  specialised  organisations. 
The  mass  of  people  know  very  little  about  their 
methods  of  operation,  their  direction,  their  equip- 
ment, or  their  needs.  Therefore  they  require 
specially  trained  men  to  direct  them. 

There  is  being  established  in  the  United  States  at 
the  present  time  a  new  industry,  the  dye  industry. 
It  is  also  a  specialty  in  commerce.  The  mass  of 
people  know  very  little  about  the  chemistry  of  these 
dyes  nor  about  choosing  men  as  chemists.  Would 
you,  if  you  were  about  to  invest  a  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars  in  one  of  these  industries,  choose  a 
man  whose  sole  qualification  was  his  ability  to 
write  good  "editorial  stuff"  or  good  fiction,  or  his 
ability  to  secure  a  certain  number  of  votes  in  a  cer- 
tain ward  or  district,  or  his  ability  to  write  good 
law  briefs  or  to  plead  well  in  court,  or  his  ability  to 
orate  passionately  for  temperance  reform?  All 
these  qualifications  might  efficiently  fit  a  man  to 
follow  any  one  of  the  respective  professions,  as 
newspaper  editor,  ward  politician,  lawyer,  or  tem- 
perance orator;  but  those  qualifications  in  them- 
selves would  not  in  any  way  guarantee  that  the 


AS  TO  EXPERTS 431 

man  would  be  a  good  chemist  or  a  good  executive 
to  handle  your  dye-manufacturing  plant. 

If,  then,  you  would  not  place  such  a  man,  recom- 
mended solely  by  such  qualifications,  at  the  head  of 
a  business  in  which  you  are  about  to  invest  a  hun- 
dred thousand  dollars,  why  should  we,  American 
citizens,  permit  such  a  man  to  be  placed  at  the  head 
of  our  army  or  navy,  the  most  technical  and  ex- 
ecutive departments  of  our  government?  Upon 
them  rest  the  safety  of  one  hundred  million  people, 
the  security  of  our  home  lands,  and  the  security 
of  a  hundred  eighty  billion  dollars  wealth. 

It  has  often  been  argued  that  it  is  possible  for  a 
great  statesman  to  become  a  good  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  or  an  efficient  Secretary  of  War.  Argument 
is  of  little  value,  because  the  nature  of  the  two  types 
of  men  and  the  nature  of  the  service  required  is 
absolutely  different. 

The  armies  and  navies  of  the  present  day  are 
half  machinery  and  half  men,  and  the  machines  are 
the  most  complicated  in  the  world.  A  man  to  effi- 
ciently understand  and  direct  the  entire  naval  pol- 
icy, naval  construction,  and  navy  organisation  of 
a  country  should  be  both  an  expert  engineer  and 
a  man  capable  of  handling  men  in  action.  The 
same  applies  to  the  organisation  and  direction  of 
the  army,  the  construction  of  fortifications,  the 
selection  and  manufacture  of  guns  and  explosives. 
A  great  statesman  is  an  administrator — not  an 


432  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

engineer,  tactician,  or  general.  No  politician,  how- 
ever great,  is  able  to  handle  these  matters  effi- 
ciently unless  he  is  also  an  expert  engineer,  a 
tactician  of  experience,  and  a  general  by  nature 
and  training. 

Probably  no  greater  statesman  existed  than 
Abraham  Lincoln.  During  the  first  two  years  of 
the  Civil  War  practically  all  of  our  military  opera- 
tions were  directed  by  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stan- 
ton, and  the  Confederate  forces  were  on  the  whole 
successful.  Referring  to  his  direction  of  the  mili- 
tary, President  Lincoln  is  reported  by  General 
Grant  to  have  stated  that  "he  did  know  that  many 
of  his  military  orders  were  wrong,  and  that  per- 
haps all  of  them  were  wrong."  It  was  not  until 
President  Lincoln  put  the  military  entirely  in  the 
hands  of  General  Grant  to  be  handled  exactly  as 
General  Grant  pleased,  that  the  North  succeeded  in 
winning  battle  after  battle  and  in  bringing  the 
war  to  a  successful  close. 

"If  Abraham  Lincoln,  great  genius  that  he  was, 
proved  himself  incompetent  to  direct  armies  in 
warfare,  what  would  happen  to  us  in  case  of  con- 
flict if  our  defences  had  to  be  organised  by  the 
petty  politicians  of  to-day?"  * 

It  is  time  we  recognised  that  a  shoemaker  should 
be  employed  to  make  shoes,  a  butcher  to  cut  meat, 
a  temperance  reformer  to  conduct  temperance  meet- 
ings, a  journalist  to  write  and  talk  for  publicity; 


AS  TO  EXPERTS  433 

but  that  a  naval  authority  should  be  appointed 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  a  war  authority  Secre- 
tary of  War ! 

In  the  past  there  has  been  inefficiency,  lack  of 
organisation,  blundering  and  negligence.  Would 
such  inefficiency,  such  waste,  such  blundering,  such 
neglect  long  continue  if  Admiral  Fiske,  Admiral 
Fletcher,  Admiral  Badger,  Admiral  Benson,  or  Ad- 
miral Dewey  were  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  any 
length  of  time?  Would  all  our  useless,  wasteful 
army  posts — obstacles  to  the  rapid  mobilisation  of 
our  army,  and  the  present  deficiency  in  guns  and 
ammunition  continue  long  to  exist  if  General  Bar- 
nett,  General  Funston  or  General  Leonard  Wood 
were  Secretary  of  War? 

England  is  learning  her  lesson;  France  has 
learned  hers.  The  first  Ministre  de  la  Guerre  dur- 
ing the  present  war  was  forced  out  of  office  by 
General  JofTre;  the  second  one  also.  Now  France 
has  an  army  general  as  Ministre  de  la  Guerre,  and 
an  admiral  as  Ministre  de  la  Marine. 

We  shall  not  lag  behind  if  each  citizen  makes  his 
demands  for  experts  strong  enough  to  make  each 
Congressman  realise  that  the  vote  of  that  individ- 
ual will  be  cast  for  or  against  him  according  to  his 
Congressionl  record  on  the  subject. 

1  Page  432.    Eric  Fisher  Wood. 


CHAPTER  II 

AS  TO  APPROPRIATIONS 

IF  a  blundering,  ignorant  nurse  has  carelessly 
thrown  out  of  the  window  the  costly  medicine 
which  you  have  drained  your  pocketbook  to  buy 
for  your  sick  child,  do  you  smilingly  free  the  nurse 
of  all  blame,  rage  about  spending  money  on  medi- 
cine and  refuse  to  spend  another  cent  to  purchase 
more,  even  though  you  know  that  your  sick 
child  is  in  greater  danger  than  ever  before?  Or 
do  you  rid  yourself  of  the  criminally  negligent 
nurse,  engage  a  trained  one,  and  spend  as  much 
as  you  have  already  spent,  even  more  if  necessary, 
to  save  the  life  of  your  child? 

Adequate  means  for  necessary  protection  must 
be  provided,  no  matter  what  the  cost — and  pro- 
vided as  soon  as  possible!  No  matter  how  great 
the  waste  has  been  in  the  past,  the  present  danger 
is  so  great  that  we  cannot  wait  "to  be  prepared  by 
1928," 

Our  danger  is  immediate.  In  191 3  France 
thought  her  danger  lay  ten  years  in  the  future; 
England  thought  the  same;  Russia  thought  she 

434 


AS  TO  APPROPRIATIONS  435 

could  finish  her  munition  factories  before  the  con- 
flict came.  Leaders  who  attempted  to  disturb  these 
sweet  dreams  were  ridiculed.  But  England  and 
France  were  awakened — and  rudely  too. 

The  greatest  national  danger  we  have  faced  since 
the  Civil  War  is  not  many  years  ahead.  Few  peo- 
ple at  present  believe  this,  any  more  than  the  peo- 
ple of  France  or  England  believed  it  two  years 
ago. 

We  must  insist  upon  an  appropriation  not  of 
four  hundred  million,  but  of  a  billion!  A  billion 
is  a  small  sum,  a  very  small  sum,  with  which  to  im- 
mediately prepare  ourselves  so  that  no  nation  shall 
be  tempted  to  attack  us. 

The  nations  at  war  have  spent  this  sum  every 
two  weeks  since  the  war  began. 

If  our  present  Congress  should  appropriae  one 
billion  dollars  for  defence  and  authorise  the  issu- 
ing of  this  amount  of  twenty-year  United  States 
bonds,  it  would  impose  upon  the  people  of  the 
United  States  a  debt  (including  interest)  of  only 
fifty-two  cents  per  person  each  year  for  twenty 
years. 

The  war  in  Europe  is  a  little  less  than  two  years 
old,  yet  every  person  in  England — man,  woman 
and  child — is  already  burdened  with  a  per  capita 
war  debt  of  two  hundred  dollars.  The  war  is  not  yet 
over.  And  this  is  but  a  portion  of  the  burden 
thrown  upon  the  English  people!     Already  thou- 


436 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

sands  of  families  have  been  ruined  financially. 
England  at  first  lost  twenty  per  cent,  of  the  men 
that  went  into  battle ;  five  hundred  thousand  homes 
have  been  made  desolate. 

A  billion-dollar  appropriation  (fifty-two  cents 
per  capita  for  twenty  years)  to  prevent  being  at- 
tacked by  a  foreign  power  is  worth  a  hundred  times 
that  amount! 

Are  we  so  poor  we  cannot  spend  a  billion  dollars, 
the  payment  of  which  can  be  distributed  over  a  pe- 
riod of  twenty  years?  Because  England  and 
France  refused  to  prepare  they  are  now  forced  to 
spend  this  same  sum  every  four  weeks;  and  they 
are  suffering  ruin,  losing  thousands  of  lives  and 
bearing  back  to  their  firesides  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  maimed  men. 

Let  us  vote  a  billion-dollar  insurance  upon  our 
country.  Of  course  it  may  not  prevent  us  going 
to  war,  but  it  will  at  least  save  us  from  indemnity 
or  devastation.  And  war  may  come.  When  you 
insure  your  house  against  fire,  you  know  the  insur- 
ance will  not  prevent  fire ;  but  you  know  it  will  save 
the  value  of  your  house  if  there  is  a  fire. 

Let  each  American  urge  an  appropriation  of  a 
billion  dollars.  Let  each  American  express  his 
willingness  to  pay  fifty-two  cents  a  year  ($10.40  in 
twenty  years)  to  insure  our  safety  against  a  pos- 
sible bombardment  of  our  cities  with  the  millions 
and  millions  of  property,  against  the  possibility  of 


AS  TO  APPROPRIATIONS  437 

being  forced  to  pay  billions  in  indemnities,  against 
the  slaughter  of  a  quarter  million  men!  Why 
should  Americans  gasp  at  the  loss  of  a  half  dollar 
per  year  when  the  safety  of  a  hundred  million  peo- 
ple and  a  hundred  eighty  billion  dollars  of  wealth  is 
at  stake? 

But  the  duty  of  each  American  does  not  end  in 
urging  Congress  to  make  a  large  appropriation. 
He  must  also  awaken  from  his  indifference  and 
watch  Congress  carefully  to  see  that  the  most  es- 
sential needs  are  the  ones  for  which  provision  is 
made.  Every  citizen  of  the  United  States  must 
keep  his  eye  on  his  Senator  and  his  Representa- 
tive to  see  that  there  is  no  more  sluicing  to  the 
"pork-barrel." 

And  every  citizen  must  let  his  Representative 
know  that  he  is  watching,  patriotically  watching. 


CHAPTER   III 

AS  TO  CITIZENSHIP  OBLIGATIONS 

THE  military  is  the  tool  of  the  nation.  It  may 
be  used  to  oppress  and  it  may  be  used  to 
graft;  but  it  may  also  be  used  to  protect  and  to 
liberate. 

The  tool  is  neither  good  nor  bad.  It  is  the  motive 
which  animates  its  use  and  the  method  of  using  it 
that  is  right  or  wrong. 

A  workman  in  the  city  light  and  power  plant 
falls  against  a  dynamo  and  is  killed.  Should  the 
city  government  abolish  the  light  and  power  plant 
and  leave  its  citizens  in  darkness  and  without  trans- 
portation ? 

A  man  goes  mad — uses  his  razor  to  cut  his 
throat.  Should  the  city  authorities  brand  all  razors 
as  evils  and  forbid  all  men  ever  shaving  again? 

America  persists  in  condemning  militarism  as  an 
evil  tool,  although  her  military  forces  won  her  her 
independence;  although  her  military  forces  freed 
the  black  man;  although  her  military  forces  re- 
deemed Cuba! 

Militarism  for  conquest  is  based  upon  the  prin- 

438 


AS  TO  CITIZENSHIP  OBLIGATIONS        439 

pie  that  in  the  conquest  of  lands  and  wealth,  a  na- 
tion has  the  right  to  demand  that  all  its  men  fight 
for  the  benefit  of  all  its  people. 

Militarism  for  protection  is  based  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  a  nation,  because  of  the  service  it  renders 
all  its  citizens  has  the  right  to  demand  in  return 
the  service  of  all  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting its  home  lands,  its  citizens  and  its  honour. 

These  two  forms  of  militarism  differ  widely  in 
certain  respects,  yet  both  are  based  upon  the  ideal 
that  the  government,  because  of  the  good  it  renders 
all  its  people,  has  the  right  to  demand  the  aid  of  all 
for  the  good  of  all. 

Militarism  for  politics  is  based  upon  the  false  as- 
sumption that  the  people  of  a  nation  are  so  un- 
patriotic that  the  protection  of  its  home  lands,  its 
citizens  and  its  honour  must  depend  upon  the 
special  few  who  are  altruistic  enough  to  give  their 
lives  for  their  less  courageous  fellow  citizens,  or 
upon  those  who  can  be  bribed  by  large  bounties  and 
by  promises  of  pensions  to  serve  their  country.  It 
is  the  worst  form  of  class  legislation. 

The  American  people  have  been  too  jealous  of 
their  individual  freedom — and  rightly  so — to  allow 
the  United  States  ever  to  become  subject  to  a  mili- 
tary organisation  existing  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
quest. But  in  reacting  against  militarism  for 
conquest,  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  be- 
come indifferent — reacted  in  the  wrong  direction 


440 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

— allowing  a  military  system  to  develop  for  the 
financial  benefit  of  the  few,  to  the  financial  and 
moral  detriment  of  the  many. 

This  system  has  been  established  under  the  plea 
that  the  citizen  is  free  to  volunteer  or  withhold 
his  services  from  the  government  which  protects 
him.  Such  a  system  implies  that  men  who  are 
not  patriotic  enough  to  volunteer  their  services  to 
their  government  in  exchange  for  the  protection 
which  their  government  gives  them,  can  basely  pay 
in  money  for  the  services  of  the  others  who  are 
patriotic  enough  not  only  to  give  their  services  but 
their  lives,  if  necessary. 

It  is  vicious:  it  sets  up  false  ideals;  it  makes  a 
people  as  a  whole  selfish,  unpatriotic  and  cowardly ; 
it  teaches  them  that  they  are  not  bound  by  duty  to 
give  anything  except  money  in  return  for  the  pro- 
tection their  government  gives  their  lands,  their 
property,  their  lives  and  their  honour;  it  teaches 
the  people  of  the  nation  that  they  may  hire  a 
special  few  for  a  few  dollars  in  gold  to  protect 
them.  In  times  of  peace  it  is  dishonest  and  waste- 
ful; in  times  of  war  it  sacrifices  the  life  of  the 
manly,  courageous  patriot;  while  the  coward,  the 
sluggard  and  the  polycule  remain  at  home  to  per- 
petuate the  race. 

It  is  based  upon  the  idea  that  a  gentleman  should 
never  protect  a  woman  who  is  being  insulted  or 
assaulted  unless  a  group  of  his  fellows  offer  him 


AS  TO  CITIZENSHIP  OBLIGATIONS        441 

a  bounty  or  pension  for  doing  so.  It  creates  a 
false  ideal  of  action  for  the  man  who  is  to  protect 
the  woman,  in  that  it  implies  that  it  is  not  his  duty 
to  protect  her  unless  his  cowardly  associates  offer 
him  a  bounty.  It  creates  a  false  ideal  of  inaction 
for  his  fellows  in  that  it  implies  that  they  are  re- 
leased of  all  gentlemanly  duty  to  protect  the  woman 
because  they  offer  a  bounty  or  pension  to  one  of 
their  number  to  do  that  which  each  one  of  them,  as 
a  gentleman  and  as  a  man,  ought  honourably  to  do 
himself  without  thought  of  reward. 

In  national  life  they  who  are  chosen  to  protect 
the  lives  of  the  citizens  of  a  nation  come  to  demand 
larger  and  larger  bounties  and  greater  and  greater 
pensions,  while  the  mass  of  people  cowardly  agree 
to  pay  more  and  more  so  that  it  may  be  exempt 
from  doing  its  duty. 

The  only  righteous  military  system  is  that  which 
is  based  upon  the  ideal  that  all  citizens  owe  a  duty 
to  their  government  in  return  for  the  protection 
which  the  government  gives  to  all. 

Certainly  Thomas  Jefferson  can  never  be  ac- 
cused of  leaning  toward  militarism.  During  the 
Revolutionary  War  and  throughout  his  entire  pub- 
lic career  up  to  1814,  he  was  one  of  the  most  stren- 
uous advocates  of  citizen  soldiery,  but  the  experi- 
ence of  the  first  two  years  of  the  War  of  1812  so 
disgusted  him  with  the  voluntary  system  that  he 
wrote  to  President  Madison  as  follows : 


442  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

"It  proves  more  forcibly  the  necessity  of  oblig- 
ing every  citizen  to  be  a  soldier.  This  was  the  case 
with  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  and  must  be  that  of 
every  free  state.  Where  there  is  no  oppression 
there  will  be  no  pauper  hirelings.  We  must  train 
and  classify  the  whole  of  our  male  citizens,  and 
make  military  instruction  a  regular  part  of  col- 
legiate education.  We  can  never  be  safe  till  this  is 
done" 

This  is  the  only  true  ideal  of  national  duty. 
This  is  militarism  for  protection — the  service  of 
all  for  the  good  of  all.  It  is  the  system  of  Switzer- 
land and  Australia. 

Let  each  American  citizen  urge  its  adoption ! 


CHAPTER   IV 

AS   TO    NATIONAL   FITNESS 

AS  a  nation,  we  have  grown  so  rapidly,  we  have 
been  so  busy  developing  our  resources  and 
making  money,  we  have  been  so  revitalised  year 
by  year  and  generation  by  generation  by  the  enor- 
mous influx  of  healthy  peasant  blood  of  Europe, 
that  we  have  failed  to  appreciate  the  increasing 
physical  unfitness  of  the  mass  of  our  citizens. 

We  have  drifted  so  completely  to  the  "star  sys- 
tem" of  athletics,  we  have  been  so  able  to  draw  a 
few  exceptional  physical  types  from  our  hundred 
million  people,  that  the  great  mass  of  American 
youths,  enthusing  in  their  worship  of  these  selected 
athletic  heroes,  have  gradually  given  up  individual 
effort  to  excel  even  in  the  common  sports. 

We  have  specialised  in  physical  fitness,  encour- 
aging a  system  which  produces  a  few  men  who 
have  been  able  because  of  their  natural  physique 
to  gain  national  fame  in  our  sports  and  world  re- 
nown in  Olympic  contests;  but  the  masses  of  our 
people  have  gradually  deteriorated. 

Those  who  seek  to  join  either  the  army  or  the 

443 


444 AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

navy  are  boys  who  have  a  stronger  physique  and  a 
greater  abundance  of  physical  energy  than  those 
who  do  not  apply.  It  is  this  superabundance  of 
physical  energy  that  urges  them  to  seek  the  mili- 
tary life.  The  youth  without  a  strong  physique 
has  no  inclination  even  to  make  the  attempt  to 
enter  the  army  or  the  navy.  Applicants,  then,  are 
men  who,  in  physical  fitness,  are  far  above  the 
great  mass  of  American  youths. 

To  be  accepted  a  man  must  have  good  eyes, 
healthy  lungs,  a  sound  heart  and  good  arms  and 
legs.  Yet  out  of  the  to-be-expected-fit  youths  im- 
pelled by  their  superabundance  of  energy  and  their 
love  of  physical  action  to  make  application  to  enter 
our  regular  army,  from  70%  to  90%  are  rejected 
because  they  are  physically  unfit  to  merely  march, 
drill  and  learn  to  use  a  gun.  Even  out  of  the  small 
number  accepted,  often  25  per  cent,  are  discharged 
later  because  of  physical  inability  to  stand  the 
marches  and  drill. 

The  record  of  the  Recruiting  Bureau  of  the 
United  States  Marine  Corps  for  the  present  year 
illustrates  most  vividly  the  physical  unfitness  of 
our  men.  It  is  astounding  to  learn  that  out  of 
41,100  who  made  application  to  enlist  during  the 
year  191 5,  only  3,800  men  were  accepted — that  the 
37>300  were  rejected,  not  because  they  were  not 
needed,  but  because  they  were  absolutely  unfit. 
The  record  of  the  largest  recruiting  bureau,  that  of 


AS  TO  NATIONAL  FITNESS  445 

New  York,  shows  a  still  larger  per  centum  of  physi- 
cal unfitness.  The  application  list  of  this  bureau 
was  611%  of  the  average  of  all  other  bureaus  in 
the  United  States.  Of  the  11,012  who  applied  for 
enlistment,  10,696  were  rejected.  Even  of  the  316 
accepted,  perhaps  25%  or  more  will  be  discharged 
during  the  year  because  of  inability  to  continue  the 
physical  training  required. 

Our  sociologists  have  been  aware  of  the  increas- 
ing effeminacy  of  the  American  man;  but  this  has 
not  become  so  apparent  to  the  layman.  The  fact 
that  our  men,  as  a  nation,  have  the  best  shoulders 
in  the  world  has  blinded  us  to  our  other  physical 
weakness.  Because  of  the  bearing  this  shoulder 
gives  us,  we  have  not  recognised  that  we  are  be- 
coming effeminate  in  other  ways.  The  legs,  the 
thighs,  the  hips  and  the  back  of  the  American  is 
far  below  par — far  below  those  of  peasant  women 
in  foreign  countries.  The  woman  of  the  peasant 
and  middle  classes  of  Russia,  Germany,  Austria, 
Italy  or  France  is  able  to  swing  along  at  a  pace  that, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  of  our  star  athletes, 
should  put  a  blush  of  shame  on  the  face  of  every 
American. 

There  is  ample  cause  for  our  self-deception.  No 
matter  where  an  American  travels,  he  is  recognised 
by  the  swing  of  his  shoulders.  Our  shoulders  are 
due  to  our  national  sport — baseball.  No  other  na- 
tion has  a  national  game — common  to  practically 


446  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

every  boy  and  youth — that  so  efficiently  develops 
the  shoulders.  Almost  every  American  boy  from 
nine  years  of  age  to  manhood,  every  season  and 
many  months  each  season,  plays  some  type  of  base- 
ball— if  it  is  only  pitching  and  catching.  This  has 
given  the  American  race  a  shoulder  stronger,  freer 
in  its  action,  more  quick  to  respond  to  demand  than 
that  possessed  by  any  other  people. 

But  as  our  youth  are  not  compelled  to  take  a 
system  of  training  for  all-round  development  of 
the  body,  we  have  degenerated  in  other  ways. 

Physical  degeneracy  in  a  nation  always  begins 
to  manifest  in  a  decreasing  strength  of  the  stride 
of  the  man.  One  has  only  to  watch  the  ankle  walk- 
ing of  most  of  our  American  men  to  realise  that 
this  degeneracy  toward  effeminacy  has  already  be- 
gun. 

The  Boy  Scout  Movement  is  offsetting  this  ten- 
dency toward  effeminacy.  The  long  marches — the 
necessity  which  compels  the  small  boy  to  swing  his 
leg  so  as  to  keep  in  step  with  the  longer  pace  of  the 
leader,  is  effecting  a  beneficial  change,  the  value  of 
which  cannot  be  over-estimated. 

Much  has  been  praised  in  the  Boy  Scout  Move- 
ment— its  ideal  of  honour  and  patriotism,  its  de- 
velopment of  a  love  of  nature,  its  awakening  of  a 
consciousness  of  comradeship  and  duty — but  the 
one  greatest  good  resulting  from  the  Boy  Scout 
Movement  is  the  development  of  the  thighs,  the 


AS  TO  NATIONAL  FITNESS  447 

strengthening  of  the  muscles  of  the  hips,  and  the 
consequent  permanent  habit  of  long  vital,  manly 
strides. 

But  baseball  and  boy  scout  marching  are  not 
enough.  We  need  universal  training  to  bring  about 
real  national  fitness. 

Incidentally  it  will  prepare  our  men  so  that  they 
will  be  able  to  defend  our  nation  in  case  of  war. 
War  danger,  however,  is  but  periodic  and  tem- 
porary, while  the  greater  danger,  the  danger  that 
ever  increases  year  by  year — the  danger  of  our  na- 
tional unfitness,  is  always  with  us. 

To  remedy  this  we  need  universal  military  train- 
ing. 

.  There  is  a  vast  difference  between  universal  mili- 
tary service  and  universal  military  training.  The 
French  nation  has  universal  military  service,  the 
Swiss  have  universal  military  training. 

The  military  service  scheme  takes  the  young  man 
away  from  home,  away  from  his  studies,  interrupt- 
ing his  profession  or  his  business  for  from  one  to 
three  years.  It  aims  to  do  by  one  dose  after  a  man 
is  twenty  that  which  should  have  been  done  year 
by  year  during  boyhood  and  youth. 

The  universal  military  training  scheme  begins 
with  the  boy  at  ten  years  of  age.  It  develops  him 
physically,  trains  him  to  long  marches,  teaches  him 
the  topography  of  the  country,  imbues  him  with  an 
ideal  of  comradeship  and  service  at  an  early  age. 


448  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

This  is  done  without  interrupting  his  schooling  in 
any  way.  In  fact  it  is  done  in  connection  with  his 
schooling — a  half  hour  a  day  in  training — a  half 
day  a  week  in  marching  and  excursions.  As  he 
grows  older  a  few  hours  a  week  are  given  to  train- 
ing him  to  shoot,  to  care  for  a  gun,  to  know  its 
mechanism,  to  be  able  to  take  it  apart  and  put 
it  together,  to  repair  it  if  it  is  out  of  order.  This 
goes  on  until  he  has  finished  the  secondary  school. 
Then  as  he  nears  manhood,  being  physically  fit,  he 
is  required  to  take  part  in  but  two  or  three 
months'  military  manoeuvres.  This  teaches  him  to 
live  hygienically  with  other  men,  to  suppress  in- 
dividualistic tendencies  harmful  to  the  group,  to 
learn  obedience,  and  above  all  to  idealise  democracy 
by  the  recognition  of  the  good  qualities  of  all  the 
youths  of  a  nation  brought  together  on  the  same 
level. 

This  results  in  unity  of  action ;  and  unity  of  ac- 
tion is  essentially  necessary  to  the  self-preservation 
of  the  group.  If  Harvard,  or  Yale,  or  Princeton, 
were  able  to  choose  an  eleven  of  the  best  football 
players  in  America,  no  matter  how  efficient  each 
individual  of  that  team,  it  would  make  a  very  poor 
showing — if  the  men  had  never  trained  together — 
against  a  well-trained  team  composed  of  individ- 
uals each  respectively  less  able  than  the  men  of 
the  unorganised  team. 

The  one  would  be  a  tiny  football  mob  of  eleven 


AS  TO  NATIONAL  FITNESS  449 

leaders,  the  other  a  football  team  under  one  leader- 
ship! 

Universal  military  training  for  every  boy  in  the 
United  States  would  remedy  our  physical  unfitness, 
would  inhibit  the  increasing  tendency  toward  ef- 
feminacy, would  teach  our  youths  unity  of  action 
and  obedience  and  would  develop  a  deeper  patriot- 
ism. 

Moreover,  it  would  teach  us  democracy,  real  de- 
mocracy. Perhaps  in  no  other  country  in  the 
world,  excepting  only  the  distinction  of  class  de- 
manded by  the  Prussian  Junker,  is  there  such  sepa- 
ration of  classes  as  in  the  United  States. 

In  principle  we  are  the  greatest  democracy  in  the 
world;  we  have  a  great  ideal  of  liberty,  we  have  a 
great  ideal  of  freedom,  and  a  greater  manifestation 
of  these  two  qualities  than  any  other  people  of  any 
other  nation.  But  our  practice  of  equality  is  lu- 
dicrously hypocritical,  compared  to  that  of  France. 

No  greater  benefit  could  come  to  our  democracy 
than  universal  military  training.  Can  any  one  es- 
timate the  value  of  bringing  together  the  farmer 
boy,  the  city  boy,  the  village  boy,  and  the  sons  of 
wealth,  who  have  never  in  their  lives  done  a  single 
day's  work — compelling  each  and  all  to  share  alike 
and  to  serve  alike? 

At  Plattsburg,  Robert  Bacon,  Jr.,  son  of  a  mem- 
ber of  the  firm  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Son,  was  ap- 
pointed to  clean  utensils  and  serve  hash.     It  was 


450  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

his  duty  to  wait  upon  his  captain  at  the  table  and 
the  captain  happened  to  be  a  clerk  of  the  firm  of 
which  his  father  was  a  member.  But  Robert 
Bacon,  Jr.,  and  a  score  of  other  Robert  Bacon,  Jrs. 
— by  their  willing  service — did  more  for  true  de- 
mocracy in  that  period  than  thousands  of  Fourth  of 
July  orations  and  scores  of  thousands  of  lectures 
by  pacifists  and  advocates  of  volunteer  citizen  sol- 
diery teaching  that  we  should  be  divided  into  two 
classes — those  who  are  manly  and  courageous 
enough  to  serve  us  in  time  of  struggle  and  those 
who  are  to  be  allowed  to  buy  with  their  money  the 
bodies  of  other  citizens  to  serve  in  their  stead.  One 
is  a  process  of  making  democracy,  the  other  an  as- 
sumption that  the  life  of  hero  should  be  sacrificed 
to  save  the  life  of  the  coward. 

Each  and  every  American  citizen  by  demanding 
universal  military  training  can  make  its  adoption 
certain.  Thus  each  citizen  can  aid  in  bringing 
about  a  change  that  will  save  our  nation  from  its 
increasing  physical  tendency  toward  efTeminacy, 
from  its  increasing  physical  disability,  from  its  in- 
creasing separation  of  the  classes.  Then  America 
will  realise  a  higher  manhood,  a  greater  unity  of 
action,  and  a  truer  democracy. 


CHAPTER   V 

AS  TO  THE   IDEM,  OF  THE  CHRIST 

WE  need  a  true  ideal  of  the  Prince  of  Peace! 
Certain  present-day  prophets  are  teaching 
that  "fast  faith"  is  superior  to  "wisdom  and  truth ;" 
that  sentimentalism  is  more  to  be  sought  than  vir- 
tue ;  that  foolishness  is  more  noble  than  fitness ;  that 
good  intentions  and  weakness  are  more  holy  than 
righteousness  and  strength. 

These  same  prophets  have  utterly  failed  us  in 
the  past.  For  a  decade  before  the  great  storm  came 
they  called  to  us  from  their  intellectual  heights, 
assuring  us  that  the  sky  was  clear ;  that  there  never 
could  be  another  storm. 

"There  will  be  no  war  in  the  future.  It  has  be- 
come impossible."  ' 

"It  (European  War)  will  never  come.  Hu- 
manly speaking,  it  is  impossible."  2 

Now  that  it  has  come  they  ask  us  to  be  gentle 
as  doves  and  stupid  as  donkeys. 

This  they  hold  up  as  the  teaching  of  the  Peace 
Christ. 

And  worse  still,  they  attempt  to  convince  us  that 

451 


452  AWAKE!  U.  S.  A. 

the  early  martyrs  who  suffered  to  give  an  ideal  to 
the  world,  taught  what  they  are  teaching.  But  why 
should  we  accept  their  interpretation? 

The  interpretation  is  false;  it  is  debasing!  It 
strikes  at  the  very  root  of  our  higher  nature,  at 
the  very  foundation  of  our  Christian  idealism.  It 
embodies  the  essence  of  all  that  is  lowest  and  basest 
in  materialism ! 

Mr.  Carnegie's  advice  to  welcome  conquest-mad 
soldiers  with  sweet  smiles  would  lead  to-day — just' 
as  it  did  when  Judea  went  out  with  incense  and 
myrrh  and  gold  to  welcome  the  conquest-mad  sol- 
diers of  Alexander — to  spoliation,  debauchery,  and 
rape.  The  nature  of  men  crazed  with  conquest- 
lust  has  not  changed  with  the  centuries.  The  cry- 
ing of  the  women  of  Galicia  suffering  from  the 
Russians,  the  moaning  of  the  women  of  Poland 
suffering  from  the  Austrians,  the  wailing  of  the 
women  of  Belgium  suffering  from  the  Germans  are 
sufficient  evidence.  Soldiers  of  an  invading  host 
are  not  all  high-minded  officers.  Men  impelled  by 
the  ideal  of  conquest  take  what  they  want  when 
able  to  do  so!  Sweet  smiles  and  mild  entreaty  do 
not  move  them.  The  only  safeguard  is  a  cour- 
ageous manhood  that  knows  its  duty,  and  does  it 
even  though  it  encounter  death  in  doing  so.  When 
did  the  Christ  teach  that  it  is  best  to  save  the  body 
and  stain  the  soul  with  cowardice  and  dishonour! 

There  is  no  greater  evidence  of  spiritual  degen- 


AS  TO  THE  IDEAL  OF  THE  CHRIST      453 

eracy  than  a  materialistic  appeal  that  urges  us  to 
save  the  body  and  sacrifice  the  soul.  Logically  car- 
ried to  its  ultimate  it  teaches  a  woman  to  tamely 
submit  to  criminal  assault;  because — if  she  does 
not — the  brute  may  scratch  her  face. 

The  spiritual  heroes  of  the  world — Peter,  Paul 
and  the  martyrs  of  their  day — are  lights  to  the  soul 
of  the  race  because  they  willingly  sacrificed  the  body 
in  maintaining  their  ideal  of  spiritual  duty.  Peter 
denying  his  Master  as  the  cock  crew  is  despicable ; 
Peter  suffering  martyrdom  is  heroically  divine ! 

The  Great  Master  Himself,  when  the  money  ven- 
dors desecrated  the  temple,  did  not  smile  upon  them. 
He  grabbed  the  whips  and  lashed  them  and  drove 
them  out  of  the  temple.  Later,  He  willingly  suf- 
fered the  most  ignominious  physical  death  rather 
than  accept  the  "peace-at-any-price"  easier  way  of 
Roman  materialism. 

Is  not  His  example  a  fit  one  to  follow  ? 

QUOTATION  REFERENCES 

1  Page  451.    I.  S.  Block,  in  "The  Future  of  War." 

2  Page  451.  Dr.  David  Starr  Jordan,  in  "War  and 
Waste,"  1913. 


Date  Due 

Library  Bureau 

Cat.  No.   1137 

J*  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A    001369  054 


